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

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THE

WORKS

OF

PLATO

ABRIDG'D.

WITH

An Account of his Life, Philoſophy, Morals, and Politicks.

Together with a Tranſlation of his choiceſt Dialogues, *viz.*

Of
1. *Human Nature*,
2. *Prayer*,
3. *Wiſdom*,
4. *Holineſs*,
5. *What one ought to do.*
6. *Immortality of the Soul*,
7. *Valour*,
8. *Philoſophy.*

In Two Volumes.

Illuſtrated with Notes. By M. *DACIER.*

Tranſlated from the *French.*

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THE

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A DISCOURSE CONCERNING *PLATO.*

WHat is every Day ſeen to befal the Nobleſt Houſes, whoſe Great Names are uſurp'd by obſcure Families, ſo that the true Heirs who only have right to bear 'em are in time no longer diſtinguiſhed, has been the fate of Philoſophy. A great number of Arts and Sciences which indeed may be of uſe in their places, but are worthy only to be the Slaves of that Science which alone renders our Lives equally good and happy, have ſeiz'd on this Magnificent Name, and render'd it contemptible in the Eyes of Men. We have now no Idea of a true Philoſopher, ſince this Auguſt Title is laviſhly beſtowed on a ſort of curious and lazy People, who make it their only buſineſs to underſtand ſome of the ſecrets of Nature, and ſpend the time of their Life in making Experiments on the weight of the Air, and the vertues of the Loadſtone. This Name has been ſtill more degraded in being given to thoſe, whoſe unſatiable Avarice chains 'em Day and Night to a Furnace; as if Gold, the greateſt quantity of which is not comparable to the leaſt Vertue, were the end of Philoſophy. In fine Men are not content with having given it ſuch blemiſhes as theſe, but have alſo render'd the Name

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odious in throwing it away on thoſe Libertines, who by a pretended *Force d' Eſprit*, or ſtrength of Thought, which at bottom is no better than Weakneſs and Ignorance, live rather like Beaſts than Men. Is it then to be wonder'd at that Philoſophy is miſtaken and neglected, and that Men no longer pay her that reſpect and veneration, which ſhe formerly excited in their Minds? Aſham'd of being confounded with the Daughters of the Earth, ſhe is reaſcended to Heaven, from whence *Socrates* brought her.

The Athenians heretofore by a publick decree forbad, that the Names of *Harmodius*, and *Ariſtogiton*, who had deliver'd their Countrey from the Tyranny of *Hippias* and *Hipparchus*, ſhould ever be given to Slaves: for they thought it a horrible Indignity by ſo ſhameful a Communication to blaſt thoſe Names that were devoted to the publick Liberty. Philoſophy is another Deliverer, ſhe triumphs over Vices, overthrows Impiety, and confounds the Wiſdom of the World. 'Tis ſomewhat greater than the Arts, and than what Men commonly call the Sciences; 'tis the love of true Wiſdom, the knowledg of Divine and Humane Things, that is to ſay, the Science of God, a Science which teaches us to know the relation which our Souls neceſſarily bear to their Creator, and by and in him, to all rational Creatures, and which produces the certain knowledge of all our Duties, towards God, our Neighbours and our Selves.

To be truly a Philoſopher is to have Temperance, Juſtice and Fortitude, to love the Truth, to avoid Senſual Pleaſures, to deſpiſe Riches, to weaken, as much as may be, the bands that faſten the Soul to the Body, to hate and contemn this Body which is always oppoſing Wiſdom, to renounce all our Deſires, to fear neither the Poverty, nor Shame, nor Reproach we may be expos'd to, for the ſake of Righteouſneſs and Truth; to do good to Mankind even our very Enemies: to have nothing in view, but

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but how to die well; and for this end to renounce one's ſelf and every thing elſe. This is the Idea the wiſeſt Heathens had of Philoſophy.

This being ſuppos'd, nothing can be more fit and uſeful, than to follow the certain, and viſible Progreſs which they made in their reſearch after thoſe Truths, and to ſee to what degree of knowledge it pleaſed God to lead 'em. If we don't make ſuch an Examen as this, we can't ſpeak of 'em with Judgment, and without falling into a falſe account of Things, as it has often happen'd, and ſtill happens every day to the moſt Learned Men. Whenever they ſpeak of the Heathens, they bear witneſs againſt themſelves that they never well read 'em, and that they have only an imperfect Idea of 'em, for they impute ſuch Sentiments to 'em as they never had, and deny 'em others which they had in reality; which is a great piece of Injuſtice: nay it ſeems (if I may ſo ſpeak) to diminiſh ſomewhat from the Mercy and Juſtice of God, not to acknowledg all the Teſtimonies he was pleaſed to give of himſelf among the Pagans, in thoſe Times that were corrupted with the moſt abominable Idolatry, in order to reduce 'em to the true Religion.

This Negligence is the more blamable; in that a Man needs only to read *Plato*, to be perfectly inform'd of the extent of their Knowledg: For his Writings have amaſſed together all the Truths that were ſcatter'd up and down in the Works of other Philoſophers; and with the advantage of new Diſcoveries of his own, they compoſe as it were a Body of Doctrine which contains the higheſt perfection of Knowledg to be found among the Heathens.

Let a Man read never ſo little of him with attention, and reflect upon what he teaches, and he'll eaſily diſcern, that God, to ſtop the mouth of Incredulity, was long ſince preparing the way for the converſion of the Heathens, which had been ſo often predicted by the Prophets; for was it not the work of God, and a kind of Preludium of their

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Converſion, that a Heathen in the moſt Idolatrous City in the World, and almoſt 400 years before the light of the Goſpel illuminated the Univerſe, ſhould declare and prove a good part of the Truths of the Chriſtian Religion.

The Circumſtance of the Time is remarkable, for *Plato* began to write immediately after the three laſt Prophets that were in *Iſrael*. So that as ſoon as the Prophets ceaſed among the Jews, God raiſes up Philoſophers to enlighten the Gentiles; and divers of the Principles of the Goſpel are taught at *Athens*. Where 'tis prov'd,

That there is but one God, that we ought to love and ſerve him, and to endeavour to reſemble him in Holineſs and Righteouſneſs; that this God rewards Humility, and puniſhes Pride.

That the true Happineſs of Man conſiſts in being united to God, and his only Miſery in being ſeparated from him.

That the Soul is mere Darkneſs, unleſs it be illuminated by God; that Men are uncapable even of praying well, unleſs God teaches 'em that Prayer, which alone can be uſeful to 'em.

That there is nothing ſolid and ſubſtantial but Piety, that this is the Source of Vertues, and that it is the gift of God.

That 'tis better to die than to ſin.

That we ought continually to be learning to die, and yet to endure life, in obedience to God.

That 'tis a Crime to hurt our Enemies, and to revenge our ſelves for the Injuries we have received.

That 'tis better to ſuffer wrong than to do it.

That God is the ſole Cauſe of Good, and cannot be the Cauſe of Evil, which always proceeds only from our Diſobedience, and the ill uſe we make of our Liberty.

That Self-love produces that Diſcord and Diviſion which reign among Men, and is the cauſe of their Sins; that the love of our Neighbours, which proceeds from the love of God as its Principle, produces that ſacred Union which makes Families, Republicks, and Kingdoms happy.

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That the World is nothing but Corruption, that we ought to fly from it, to join our selves to God, who alone is our Health and Life; and that while we live in this World we are surrounded by Enemies, and have a continual Combate to endure, which requires on our part a resistance without intermission; and that we cannot conquer, unless God or his Angels come to our help.

That the WORD fram'd the World, and render'd it visible; that the knowledg of the WORD makes us live very happily here below, and that thereby we obtain Felicity after Death. λόγος.

That the Soul is immortal, that the Dead shall rise again, that there shall be a final Judgment both of the Righteous and of the Wicked, when Men shall appear only with their Vertues or Vices, which shall be the occasion of their eternal Happiness or Misery.

But I forbear to proceed, that I may not repeat that here, which will be found in its full extent elsewhere. Yet I cannot chuse but add, that *Plato* had so great and true an Idea of perfect Righteousness, and was so throughly acquainted with the corruption of Mankind, that he makes it appear, * that if a Man perfectly righteous should come upon Earth, he would find so much opposition in the World, that he would be imprison'd, reviled, scourg'd, and in fine crucified by such who, tho they were extremely wicked, would yet pass for righteous Men. *Socrates* was the first proof of this Demonstration. For as St. *Justin* says, the Devils seeing this Philosopher made their Nullity appear by the discovery of the Truth, and that he endeavour'd to reclaim Men from giving them religious Worship; these malicious Spirits so order'd the matter by means of Men who were corrupt and took pleasure in Vice, that this righteous Man was put to Death as if he had been an impious Person, that liv'd without God in World, and introduc'd new Gods.

* In the II. Book of his Common-wealth. *Tom.* 2.

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There are ſome who pretend the abovementioned Paſſage of *Plato* is a Propheſy, becauſe the Terms don't agree with the Circumſtances of *Socrates*, who was put to death only by a draught of Poyſon, but preciſely ſute with thoſe of the Saviour of the World, who was both ſcourged and crucified.

But we ſhall not preſume to make a Prophet of our Philoſopher, from whom Reaſon alone, when mov'd by the injuſtice of Men, might extort ſuch exaggerated Expreſſions; but ſhall content our ſelves to enquire what there may be in his Writings conformable to the deſigns of God, who always deſir'd the Salvation of Men, and often made uſe of the Pagans for the execution of his eternal Decrees.

We underſtand by the Holy Scripture, which is the only Lamp of Truth, that natural Religion was the firſt uſe Men made of their Reaſon; that Luſt and irregular Paſſions having corrupted their Reaſon, they abandon'd themſelves to the ſacrilegious worſhip of Idols; and that God to ſtop the courſe of this Abomination made himſelf known a ſecond time, and gave the Jewiſh Law; which as it reviv'd in the minds of Men the Principles of the Law of Nature, ſo it promis'd a more ſacred and perfect Covenant which the Righteous were to expect, and which alone was capable of triumphing over Death; and ſo alone able to conduct Men to a glorious Immortality.

Plato ſeems to have been acquainted with the Divine Conduct in this matter, and to endeavour to reclaim the Heathens by the ſame means.

He endeavours to reeſtabliſh Natural Religion by oppoſing Paganiſm which was the corruption of it.

He gives a Law which in its principal heads is entirely conformable to the Tradition of the Hebrews, and the Precepts of *Moſes* and the Prophets; from whom he has borrowed that which is moſt rational and ſubſtantial in his Works.

And he ſupports this Law by a great many Principles more ſublime than thoſe of natural Religion, and

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and of the Law of *Moſes*; and by clear and expreſs Promiſes of ſpiritual and eternal Bleſſings, which the Chriſtian Religion alone can make Men enjoy, and which *Moſes* and the Prophets only promiſed under the Veil, and Figures of temporal Enjoyments. So that *Plato* is not content to give a Teſtimony only to natural Religion, and the Jewiſh Law, but alſo in ſome ſort pays Homage to Chriſtianity; in piercing by a ſupernatural Light into a part of thoſe Shadows and Figures that cover'd it; and in propoſing moſt of the greateſt Motives and glorious Objects, which it has always employ'd to raiſe Men above themſelves, and to make them Maſters of their Paſſions.

* *A happy Immortality* (ſays he) *is a great Prize ſet before us, and a great Object of Hope, which ſhould engage us to labour all the time of our Life to acquire Wiſdom and Vertue.* This the reading only of theſe two firſt Volumns will compleatly ſet in its true Light.

'Tis commonly enquir'd on this Subject, how the Books of *Moſes* and thoſe of the Prophets could come to *Plato*'s knowledg. I will not undertake to prove that there were Greek Tranſlations of 'em before that of the Septuagint, 'tis too difficult a matter to ſupport that Suppoſition, and I muſt confeſs I can find no ſolid foundation for it. But I'll declare what ſeems moſt probable to me.

After the departure of the Iſraelites out of *Egypt*, they almoſt always continued their Commerce with the Egyptians. They traded in their Country, they ſometimes deſir'd their aſſiſtance againſt their Enemies, and often enter'd into Treaties and Alliances with them. By theſe means the memory of all that had happen'd to their Nation was eaſily preſerv'd among thoſe People. † The Captivity of King *Jehoachaz*, whom *Pharaoh Nechoch* carried away Priſoner about the beginning of the 42 Olympiade; and ‡ the dwelling of the Prophets *Jeremiah* and

* Vol. 2. † 2 Kings 23. ‡ Jer. 43.

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Barach in *Egypt* some years after with the miserable remainder of the Jews, that the King of *Babylon* had left in *Judæa*, could not suffer the Egyptians to forget these things.

About this time *Pythagoras* travell'd into *Egypt*, from whence he brought these Traditions into *Greece*; his Disciples communicated them to *Socrates*, who acquainted *Plato* with 'em; and he, to be more perfectly instructed in 'em, went to the same place where he might see not only the Grand-Children but the Children of such as had convers'd with the Fugitives that retired thither with those Prophets. And perhaps 'tis no ill-founded Supposition, that by his frequent Conversation with them he learned enough of their Language to read those Originals himself, of which the Egyptians, who were a very curious People, might have Copies. But whether he read 'em, or knew nothing of 'em, but what he learned in Conversation, 'tis certain he could draw that Tradition which he calls *Sacred* from no other Source. For he harmonizes so well with those Originals in many things, not only in respect of the Truths themselves, but moreover in the very manner of his Expressions, that one would often think he translates 'em. From whom, unless from the Hebrews, could the Egyptians have a Tradition containing such wonderful Doctrine, and of which never any other People had heard, before the peculiar People of God were instructed in it?

But 'tis said there are many Errors intermix'd with the Writings of *Plato*; that in his Explication of the greatest Truths, he is full of Doubts and Uncertainty; and 'tis observ'd that *Socrates* constantly professes that *he knows nothing*: What advantage can be received from a man that knows nothing but his own Ignorance? And 'tis fit these Objections should have an Answer.

'Tis certain *Plato* is not without his Errors; but when they come to be strictly examin'd, there are to be found in 'em some Traces of ancient Traditi-

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ons, and Predictions of the Prophets; and if theſe Traces are compar'd with the Doctrine of the Holy Scripture, one may diſcover the Source of thoſe Errors, which by this means become one of the Proofs of the Truth of the Chriſtian Religion. For we muſt be forc'd to acknowledg that the Heathens had a dim ſight of divers great Truths, which becauſe they were not to be fully unveiled till the coming of the *Meſſiah*, were involved in Darkneſs too thick to be penetrated by their Eyes. And this was predicted by the Prophets, who all declar'd that *Chriſt ſhould be the Light of the World.* None but Jeſus Chriſt was able to diſcover to 'em thoſe Myſteries, which were to be kept ſecret before his coming. Therefore 'tis no very ſurprizing thing, that ſuch Perſons as attempted to penetrate * theſe Myſteries, only by the Light of their Reaſon, did evaporate into vain Imaginations. And for this reaſon we ought not to pretend to give a clear Explication of the Truths of Religion by the Notions of this Philoſopher; but on the contrary ſhould explain *his Notions by theſe Truths*, this is the way to diſplay Light every where, and diſſipate all Errors. And when his Principles accord well with thoſe Truths, we may with very good advantage make uſe of the proofs he has given of 'em.

The Doubts and Uncertainty, of which he is reproached, about the moſt eſſential Points, are ſo far from ſhaking his Principles, that they only give the greater Confirmation to 'em, and one may ſay that Certainty and Conviction ſpring from theſe very Doubts. For inſtance in his *Phædon*, where he is treating of the great Objects of our Hope in the other Life, he inſinuates that 'tis a very difficult matter certainly to know the Truth of theſe things, while we live here, and that how ſtrong ſoever the proofs are, on which we may found an

* Such as the Doctrine of the Trinity, the Reſurrection, the Fall of Man, and the Creation of the Souls of Men before their Bodies.

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Expectation of a happy Eternity, the greatneſs of the Subject and the natural Infirmities of Man are inexhauſtible Springs of Doubts and Uncertainties; for theſe ſpring up in multitudes from the ſtock of corrupt Nature, which oppoſes the moſt manifeſt Truths, and reſiſts the moſt evident proofs which Reaſon can produce. What was to be done then to diſſipate theſe Doubts? The Prophets had ſpoken, but their Oracles were yet obſcure, and men might not diſcern in their Words the Divine Spirit that animated 'em. It was neceſſary that God himſelf ſhould ſpeak. Nothing leſs than an expreſs Promiſe, nothing leſs than a plain Divine Revelation could entirely diſperſe the Clouds of Ignorance and Incredulity, and convert theſe Doubts into Certainties. This is what * *Plato* confeſſes in expreſs Terms. For he brings in ſome Philoſophers that render Homage to God, calling his Promiſes *the Veſſel in which no danger is to be feared, and the only one in which we can happily accompliſh the Voyage of this Life, on a Sea ſo tempeſtuous and full of Rocks.* Thus we ſee where his Doubts terminated; they led Men to acknowledg the need they had of a God, to aſſure 'em of the reality of the great Bleſſings for which they hop'd. And this is accompliſhed in the Chriſtian Religion; which as it is the only Religion that has God for its Teacher, ſo has alſo the Promiſes of Eternal Happineſs, of which the Prophets ſpake, and of which *Plato* had a glimpſe; and for which the word of this God, by the confeſſion even of theſe Pagans, is a moſt certain Security. So that, by the acknowledgment of the moſt enlighten'd Heathens, there are now no reaſonable Doubts concerning the Truth of the Chriſtian Religion; that being the only Veſſel in which we can never be loſt. And this is what the Prophets predicted, that in Jeſus Chriſt Life and Immortality ſhould be fully brought to Light, and that he ſhould be the deſire of Nations.

* In his Phœdon. Vol. 2.

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'Tis not only in theſe principal Points that *Plato* doubts, but almoſt in every thing; and his doubts have given occaſion to many to make a wrong judgment of the Academick Philoſophy; for it has been imagined that it aſſerted nothing, but accounted all things equally uncertain, which is a very unjuſt Suppoſition. *Socrates* and *Plato* were not of the number of thoſe Philoſophers, whoſe fluctuating minds kept 'em continually wandering, ſo that they had no fix'd and ſteady Principles. This was their Principle and Rule; They taught that men could not of themſelves have any Opinion but what was founded only on Probabilities; but that when God enlighten'd 'em, that which was no more than Opinion before now became Science: And this they explain'd by a pretty Compariſon. *Dedalus* made two ſorts of Statues that could walk, with this difference, the one ſort had a Spirng which ſtop'd 'em when one pleas'd, and the other had none; ſo that when they were let go, they run along to the end of their Line, and could not be ſtop'd. The latter were not of ſo great a Price, but the former were very dear. Now *Socrates* and *Plato* compar'd Opinion to theſe Statues, that could not be ſtop'd; for Opinion is not ſtable, but is ſubject to change. but when 'tis reſtrain'd and fix'd by reaſoning drawn from Cauſes which the Divine Light diſcovers to us, then Opinion becomes Science, and is fix'd and ſteady, like thoſe Statues which had that governing Spring added to 'em. So that their meaning was, that Opinion turns only on Probability, which is always like moving Sand, but that Science reſts on Certainty and Truth, which are a firm Foundation. Thus *Socrates* and *Plato* diſputed about every thing, while they had only Opinions; but when theſe Opinions after ſerious reſearches and long labour, were become Science by the Divine Light; then they affirm'd what they knew. Till then all was doubtful and uncertain to 'em. But theſe Doubts were more wiſe and ſafe than the Arrogance of thoſe poſitive

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poſitive Philoſophers, that raſhly affirm'd every thing, and always took Opinion for Science.

The Third Objection againſt *Socrates*; *That he only knew that he knew nothing*, is no more ſolid than the former; and is to be anſwer'd by the ſame Principle: and if I am not miſtaken, we ſhall find in this Ignorance a marvellous Fund of Knowledg.

There are two ſorts of Ignorance, the one Natural, which is good or evil, according to the good or ill uſe that is made of it, and the other Acquired, and always good: For this latter is the Ignorance of thoſe who after they have learned all that Men can know, are convinc'd that they know nothing. This was *Socrates* his Ignorance, it was * *a learned Ignorance that knows it ſelf.* He had run through Aſtronomy, Geometry, Phyſicks, Metaphyſicks, Poetry, Polite Learning, *&c.* and ſaw the vanity of 'em. He even undertakes to prove that all theſe Sciences are either uſeleſs or dangerous, and that nothing but the knowledg of God can make us happy, that where this Divine Science is not, there can be no Good, and conſequently that there is a ſort of Ignorance more uſeful than the Sciences; for this Ignorance ſeeks not for knowledg in it ſelf, well knowing it has none, but only in God who is pleas'd to fill its *Vacuum.* It was for this reaſon, *Socrates* always began his Inſtructions with an Affirmation that he knew nothing. By this he ſignified that our Souls have no true knowledg of any thing, any farther than they are enlightned by God. That they ſhould always look on that piercing Light, in which alone they can ſee Light; and that when they turn their Looks another way they neceſſarily fall back into Obſcurity, and produce nothing but the Works of Darkneſs. Let the Proud Wiſe Men of the World appear, and compare themſelves with this Ignorant Man.

* 'Tis an Expreſſion of *Socrates*, which ſtates two ſorts of Ignorance, one that is ignorant of it ſelf, and t'other that knows it ſelf.

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So much for one of the uſes that may be made of *Plato*'s Writings, which ought to be look'd upon as ſo many Titles belonging to Chriſtianity, found long ago among the Pagans, and are ſo much the more venerable, in that ſo much as is found in 'em is faithfully copied from thoſe which the Prophets have left us; and in that which we find altered and corrupted, we may however diſcover the Veſtiges of thoſe Truths which theſe irreproachable Witneſſes publiſh'd.

The ſecond uſe that may be made of 'em, and which is no leſs conſiderable than the former, is that by this means we may be confirm'd in the knowledg of a great many Chriſtian Truths which are prov'd in 'em with ſuch a Strength and Evidence, as no reaſonable Man can reſiſt.

Religion only propoſes them; for it belongs not to the Majeſty of a God to prove the Neceſſity, Juſtice, and Truth of all he commands. He makes Men love what he requires, and that is more than to prove it to be reaſonable. But a Philoſopher, who *has no* Authority over us any farther than he perſwades us by his Reaſons, is obliged to give Proofs of every thing he advances; and thus *Plato* does, and his Proofs can't chuſe but be very agreeable to them that believe, and very uſeful to Unbelievers, if they are but willing to attend a little to 'em for their Inſtruction.

Some Learned and Zealous Perſon, who is well read in *Eccleſiaſtical Hiſtory*, will perhaps ſay; if *Plato* be ſo uſeful, whence come thoſe thundering Cenſures, which ſome of the Fathers of the Church, and above all, St. *Chryſoſtom* have let fly againſt him? It would be a ſufficient Anſwer to this, ſhould I only oppoſe to it thoſe great Praiſes, which other Fathers have given him, eſpecially St. *Auguſtin*: But is it to be imagin'd, that that the ſame Principles that charm'd St. *Auguſtin*, were diſpleaſing to St. *Chryſoſtom*? No certainly: The Spirit of God is not divided, and Truth always appears to thoſe

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thoſe whom God is pleaſed to illuminate. I'll therefore endeavour to ſhew from whence this difference of their Sentiments proceeded.

The Philoſophy of *Plato* was look'd on two different ways, which have given occaſion to two very oppoſite Opinions concerning it.

Chriſtian Philoſophers look'd upon it as a Doctrine, which by it's Principles naturally led to the Chriſtian Religion.

And Pagan Philoſophers conſidered it as a Doctrine, which contain'd Morals as perfect as thoſe of Chriſtianity, and which might even take place of this holy Religion.

In the firſt reſpect it was worthy of all the Encomiums that have been given it by the greateſt Doctors of the Church, who came out of his School.

And on the ſecond Account it deſerved the greateſt *Anathema*. The defects of this Philoſophy could not be too much aggravated, nor could thoſe haughty Philoſophers that valued themſelves ſo much upon it, be too much abaſed; for the Wiſdom of the Wiſe, and the Knowledg of the Learned are no better than Folly, if they lead us not to the knowledg of Jeſus Chriſt. *Plato* himſelf, by his Principles, would furniſh us with Arms, to oppoſe thoſe of his Admirers, that ſhould be ſo ſenſeleſs, as to take up with his Opinions, and ſhut their Eyes againſt the bright Truths of Religion.

But this Difference is now ceaſed: There are now none of thoſe ignorant Perſons. No Body is ſo blind to prefer, or even compare *Plato* and *Socrates*, I will not ſay to the Evangeliſts or Apoſtles, but to the meaneſt Chriſtian. So that there is no danger in ſetting a value on thoſe Truths which are found in *Plato*, and in rendering them all the Honour they deſerve. They are not the leſs worthy of our reſpect, becauſe they proceed from the mouth of a Heathen. Did not God take *Balaam* from among the Gentiles, to communicate his Spirit to him

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him? When we render homage to the Truths foretold by that covetous and corrupt Prophet, we don't honour the Prophet, but Him by whom he was inspir'd. For as St. *Ambrose* says, * *'Tis not the desert of him who propheſies, but the Oracle of him who calls, and which the Grace of God reveals.* The greater the Darkneſs was that benighted thoſe Times, the more eſteem we ought to have for *Plato* and *Socrates*, whom God ſeems to have choſen to be the firſt Heraulds of thoſe great Truths, and if I may venter to ſay it, the fore-runners of St. *Paul*, in the moſt ſuperſtitious, and idolatrous City in the World. 'Twas the Doctrine of theſe Philoſophers that had produced and cheriſhed thoſe Sparks of knowledg, which this great Apoſtle found in the Hearts of ſome of the *Athenians*, concerning the Reſurrection of the Dead, and the Immortality of the Soul.

What reſpect we have for this Doctrine will turn to the Glory of the Chriſtian Religion: For if the Conformity of a part of *Plato*'s Opinions, with what is revealed to us in the Goſpel, has ſo raiſed this Philoſopher's Name, that he is called *the divine Philoſopher*: What Eſteem and Veneration do they deſerve, whoſe Minds and Hearts are fill'd with all the Truths of Chriſtianity, and who are fed with the Celeſtial Doctrine, which our Lord Jeſus Chriſt learned of God the Father, and came himſelf to teach us?

This Conformity of *Plato*, with the Doctrines of the Goſpel, laſt Year engag'd a Learned and Pious Eccleſiaſtique, to give a ſmall Extract of it, which was very well received by the Publick. This Extract, which was made in the Pallace, and under the Eye of one of the beſt and moſt learned Arch-Biſhops God has given his Church, is a great Elogium on the Doctrine of this Philoſopher. What greater Appprobation can it have than that

* Non confitentis meritum, ſed vocantis oraculum eſt revelante Dei Gratiâ. *S. Ambr. Lib. 6. Epiſt.* 37.

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of a Prelate, who so strongly adheres to the word of Truth, and is so diligent in instructing the People in it himself, as well as in causing others to instruct 'em.

Another great Advantage to be gained out of *Plato*'s Writings, is that a Man may form his Judgment by 'em; and acquire that justness of Mind, and accuracy of reasoning, which are necessary in all conditions of Life, in order to discern Truth from Error, that he may take the right side in all Affairs that occur. For the Philosophy of *Socrates* is the source of good Sense, as * *Horace* himself acknowledges.

There is no Book in the World that teaches, so well as this, the Art of confuting Sophists, who by their poysonous Maxims, labour to corrupt the Minds of Men, and to destroy Truth and good Sense. As there will always be such Impostors to be found, this Art will always be of very great use, and there's no Man teaches it like *Plato*. There is nothing more compleat than his Logick, which infallibly gains its Point in every thing it undertakes; and 'tis impossible for a Man to defend himself from the force of it. It may be compar'd to the Sun, which when it rises, scarce makes us feel its Heat, but gradually encreases it, so that at length it becomes to hot to be endur'd.

I shall not speak of the Charms of his Dialogues, which are unexpressible: There are no Satyrs or Comedies that come near 'em. We can no where find such sharpness of Wit, so many Graces, and decent turns of Thought, nor so much variety either of Conceptions or Expressions: Nor were Ironies ever so finely manag'd; so that 'tis not so much an Entertainment of Reading as an Inchantment. In the Life of *Plato* I have sufficiently expos'd to view the advantages of Dialogue above all other ways of treating a Subject. I shall here only add that that which contributes most to render

* In Arte Poetic. V. 310

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it ſo agreeable and uſeful, is that Truth comes gradually out of the Bowels of the Diſpute; Juſt as when Pictures are unrolled we ſee the Perſons repreſented riſe up by degrees, till at laſt they appear in their full Proportion: and there is nothing more agreeable to the Mind than the ſpringing up of Truth after this manner, the inſenſible progreſs of which even leaves the Soul time to be before hand with it, and to foreſee its appearance. Now a Truth which our Minds have as it were divined, pleaſes us much more than that which has been formally prov'd to us, which moſt commonly only irritates and makes us uneaſy.

Theſe Dialogues have been the admiration of all Ages: In the Reign of *Trajan* they were ſtill ſo much eſteemed at *Rome*, that they occaſion'd the introducing of a Cuſtom which was received with great applauſe; they us'd to chuſe the fineſt of theſe Dialogues, and make their Children learn them by Heart, that ſo they might at their Feaſts recite 'em at Table, with thoſe different Tones and Geſtures that were ſuitable to the Manners and Characters of the different Perſons whom *Plato* brings in ſpeaking.

'Tis true this Cuſtom laſted not long; but that which put an end to it was no leſs honourable than that which introduc'd it. For the Philoſophers that condemn'd and aboliſhed it, did ſo only becauſe they accounted *Plato* too ſublime to be ſo uſed, and becauſe they could not endure that Dialogues ſo ſerious and ſolid ſhould ſerve for a Divertiſement at Table, and be heard amidſt the Merriment, Noiſe and Tumult of a Feaſt. And this Sentiment of theirs was ſupported by the Authority of *Plato* himſelf; who in his Banquet, being to ſpeak of the End of Man, of the Sovereign Good and other Theological Matters, does not puſh on his Demonſtrations very far; he does not, according to his ordinary Cuſtom, imitate a vigorous Wreſtler, who never lets go his Hold, and who locks his Adverſary ſo cloſely that he can't eſcape him; but he ſoftens his Proofs and

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makes 'em pleaſant, and attracts his Auditors by the inſinuation of Fables and Examples, which ſeem to be contriv'd not ſo much to convince as to divert 'em. For no Queſtions ought to be ſtarted at Table but ſuch as may move the Soul after an agreeable and uſeful manner, and ſuch as every one may eaſily underſtand, and thoſe ought to be baniſh'd (to uſe the Words of *Democritus*) that are thorny, and out of which 'tis difficult to extricate one's ſelf. The Diſcourſe at Table ought to be for every one, like the Wine, and ſuch as propoſe there abſtracted and difficult Queſtions, exile thence this kind of Community, and renew the Feaſt of the Fox and the Crane.

If I had only conſider'd the Eloquence, the Strength and Harmony of theſe Writings, I confeſs I ſhould never have had the courage to tranſlate 'em; in doing which, either through my own defect, or that of the Language in which I write, I have had the uneaſineſs of finding my ſelf unable to preſerve a multitude of Beauties and Elegancies that render theſe Dialogues Maſter-pieces, not to be equall'd. But I conſider'd, that ſeeing they contain'd Matters of ſo great Importance and Neceſſity, it would be a great piece of Folly, to be ſo ſuperſtitious about Terms, as to deprive Mankind of ſo great an Advantage. And by good hap, that which is the moſt uſeful can't be hurt by my Tranſlation. It preſerves the Art of Logick, and all the Truth which *Socrates* proves by that means, and that's enough. Thoſe Beauties which conſiſt only in Expreſſion are not ſo neceſſary, and we may eaſily forego 'em, provided we enjoy others; and not do like a certain Writer of the laſt Age, who after he had made very good Reflections on *Socrates*, and had acknowledged him to be *an admirable pattern in all great Qualities*, amuſes and perplexes himſelf with Trouble, that a Soul ſo lovely had met with a Body ſo deform'd, and diſagreeable to its Beauty. Which is as if a Souldier in reading the great Actions of *Ceſar* or *Alexander*

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Alexander inſtead of making advantage of his reading, and learning the Art of War, ſhould diſtreſs and afflict his Mind, becauſe one was bald, and t'other inclin'd his Head on one ſide.

But it may be I have leſs reaſon to fear how it will go with my Tranſlation, than how *Socrates* himſelf will eſcape. Our Age ſo much reſembles that wherein this Philoſopher liv'd, that in all appearance, if this wiſe Man now finds ſome intelligent Judges who will do him Juſtice, he'll find a greater number of Perſons extreamly prejudic'd, who will be ſure to condemn him. In an Age wherein nothing is eſteem'd but Riches; wherein that Slavery, which leads to Wealth, is prefer'd to Liberty, and Men chuſe rather to nouriſh the Vices of others by their Flatteries, than to augment their own Vertues by their Labour. The Temperance, Frugality, Fortitude, Juſtice and Liberty of *Socrates* will be laugh'd at; and this will be but the accompliſhment of what he predicted. * *If my Fellow-Citizens* (ſays he) *have not been able to endure my Maxims, much leſs will they be tolerable to Strangers.*

The greateſt part will not give themſelves ſo much trouble as to read him. † They will much ſooner read the *Mileſian Tables*, as St. *Jerome* ſays, that is ſuch Pieces as corrupt the Heart and Mind, than Dialogues which inſpire nothing but Wiſdom. And among thoſe that will read him, many will do it only out of Curioſity, for in our Time we may make the ſame Complaint that was made heretofore by *Taurus* the Philoſopher, an ancient Commentator on *Plato*. One asks for *Plato*'s *Dialogue of the Banquet*, to have the pleaſure of ſeeing the Exceſſes of *Alcibiades*. Another for his *Phædrus*, becauſe 'tis a Treatiſe of Criticiſm, and the Oration of *Lyſias* is examin'd in it; and others deſire

* Apology 69. † Multoq; pars major eſt Mileſias Fabulas revolventium, quam Platonis Libros. *St.* Jerome *in the Preface of his* XII *Book on* Iſaiah.

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thoſe Dialogues which have the greateſt Reputation, and are accounted the beſt Pen'd, only for a frivolous Pleaſure; and not one of all theſe thinks of embelliſhing his Mind by reading of theſe Books, ſo as to become more Modeſt, Temperate, Juſt, Patient, and Pious.

But thoſe who will prove the leaſt favourable to *Socrates*, are a ſort of Men who highly value themſelves upon their refin'd Wit; and a great many of thoſe who are taken with the Pomp and Gay appearances of the World.

The former not having Eyes piercing enough to diſcover the ſecret Light of thoſe hidden Beauties that adorn theſe Dialogues, will count *Socrates* a Dull and Languid Author, becauſe he has no Witticiſms, nor Gentile Turns. An obſcure Perſon who never did any thing worthy to be read, ſhall call in queſtion the Reputation of *Socrates*, a Perſon who has been an honour to Humane Nature by the Excellency of his Underſtanding; and ſhall prefer himſelf to him, trampling under his Feet * *the Teſtimonies which all the learned Men of Antiquity, and all* Greece *have rendred him, that for good Senſe, Wit, Pleaſantneſs, Subtilty, Strength, Variety and Abundance, he excelled all that ever had appeared in the World.* A Man muſt have a great Stock of good Opinion of himſelf, to appeal from ſo ſolemn a Judgment, and to make his appeal to himſelf too.

The latter are commonly corrupted by reading frivolous Books, which are wholly Compos'd for Oſtentation, and as *Montagne* ſays, *can't perceive Riches unleſs they make a pompous Show*, and ſo have a diſguſt for every thing that is Plain and Simple; being perſuaded that what is Natural and Eaſy, is a Kin to Dulneſs and Stupidity. Theſe will think it below 'em to attend to a Philoſopher who entertains 'em only with ſuch Diſcourſes as they count Vulgar and Trivial, who is ſcarce ever to be found out of Shops; who talks only of Husband-men, Smiths,

* *Cicero* in his 3d Book of Oratory.

Maſons,

J Fulham

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Masons, Carpenters, Shoemakers, and Taylors, and is eternally hammering on the same Subjects, and representing the same Images.

There are not wanting good Reasons to prove to 'em, that as a Man sometimes is thought plump and in good Case, when he is only *swell'd* and *bloated*; so that which is frequently taken for Accuracy of Judgment, is the Effect of some Distemper, and not at all the mark of a nice and fine Relish. The highest and most sublime Conceptions are often hid under a form that appears Vile and Contemptible. Are not the most Celestial Truths propos'd to us in the Gospel under Popular Images and Modes of Expression, like those us'd by *Socrates*? That which creeps on the Earth, is no less capable than that which is rais'd to the Heavens, of serving for a Representation to let the greatest Secrets, both of Nature and Grace into our Understanding. Nay, many times the most Simple and Common Ideas are the most proper to impress Truth on the Minds of Men, for besides that these are more proportionate to us, they do not Transport us out of our selves as the most Magnificent Ideas do. If none but great and dazling Images could strike us, God would not have fail'd to have constantly employ'd 'em, and since 'tis no more difficult for him to change Men than to illuminate 'em, he would have been so far from making his Spirit stoop to the Manners and Customs of those whom he inspired; that on the contrary he would have transform'd their Manners and Customs, to subject 'em in some sort to his Spirit, and yet he did not do thus. When he inspires *Daniel*, he leaves him to speak like a Man Educated in a Royal Court, he uses only Great and Magnificent Ideas; and when he inspires a Shepherd, such a one as *Amos*, he leaves him to explain himself by such Terms as were most familiar to him; but the Truth is every where equally sublime, and as it receives no accession to its Lustre by the Majesty of Figures, so neither does it lose any thing of its Glory by their Simplicity

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city. *Socrates* was ſo well perſuaded, that this Simplicity was alone capable to move and correct the Minds of Men, that when *Critias*, the moſt Cruel of the Thirty Tyrants, commanded him to let all the Artificers alone, and talk no more of 'em, he anſwer'd; * *I muſt then let all thoſe Conſequences alone too, which I draw from 'em, and muſt ſpeak no more, either of Holineſs or Juſtice, or any other Duties that become a Good Man.*

But perhaps our Cenſors will have leſs deference for the Authority of Reaſons, that for that of Examples: 'Tis therefore neceſſary to give them an Account of what paſs'd in the Time of *Socrates* himſelf; and to ſhew 'em the Characters, both of his Friends and Enemies.

On the one ſide were the moſt ſtupid and moſt corrupt among the People, ſome of whom, through ignorance, laugh'd at his Morality, and the manner of his Behaviour: Others through the Corruption of their Hearts, could not endure his Generous Liberty.

On the other ſide, Perſons of the greateſt Honour, and of chief Note in the Commonwealth; *Pericles*, *Nicias*, *Xenophon*, *Apollodorus*, *Criton*, *Critobulus*, *Eſchinus*, *Antiſthenes*, &c. Theſe found infinite Charms in his Converſation. Who is it that is ignorant of *Alcibiades*? No Man had more Wit, or a truer guſt of things; he was one of the beſt made, Braveſt, moſt Gallant, moſt Magnificent, moſt Ambitious, and Niceſt Men in the World; he was at the Head of the Athenians, he commanded their Armies, he had won ſeveral Battles, he had glitter'd in the Courts of Kings, and had not been rudely treated by Queens. According to the Maxims of the World, there's nothing more Bright and Illuſtrious than ſuch a Man as this. Yet this ſame *Alcibiades* amidſt all this Glory and Pomp, is ſo far from being offended at *Socrates* his way and manner of Deportment, which were ſo oppoſite to his own, that he no ſooner became acquainted with him,

* *Xenoph.* in the 1ſt Book of the Memorable Things of *Socrates*.

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but he was ſtruck with ſuch a ſenſe of his Merit, and the ſolid Gracefulneſs of his Converſation, that he knew not how to leave him; he was enchanted with his Diſcourſes, which he prefer'd to the moſt excellent Muſick; * he confeſſes, that a Man could neither hear him ſpeak, nor even hear others repeat what he had ſaid, without being tranſported. The Force and Truth of his Words drew Tears from him, and made him even leap for Joy. He compar'd him, to certain Statues of *Satyrs* and *Silenes*, which were made to open and ſhut: to look on the out-ſide of 'em, nothing was more ugly; but when they were open'd, all the Deities were found in 'em together. He hardly lov'd or reſpected any one beſides him, and he never met with him, but he took off from his own Head the Crown, which he, according to the Cuſtom, wore on days of Ceremony, and put it on the Head of *Socrates*.

Therefore there is no *medium*, we muſt judge of *Socrates* either as the worſt and meaneſt of the Athenians did, or like *Pericles* and *Alcibiades*; we may take our Choice.

All theſe Contradictions which I have foreſeen, and which indeed may make theſe Dialogues become to the greateſt part of Readers † *like thoſe exquiſite Dainties that were formerly ſet on Tombs*, have not diſcourag'd me, but only convinc'd me that a bare Tranſlation, though never ſo exact and faithful, would not make a ſufficient impreſſion on the Minds of ſome Men, if it were not ſupported by ſomething, that might prevent all theſe Inconveniencies, or at leaſt a good part of 'em; and I could think but of two ways to ſucceed in this.

The firſt was, to place an Argument at the Head of every Dialogue, to explain the Subject of it, to unfold the Art and Method of it, and to take particular notice of every thing in it of the greateſt im-

* In the Dialogue of the Banquet.

† Quaſi appoſitiones Epularum circumpoſitæ Sepulchro, *Eccleſiaſtic.* 30. 18.

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portance. The Arguments of *Marsilius Ficinus* do not go to the Matter of Fact; besides, they are too abstracted, and are abundantly more difficult to be understood than the Dialogues themselves. And those of *De Serres* are too wide and indefinite, they never well fix the State of the Question, or the Quality of the Proofs; nor do they ever explain either *Plato*'s Design, or his Address. Now an Argument ought to be a faithful Guide always to attend the Reader, to conduct him where-ever he goes, and always to set him into the right Path.

The second way was to make Remarks to elucidate the principal Difficulties, to render the hidden Beauties discernable, to explain the Train of Reasoning, and the Solidity of the Principles and Proofs, and to help to discover what is false, from that which is true.

Marsilius Ficinus did not so much as think of this; *De Serres* on this Account is more useful than he; for by his Marginal Notes he at least hinders you from losing the Thread of *Plato*'s Reasoning, and makes you comprehend the Train and Progress of his Proofs: But yet he abandons you in the greatest difficulties.

In the Time of *Maximus Tyrius*, that is in the second Age, it was very earnestly desired, that some one would undertake to elucidate those obscure and knotty Passages of *Plato*; above all in what respects his Opinions in Theology, and many Philosophers labour'd in this Work, as may be seen in his Life; but with so little success, that instead of resolving the Difficulties, they have increased 'em. They have scarce assisted me once or twice in the Ten Dialogues which I have Translated; and they would have very often led me into Mistakes if I would have followed 'em.

The cause of their Errors was, that they did not draw from the true Fountain, and had a mind to explain *Plato* by *Aristotle*'s Principles, which are very different from those of *Plato*. The latter is most commonly

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commonly conformable to ſound Theology, or may be very eaſily reduc'd to it by his own Principles well explain'd: But 'tis otherwiſe with his Diſciple, and where *Plato* may be once corrected by *Ariſtotle*, *Ariſtotle* may be corrected a hundred times by *Plato*.

I don't preſume ſo much on my own Ability, as to think I have filled up all the Devoirs of a good Interpreter; without doubt ſome Difficulties will yet be found in that which I have Tranſlated, but perhaps all of 'em ought not to be imputed to me. Obſcurities ordinarily ariſe from three Cauſes, from the Sublimity of the Subject, from the Ignorance of the Interpreter, and from the Incapacity or Unattention of the Reader. It will be reaſonable for the Reader to accuſe me of ſome of 'em; but let him alſo ſometimes accuſe, either the Subject or himſelf: If this Conduct be obſerved, I may venture to hope for the Diminution of theſe Difficulties.

At the end of the firſt Volume the Reader will find an Abridgment of Three Dialogues, which are alſo entirely Tranſlated in the ſame Volume. That which has given occaſion to this Repetition, is as follows; I had a very great deſire to publiſh *Plato* in French, but I made this Reflection; that Philoſophy, as *Plato* himſelf ſomewhere ſays, requires Free Men who are Maſters of their Time; and who, provided they find the Truth, don't enquire whether the Diſcourſes that lead to it, are long or ſhort: But nothing in our Time is more rarely found, than theſe Free Men. Some are ſo oppreſs'd with Care and Buſineſs, that they are ſcarce ever at their own diſpoſal; and others are ſo continually agitated and ſhuffled by a Thouſand Paſſions, that they are always in Action, without doing any thing, and reſemble ſo many fugitive Slaves.

Therefore to Accomodate *Plato* to the Occupations of the former, and the reſtleſs Humour of the latter, I thought ſuch Abridgments might be made, as would be of very great Uſe; and I made ſome, in which I preſerved, the beſt I could, the Spirit of

Socrates

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Socrates and his Method, ſo that none of his Principal Strokes might be loſt. From hence I ſuppos'd two conſiderable Advantages might be drawn. Firſt, That by this means *Plato* might be read in a Weeks time, and then, that the Truths he teaches, would be more deeply fix'd in the Mind; becauſe the Proofs being more contracted, would make a more lively Impreſſion. I was farther confirm'd in this Thought by obſerving the effect theſe Abridgments produced on all that heard 'em read; every one was mov'd by 'em, and could not chuſe but feel the force of 'em.

But it muſt be confeſs'd to the Glory of *Plato*, and perhaps ſomewhat to my Shame too, that when I was on the point of committing 'em to the Preſs, and was willing to review 'em by the Original, I was my ſelf diſguſted with my Work, and found in the Original ſo many Elegancies which I had not been able to preſerve; that I was afraid I ſhould make it ſuſtain too great a loſs in not publiſhing it entire, for nothing can be taken from it, that is not worthy to be admired. And to think there are any Vacuities and uſeleſs parts in his Writings, is but to deceive ones ſelf. There is a great deal of difference between a Man's quitting his Subject, and ſounding it to the bottom. *Plato* always goes back to firſt Principles, and examines every Subject on all its different ſides; he maintains that this is the only way to make ſure Demonſtrations; and he is every where ſuch an Enemy to long Diſcourſes, that is, ſuch as are uſeleſs, that he looks upon 'em as the Rock on which Truth is ſplit, and as the Character, not of a Philoſopher, but of a Sophiſt. This obliged me to alter my Reſolution: However, in Obedience to ſome Perſons of very great Merit, who deſired theſe Abridgments of me, I have publiſhed three, that the Publick may draw ſome profit from 'em, or at leaſt may make a Judgment of 'em.

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I might here have a fair occasion to answer the Invectives that have been made against *Plato* in our Time: But since they come only from such Persons as never read so much as one of his Dialogues; perhaps they'll change their Sentiments when once they have read him. Besides, 'tis wasting of ones Time to defend *Plato*; for he sufficiently defends himself; and that may be said of him with yet more Justice, which the greatest of the Latin Historians said of *Cato*, equally ridiculing the Praises *Cicero* had given him, and the Satyrs *Cesar* had made on him. * *None could ever augment the Glory of this Great Man by his Praises, nor diminish it by his Satyrs.*

* Cujus Gloriæ neque profuit quisquam laudando, nec vituperando quisquam nocuit. *Titus Livius.*

THE

THE LIFE of *PLATO*, WITH An Account of the Principal of his Opinions in Philosophy.

GOD was pleas'd to endow the first Man with true Wisdom; but the Passions soon communicated to him their Mortal Poyson, and precipitated him into a state of Rebellion against his Maker, and so made him lose all the advantages of his Origin. 'Tis from this Fountain his Posterity have deriv'd all their Errors. Being unhappily taught what Good they had lost, by the Evils they suffer'd, they made their best Efforts to repair their loss. But since Man in a state of Perfection had not strength enough to keep that Happiness he enjoy'd; how should he be able when in a state of Corruption, to put himself in possession of that true Good, of which Sin had deprived him? No, 'tis not to be expected from him, that he should conduct us back to our former Felicity. This is the work of God and not of Man. All the wise Pagans may in this respect be compar'd to drunken Men, who while they have a mind to return Home, knock at every Door, and take every House for their own. Some remains of Reason still gave 'em a discovery of what they ought to seek; and an inexhaustible Source of Blindness and Corruption, still hinder'd 'em from finding it, or if they found it from embracing it. *Socrates* was the first of 'em, who was eminently distinguish'd from others by a clearer and purer Light (which perhaps was

The Rise of all the different Sects of Philosophers.

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was the Reward of his Modesty and Humility) and acquir'd a more sublime and certain knowledg of the Duties of Man, of the Nature of God, of the Law of Nature, and of Justice. Therefore *Plato* says of him, that he added Fire to Fire, thereby signifying, that by amassing together those degrees of Light, which he found scatter'd up and down; and giving 'em a new Lustre by his luminous and fruitful Mind, he spread Light far and near, and rais'd a great Flame out of that, which before his time, was but a number of little Sparks almost buried under the Ashes: But this sublime knowledg of his, was not without a mixture of many Errors; so that to gain advantage by his Doctrine, which has been preserv'd and improv'd by *Plato*, care must be taken to separate the Truths which it pleas'd God to discover to him, from the Falshoods and Illusions, in which he himself involv'd 'em. This we may most certainly do, since we have the true measure of Truth in our Hands, which is the Word of God. All he says, that is conformable to this, is undoubtedly true; and may moreover serve to prove the Truths of the Christian Religion; and whatever is opposite to it, is the fruit of Falshood and Error. And the Doctrine of *Plato* it self has this advantage, that such an Examen as we plead for is one of his principal Rules, and his first Principle; for he maintains, that nothing ought ever to be received in any Science, but what agrees with * Eternal Truth, and with the Oracles of God.

Plato founded the Old Academy on the Opinions of *Pythagoras*, those of *Heraclitus*, and those of *Socrates*, and by adding to the discoveries of these great Men that Light which he had acquir'd in his Travels, and had deriv'd from the same Springs, he establish'd a Sect of Philosophers much more perfect than those that had appear'd in the World before him. However, I shall not look back so far as those

* By this Eternal Truth *Plato* means an ancient Tradition, which he pretends the first Men received from God, and transmitted to their Posterity.

Philoso-

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Philoſophers I have mention'd, whoſe Opinions may be ſeen in *Diogenes Laertius*. I'll ſay but a Word of them by the way, and confining my ſelf only to what relates to *Plato*. I ſhall firſt give an Account of his Life; after this I ſhall explain his Doctrine, and examin it with reſpect to Morality, Religion, Policy, Phyſicks and Logick. I ſhall as much as in me lies, diſcover the Source, both of the Truths and Errors he teaches: I ſhall ſpeak of his way of treating the Subjects on which he inſiſts: From thence I ſhall proceed to make a Judgment of his Stile; I ſhall ſpeak of his Principal Interpreters, and in fine ſhall give a Tranſlation of ſome of his Dialogues; the Method and Subjects of which I ſhall explain; and here I ſhall remark whatever I think may be ſtill of uſe to us. 'Tis with ſuch a diſpoſition of Mind as this, that we ſhould read the Works of the Heathens; for thoſe who are too much enamour'd of 'em, and take up with them, never find enough Truth in 'em to give 'em Satisfaction and Righteouſneſs enough to fortifie 'em againſt Vice, but continue to want the true Food of Souls, and remain indigent of ſolid Vertue. This Method I ſpeak of, is taught us by a * Learned Father of the Church, and was followed by himſelf, as he informs us in the † Letter he wrote to Pope *Damaſus*; in which, after he had applied to this purpoſe, the † Law God gave his People, concerning a ſtrange Woman, when taken Captive in War, who was not to be married to an Iſraelite, till he had caus'd her to change her Clothes, to be purified, and to have her Nails and her Hair cut; he adds. ‖ " *We do the ſame when we read the Hea-*
" *then Philoſophers (who to us are that ſtrange Wo-*

* St. *Jerom*. † Letter 146. ‡ *Deut. Chap.* 21.

‖ Itaque & nos facere ſolemus quando Philoſophos legimus, quando in manus noſtras libri veniunt ſapientiæ ſæcularis; ſi quid in eis utile reperimus, ad noſtrum dogma convertimus, ſi quid verò ſuperfluum, de Idolis, de amore, de cura ſæcularium rerum, hæc radimus, his Calvicium inducimus, hæc in unguium morem ferro acutiſſimo reſecamus.

" *man*)

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" *man*) *and when the Books of the Wiſdom of this* " *World fall into our hands. If we find any thing* " *in 'em that is profitable, we make uſe of it by re-* " *ferring it to our own Principles; and when we* " *find any thing uſeleſs and ſuperfluous, as when they* " *treat of Idols, of Love, and of the Care of Earth-* " *ly and Periſhable things, this we pare away. Theſe* " *are the Clothes which we take from this ſtrange* " *Woman; theſe are the Nails and Hair we cut off* " *with a ſharp Inſtrument.*

By this means we reſtore to the good Philoſophy and ſound Theology of the Ancient *Hebrews*, what the *Greeks* have ſtollen from 'em, for they are enrich'd only with their Spoils.

Plato deſcended from a Brother of *Solon*, and conſequently was of the Family of *Codrus* King of *Athens*, and thus his Genealogy may be Trac'd to *Neptune* by *Neleus* King of *Pylos*, from whom *Codrus* deſcended in the Fifth Generation: So that in reſpect of his Birth, his Nobility was as great as any the Pride of any Man can flatter themſelves withal. *Ariſton* having eſpous'd his Couſin German *Perictione*, * 'tis pretended that *Apollo* appear'd to him in a Dream, and forbad him to approach his Wife, becauſe ſhe was with Child by Him. *Ariſton* obey'd; and now look'd upon *Perictione* no more as his Wife, but as a Goddeſs, till ſhe was deliver'd of *Plato*, on the Day of *Apollo*'s † Nativity, as the Delians affirm. *Plutarch* makes a Reflection upon this, which deſerves not to be forgot. He ſays, Thoſe that have made *Apollo Plato*'s Father, have done that God no diſhonour in attributing to him the Production of a Man, who is the Phyſician of Souls; and labours to cure 'em of the moſt violent Paſſions, and moſt dangerous Diſtempers. And St. *Jerome*

* Theſe Suppoſitions were uſual in thoſe Times, for inſtance, there was ſoon after this, a Woman of the Kingdom of *Pontus*, who perſuaded a multitude of People that ſhe was with Child by *Apollo*, and was brought to Bed of a Son, who was nam'd *Silenus*, whom *Lyſander* was willing to make uſe of to carry on the Deſign he had laid to make himſelf King of *Sparta*. † The 7th of *Feb.*

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ſomewhere obſerves, That thoſe Philoſophers who firſt gave out this Fable, did not believe that he whom they look'd upon as the Prince of Wiſdom, could be born of any other than a Virgin.

Plato was born the firſt Year of the Eighty eighth Olympiade, that is 426 Years before the Nativity of *Jeſus Chriſt*. He was at firſt call'd *Ariſtocles*, after the Name of his Grand-Farher: His Wreſtling-Maſter call'd him *Plato*, from his broad ſquare Shoulders; and he continued ever after to bear this Name. In his Infancy as he was one Day ſleeping under a Myrtle Tree, 'tis ſaid a Swarm of Bees ſettled upon his Lips, which was taken as an Omen to ſignifie that his Style would be extreamly ſweet. He began his Studies under a Grammarian call'd *Dionyſius*, made his Exerciſes under *Ariſton* of *Argos*, learn'd Muſick of *Draco* the Athenian; and under *Metellus* of *Agrigentum*, he apply'd himſelf to Painting and Poeſy; he even made ſome Tragedies which he burnt when he was 20 Years of Age, after he had heard *Socrates*. To this Philoſopher he entirely adher'd; and having a marvellous Inclination to Vertue, made ſo good a Proficiency by the Diſcourſes of this Righteous Man, that at 25 Years of Age he gave ſuch proofs of his extraordinary Wiſdom, as made it appear that he was already capable of Governing a State.

The Lacedemonians had then made themſelves Maſters of *Athens*, and *Lyſander* eſtabliſhed there the Government of 30, who at firſt Rul'd with ſome kind of Mildneſs, but ſoon after made uſe of a Tyrannical Power. At this Juncture *Plato* gave a very conſiderable Inſtance of the freedom of his Soul, and ſhew'd he could not truckle to make his Court to a Tyrant. *Lyſander*, who made all ſtoop to him, and had render'd himſelf formidable by his Cruelties, kept ſome Poets about him, who made it their buſineſs to celebrate his Glory, and flatter his Vanity. *Antimachus* and *Niceratus* were of this Number; they made Verſes in Praiſe of *Lyſander*, by way of Emula-

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lation; he being made Judge of their Performance, gave the Prize to *Niceratus*. *Antimachus* overborn with this Disgrace, suppressed his Poem. *Plato* who lov'd him for his fine Poetry, endeavour'd to encourage him, and without fearing *Lysander*'s Resentment, told him, that he was not so much to be blam'd as his Judge; for (said he) Ignorance is as bad a Distemper in the Eyes of the Mind, as blindness in those of the Body.

Plato's Merit which now began to be much taken notice of, induc'd the Ministers of Tyranny to make the greatest efforts they could to draw him to their Party, and to engage him to concern himself in the Government. Nothing was propos'd to him but what was suitable to his Age, and agreeable to his Maxims. Indeed all his Ambition lay in a desire of making the Knowledge he had acquir'd, serviceable to his Countrey; and he was so far perswaded by the Promises of those Thirty Tyrants, that he did not despair of inducing 'em at length to abandon their Arbitrary Methods; and Govern the City with all the Wisdom and Moderation of good Magistrates. While he employ'd his Thoughts to this purpose Night and Day, and was in search of the most proper means to make this Design successful, he carefully observ'd all their Steps: But soon perceiv'd that the Mischief grew worse and worse; and that the Spirit of Tyranny was too deeply rooted, to leave him any hope of being able to destroy it. * These Thirty Tyrants filled the whole City with Murders and Proscriptions; and while he had a share in the Publick Affairs, it came to this Point, that he must either be a Confederate in their Crimes, or a Victim to their Fury. The pressure of this Misfortune, which none but God himself could redress; gave a check to his Ambition, and made him willing to wait for more favourable Times.

Fortune soon appear'd willing to second his good Intentions; for the Thirty Tyrants were expell'd,

* See Xenophon's History of Greece. Lib. 2.

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and the Form of the Government quite changed. This gave a little Revival to *Plato*'s Hopes, when almoſt extinguiſhed. But it was not long before he perceiv'd that this new form of Government was no better than the former; and that the State every day receiv'd new Wounds. Nay *Socrates* himſelf was ſacrific'd upon this Revolution. The Laws were trampled under foot, Order and Diſcipline were no more regarded, and all Authority was in the Hands of the People, who were always more formidable than any Tyrants could be. It was impoſſible to rectify this Diſorder, for a Man that ſhould undertake it had need of good Friends; and in ſo great a Confuſion, the Fidelity of old Friends becomes as ſuſpected as that of new ones is dangerous.

Plato knew not what to determine under theſe Circumſtances. He had no expectation of help from the neighbouring Cities, where Confuſion reigned no leſs than it did at *Athens*. In an Age wherein Philoſophy was advanc'd to its higheſt perfection, Injuſtice was carried to the laſt extremity, which is the ordinary effect of that Contempt of Truth which Men ſometimes manifeſt, when it ſhines upon 'em with the greateſt evidence. This Inundation of Injuſtice and Violence augmentcd the love which *Plato* bore ro Philoſophy; He caſt himſelf into its Arms as into a ſafe Port, fully convinc'd that the Welfare of Cities and of particular Perſons depend on it; and that it is impoſſible to be happy without it. At this time he heard the Diſcourſes of *Cratylus* who taught the Philoſophy of *Heraclitus*, and *Hermogenes* who taught that of *Parmenides*. He afterward went to *Megara* to ſee *Euclid* who founded the *Megarick* Sect. From *Megara* he paſs'd to *Cyrene* to perfect himſelf in the Mathematicks under *Theodorus*, who was the greateſt Mathematician of his Time. He then viſited *Egypt*, and convers'd a long time with the Egyptian Prieſts, who taught him a great part of their Traditions, and made him acquainted with the Books of *Moſes*, and thoſe of the Prophets.

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While he was at *Memphis* there arriv'd a Lacedemonian who was ſent by *Ageſilaus* to deſire the Prieſt *Connuphis* to explain a certain Inſcription which was found on a Copper Plate in the Tomb of *Alcmene*. This Prieſt after he had ſpent three days in looking over all ſorts of Figures and Characters, anſwer'd, that the Letters of this Plate were ſuch as were uſed in *Egypt*, in the time of *Proteus*, that *Hercules* had carried them into *Greece*, and that they contain'd an Admonition which God gave the Greeks to live in Peace; by inſtituting Sports in honour of the Muſes, by the ſtudy of Philoſophy, and other parts of Learning, and by diſputing one againſt another with Reaſons, and Words of Juſtice, with a deſign only to know the Truth and to follow the Dictates of it. 'Tis probable this Prieſt was not able to read the Inſcription, but wiſely made uſe of ſo favourable an occaſion to appeaſe the Grecian Wars, which was infinitely better than if he had read it.

This Stratagem of *Connuphis* was ſoon ſerviceable to *Plato* for a like deſign; for when he was upon his return with *Simmias*, and on the Coaſt of *Caria*, he met ſome Men that came from *Delos*, who entreated him to explain a very terrible Prediction which they had received from the Oracle of *Apollo*. The Purport of it was, that the Miſeries under which the Greeks labour'd ſhould not ceaſe, till they had doubled the Cubical Altar which was in his Temple. They told him they had attempted to put this Order in execution, but that when they had doubled each ſide of the Altar, inſtead of making it double as they hop'd to have done, and as the God requir'd, they made it eight fold; which made 'em fear the continuation of their Calamities. *Plato* calling to mind what the Egyptian Prieſt had done, told 'em, that God did but mock the Greeks for their Contempt of Sciences; and by reproaching 'em of their Ignorance and Stupidity, exhorted 'em ſeriouſly to apply themſelves to the ſtudy of Geometry, which alone would make 'em able to find

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two proportional Lines to double a Cubical Body by equally augmenting all its Dimensions. And added, that if they had a mind to correct their Work, it was but to address themselves to *Eudoxus* or *Helicon*; but that God had no design at all to have his Altar doubled, and that the only thing he requir'd by the Oracle was, that they should lay down their Arms to converse with the Muses, and moderate their Passions by the Study of Letters, and Sciences; in rendering mutual Love and Service, instead of hating and destroying one another. He went after this into *Italy*, where he heard *Philolaus* and *Eurytus*, who were Pythagorean Philosophers. From thence he pass'd into *Sicily* to see the Wonders of that Island: By this time he had arrived to forty Years of Age.

This Voyage, which was purely the effect of his Curiosity, laid the first foundations of the Liberty of *Syracuse*, and made way for those great things that were put in Execution by *Dion*, * the Brother-in-Law and Favourite of *Dionysius* the Elder.

See Plutarch *in the Life of* Dion.

There was at that time a Young Man who was naturally Couragious and Magnanimous; but having had a Servile Education under a Tyrant, and being accustom'd to the Submissions and Slavery of a Cringing and Timerous Courtier, and which is yet more pernicious, brought up in Luxury, Opulence, and Lazineſs, would have suffer'd those precious Seeds of Vertue to die in his Soul, had not *Plato* reviv'd them by his Discourses. He had no sooner heard the Precepts of this Philosopher, but his Mind was so inflam'd with the love of Vertue, that he desir'd nothing so much as to embrace and follow it. And perceiving with what facility *Plato* had chang'd his Mind, he believ'd he might produce the same effect upon that of *Dionysius* too, and could not rest till he had engag'd this Prince to have a Conference with him. *Dionysius*, who then

* For he was the Son of *Hipparinus*, whose Daughter *Dionysius* had married.

enjoy'd

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enjoy'd a great deal of Leiſure, conſented to this Enterview. Their Diſcourſe was wholly on Vertue, and they preſently fell into a Diſpute about the Nature of true Fortitude: *Plato* prov'd that this could by no means be attributed to Tyrants, who are ſo far from being Valiant and Brave, that they are more Weak and Timorous than Slaves. They afterwards came to ſpeak of Utility, and of Juſtice. *Plato* ſhew'd that nothing could be properly ſaid to be uſeful, but that which is Honeſt and Juſt; and made it appear, that the Life of Juſt Men was happy amidſt the greateſt Adverſity; and that of the Unjuſt miſerable in the very boſom of Proſperity. *Dionyſius* who found himſelf convinc'd by his own Experience, could no longer hold the Diſcourſe, but with a pretence of making a Jeſt of his Morals, told him *his Diſcourſes ſavour'd of Old Age*; to which *Plato* replied, *that his ſavour'd of Tyranny.* This Prince not accuſtom'd to hear ſuch odious Truths, ask'd him very importunately *for what he came into Sicily?* *Plato* anſwer'd that, *He came thither to ſeek a good Man. And by thy Speech*, replied Dionyſius, *it ſeems thou haſt not yet found one.*

In another Conference which was no leſs ſmart than the former, the Tyrant to intimate to *Plato*, that he ought to conduct himſelf with more Caution before him, and not to uſe ſo provoking a Liberty of Speech, mention'd theſe two Verſes to him,

——* *In every Tyrant's Court*
He a meer Slave becomes, who enters free.

Plato return'd him theſe two Lines, changing the latter thus,

——*In every Tyrant's Court*
Who enters free, ſhall ne're become a Slave.

to ſignifie that a True Philoſopher can never loſe

* Theſe are two Lines of *Sophocles*.

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his Liberty. *Dion* fearing the Prince's Diſpleaſure hereupon would have ſome fatal effect, ask'd a Diſmiſſion for *Plato*, that he might take the advantage of a Veſſel that was to carry back *Poluides* the Lacedemonian Ambaſſador. *Dionyſius* gave him leave to go; but preſſed the Ambaſſador with great importunity, either to take *Plato*'s Life away by the way, or at leaſt to ſell him; aſſuring him, this would do him no injury. *For if he is a Juſt Man* (ſays he) *he'll be as happy in Slavery as in the enjoyment of Liberty.* 'Tis ſaid *Poluides* carried him to the Iſle of *Ægina*, where a Law had been publiſhed, by which all Athenians that ſhould come aſhoar there, were order'd to be put to death. *Plato* therefore was taken, and brought before the Judges. He expected his Sentence without ſhewing any token of fear; which made one of 'em think fit to ſay, that he was a Philoſopher, and not an Athenian. This word ſpoken after a jeſting manner, ſav'd his Life. He was only condemn'd to be ſold, and was immediately bought for Thirty * Mina's by a Cyrenian named *Anniceris*, who ſet him at Liberty, ſent him back to *Athens*, and would by no means be reimburs'd; telling them, That as the Athenians were not the only Perſons who knew *Plato*'s Merit, ſo they were not the only Perſons who were worthy to render him Service. However, *Plato* ſays nothing of all theſe particulars in his Seventh Letter, where he ſpeaks of this Voyage into *Sicily*; and t'is probable he would not have forgotten to ſpeak at leaſt of his Benefactor.

After the Death of *Dionyſius* the Elder, his Son *Dionyſius* the Younger ſucceeded; who had been very ill Educated; for his Father, who was jealous even of his own Children, had always ſtrictly kept him from Company; leſt if he ſhould come to know himſelf, and to converſe with Men of Senſe, who were weary of Slavery, he ſhould Conſpire againſt him. This Young Prince was no ſooner up-

* About Sixty Pound Sterling, or ſomething more.

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on the Throne, but he was so dazzled with his Grandeur, that he knew not where he was, and so became an easie prey to his Courtiers, who forgot nothing that might corrupt him, and became the ingenious and industrious Ministers of his Pleasures. Nothing was to be seen in the Pallace but horrible Corruption of Manners and Excesses. They had Debauches that held for Three Months together, during which time, all Wise and Sober Men, whose presence alone would have condemn'd or disturb'd these shameful Divertisements, were forbidden to enter. *Dion*, whose concern for the State made him fear the Pleasures of the Young *Dionysius* more than ever he had fear'd the Cruelty of his Father, lost no opportunity of letting him know what Precipices were before him, and how certain his Fall would be; and believing his Vices sprang only from Ignorance and Idleness, he endavoured to put him upon some Honourable Exercises, and to make him in Love with the Sciences, especially that which aims at the Reformation of Manners. He told him, nothing but Vertue could give him a solid Happiness, which would extend its Influence to all his People. That his Father had in vain flatter'd himself, that he had left him an Empire bound with Adamantine Chains, since these Chains would soon be soften'd by his Debauches. That Fear and Force were not the true Supports of a Throne, but the Affection and Love of Subjects, which, he said, was always the consequence of the Vertue and Justice of Princes. He represented to him, that True Grandeur consists not in having great Equipages, superb Pallaces, sumptuous Furniture, and fine Clothes; but in having the Pallace of the Mind royally adorn'd: And that none but *Plato* was capable of communicating to him all the Vertues that ought to embellish a Prince's Soul. By entertaining him with such Discourses as these, in which he always thus intermix'd the great Truths he had learn'd from this Philosopher; he inspir'd him with such

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an ardent, or rather furious desire to draw him to his Court, and to put himself under his Direction, that he sent Couriers to *Athens* with very pressing Letters of his own, accompanied with other Letters of *Dion*'s, and of all the Pythagorean Philosophers that were in *Great Greece*; who entreated him very earnestly to take the advantage of the favourable Opportunity the Divine Providence offer'd him, to make a Philosopher of a King; and conjur'd him to come with expedition, before the Debauches of the Court had made this Prince alter his Resolution, who at present was passionately in Love with Philosophy.

These great Promises did not immediately move *Plato*, who knew Young People too well, to promise himself any thing certain from the Flashes of a Young Prince, whose Inclinations commonly are various and opposite, and frequently pass suddenly off; and in whom the Love of Vertue does not always take root deeply enough to resist the Efforts of those Vices which attaque him on all sides. So that *Plato* did not know how to resolve on this Voyage; but at length, after he had consider'd, that in curing only one Man, he should make a whole Nation happy, and that perhaps God was opening a way for him here, actually to set on foot that Perfect Government of which he had already given the Idea in the first Books of his Commonwealth; he resolv'd to go, not out of Vanity, or to acquire Riches, as his Enemies have accused him; but was overcome only by the respect he bore to himself, that he might not give the World an occasion to reproach him, that he only discours'd of Vertue, but never voluntarily put himself in a Condition to reduce it to practise.

To these Reasons there was added another Motive much more pressing; and that was, that it would be a shame for him to abandon *Dion* in the dangerous Circumstances he was in, attack'd on all sides by the Calumnies of his Enemies; who because they could not

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not bear the Severity of his Manners, and the Wisdom of his Conduct, endeavour'd to render him suspected to *Dionysius*, and who would infallibly destroy him, if this Prince had time given him to relapse into his former Disorders. This cast the Ballance in detetmining *Plato* to quit his Employments at 64 years of Age, to go, it may be with too much Confidence, as himself confesses, to deal with the Caprices of a young Tyrant.

He was received in *Sicily* with all possible marks of Honour. *Dionysius* was not content only to send him a Galley adorn'd with Ribbands, as if he had been a God, but also went himself to receive him at the Port in a magnificent Charriot, into which he took him; and render'd thanks to the Gods by a publick Sacrifice for his Arrival, as the greatest Felicity that could happen ro his Government.

This so happy beginning had yet happier Consequences; for, as if some God had appear'd and taken pleasure in changing of Hearts; the whole Court became so reform'd, at least in appearance, that the Pallace of *Dionysius* was more like a School of Philosophers, or a sacred Temple, than the place of a Tyrant's Residence.

Some days after *Plato*'s Arrival the time of an Anniversary Sacrifice came about, which was wont to be offer'd in the Castle for the Prince's Prosperity.

The Herald having according to the Custom, pronounced with a loud Voice the solemn Prayer in this Form, *May it please the Gods long to maintain the Tyranny, and to preserve the Tyrant.* *Dionysius* who began to hate those Names, cry'd aloud to him. *What wilt thou never leave cursing me?* By which words 'twas judg'd the Discourses of *Plato* had made a real and strong Impression on his Mind: This made all those that favour'd this Tyrannical Form of Government, believe 'twas best to lose no time, and that it was necessary to ruine *Dion* and *Plato* before they had acquir'd Authority and Power enough over the Tyrant, to render all their Efforts useless. They soon

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ſoon found an occaſion very favourable to their deſign, nor did they fail to make their advantage of it. *Plato* had already perſwaded *Dionyſius* to diſmiſs ten thouſaud Forreigners which compos'd his Guard, to disband ten thouſand Horſe, with the greateſt part of his Infantry, and to reduce the 400 Galleys, which he always kept equip'd, to a very ſmall number. Thoſe ill deſigning Men miſrepreſented this Advice, and would have perſwaded *Dionyſius* that *Dion* had engag'd this Sophiſt to induce him to diſtruſt his Guards, and the reſt of his Troops, that ſo the Athenians finding him without defence might come and ravage *Sicily*, and revenge themſelves for the Loſſes they had ſuſtained under *Nicias*; or elſe with a deſign to expel him, and to take his place himſelf in the Throne. This Calumny, which was plauſible enough to ſurprize a Tyrant, did not however produce half the effect they expected from it. Only *Dion* became a Victim to the Anger of *Dionyſius*, who caus'd him to be put on board a Veſſel in his Preſence; and ſhamefully baniſhed him.

At the ſame time it was reported at *Syracuſe*, that he had alſo put *Plato* to death; but this Story had no foundation; for *Dionyſius* on the contrary redoubled his Careſſes towards him, either becauſe he believed, that he had been firſt deluded by the Artifices of *Dion*, or elſe becauſe indeed he himſelf could not tell how to live without ſeeing and hearing him.

The Love he had for *Plato* augmented every day, and advanc'd to that exceſs, that he became as jealous of him, as of a Miſtreſs, and us'd his utmoſt Efforts, to oblige him to prefer his Friendſhip to that of *Dion*: But, as *Plato* ſaid, he took a wrong Courſe to obtain this Preference; for he endeavour'd to acquire it only by demonſtrarions of an ambitious and tyrannical Love, inſtead of meriting it, if that had been poſſible, by a conformity of Manners, in making an Improvement of his Maxims, and uniting himſelf to him by the bonds of Vertue. His Timouroufneſs

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mouroufneſs rather than his Ill humour hinder'd him from taking this method: for tho he paſſionately lov'd *Plato*, he ſcarce dar'd to ſee him but by ſtealth, for fear of irritating ſuch as were diſpleas'd with this Intimacy between 'em; ſo that he always fluctuated between deſire, and fear, and thereby render'd all *Plato*'s Exhortations uſeleſs to him, and remain'd a Slave to his Vices. However becauſe he fear'd he would leave *Sicily* without his permiſſion, he order'd him to lodge in the Caſtle, on pretence to do him honour, but in reality to ſecure his Perſon. There he endeavour'd to gain his Heart by the moſt magnificent Offers he could think of. He ſhew'd him his Treaſures, and told him all that he deſir'd of him was to become Maſter of his Forces, and of all his Power, provided he would love him more than *Dion*. Few Philoſophers would have reſiſted ſuch powerful Temptations. But *Plato*, who could make Vertue give place to Vice in his Soul, conſtantly told him, that he would love him as much as *Dion*, when once he was as truly vertuous as He. This threw the Tyrant into an horrible Rage; he threaten'd him with Death, and the next moment beg'd pardon for all his Violence. *Plato* would have found his Priſon more tolerable, if he had been the Object of his Hatred; for he was every day oblig'd to uſe new Management to make the Obligations of Hoſpitality agree with the Intereſts of Philoſophy. In fine, he had the good Fortnne to be deliver'd from this Captivity. For a War broke out, which forc'd *Dionyſius* to ſend him back into *Greece*. At his departure he would have loaded him with Preſents, which *Plato* refus'd, contenting himſelf with the Promiſe he made him of recalling *Dion*, when the War ſhould be once ended. When he was ready to embark *Dionyſius* ſaid to him. Plato, *when thou art in the Academy with thy Philoſophers thou wilt ſpeak ill of me.* *God forbid* (reply'd Plato) *that we ſhould have ſo much time to loſe in the Academy as to talk of* Dionyſius. The diſintereſſedneſs of *Plato* appear'd on many

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many occaſions, as his Rivals themſelves could not chuſe but grant. *Dionyſius* having a mind to make Preſents to the Philoſophers of his Court, and putting it to their choice what to have, *Ariſtippus* deſir'd Money, and *Plato* ask'd only for Books; upon which *Ariſtippus* being rallied for his Avarice, made anſwer, *Plato loves Books, and I love Money.*

As he return'd into *Greeee* he paſs'd by *Olympia* to ſee the Games; and there gave marks of a Modeſty not much differing from deep Humility, and ſuch as deſerve to be remark'd. He happen'd to lodge with ſome Strangers of conſiderable Note; He eat with 'em, paſs'd whole Days in their Company, liv'd after a moſt ſimple and ordinary manner, without ever ſpeaking a word to 'em either of *Socrates* or the Academy; and without letting them know any thing more of himſelf than that his Name was *Plato.* Theſe Strangers were extremely pleas'd that they had found a Man of ſo ſweet and ſociable a Temper; but becauſe he ſpoke only of very common Matters, they never thought he was that Philoſopher, whoſe Name was ſo well known.

The Games being ended, they went with him to *Athens*, where he furniſhed 'em with Lodgings; they were no ſooner come thither, but they entreated him to carry 'em to ſee that great Man, who bore the ſame Name with him, and was the Diſciple of *Socrates*. *Plato* told 'em ſmiling, that himſelf was the Man. Theſe Strangers were ſurpriz'd, that they had ſo long poſſeſs'd ſo great a Perſon among 'em without knowing him; and could not ſufficiently admire that he had liv'd with 'em after ſo plain and ſimple a manner, and that he had ſhown that by the ſweetneſs of his Manners alone, without the help of his Wit and Eloquence, he could gain the friendſhip of all Perſons with whom he convers'd.

Some time after this, he gave the People * Plays, for which *Dion* furniſhed the Habits, and was at

* They were Tragedies.

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all the Charge: *Plato* being willing to let him have this Honour, that his Magnificence might acquire him a yet greater Intereſt in the Good-Will of the Athenians. It is not known whether *Dion* made a long ſtay at *Athens*; this only is certain, that *Plato* forgot nothing that might induce him to moderate his Reſentment, and not to attempt any thing againſt *Dionyſius*. He repreſented to him, that the Injuſtice that had been done him, and the ill Conduct of that Prince, were not a lawful occaſion of taking up Arms againſt him; That he ought to reduce him by Reaſon, or to wait for ſome Change of Fortune; that he could not have recourſe to force, without doing himſelf a very great injury; and bringing entire ruin upon *Sicily* beſides. And to diſpoſe him the better to reliſh theſe Maxims, he endeavour'd to make him pleaſant and gay by innocent Divertiſements; and above all, by the Converſation of his Nephew *Pſeuſippus*, which was very agreeable, and this ſucceeded for ſome time.

After *Dionyſius* had ended the War, he fear'd the Treatment he had given *Plato*, would give him diſcredit among the Philoſophers and make him paſs for their Enemy, therefore he ſent for the moſt Learned Men of *Italy*, and held Aſſemblies in his Pallace, where he ſtrove by a fooliſh Ambition to ſurpaſs 'em all in Eloquence, and depth of Knowledge, and impertinently utter'd what he had retain'd of *Plato*'s Diſcourſes: But theſe having place only in his Memory, without reaching his Heart, the Source was ſoon exhauſted. He then became ſenſible of what he had loſt, in not making a better improvement of that Treaſure of Wiſdom, and in not retaining it with him. So that he began to long for *Plato* again with extream impatience; which he ſignified to him by frequent Letters. *Plato* excus'd himſelf on account of his Age, and of the failure of *Dionyſius* in not performing any thing that he had promiſed. In fine, *Dionyſius* not able to bear his Refuſal any longer, oblig'd *Archytas* to write to him, and

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and to engage his Word, that he might come in ſafety, and that *Dionyſius* would perform his Promiſe to him. At the ſame time he ſent a Galley with ſome of his Friends, of which number *Archidemus* the Philoſopher was one; they aſſur'd *Plato* of *Dionyſius* his vehement Love to Philoſophy, and preſented the following Letter from him.

What I deſire with the greateſt ardor is, that thou wouldſt ſuffer thy ſelf to be perſuaded to come ſpeedily into Sicily. *I will do for* Dion *whatever thou ſhalt deſire; for I am perſuaded thou wilt deſire nothing but what is Juſt, to which I will always very readily ſubmit: But if thou refuſe to come, I declare to thee, that I will never do any thing that ſhall be agreeable to thee, either in the Affairs of* Dion, *or in any thing elſe wherein thy Intereſt is concerned,* &c.

This Letter, which ſavour'd more of a Tyrant than of a Philoſopher, would have had an effect contrary to his wiſhes, if *Dion* had not added his Solicitations, and Entreaties, conjuring *Plato* not to abandon him; and if all the Philoſophers of *Italy* and *Sicily* had not written to him, that if he refus'd to come, he would render 'em all ſuſpected in the mind of *Dionyſius*, who would certainly imagine, that he had inſinuated them into his favour, only that they might betray him. And it was this that determin'd *Plato* to go the third time into *Sicily*, when he was Seventy Years of Age.

His Arrival rais'd the hopes of all the People, who flatter'd themſelves that his Wiſdom would at laſt ſubdue the Tyranny they were under; and *Dionyſius* expreſs'd, on this occaſion, a Joy not to be deſcrib'd by Words. He order'd him to Lodge in the Apartment of the Gardens, and had ſuch Confidence in him, that he allow'd him acceſs to his Perſon at all times without being ſearch'd. *Plato* immediately uſed all the Addreſs he had to know if he had a true deſire of becoming Vertuous. He

* tells

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* tells us himſelf after what manner he made the Tryal of it; but he ſoon perceiv'd, that he was called thither only out of Vanity, and to deprive *Dion* of the Society of a faithful Friend. When he would have propos'd the recalling of this Exile, he was ſo far from accommodating his Affairs, that he entirely ruin'd 'em. *Dionyſius* forbad his Intendants to ſend *Dion* his Revenues, on pretence that all his Eſtate belong'd to his Son *Hipparinus*, who was his Nephew; to whom by conſequence he was the Natural Guardian. *Plato* highly provok'd by this Act of Injuſtice, deſir'd leave to be gone. *Dionyſius* promiſed to order him a Veſſel, but put it off from one Day to another, and after he had thus amus'd him for a conſiderable time, he one Day told him, *That if he would continue with him one Year longer, he would ſend* Dion *all his Eſtate, provided he would place it in* Peloponeſus *or at* Athens, *that he ſhould only enjoy the Revenue of it, and that he ſhould not have power to take away the Principal, without the conſent of* Plato *and his Friends. For,* ſaid he, *I cannot truſt him, but am jealous he would employ this Money againſt me. Plato* accepted this offer, but *Dionyſius* deceiv'd him again; for after the Seaſon fit for his Embarking was paſt, he ſaid he would reſtore but one half of *Dion*'s Eſtate, and would reſerve the other half for his Son: And ſome time after he caus'd all he had to be publickly ſold, at any Rate, and without ſpeaking a word of it to *Plato*; who at length wearied with his Diſſimulation and Lyes, and convinc'd that Philoſophy was too weak and tender a thing to oppoſe to the rigour of a Tyrant, thought of nothing elſe but how to quit *Sicily*. But it was impoſſible for him to go without Permiſſion, and a very difficult thing to obtain leave, new Obſtacles being every day rais'd againſt it. *Dionyſius* continued ſtill in publick to ſhew him all manner of reſpect, and continually multiplied his Careſſes. But at laſt *Plato* having warmly eſpous'd

* In his VII. Letter. Tom. 3.

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the Intereſts of *Theodotus* and *Heraclides*, who were wrongfully accus'd of cauſing Troops to be Levy'd, their miſunderſtanding openly broke out. *Dionyſius* order'd *Plato* to leave the Apartment of the Gardens, on pretence that the Ladies of the Court were to make a Sacrifice there, which was to continue ten Days; and appointed him a Lodging without the Caſtle in the midſt of his Guards, that ſo (as it was ſuppos'd) the Soldiers, who had been long incenſed againſt him, becauſe he was for having 'em disbanded, or their Pay diminiſhed, might ſacrifice him to their Reſentment. Some Athenians warn'd *Plato* of his danger, and *Plato* inſtantly gave advice of it to *Archytas*, who was at *Tarentum*. *Archytas* immediately diſpatch'd away a Galley with 30 Oars, and wrote to *Dionyſius* to put him in mind, that he had promis'd *Plato*, that he ſhould be entirely ſecure; and that he could neither detain him, nor ſuffer any Indignities to be offer'd him, without an open Violation of his own Word, of which he defir'd both him, and all Men of Honeſty and Honour to be Guarantees. This awaken'd that remainder of ſhame which was in the Tyrant's Mind, ſo that he at laſt permitted *Plato* to return into *Greece*.

Thus much for the occaſion of *Plato*'s third Voyage; for which his Enemies have made ſo many Efforts to decry him; as if he return'd into *Sicily* only for the ſake of the delicious Table *Dionyſius* kept; and to immerſe himſelf in all the Pleaſures that reign'd in this Prince's Court. *Diogenes*, who had a great deal of Wit, but a very ſatyrical Genius; and who could not ſee the great State *Plato* liv'd in without Envy, was the firſt who thought good to throw this Reproach on him. For ſeeing him one day eat nothing but Olives at a great Feaſt, he ſaid to him; *ſince the Love of Dainties made you go into* Sicily, *why do you deſpiſe 'em ſo much here? I aſſure you* Diogenes, *replied* Plato, *I for the moſt part eat nothing but Olives when I was in* Sicily: *What need had you then to go to* Syracuſe, *ſays* Diogenes? *Was it*

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it at a time when Attica *produced no Olives?*

Never was any Calumny more ill founded than this; therefore an * Ancient Philosopher speaking of the Advantages of an active Life, made no difficulty of commending *Plato* for this Voyage of his, of the true Motive of which he gives us an account. For he says, *it was for one of his Friends, who was depriv'd of his Estate and banished, that* Plato *had the Courage to go and face a very formidable Tyrant, and to expose himself to his Hatred, and all the dangers with which that threaten'd him.* In the Letter which *Plato* wrote to *Dion*'s Friends soon after this Voyage, he takes notice in express Terms, *That the splendid Tables of* Italy *and* Sicily *extremely displeas'd him; and that he could not without Horror look on the Custom these People had of filling themselves with Wine and Meat twice a day, and of abandoning themselves to all manner of Debauchery. When a Man* (says he) *has been accustomed to these Excesses from his Youth, 'tis hardly possible for him ever to be reclaim'd (how good soever his natural Disposition may otherwise be) so as to become temperate and wise: How much less may he pretend to other Virtues?* He afterwards adds; *My Life would be insupportable to me, if I were such a Slave to those Passions.* Tom. 3

As *Plato* pass'd through *Peloponnesus* he found *Dion* at the Olympick Games, and gave him an account of all the Proceedings of *Dionysius*. *Dion* more touch'd with the Injuries *Plato* had received, and with the Risque he had run, than with all the Acts of Injustice that had been offer'd to himself; swore he would attempt to be reveng'd. *Plato* did all he could to divert him from this Thought, but when he saw all his endeavours were in vain, he predicted to him what Miseries he was going to occasion, and declar'd to him, that he must not expect either Assistance or Advice from him; and since he had had the Honour to eat at the Table of *Dionysius*, to lodge in his Pallace, and to participate of the same Sacrifices

* Maxim. Tyr. ch. 5.

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with him; he ſhould always remember the Obligations to which this engag'd him: And that on the other hand, to anſwer the Friendſhip he had for *Dion*, he would ſtand Neuter, always ready to perform the Functions of a good Mediator to reconcile 'em, and always equally oppoſite to their Deſigns, whenever they went about to deſtroy one another.

* *Dion* gather'd ſome Troops together, went into *Sicily*, deſtroy'd the Tyrannical Government, expell'd the Tyrant, and reſtor'd Liberty to his Countrey. 'Tis well known what Miſchiefs were occaſion'd by this Enterprize. It being a difficult thing to preſerve Juſtice and Innocence long, amidſt the diſorders of Arms, above all thoſe of a Civil War; *Dion* had the unhappineſs only by one Action to ſtain the Glory of all the reſt; for he permitted the Murder of *Heraclides*, which did not remain long unpuniſh'd; for *Dion* was aſſaſſinated by *Callippus* the Athenian in the midſt of his Succeſſes and Triumphs.

After the Death of *Dion* his Relations and neareſt Friends wrote to *Plato*, to entreat his Advice in the deplorable Condition to which they were then reduc'd; ſome of 'em having a mind to revive the Tyranny, and others uſing their utmoſt Efforts to reeſtabliſh the Popular Government. *Plato* wrote to 'em, † *That a State would never be happy either under a Tyranny, or too great a Liberty, that the Medium was to yield Obedience to ſuch Kings as were themſelves ſubject to the Laws: that great Liberty and great Servitude were equally dangerous, and produc'd almoſt the ſame Effects; that the Obedience which was given merely to Men, was always exceſſive, and as exorbitant as their Luſts. That there could be no Moderation but only* ‖ *in that Obedience which is render'd to God, who being always the ſame, always requir'd the ſame things at the hands of his Subjects; that it was only this that could make Nations happy,*

* See *Dion*'s Life, in *Plutarch*.
† This is the 8th Letter. Tom. 3.
‖ God's Yoke eaſier than Man's.

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and that they who would obey God must obey the Law, that the Law was the God of Wisemen, and Licentiousness the God of Fools. That he therefore advised 'em to constitute three Kings, the Son of *Dion*, the Son of *Dionysius* who was expelled, and the Son of *Dionysius* the Elder, to chuse by their order such a number of Old Men as they should think fit, who should take the care of making Laws, and regulating the Government of the State, as the Kings should have the superintendance of Sacred and Religious Matters; and of all other things fit to be left at the Disposal of Benefactors. That it would after this be needful to create 35 Guardians or Conservators of the Laws, who should have the disposition of Peace and War, in conjunction with the Senate and People. That Criminal Matters should be judged by these 35 Conservators of the Laws, to whom there might be joined for Commissaries, the most aged and most honest of those Senators, that had laid down their Charge: That the Kings should not assist at these Judicial Acts; because being * Priests they could not, without defiling themselves, and derogating from their Character, condemn any one to Death, Exile, or Imprisonment. He also particularly enjoyn'd 'em to drive out the Barbarians from all the Places they possess'd in *Sicily*, and to reestablish the ancient Inhabitants in their room.

Plato surviv'd *Dion* but 5 or 6 years, which time he spent in the Academy, not being willing in any manner to intermeddle with the Government, because he saw the Manners of the Citizens were very much deprav'd. The Cyrenians sent Deputies to him, to entreat him to go and give 'em Laws, which he refused, telling 'em, *they were too fond of Riches; and that he did not believe it possible, that so rich a People could be subject to the Laws.* The Thebans made the same Request to him, and he gave 'em the like Refusal; *because*, he said, *he perceiv'd they were too great Enemies to Equality.* But He sent

* The Royalty joined with the Priesthood.

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his Disciples into those places, where the People were in a disposition to conform themselves to his Maxims.

Plato was naturally an Enemy to Pride and Ostentation; and sought for nothing but Truth, Simplicity, and Justice. His Behaviour was courteous and sweet, temper'd with Gravity. He was never seen to laugh immoderately, nor to be extremely angry. One may judge of the Mildness of his Temper by the course he took for the Reformation of his Nephew *Pseusippus*, who was excessively debauch'd. When his Parents had turn'd him out of Doors, he took him to his House, and entertain'd him as if he had never heard a word of his Debauches: His Friends amaz'd, and shock'd at a procedure that seem'd to them to carry so much insensibility in it, blam'd him for not labouring to reform his Nephew, and save him from utter ruine. He told 'em he was labouring more effectually than they imagin'd; in letting him see by his manner of Living, what an infinite difference there is between Vice and Vertue, and between honourable and base things. And indeed this Method succeeded so well, that it inspir'd *Pseusippus* with a very great respect for him, and a violent desire to imitate him, and to devote himself to the study of Philosophy, in which he afterwards made a very great progress.

His way of speaking was so agreeable and insinuating, that he never fail'd to make an Impression on those that heard him. One day as he was walking a little way out of the City, with some of his Disciples and Friends, He met *Timothy* the Athenian General returning from the Army in the greatest height of his Fortune, and at a time when the Athenians knew not how sufficiently to honour his merit, while they gave him the greatest Testimonies how much they admired and respected him. The General making a stop, would needs hear his Discourses, in which he insisted, neither on Taxes, nor the equipping of Fleets, nor the subsistance of Troops, but on Vertue, and the Dominion a Man ought to have over his

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his Passions; whereby he only aim'd at the Explication of the Nature of the Chief Good. *Timothy* struck with the Truth and Elegancy of his Maxims, cry'd out, *O happy Life, O true Felicity!* by which words he signified, he was convinc'd that all the Glory and Honour he enjoy'd were nothing in comparison of the Happiness of a Philosopher, and that without the study of Wisdom no solid Good was attainable.

As Temperance is accounted the first Vertue of a Philosopher, so 'tis said of *Plato*, that he was always very grave and sober, and always liv'd a single Life; but there is reason to doubt whether his Celibacy was the Effect of his Sobriety and Chastity; for there are yet in being some Verses which he made on a certain Miss of *Colophon*, nam'd *Archeanassa*, whom he lov'd, tho she was grown old. *I have* (says he) *with me* Archeanassa *the Miss; Love still lies in ambush in her Wrinkles. How unhappy were you that were expos'd to her Glances in her Youth! a midst what Flames have not you liv'd?* He also lov'd another, call'd *Xantippe*. He requested her Favours in very pressing Terms, and with those fine Reasons which are since become *the* * *common places of those lascivious Morals*, which now reign on one of our Theaters, from whence they insensibly glide into our Cities and Houses, viz. *That Beauty is a Flower which very speedily withers, that if Persons don't make haste to love, they lose their Youth to no purpose, and that old Age comes swiftly towards us, to ravish our pleasant Days, and all our Delights from us.*

'Tis true, 'tis said to excuse *Plato*, that these Verses are not his, but compos'd by *Aristippus*, who imputed 'em to him to degrade him, and to revenge himself on him for his Railleries. But there is not much got by this Apology, if it be true that he had yet more Criminal Passions, and that he lov'd *Dion*, *Phædrus*, *Alexis*, *Agathon*, and *Aster*. In the Ver-

* M. *Despreaux* in his Satyr against Women.

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ſes he made on 'em he expreſſes himſelf in ſuch Terms as the heat of a poetick Fancy alone could not inſpire. He writes thus to *Dion*, *Thou makeſt my Soul love thee even to Folly.* He ſays to Aſter, *that he could wiſh himſelf to be the Sky, that he might be full of Eyes to look on him*; and expreſſes himſelf after a yet more licentious manner, when he ſpeaks to *Agathon*. 'Tis true, after all, theſe Verſes may be ſuppoſititious; but if they are really his, there is ground to believe they were only the Faults of his Youth, which are the leſs ſurprizing, becauſe committed in an Age, wherein all *Greece* was tainted with horrible Enormities. *Socrates* and his Philoſophy ſoon drew him out of this miſerable State, by making him comprehend the horrid Evil of thoſe brutal Paſſions. He was not content to be cured of 'em himſelf, but alſo labour'd to make others partake of the ſame advantage, and to furniſh 'em with Remedies againſt this mortal Poyſon: for he vehemently oppoſes them in all his Writings, and particularly in his firſt Book of Laws, where he condemns the Government of *Lacedemonia*, and that of *Crete*, becauſe of their publick Exerciſes, * *which produc'd and fomented thoſe abominable Flames in Women towards Women, and in Men towards Men, by a perverſion of their natural uſe.* And he calls this deteſtable and infamous Crime; *one of the moſt audacious and execrable Sins, which Intemperance could cauſe to be committed againſt God.*

In the third Book of his Common-wealth, after he had prov'd that there is no Pleaſure more furious than that which is cauſed by irregular Love, and that it is inſeparable from Inſolence and Intemperance: He adds; † *But true Love conſiſts in loving that which is decent and becoming, and in loving according to all the Laws of Temperance and Muſick.* *Plato* uſes this Word to ſignify the perfect Accord with Reaſon and Harmony, which reſults from all the Vertues. *Nothing that is violent and furious,*

* Tom. 2. † Tom. 2.

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or that approaches Intemperance and Diſorder ought to be tolerated, and conſequently no Man ought to propoſe to himſelf any Criminal Pleaſure. Therefore a Law ſhould be made, permitting Men to love young People, provided they love 'em as a Father loves his Son; and that they have no other end but to incite 'em to every thing that is honourable and comely; and that they never give the leaſt ſuſpicion of any vicious thought, or criminal deſire. And that if they make a default herein, they be look'd on as infamous perſons, who have renounced all Honour and Virtue.

Plato deſerves to be highly commended for having lov'd his Brothers with an extream tenderneſs; for as 'tis ſaid of *Pollux*, that he would not be a God alone, but choſe rather to be a Semi-Deity together with his Brother, and to ſhare with him in a mortal State, that ſo he might make him partake of his Immortality; *Plato* in like manner was willing to communicate to his Brothers the Glory which himſelf only was capable of acquiring by his Works. In his Books of a Common-wealth he aſcribes ſome very conſiderable parts to *Adimantus* and *Glaucon*; and he makes *Antiphon*, the youngeſt of 'em all, ſpeak in his *Parmenides*, whereby he has render'd 'em all three as immortal as himſelf.

He never employ'd his Wit to revenge the perſonal Injuries he receiv'd, but to revenge thoſe that were offer'd his Friends, or the Truth. It can't be ſhown that he ſaid one Word of *Timon*, who had often attack'd him. And he anſwer'd *Diogenes* his Witticiſms only in a jeſting way, without ever ſpeaking of him in his Writings.

Plato one day having made a great Treat for the Friends of *Dionyſius*; *Diogenes* came into the Hall where the Feaſt was kept, and his Feet being very dirty, choſe to walk upon the fineſt Purple Carpets, ſaying, *I trample* Plato's *pride under my Feet.* Plato ſmiling made this Reply; *Thou trampleſt my Pride under thy Feet with greater pride of thy own.*

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Diogenes once requested some Bottles of Wine of *Plato*, who sent him three dozens. When *Diogenes* met him the next day; says he, *When one asks you how many twice two makes, instead of answering four, you answer twenty.* Thus under the Colour of returning him thanks, he reproach'd him with being too prolix in his Dialogues.

Plato having defin'd Man to be *a Two-leg'd Animal without Wings*; *Diogenes* got a Cock, cut off his Wings, and carried him to *Plato*'s School, telling his Scholars, *that was the Man their Master talk'd of.* This Jest made him change his Definition.

Diogenes being reproach'd of continual Begging; whereas *Plato* never ask'd for any thing, answer'd thus. *The only difference between* Plato *and me, is, that I beg aloud, and he whispers when he begs.*

As *Diogenes* one day continued abroad in a very great Snow mixt with Hail, and abundance of People that saw him were pitying him; says Plato, *If you have any Compassion for him, look on him no longer:* thereby to reproach him, that what he did was not from any vertuous Principle, but out of Ostentation and vain Glory.

It being his perswasion, that Men were not born for themselves, but for their Country, for their Relations and Friends; he was far from authorizing the opinion of those who believ'd that Philosophy had a right of annihilating such essential Obligations; and taught that the Life of a Philosopher is the Life of a Man entirely devoted to the publick; who endeavours to become better, only that he may be the more useful; and that he shuns the hurry of Business then only when his Country refuses his Service, or when he is incapable of serving his Country to good purpose. And his own Practise was sutable to this through the whole Course of his Life. For 'tis reported that he did not so much as excuse himself from bearing of Arms, and that he behav'd himself bravely at the Battel of *Tanagra*, that of *Corinth*, and

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and that of *Delium*, where he obtain'd a considerable Victory; but it is not known on what occasion; for this Battel of *Delium* is not to be confounded with that which was fought before in the same place; in which *Socrates* was engag'd, and sav'd the Life of *Alcibiades*, in the first Year of the LXXXIX *Olympiade*, *Plato* being then but five or six years old.

And he serv'd his Friends with as little concern for his own Life; for he not only did all we have said before for *Dion*, but also defended *Chabrias* the Athenian General when impleaded at the Bar; and when his Accuser *Crobylus*, to put him out of countenance, said to him, *Thou comest hither to defend others, little thinking that* Socrates *his Poyson is ready for thee.* He made this return; *When my Country formerly had occasion for my Life, I readily expos'd it; but there's no danger now before me to put me into a Consternation, and to make me desert my Friend.*

He would say there was nothing more unworthy of a Wise Man, and which ought to trouble him more than to have allow'd more time for unnecessary trifling and useless things than they deserv'd. Therefore he omitted no occasion of reproving such as he saw were vainly puff'd up on the account of those Qualities of which they rather ought to have been asham'd. And to this purpose 'tis said the same *Anniceris* of *Cyrene* of whom we have spoken before, who was a considerable Person both for his Birth, and for his Ingenuity; but valued himself above all for being the best Charioteer in the World, having a knack to guide a Chariot above those of the best reputation in that Art, had a mind to shew his Dexterity in his Presence. A Chariot was brought for this purpose into a Close belonging to the Academy, where he made several Turns with that exactness, that the Wheels always ran in the same Track, and constantly describ'd the same Line. All the Spectators were charm'd and extoll'd *Anniceris* to the Skies by their Praises: But *Plato* seriously blam'd him, telling him it

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it was not poſſible but that he who had ſpent ſo much time in ſo vain and inconſiderable a matter, muſt needs have neglected other things that were very neceſſary and important; and that a Mind entirely taken up with ſuch Trifles could not be capable of applying it ſelf to any thing valuable, and truly worthy of admiration.

He was ſo free from the vice of Flattery, and the baſe and ſervile ſubmiſſions of the Orators of that Age, who made themſelves Maſters of the People only by a mean and cringing Complaiſance, and by conforming themſelves to their Paſſions; that he was compar'd to *Epaminondas*, aud *Ageſilaus*; who tho they travell'd to many Cities, and convers'd with Men whoſe courſe of Life and Manners were very different, yet wherever they were, ſtill retain'd, in their Habit, in their Diſcourſe, and in all their Behaviour, what was worthy of themſelves, and ſutable to their Character. For *Plato* was the ſame Man at *Syracuſe* that he was in the Academy, the ſame with *Dionyſius* as with *Dion*: A certain ſign that the Maxims of his Philoſophy, which were full of Force and Vertue had penetrated his Soul, like a deep Tincture, which nothing can either efface or tarniſh.

During his laſt ſtay in *Sicily*, *Dionyſius* having a mind to Regale all Perſons of chief Note in his Court, and all his Philoſophers, *Plato* and *Ariſtippus* were invited among the reſt. In the midſt of the Feaſt the Tyrant order'd Purple Robes to be brought and given to all the Company, deſiring to ſee 'em dance. *Plato* refus'd the Robe that was preſented him, ſaying, *it would too much daſh him out of Countenance to ſee himſelf apparell'd like a Woman.* *Ariſtippus* made no ſuch Scruple, but took the Robe and fell a dancing, ſaying, *a very wiſe Woman would never be diſreſpected for her dancing.*

Plato has been accuſed of three things, firſt that his Humour was too Satyrical, which render'd his Writings more piquant than the Strokes of ancient Comedy, and the more unworthy of a Man of Honour,

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nour, in that he did not ſpare his beſt Friends; for inſtance when in his *Phædon* he is ſpeaking of *Cleombrotus* and *Ariſtippus*, he ſays, *they* * *were not preſent at the Death of* Socrates, *becauſe they were at* Ægina.

The ſecond thing with which *Plato* is reproached, is an envious and jealous Diſpoſition, which made him uncapable of enduring an Equal or Partner in any thing whatſoever; and engag'd him tacitely to contradict *Xenophon*, without ever giving one word of Commendation to the Vertue of that Great Man, notwithſtanding his extraordinary Merit.

The third thing objected againſt him, is that many of his Diſciples were poſſeſſed with a Spirit of Tyranny; *Euphræus* for Inſtance who was at the Court of *Perdiccas* King of *Macedonia*, had as much Authority as that Prince himſelf, and would not ſuffer him to entertain any but Geometricians and Philoſophers at his Table; which provok'd *Parmenion* to kill him after the Death of *Perdiccas*; and *Callippus* who kill'd *Dion* to make himſelf King of *Syracuſe*; and *Evagon* of *Lampſacus* who having lent Money to his Countrey, upon the Cittadel, that was given him for his Security, would have employ'd this Fort againſt it to ſubject it to himſelf; and *Tymeus* of *Cyzicus*, who having made a free diſtribution of Corn among the People, would have abus'd the Favour and Authority which that procur'd him, to make himſelf their Tyrant: And in fine *Cheron* of *Pellene*, who having cruelly brought his Countrey into ſubjection, drove away the beſt Citizens, and gave their Eſtates and Wives to his Slaves.

Plato defended againſt the Reproach of being too Satyrical.

Let's examine the firſt of theſe Reproaches. *Plato* is perhaps the only Perſon who was ever accuſed of two Faults directly oppoſite, and which are deſtructive of each other. *Athenæus* has accus'd him of being too Satyrical, and others have blam'd him for being too mild, and for having taught a very conſiderable time without diſpleaſing any one; by which he would inſinuate that his Doctrine was not good, or

* See *Plato Phæd.* at the beginning.

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that his method was bad, since nobody either in hearing or reading him had felt that trouble which naturally arises from the Sense of one's having been vicious. But without troubling my self to confute or reconcile these Contradictions, I shall only say, that *Atheneus* was himself in an ill humour, when he cast this Reproach upon *Plato*: And I shall make use of the same words against him, which this Philosopher us'd against *Anytus* who accus'd him of having been guilty of Calumny. * *He knows not what it is to calumniate, for if he did, he would not accuse me of that Vice.* And indeed *Plato* did no ways slander *Themistocles*, *Pericles* and *Thucydides*, when he made use of them as Instances to prove, that Vertue could not be attain'd, merely by Instruction; since these Men had not made their Children learn it. As for that word he spoke against *Aristippus* and *Cleombrotus*, besides that the turn of it is very fine, it must be ascribed to that Love and Gratitude *Plato* retain'd towards *Socrates*, which made him highly resent it, that his two Friends had not attended their Master at his Death, because they were at *Ægina*; which by the manner of his Speech one would take to have been at a hundred Leagues distance, tho indeed it was near the Gates of *Athens*. And as occasion offers, we shall hereafter examine all the other Satyrical Touches *Atheneus* charges on him. Not that I pretend to cross *Plato*'s Name out of the number of Satyrical Writers: For on the contrary I am perswaded that never any Man had a finer knack at Raillery; that the most refin'd Satyr is to be learned in his Works, and that none can teach it better than he. He may be compar'd to *Aristophanes* himself. But it will be no difficult matter to make it appear, that as he never threw his Darts against any but Men of profligate Lives, who by abusing their Character, corrupted Youth, and ruined Religion: He is so far from deserving Reproaches on this account, that he deserves to be highly

* In Menon.

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praisd. Wise Men, as a Learned * Father of the Church observes, ought not to give soft and flattering Touches; but on the contrary to give Wounds and Pains to those who are fallen into great Faults, and cannot be otherwise excited to Repentance and the practise of Vertue. Those Discourses which instead of carrying pungency and Reproof in 'em, are only calculated to sooth and please, are not becoming a Wise Man, since *Solomon* himself says, *The Words of the Wise are as Goads.* Besides does not every one know that Laughter is the just Recompence of Ignorance when accompanied with Pride and Vanity.

The second Accusation has no more Justice in it than the first, for 'tis chiefly founded on this, that *Xenophon* and *Plato* wrote on the same Subjects. For each of 'em made an Apology for *Socrates*, each made his Banquet and Treatises of Morality and Policy. If to make Books on the same Subjects on which others have treated were always a sign of an envious and jealous Mind; this Reproach would rather fall on *Xenophon*, who did not write of the Education of *Cyrus*, till after he had seen the two first Books of *Plato*'s Common-wealth.

Plato not justly accused of Jealousy and Envy.

And it would be no very easy matter entirely to justify *Xenophon* from this spirit of Envy, when one reads the Fragment of a Letter which he wrote to *Eschines*, in which he extreamly inveighs against *Plato*, and charges him with having corrupted the Philosophy of *Socrates*, by intermixing that of *Pythagoras*, and makes the end of his going into *Sicily* to be the Enjoyment of the Delicacies of *Dionysius* his Table. To these Invectives of his *Plato* makes no answer, nor speaks one Word of *Xenophon*; in

* St. *Jerome* on that Passage of the XII Chap. of *Eccles.* *The Words of the Wise are as Goads.* Simul & hoc notandum est, quod dicuntur verba sapientium pungere, non palpare, nec molli manu attrahere lasciviam, sed errantibus & tardis pœnitentiæ dolores, & vulnus infigere. Si cujus igitur sermo non pungit, sed oblectationem facit audientibus, iste non est sermo sapientis, verba quippe sapientium ut stimuli.

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which his Modesty can scarce be enough commended; and perhaps this Silence was the chief thing that incensed *Xenophon*. For the greatest Indignity one can offer a Writer is (not to say some ill thing of him, but) to say nothing at all to him. 'Tis true, *Plato* in one place writes, that *Cyrus* was a good General, but that he never had a good Education; by which some pretend he design'd to deny *Xenophon*'s Treatise of the Education of *Cyrus*; but this being made only to give the Idea of a great Prince, and not to pass for a true History, *Xenophon* could not be offended at a thing which he believed as well as *Plato*. In fine, that which yet more discovers with what Spirit *Xenophon* was animated against him, is the frightful Description he makes of *Menon*, in the 11th Book of his Retreat; where he accuses him of having betrayed *Clearcus*, and of having been the Cause of his Death. *Menon*'s Misfortune proceeded from the Intimacy of his Friendship with *Plato*, who had praised him, and inscribed his Name on the Dialogue he compos'd, concerning Vertue; for his pretended Treachery is not at all well proved, and he was sufficiently justified from it by his Death. Not that I pretend to accuse *Xenophon* of Calumny and Imposture: these Vices are not to be found in a Man of Sobriety and Religion; but the Hatred or Jealousy he conceived against *Plato*, dispos'd him insensibly to receive all Reports, that were made against such as were engaged in strict Friendship with him. However if *Menon* had been as bad as *Xenophon* describes him to have been, since his Villany was not known till after his Death, it can't be charg'd on *Plato* as a Crime, that he had spoken in his Praise.

Some moreover support this Accusation, in saying, that *Plato*, who speaks of almost all the Philosophers that preceded him, and refutes their Sentiments, speaks not one word of *Democritus*, tho frequent Occasions presented of saying something of him. This is also built on the Testimony of *Aristoxenes*,

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toxenes, who in his hiſtorical Commentaries, wrote that *Plato* would have burnt all the Books of *Democritus* which he could heap together, if he had not been prevented by *Amyclas* and *Clynias*, two Pythagorean Philoſophers, who repreſented to him, that it would ſignify nothing to burn 'em, ſince they were in the hands of a great many other Men. And this is counted more than enough to make it believed that *Plato* hated *Democritus*, and was jealous of his great Reputation. For my part I confeſs this Fable of *Ariſtoxenes* ſeems to me to be very ill invented: A Man who has a mind to commit his Rival's Books to the Flames, does not ſeek for Witneſſes to ſuch an Action. Beſides this ſilence of his of which they ſpeak ſo much, ſeems a very doubtful Buſineſs. If the Glory of *Democritus* had touch'd *Plato* ſo ſenſibly, why did he not take the advantage of ſo many occaſions, that were fairly offer'd him to diminiſh it, or to caſt ſome blot on it, by writing againſt him, and deſtroying ſome one or other of his Principles? An Author is ſeldom Maſter of that Reſentment with which the Glory of a Competitor inſpires him. Tis a very difficult matter to come to a certain determination of things that depend on a thouſand Circumſtances, of which we are wholly ignorant; but that which appears to me moſt probable is as follows. 'Tis affirm'd, that *Democritus* never went to *Athens*, or if he went thither that he was always unknown, and never diſcover'd himſelf ſo much as to *Socrates*. 'Tis moreover very well known, that when *Hippocrates*, who was now much advanc'd in years, went to *Abdera* to confer with *Democritus* about the Folly that was imputed to him; this Philoſopher was not yet known in *Greece*, nor had his Works been brought thither. If they had been publiſhed, they would have ſav'd *Hippocrates* the trouble of this Voyage; for they would have diſcover'd the great Wiſdom of their Author, and the Stupidity and Ignorance of the People, who founded this Accuſation of Folly only on thoſe Sentiments,

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timents, which this Philosopher explain'd in his Writings? Now the Death of *Democritus* was not long before that of *Plato*. In a word, I don't think any Passage of Antiquity will make it appear, that the Writings of the former were known at *Athens*, during the Life of the latter. Nay I am of opinion, that there are not wanting some Proofs among the Ancients, that shew they did not begin to make a noise in the World, till after the Birth of *Epicurus*. Whence we may conclude, that *Plato* was so far from hating *Democritus*, that he never knew him, nor ever saw any of his Books.

It would not be so easy to justify *Plato*'s procedure towards *Eschines*, if that with which he is reproach'd were true. 'Tis said he was so jealous of the Reputation and Credit which *Eschines* had acquired in the Court of *Sicily*; that he made it his business to seek his ruine by his Insinuations to *Dionysius*; and that he push'd this malicious and envious Humour so far, that he attributes those Discourses to *Criton*, which are pretended to have been held by *Eschines* with *Socrates* in Prison; but this being supported only by the Testimony of one *Idomeneus*, one of *Aristotle*'s Schollars, 'tis more just to guide our Judgment by *Plato*'s Vertue, than to suffer our selves to be prejudic'd against him by mere Calumnies. Would *Xenophon* have forgotten a Circumstance that might have done so much honour to *Eschines*, and cover'd *Plato* with so much shame? And have we not in *Plutarch* the Discourse which *Plato* made to *Dionysius*, to engage him to be kind to *Eschines*, and to give him some Marks of his Esteem? Nothing is more opposite to that Magnanimity, for which *Plato* has been commended, than this Spirit of Envy. Let us see how he himself speaks of the Envious, in the * 5th Book of Laws. *While the Envious Man thinks to exalt himself above others by Detraction and Calumny, he wanders out of the Path of true Vertue, and balks the Courage of his Competitors,*

* Tom. 2.

when

when they ſee themſelves treated with ſo much Injuſtice; and as he by this means extinguiſhes all that noble Emulation which the whole City appear'd to have in this glorious Contention of Vertue, he diſpirits it, and diminiſhes its Reſolution and Vigour, as much as in him lies, and renders it leſs ardent in the purſuit of Glory. Can one accuſe a Philoſopher of Envy, who ſcarce names himſelf in his own Works, and who attributes all his own Inventions and Notions to his Maſter?

* The third Accuſation is ſtill worſe founded than the two former. The Condition of a Philoſopher would be very deplorable; if he were to anſwer for all the Actions of his Diſciples. None of their Faults can be juſtly charg'd on him, but thoſe which they committed in purſuance of his Opinions. The Inſtance of *Dion* only may be ſufficient to acquit *Plato* of the charge of a Tyrannical Spirit. What could any one have done more than *Dion* did to induce *Dionyſius* the Elder and his Son after him to govern juſtly, that they might firmly eſtabliſh their Dominion? and when he had taken up a reſolution to expel the latter, could any one more vigorouſly oppoſe this deſign than *Plato* did? Beſides, 'tis a great piece of Injuſtice to make *Calippus* paſs for one of *Plato*'s Diſciples, contrary to what this Philoſopher himſelf ſays in his 7th Letter, in which he aſſures us that it was not by the ſtudy of Philoſophy that *Calippus* acquir'd *Dion*'s friendſhip; but as it uſually happens by civil Converſation, he having gone often in his Company to the Theater, to Sacrifices and other religious Rites; and they being both addicted to the ſame kinds of Pleaſure.

There is not only injuſtice in this Accuſation, but alſo either a great deal of Ignorance or a great deal of Diſingenuity. Could *Atheneus*, who had read and collected ſo much, be ignorant after what Manner *Xenophon* defends *Socrates* againſt his Ene-

* The Faults of *Plato*'s Diſciples ought not to be thrown upon him.

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mies who charg'd him with all the Violences and Injuries of *Critias* and *Alcibiades*, laying the guilt of 'em upon him, on pretence that they had been his Disciples? and if he knew this, ought not he to have made use of the same Maxims to justify *Plato?* As there is some Justice in imputing to Masters the Miscarriages of their Scholars, when they become guilty of 'em by following their Opinions and Principles; so on the other side 'tis just to ascribe to 'em their great and noble Actions, when they are the fruit of their Precepts. *Plutarch* therefore is more just than *Atheneus*, when he places to *Plato*'s Account, all the great things his Disciples had done. His Words are remarkable and entirely overthrow all the Criticism of this Censor. * *Plato* (says he) *had left fine discourses of Laws, and the Government of States; but he had impress still finer on the hearts of his Disciples. These curious discourses engag'd* Dion *to restore* Sicily *its ancient Liberty; and* Python *and his Brother* Heraclides *to deliver* Thrace *from Tyranny by killing* Cotys. Chabrias *and* Phocion, *those two Great Athenian Captains, came out of the same School.* Plato *gave Laws to the Arcadians by his Disciple* Aristonymus, *to the* Elians *by* Phormion, *to those of* Pyrrah *by* Nemedemus, *to the* Cnidians *by* Eudoxus, *and to those of* Stagira *by* Aristotle. *Nay, the Rules of governing well which* Alexander *desir'd of* Xenocrates, *were only* Plato's *Precepts. And he that kindled that Prince's Courage, and perswaded him to make war with the King of* Persia, *was* Delius *the Ephesian, an intimate Friend of this Philosopher.*

Atheneus carried his Malignity and Envy yet farther; for he writes, that *Plato*'s *Timeus*, his *Gorgias*, and his other Dialogues of the like kind, in which he treats of the Mathematicks, and of Natural Philosophy, are not so much to be admir'd, as 'tis commonly said they are: for he says the same things are to be found elsewhere, as well explained, if not better; and he assures the World, that *Theo-*

* In his Treatise against *Colotes* the Epicurean.

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pompus of *Chio* writes, that the greateſt part of his Dialogues were falſe and uſeleſs, becauſe ſome of 'em were taken from *Ariſtippus*, others from *Antiſthenes*, and others from *Bryſon*. He adds, that *when one expects in his Writings the Morals and Wiſdom of a Philoſopher, one finds nothing but Banquets, and Diſcourſes about Love, which have a great deal of Indecency, and very little Chaſtity in 'em, which he compos'd to the great undervaluing of the Judgment of his Readers.*

I will not now ſay the Judgment of *Theopompus* ought to be ſuſpected, becauſe the Ancients have accus'd him of Malice and Calumny; and therefore *Plutarch* ſays of him, 'tis ſafer to believe him when he praiſes, than when he accuſes any one. Let *Plato*'s Dialogues be taken as much as he pleaſes from *Ariſtippus*, *Bryſon* and *Antiſthenes*, ſince their Works are not now extant, the Teſtimony of *Theopompus*, contrary to *Atheneus* his Intention, proves that theſe very Dialogues which he has ſo much condemn'd are now the beſt, and moſt conſiderable Work on thoſe Matters, that is to be found among the Ancients.

And if *Atheneus* paſſes a Judgment on 'em only of his own head; I'll venture to ſay, 'tis not the firſt Fault this Author has committed, who is more to be commended for his vaſt Learning, and great Collections which were the product of a prodigious Reading, than for his Accuracy and Wiſdom in his critical Reflections, and for the Solidity of his Judgment. Is a Man well qualified to judg of *Plato*'s Writings, when he dares to write, that he can't ſee what advantage can be drawn from the Immortality of the Soul, ſince after its ſeperation from the Body, it has no more any Remembrance or Senſation?

As to what he ſays of the indecent Diſcourſes *Plato* has made of Love to the great undervaluing of the Judgment of his Readers; his aim was to decry the Dialogue of the *Banquet*; but by this he diſgraces himſelf more than he does that Dialogue. For

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beſides that he diſcovers the Corruption of his Heart; he makes it appear that he was ignorant of the beauty and deſign of that Dialogue; the end of which is only to diſengage us from the Love of Earthly Beauties, and to raiſe us to the Love of the Soveraign Beauty which is God himſelf. No one I believe will heſitate in his choice between the Judgment of *Atheneus*, and that of *Origen*, who in his Excellent Preface on the Song of Songs, ſpeaks of *Plato*'s *Banquet* in theſe Terms. *Divers Learned perſons among the Greeks, who were deſirous to penetrate into Truth, have written Dialogues about Love, to ſhow that 'tis this only that can raiſe our Souls from Earth to Heaven, and that 'tis only by the help of this, that true Felicity is attainable. The Queſtions that are ſtarted at Table on this Subject, are made by perſons not ſo greedy of Dainties, as curious to occaſion fine Diſcourſes. Nay ſome of 'em have taught in Writing, the Ways and Arts of producing or augmenting this Love in the Soul. But Men of carnal Inclinations perverting theſe Arts have employ'd them to ſatisfy their Luſts, and abus'd 'em to promote an infamous Converſation. Therefore it is not to be wonder'd at, if with us among whom there are ſo many more ignorant perſons, as there are more illiterate, a Treatiſe of Love has ſome danger attending it; ſince among the Greeks, who are ſo Learned and Wiſe, there have yet ſome been found, who have miſtaken theſe Dialogues, and interpreted 'em in a ſenſe quite different from that in which they were written, and who, taking occaſion from what is ſaid in 'em of Love, have fallen into a Snare, whether they truly found in theſe Writings any thing that incited 'em to Sin; or whether the Corruption of their Hearts hinder'd 'em from underſtanding 'em.*

This Apology ſtrikes at *Atheneus*, whom *Origen* without doubt had in his Eye; when we publiſh *Plato*'s *Phedrus* we ſhall examine whether that Cenſure paſt on it by *Dicearcus*, *Ariſtotle*'s Diſciple, in affirming (as *Diogenes Laërtius* reports) that the Queſtion

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Queſtion handled in this Dialogue is Puerile, and the Character of it Extravagant, ought to be received; and whether *Cicero* had reaſon to embrace the Sentiment of this Critick, and to tax *Plato* with having given too much Authority to Love.

Let us then without ſtopping at what has been written againſt *Plato*, endeavour to know him by his own Works.

Before the Age in which *Pythagoras* liv'd, Morality was treated on only in Sentences and Enigmas: Therefore *Solomon* ſays, a Wiſe Man will * *underſtand the words of the Wiſe, and their dark ſayings. Pherecydes*, and his Diſciple *Pythagoras*, who had brought Treaſures of Knowledg with them when they return'd from their Travels, from *Babylon*, *Egypt* and *Perſia*, were the firſt that open'd a door to good literature among the Greeks. It was from them, and eſpecially from *Pythagoras*, that the firſt Beams of Truth ſhin'd out in *Greece*. Morality was then conſiderably improv'd, yet it conſiſted only of Precepts wrap'd up in Obſcurity. The Method of Reaſoning and Demonſtrating was not yet in uſe. This dry way (if I may ſo term it) of handling Morality, was occaſion'd by the Application of Men's Minds then only to the knowledg of Numbers, Natural Philoſophy, and Aſtronomy. *Socrates* was the firſt, who upon the Reflection he made, that that which happens without us, does not nearly concern us; and that the ſtudy of it is more curious than uſeful, applied himſelf more particularly to the ſtudy of Morality, and handled it more methodically in his Diſcourſes. *Plato* his Diſciple being convinced of how great Importance it was to preſerve to Mankind ſo precious a Treaſure attempted to write of it. And that he might do this to the greater advantage, and might the better retain the Air of him who had revived this Science, prefer'd the way of writing in Dialogues, to all other Methods of treating a Subject: for beſides,

* Prov. 1.6.

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that it is the moſt diverting manner of writing, in that it as it were expoſes a Scene, in which all the Actors are ſeen to perform their parts; one may ſay it is beſt fitted to attain the end, which is to perſwade and inſtruct, that it is animated with the moſt Life, and hath all the force of contrary Opinions, wherein the two Parties defend themſelves as much as they will, or can, and conſequently the Victory obtain'd by one over the other can be no longer conteſted, at leaſt when the Dialogue is made by a Man of great ſenſe, and who makes it his only buſineſs to enquire after Truth. Before *Plato*'s time this manner of writing was very little known in the World: None had practiſed it but *Zeno* of *Elea*, and *Alexamenes* of *Teos*; but the Politeneſs, Elegancy and Beauty which *Plato* gave to this way of Diſcourſe, occaſioned the Glory of this Invention to be aſcribed to him, ſo that he has been look'd upon in all Ages as the firſt that ever made Dialogues.

There are two ſorts of Truth, that which is already known, and that which is yet unknown to us, and after which we are ſearching. This difference conſtitutes two principal Characters of *Plato*'s Dialogues. Thoſe of 'em that treat on known Truths, are called, * *Explicatory, or Inſtructive Dialogues*; and thoſe that handle ſuch Truths as are yet unknown, but enquired after, are called † *Inquiſitive Dialogues*. Each of theſe two kinds is divided into divers Species, according to the Subject of which they treat, or the manner of treating of it. For the Inſtructive Dialogues, either have Speculation for their End, and then they are divided into ‡ *Phyſical*, and ‖ *Logical*, or Action, and then they are divided into ª *Politick* and ᵇ *Moral*; and the Inquiſitive Dialogues are deſtin'd, either to ᶜ *Exerciſe* or ᵈ *Conteſt*. Thoſe that are made for Exerciſe are again of two ſorts; in ſome of 'em *Socrates* exerciſes the Mind after

* ὑφηγηματικοί. † ζητητικοί. ‡ φυσικοί. ‖ λογικοί.
ª πολιτικοί. ᵇ ἠθικοί ᶜ γυμναστικοί. ᵈ ἀγωνιστικοί.

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ſuch a manner, that he cauſes all ſorts of Truths to be produced in it, which 'tis capable of finding out it ſelf when well aſſiſted. Therefore he calls himſelf the *Midwife of Minds*, jocoſely alluding to the Employment of his Mother, who was a Midwife; and theſe Dialogues are called **Obſtetrical Dialogues*. Or elſe he exerciſes it only in making it ſound, and juſt perceive the Truths in which he is willing to inſtruct it; and theſe are called † *Dialogues of Eſſay*. In fine, thoſe that are deſtin'd to conteſt, are alſo of two ſorts; the one kind are fram'd to accuſe certain Perſons, and to expoſe certain Vices, and are therefore called *Dialogues of* ‡ *Demonſtration, or of Accuſation*. Theſe are properly ſatyrical Dialogues, made for the Reader's Diverſion; exciting in his Mind at the ſame time, a juſt Contempt of thoſe whoſe Vices are diſcover'd to him; and others are calculated to refute and overthrow Errors, and are therefore call'd ‖ *ſubverting* Dialogues. And this is the diviſion that has given a third Title to theſe Dialogues; for they have three. The firſt is the name of the principal Perſon. The ſecond is taken from the Subject, and the third is what I have been juſt mentioning, and expreſſes the Method and Turn of the Dialogue, and of what kind it is. 'Tis only the firſt of theſe at moſt which is *Plato*'s, the laſt of 'em was impos'd by the Platonick Philoſophers, and is very ancient, as we ſee by *Diogenes Laërtius*, who knows only this and the firſt. The ſecond is altogether modern. It was given by ſome that were but little acquainted with the Doctrine of this Philoſopher, and were often miſtaken. For Inſtance, at the head of *Gorgias*, they place this Title, *Gorgias of Rhetorick*; whereas the Ancients cite it only under the name of [a] *Gorgias Subverſive*. And 'tis ſo far from being true, that *Gorgias* was made to teach *Rhetorick*, that on the contrary the deſign of it is to expoſe and overthrow the ill Principle,

* μαιευτικοί. † πειραστικοί. ‡ ἐνδεικτικοί. ‖ ἀνατρεπτικοί.
[a] γοργίας ἀνατρεπτικός.

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by which the Orators were conducted, who then governed all the Cities of *Greece*; and 'tis a Dialogue purely moral; but this Subject shall be treated more at length in the Argument which shall be placed at the head of every Dialogue.

Having explained the Titles of these Dialogues, 'tis needful to say something of the different division which the Ancients have made of 'em. Some have put 'em into Fours, being of opinion that *Plato* had respect to the Tetralogies of the Ancient Tragical Poets, who compos'd four pieces on one and the same Subject for the four great Feasts of the Athenians; but I can't imagine that a great Philosopher should have so frivolous a Reason. Others have divided 'em into Threes; and 'tis certain that in his Works there are three Dialogues found that properly make but one and the same Treatise, as his *Theætetus*, *the Sophist*, and *the Politician*. In the first *Socrates* examines and refutes various Definitions of Science. In the second he establishes divers Definitions of the Sophist, which serve to shew the Art of dividing and defining, and at the same time of making the Sophists ridiculous. And in the third he defines a Politician or Statesman, and there is nothing wanting in this Treatise, because the Statesman can't be well qualified without being tinctur'd with Philosophy. The ten Books of a Common-wealth, which are look'd upon as only one Dialogue, are yet apparently one and the same Treatise with his *Timæus*, *Atlanticus*, or *Critias*. In the first, that is in the long Conversation about a Common-wealth, *Socrates* gives the Idea of a perfect State. In *Timæus* he supports his Rules and Principles by the knowledg of Nature which he communicates; and in *Critias* he confirms this knowledg of Nature, and those Rules of Morality and Policy by the Authority of ancient History, or that I may use *Plato*'s own Words, the Books of his Common-wealth form good Citizens; his *Timæus* discovers to them the Creation of the World, that this Knowledg may fortify in their Minds the Principles

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ciples he has given 'em; and his *Critias* proves to 'em by ancient Hiſtory, that ſuch was the Life of their firſt Anceſtors, that is of the firſt Athenians, who liv'd before the Deluge, whoſe Example he recommends to their Imitation. And it was after this manner, that the greateſt of Legiſlators compos'd the Lives of the Ancient Hebrews and Patriarchs. Excepting theſe ſix Dialogues, the three firſt of which make a Treatiſe of Logick, and the three laſt a very methodical Treatiſe of Morality; I don't think any others of 'em can be connected together by the Continuance of the ſame Subject: They are all ſeparate and independant, in reſpect of the matter of 'em, and have no mutual Correſpondence or Reſemblance, but by the Method or Manner of treating their Subjects, which has been already ſufficiently explained.

Plato affirms that which is certain, refutes that which is falſe, examines that which is doubtful, and does not pronounce any thing on that which is uncertain, or has but little probability.

The Maxims of Plato.

His firſt Maxim is not to give one's Conſent, but only to evident and certain Truths, and to diſengage one's Mind from all kinds of Prejudice.

The ſecond is never to attempt to handle Queſtions which 'tis impoſſible to decide.

The third is to diſtinguiſh well between what we know, and what we are ignorant of; and not to believe we know what indeed we don't underſtand.

From theſe Maxims it follows, that *Plato* believed there were certain Truths, and conſequently, that there were ſuch Principles as might be term'd *Dogmata*. That is, he affirm'd ſome things to be abſolutely true; but becauſe he entirely follow'd *Socrates* his manner of diſputing, and all along avoided the deciſive Air of the Sophiſts and Dogmatiſts, who affirm'd every thing, almoſt continually taking ſimple Probabilities for Truth, he ſeems poſitive in nothing in his Writings, in which by his Doubts he endeavours to convince his Adverſaries of the

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the Errors he designs to refute, and to make 'em of themselves discover the Truths he has a mind to teach; and thus that Passage of *Cicero* ought to be understood, who in the first Book of his Academick Questions, says, *in* Plato's *Books many things are said Pro and Con, but every thing is doubted, and nothing ever affirmed.*

The Ancients inform us, that *Plato* follow'd *Heraclitus*, in things that fall under the Cognizance of the Senses, that is in natural and sensible Objects: *Pythagoras* in intellectual things, which can't be comprehended but by the understanding; and *Socrates* in those which are only dictated by Reason, that is in Morality and Policy; and this deserves to be explained.

Plato followed *Heraclitus* in natural and sensible things, that is, he believed with *Heraclitus*, that there was but one World, that all things were produced of their Contraries; that Motion which he calls War, causes the production of Beings, and Rest their Dissolution; and in fine, that our Senses are very subject to be deceived, and that there is no certain Truth in their Depositions.

He followed *Pythagoras* in intellectual Truths; that is, he taught, as this Philosopher did, that there is only one God, the Creator of all things; that the Soul is immortal; that Men ought continually to labour to purify themselves from their Passions and Vices, that they might be united to God; and that after this Life there is a Reward for good Men, and a Punishment for the Wicked; that between God and Men there are different orders of Spirits, who are the Ministers of that first Being. Seeing he drew his Notions from the same Fountains, namely from the Egyptians and Hebrews, 'tis not to be wonder'd at, if he had the same Doctrine.

But if *Plato* followed *Pythagoras* in his Sentiments, he also imitated him in the manner of explaining them: For he deliver'd 'em only in Enigma's, and under the Vail of Mysteries, Figures and

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and Numbers, that he might not expose such sublime Truths to the Raillery of wicked and profane Men, and might discover 'em only to such as were worthy to learn 'em, and who would give themselves the trouble of unfolding them. * *'Tis not reading of Books*, says he, *that will communicate this great Knowledg; it must be attained by profound Meditation; and every one must for himself draw this Celestial Fire from its true Source. For by this Union with its Object † a divine Flame, (kindled on a sudden, as from a Fire that spreads it self round) illuminates the Mind, and feeds and preserves it self therein. And for this reason, as I have never yet written, so I am resolved never to write on these Matters:* That is, to explain them after a clear and intelligible manner. ‡ *Whoever undertakes it, will never do it to any purpose; and all the Good he'll reap by his Labour will be, that, excepting a small number of Men whom God has endowed with Understanding, capable of unravelling those Celestial Truths of themselves, he'll cause some to despise 'em, and fill others with a vain and rash Confidence, as if they understood wonderful things, when indeed they are unacquainted with 'em.*

This method often causes great obscurity in the writings of this Philosopher, which he has indeed taken care to augment, in chusing to make use of some terms that signify contrary things. And this is the reason why he can't please young People, who have not yet attain'd Judgment enough to discern the Beauty and Solidity of his Dialogues; nor grown men neither who have not had the preparation of those Studies that were necessary, before they attempted to read him, and who are not capable of Reflection and Meditation. For this reason *Antiphanes*, one of *Plato*'s Friends jocosely compar'd his Writings

* Tom. 3. † This is what *David* says in the 35th *Psalm*, *In thy Light we shall see Light.* There is none but God, that can enlighten the Minds of Men. ‡ A Remarkable Passage. *Plato* is not for writing on the Mysteries of Religion, and those of Nature.

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to a City, in which Mens words freez'd in the Air as ſoon as they were pronounced, and the following Summer when they came to be warm'd and melted by the Beams of the Sun, the Inhabitants underſtood what had been ſaid in the Winter; for *Plato*'s Diſcourſes ought to be warm'd, and as it were melted by the rays of an underſtanding well exercis'd, if one would know the true ſenſe of 'em.

In fine, he imitated *Socrates* in what relates to Morals and Politicks, that is, he reduc'd every thing to Morality, and made it his whole buſineſs to engage men to fill up the Duties they ow'd to the State in which Providence had caſt their Lot.

'Tis pretended that *Plato* to his Natural Philoſophy and Morality added Dialectick; but this ought only to be underſtood of his bringing it to perfection: For *Socrates* had the uſe of Dialectick before *Plato*; as appears by his proving and refuting ſo ſolidly in Converſation what ever he had a mind to eſtabliſh or overthrow. How can it be imagin'd that Truths were diſcover'd and prov'd before *Plato* and *Socrates* without the help of Dialectick? 'Tis impoſſible.

Theſe are then the three parts of the Philoſophy of the Academicks, Morality, Natural Philoſophy and Dialectick; and theſe three parts make Philoſophy compleat, in which one can't ſo much as imagine a fourth. Natural Philoſophy reſpects Speculation, Morality Action, and Dialectick is uſeful both for one and t'other. For 'tis by means of this that we diſtinguiſh Truth from that which has only the Appearance of it, both in Morality and Natural Philoſophy. And many Ages before *Plato*, the Philoſophy of the Hebrews was likewiſe divided into three parts, Reaſoning, the Knowledg of Nature, and Morality.

The Morality of the Platonicks.

The Platonicks make the Perfection of Morality to conſiſt in living in conformity to Nature, that is to the Will of God the only Author of Soveraign Happineſs; and they teach that the Scope of all our Deſires ſhould be to obtain of Him thoſe good things that

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that are neceſſary for Soul and Body, and for our State of Life, Thus they divide Good, into that which is divine and that which is humane,

Humane Goods are diſtinguiſhed into Goods of the Body, and Goods of Life. The Goods of the Body are Health, Beauty, good Humour, Strength, *&c.* The Goods of Life are Friends, Riches, in fine, every thing that ſerves to advance Vertue, and ſet it on work. For they teach that a man is not born for himſelf alone; but is united to all other men by Society, which renders him a member of one and the ſame body, to the Advantage of which he ought to refer all his Actions, and Thoughts.

Divine Goods are the Goods of the Soul, that is, every thing which renders the Soul capable of knowing, loving and embracing that which is good and lovely, *&c.* And they divide theſe Goods, into thoſe of Nature, aud thoſe of Morality. The Goods of Nature are the Imagination and the Memory, which properly depend on the Mind? and the Goods of Morality are thoſe that are procured by ſtudy and the habit which is form'd by Exerciſe and Reaſon. That which has made but a ſlight Impreſſion they call a certain motion toward Vertue; and that which is finiſhed is what they term Vertue, which is the perfection of Nature, and the moſt excellent of all Goods.

Humane Goods are ſobordinate to Divine; and when once a man has theſe he has all the other; the firſt of 'em all is Prudence, the ſecond is Temperance: from theſe two mix'd with Courage ſprings Juſtice, which is the third, and Valour is the fourth. They teach that Divine Goods can't be given by men, and that they are not to be acquired by our Labour; that they are given only by the favour of God, and that they ought to be ſought at his hand alone.

So that they do not equally eſteem theſe three ſorts of Goods, but prefer thoſe of the Soul before the two others, as infinitely more conſiderable, and which alone ought to be ſought for themſelves.

Hence

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Hence it comes, that they make the Happineſs of Life to conſiſt only in Vertue, tho at the ſame time they maintain, that it cannot be very happy without the Goods of the Body, and the other that are neceſſary for the uſe of Vertue; and from thence ariſes an indiſpenſible Obligation to Labour, and to fill up the Duties which Nature impoſes: An Obligation which engages us to avoid Idleneſs, and to contemn criminal Pleaſures; and which neceſſarily diſpoſes us to ſuffer all ſorts of Labour and Pain too, for that which is juſt and honeſt. From whence Friendſhip, Juſtice, and Equity reſult, which they perfer to all the Pleaſures and Advantages of Life.

There is nothing more ſolid and ſublime than theſe Morals, which make the chief Good to conſiſt in being united to God, in obeying his Commands, and in receiving with Submiſſion whatever comes from his hand; becauſe all God's Acts towards Men are uſeful to 'em, if they know how to make an Improvement of 'em.

Plato every where inſinuates a diſintereſſed frame of Mind, and the Contempt of Riches; and teaches to poſtpone all the Gold in the World to the leaſt Vertue. He is for a Man's expoſing himſelf to Death in the defence of Juſtice, and in maintaining Laws, Order, and the Publick Good; and would have us avoid, not only all criminal Pleaſures, but Delicacy, Idleneſs, and too much Sleep. We find his Writings full of Precepts of Truth, Chaſtity, Temperance, Modeſty, Patience, Meekneſs and Humility; but theſe Precepts are accompanied with Proofs. For he utterly overthrows the Principles of ill Morals, after he has propos'd 'em in their full Strength; and this is the way of Perſwaſion that becomes a Philoſopher.

Almoſt every thing in his Doctrine is worthy of Chriſtianity. * That which he ſays of the Duty of honouring Parents, deſerves to be recited. *The fear*

* Precepts of the Honour due to Parents 11th Book of Laws.

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of God is the Foundation of that Duty which Children owe their Parents; and if the Gods are pleas'd with the Reſpect which is render'd to their Images, which are only dead Repreſentations of the Deity, how much more do they rejoice in thoſe Honours which are given to Parents, who are the living Images of God; and the older they are, the more Force and Efficacy have theſe living Images of the Deity (who are kept in the Houſe like the moſt precious Jewels) to make all ſorts of Bleſſings deſcend on their Children, who give 'em the Reverence which is due to 'em; and to bring upon their heads the moſt dreadful Curſes, when they refuſe it. For God hears the Prayers which Parents addreſs to him either for or againſt their Children. So that there is no ſurer way to pleaſe God than to honour our Parents, and whenever they are reſpected 'tis very grateful and acceptable to God himſelf. The way of honouring them duly, is to love them more than our own Children, or our ſelves. And they who fail in this Duty ſhall be brought to the Magiſtrates conſtituted for this purpoſe, who ſhall take care to puniſh 'em.

Revenge forbidden.

He every where maintains, and particularly in his *Gorgias* and *Criton*, that no injury is to be offer'd to any man, no not to ſuch as deal injuriouſly with us, and makes it appear, that to introduce this Maxim into civil Converſation, that 'tis lawful for a Man to revenge himſelf and render Evil for Evil, is to pretend to lay a foundation for Juſtice in innumerable Acts of Injuſtice, and to open an inexhauſtible Source of Crimes, and Acts of Violence. What Bank would be ſtrong enough to ſtop ſuch an Inundation of Wickedneſs, and what end would there be of Injury and Revenge? He carries his Proofs of this Matter ſo far, that his Diſciples aſſure us, that he that revenges an Injury, is more criminal than he that offers it.

The Neceſſity of Prayer.

He teaches that if a man have any degree of Wiſdom, he will never undertake the leaſt thing without the Invocation of God; and that if Prayer is neceſſary before every ordinary Action, 'tis much more ſo when we

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we are about to ſpeak of God, becauſe 'tis God that illuminates our Minds, 'tis he that aſſiſts us, and without him we can do nothing. He well underſtood the Neceſſity and Beauty of that Precept of *Pythagoras*. * *Begin all thy Actions with Prayer, that thou mayſt be able to accompliſh 'em.* Prayer and Action ought to be inſeparable; want of Prayer renders Action uſeleſs, and want of Action renders Prayer ineffectual. We ought to ask what we do, and to do what we ask. But he at the ſame time affirms, that Men are ſo blinded by their Paſſions, that they know not how to pray well, unleſs God inſtructs 'em; and therefore the trueſt Prayer, and that which alone can be agreable to him, is to requeſt of him to perform his own Will in us, and not ours.

The moſt conſiderable thing in Morality is the political part of it, the true uſe of which *Plato* endeavours to ſhew, and to reeſtabliſh it in that Perfection from whence it fell by the Corruption of Men. In the time of this Philoſopher, Injuſtice had overturn'd all the States of *Greece*; ſo that there was not one Government left that deſerv'd to be approv'd. *Plato* in oppoſition to this diſorder gave a perfect Model of a moſt juſt form of Government, that all States might correct the Vices of their way of Government by this Pattern. To this purpoſe he employs his Books of a Common-wealth, and thoſe of Laws; in which he after a wonderful manner reconciles Policy to Religion, which is the very Baſis of it.

Princes can't govern well, but as they imitate God.

He ſhews that Princes and Governors of States, can never conduct the People well, but by imitating the King of Kings, the Soveraign Lord of the World, the only and perfect Model of all Wiſdom and Juſtice. For as a Sheep is not capable of guiding the whole Flock, which ought to be under the Conduct of a Shepherd; ſo one man is not capable alone of conducting others, who all together

* *Pythagoras* his Precept.

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ought to be subject to God. One would think he had read that Complaint made by the People of God by the Mouth of * *Isaiah*, as the greatest of all Miseries, *O Lord our God, other Lords besides thee have had Dominion over us.*

† He renders this Truth sensible by a Fable in which the Vestiges of the Truth of ancient History are easily discern'd. *The Memory of the happy Course of Life the first Men led is preserved to our Time. They were abundantly provided for without any Labour; the Earth spontaneously furnished them with all Necessaries: And the Cause of their Happiness was this;* Saturn *well knowing that there was no Man that could have an Absolute Empire over others, without abandoning himself to all sorts of Violence and Injustice, subjected the Nations not to men, but to more noble and excellent Beings, as their Lords and Kings; namely to intelligent Spirits (or Angels) after the same manner as we deal with our Cattle; for as we don't set a Bull over a whole Herd of his own kind, nor a Goat to govern a Flock of Goats; but put those of one kind and another under the Conduct of a Man; so God who loves Mankind plac'd us at first under the Conduct of Angels, who with marvellous Facility, and without any trouble to them, took a great deal of care of their Affairs, and by making, Peace, Chastity, Liberty and Justice reign among them, kept all sorts of Troubles and Seditions at a distance from them, and render'd their Lives very happy.* This Fable which is founded on ‡ Truth, clearly shews us, that *those Societies which yield Obedience to Men and not to God can never be happy, and will never find the end of their Miseries: and farther intimates, that if we will be happy, we must with all our might imitate that manner of Life Men led under the reign of* Saturn; *and that according to that Immortal Principle which is in us, we*

The Cause of the happy Life of the first Men.

What the Reign of Saturn *is.*

* Isa. 26. † In the 4th Book of Laws, Tom. 2.

‡ For the Nation and Kingdom that will not serve thee shall perish, *Isa.* 60. 12.

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ſhould govern our Families and Cities according to its Dictates; taking this wiſe Diſpenſation of the Underſtanding for our firſt and chief Law. For if a King, if Nobles who govern in an Oligarchy, or if the People who are ſupreme in Republicks, think of nothing but how to ſatiate their Paſſions, and drown themſelves in Senſuality, and run like mad men after ſuch Pleaſures as only irritate their inſatiable Intemperance: 'Tis impoſſible they ſhould forbear to trample on the Laws, and there can be no ſafety to ſuch as obey 'em.

The choice of Prieſts and Magiſtrates.

He gives admirable Precepts for the Eſtabliſhment of Prieſts and Magiſtrates; he would not have ſuch choſen, who have nothing to recommend 'em but their Birth, their Riches, Credit, or Power, but would have the choice of 'em regulated only by their Merit and Piety. * *Thoſe are the beſt (ſays he) who yield the greateſt Obedience to the Laws, and excel all the reſt of their Fellow-Citizens in that reſpect. The firſt places ought to be given to thoſe of the firſt Rank, the ſecond to thoſe of the ſecond Degree, and ſo of the reſt in proportion, as every one diſtinguiſhes himſelf, and is diſpoſed to look on himſelf, not as Maſter of the Laws, but as their Servant. For wherever the Law is Miſtreſs, and the Magiſtrates its Servants, there States are obſerv'd to proſper, and abound with all the Bleſſings one can expect from the hand of God: Whereas in all places where the Magiſtrate is Maſter, and the Law his Servant and Slave, there nothing is to be expected but Ruin and Deſolation.*

† He would have none made Prieſts till they are ſixty years of Age: He ſays, *they ſhould be lawfully begotten, and without any bodily Imperfection; that they ſhould be ſuch as have been educated in chaſt Families, and have their hands free from the ſtain of Blood, that they ſhould not be tainted with any of thoſe Pollutions that are offenſive to God; and are incompatible with the Sanctity of their Cha-*

* Tom. 2. † IV Book, Tom. 2.

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rather; and that their Parents should be such as have liv'd with the same Purity of Conversation.

He proves, that those Laws which are made solely for the Profit of the Legislator, and not for the Publick Good, are not properly Laws, but the Product of Self-Love and Injustice.

He shews, that of all Governments the Monarchical is the most perfect, because it approaches neareſt to the first Model; but that the Power of it ought to be mitigated by the Law which is to govern as the Supream Reason. *Monarchy the most perfect of all Governments.*

After having shown the Good and Evil of all known Governments, he maintains, that all political Schemes which tend to render the Ruler powerful to the detriment of the Subject, and which make all the Vettue of the Sovereign to consist in confirming and augmenting his Power, leaving Justice, Patience, Goodness, Fidelity, and Humanity to private Persons, as Vertues only becoming Slaves, are no better than open Tyranny; and that the end of true Policy is to make all the Members of the Community live together in Society as so many Brothers, after the most happy manner that can be, without either Poverty, or very great Riches, according to the Rules of Justice and Holiness. To engage Princes to employ Men according to the different Talents they discern in them, he * relates this Fable, which he calls a *Phœnician Lie*, because 'tis † taken out of the Books of the Hebrews. *Hear* (says he) *this Fable, you who are the Inhabitants of this City; you are all Brethren, but God who created you mingled Gold in those who are worthy to command; therefore they are the most excellent and honourable. He mingled Silver in those who are capable of assisting them in their Functions; and Iron and Brass in those who are fit for nothing but to be* *The end of his true Policy.* *To employ Men according to their Talents.*

* 3d Book of Laws. *Tom.* 2. † *Eusebius* shows that *Plato* deriv'd this Fable from what God says in the Prophecy of *Ezekiel, ch.* 22. *v.* 18. *Son of Man the House of* Israel *is to me become Dross; all they are Brass and Tin, and Iron and Lead.*

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Husband-men and Artificers: And as we are all Parents, we have ordinarily Children that reſemble us; but it alſo ſometimes happens, that he who is mix'd with Gold, has Children who are only mix'd with Silver; and he who is mix'd with Silver, hath Children mix'd with Gold, and ſo of the reſt. That therefore which God in a ſpecial manner recommends to Princes, is to take ſtricter notice of their Children than of any thing elſe, that they may well diſcover what was mix'd with 'em in their firſt formation; that if they perceive Iron or Braſs in it, they may not ſhew 'em any pity, but place 'em in the Rank to which they were deſtin'd by Nature, and make 'em Husband-men, or Artificers; and as for ſuch as are found to be temper'd with Gold or Silver, that they ſhould deſtine ſome of 'em to govern, and the reſt to aſſiſt and eaſe them by their Miniſtry; there being an Oracle which predicts, that the City ſhall periſh when under the Government of Iron or Braſs.

This Treatiſe is full of admirable Maxims, and ſuch as are worthy to be ingraven on the Hearts of all Mankind. 'Tis true, there is one very conſiderable defect in it, in that *Plato* to take away *Meum* and *Tuum* from the Government which he forms, inſtitutes a Community, not only of Eſtates, but alſo of Women and Children. This Notion was not entirely Chimerical, ſince it had already been put in practice in part among the *Lacedemonians*, and ſome other Nations; but that does not excuſe it from being a moſt vitious Uſage; for the Authority of Cuſtom can't render that Good which is in its own Nature Evil. This Community of Things and Perſons can't conduct this Law-giver to the end he propoſes, but on the contrary ſets him at a greater diſtance from it, and makes him loſe the advantage of all he has before eſtabliſhed; for inſtead of uniting his Citizens this divides 'em, by breaking aſunder all Relations, and all the moſt ſacred Ties of Nature, and trampling on Laws, and Religion, Honour and Decency. Before the Chriſtians ſhew'd their

A defect in Plato's *Politicks.*

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their Indignation againſt a Maxim ſo full of Wickedneſs and Error, the Pagans diſcerned the falſhood of it; for *Ariſtotle* attacks it in the II Book of his Politicks. Nay *Plato* himſelf abandons it in his *6th* Book of Laws, where he reſtores all that honour to Marriage of which he had before diveſted it.

Beſides this Fault, there is another taken notice of, and that is the Education of Women, to whom he aſſigns the ſame Employments as Men committing to 'em the Command of Armies, and the Government of States. He founded this Notion on a Maxim of *Socrates*, who held, that Women were capable of the ſame Vertues as Men, tho they can't carry them to the laſt Perfection. Excepting theſe two things, which yet occaſion very ſolid, and very uſeful Reflections, there is nothing among the Writings of the Pagans, which better deſerves to be read, and retained, than *Plato*'s Book of a *Republick*, and thoſe of *Laws*: They have a Beauty on 'em that may be called Divine; and indeed they appear to be a Copy of a truly divine Original. For this * Republick of which *Plato* gives an Idea, is the true Draught of the Common-wealth of the Hebrews under the Conduct of *Moſes*. We ſee in both the ſame Simplicity of Manners, the ſame way of living, and the ſame end propos'd. The Miſeries of both proceed from the ſame Cauſes; that is only from the Diſobedience of the People; and their forgetfulneſs of their principal Duties; and their Proſperity always ſprings from their diligent Attendance on the ſame Duties, and their readineſs to obey. But here is one thing that ſeems to be very remarkable. *Plato* will have his wiſe Man to be of a wonderful Genius, and Temper; he muſt have had a miraculous and divine Education; he muſt from his Youth have given Marks of his great Zeal for the Publick Good; he muſt be fit, both for a Contemplative and Active Life; he muſt be an E-

Moſes the Model on which Plato forms his wiſe Man.

* *Plato*'s Republick, the Draught of that of the Hebrews.

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nemy of Grandeur, and attain it only by Obedience; this Obedience muſt be the occaſion of his taking the Conduct of a People; he muſt govern them according to the Inſtitutions of God to whom he is only a Vicegerent; Religion muſt be the principle and end of all his Enterprizes; he muſt have both Severity and Meekneſs; he muſt be arm'd with Courage and Temperance, with Juſtice and Wiſdom; and muſt make it his buſineſs to render thoſe whom he governs the Friends of God. And theſe are the principal Strokes in *Moſes* his Picture; ſo that if the Idea of our Philoſopher does honour to this Legiſlator, and his People whoſe Grandeur he repreſents; one may ſay the Truth accompliſhed in one and t'other does yet more honour to the Philoſopher, by ſhewing his great Wiſdom, and the extent of his Mind. If *Plato* had had this Idea without any knowledg of the Hiſtory of *Moſes* (which yet I do not believe) nothing can be imagined greater; he would be more than a Man. And if he form'd it only on this Hiſtory, which he had read, or learn'd by Tradition in *Egypt*; it was a very great Demonſtration of his Wiſdom, that he diſcern'd the Beauty of it, and follow'd it as a Pattern.

Religion founded on Revelation.

As *Moſes* regulated the People of God, ſo *Plato*'s Wiſe-man regulates thoſe under his Conduct. Firſt he inſtructs them in Religion, about which he eſtabliſhes nothing without having conſulted God; that is nothing but what is conformable to true Traditions, and ancient Oracles. He fortifies them againſt the Poyſon of the Theology of the Poets who intermix Lies with the Truth, and againſt the Religion of credulous and ſuperſtitious People. He teaches 'em to believe there is one only true God, who being infinitely Good loves Mankind, and is willing to render 'em happy, and who as he is alſo infinitely Juſt makes none happy but thoſe who reſemble him, and puniſhes ſuch as diſhonour the ſacred Character he had imprinted on 'em. He tells 'em that *God as*

4th Book of Laws, 2.

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we are taught by ancient Tradition * *having in himself the beginning, the middle and the end of all things, always goes on his way according to his Nature without ever ſtepping aſide: He is followed by Juſtice which never fails to puniſh the Tranſgreſſions committed againſt his Law. Thoſe who would be Happy, conform to this Divine Juſtice with* † *Humility; whereas he that becomes proud becauſe of his Riches, Honours, or Beauty (for Beauty often betrays young people into Extravagancy and Folly) and who has preſumption enough to think he has no need of a Guide, but is capable of conducting both himſelf and others, is entirely abandon'd of God for his Pride. A Man in this condition joins himſelf to others who are tainted with the ſame Vice; and* ‡ *turning all things upſide down with extreme boldneſs, and moſt horrible preſumption, he comes to be look'd upon by the people as ſome great perſon: But ſoon after by the juſt judgment of God, he is ſeen to deſtroy himſelf, to ſubvert his own Houſe, and to involve the whole State in his Ruine.* He explains to 'em the Puniſhments that are reſerved for the Wicked. *They are not limited* (ſays he) *to the Miſeries of this Life, nor to Death it ſelf, from which even Good Men are not exempted; for theſe are Penalties too light, and ſhort; but they are horrible Torments which ſhall never have an end.* He encourages them by the hope of Rewards, and an everlaſting ſtate of Felicity. He takes ſo great care of 'em that he obviates every thing that might occaſion 'em to call in queſtion the Divine Providence, and throw 'em into Impiety. One would think he had copied out of *David's*

The Recompence of Humility.

The Puniſhment of Pride.

* This is what God ſays in Iſa. 41. 4. *I the Lord the firſt, and with the laſt I am he.* † *Plato* here employs the ſame term, which the ſacred Writers uſe, to expreſs one who is of a humble Spirit, ταπεινὸς; ſo that the Pagans, not only knew the name of the Vertue, but the Vertue it ſelf. ‡ *Plato* here admirably well repreſents the Miſery and Littleneſs of ſome Men, who think themſelves great, and appear ſo in the Eyes of the People: And ſhows, that there are no Men truly great but ſuch as humbly ſubmit to the Divine Law.

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Pſalms; for thus he ſpeaks to a Young Man not well inſtructed in the Divine Conduct. *You have in you a Nature which having ſomething Divine in it, leads you to believe the Gods, but the proſperity of the Wicked, whoſe happineſs is ſo much boaſted of, tho they are indeed very miſerable, is ready to lead you into Impiety: You can't ſee profligate Perſons arrive at extreme Old Age without meeting with any remakable Calamity, and leave their Children's Children after 'em, Heirs to their Eſtates and Fortune; you can't ſee all this (I ſay) without being ſhaken by it. You have often heard ſay, and have often ſeen with your own Eyes, that the meaneſt Perſons have aſcended Thrones by their Crimes; and upon this you dare not down-right deny the Gods, nor accuſe them of being the cauſe of this; for there is ſomething in you, that reſtrains you from this, and oppoſes it: But you are ſo far ſeduced and deceived by your Folly and Ignorance, that while you confeſs there are Gods, you reduce your ſelf to ſay they are regardleſs of humane Affairs. A Remedy ought to be ſpeedily applied to remove this Diſtemper, before it has time to grow upon you, and ſo to precipitate you into the Abyſs of Impiety. Perhaps it will be no difficult matter to prove, that the Gods extend their Care and Regard to the ſmalleſt things as well as the greateſt. And that the divine Nature being Vertue it ſelf, extends its Providence over all.*

IId Book of Laws, Tom. 2.

Proofs of Providence.

And indeed he proves this with wonderful Solidity. I'll only give an Abridgment of theſe Proofs, which have yet more force in the Original. *If God* (ſays he) *ſhould take no care of Men, it would be either through Malice, or Ignorance, Weakneſs, Negligence or Lazineſs: But none of theſe Vices, which are in us, can be found in God, who is infinitely perfect; who is Goodneſs, Knowledg, Wiſdom, Power, Providence, and Activity it ſelf. He takes care of all things, for he created them, and they are his. How then can he neglect Men, who belong to him in a more particular manner? Has God leſs Capacity,*

Tom. 2.

or

or is he leſs diligent than Artificers? By how much the more knowing theſe are; by ſo much the more perfect are their Works, whether ſmall or great, they forgetting nothing that may conduce to the Improvement of 'em. And ſhall God, who is moſt wiſe, moſt knowing, and has a Power proportionate to his Will, regard only the greateſt things; and neglect others which may be ſtill more eaſily mended; as if he was idle, and afraid of giving himſelf trouble? This is followed with other admirable Proofs, which it would be too long to relate. In fine, he * ſhows, that *ſooner or later God renders to every Man according to his Works. The Righteous, who have been expos'd to Troubles in this Life are recompenced in the other, and the Wicked who have always enjoy'd the Pleaſures of the World, are puniſhed in Hell. This is neceſſarily infer'd from the Juſtice of God: 'Tis impoſſible to avoid this Judgment which the Gods have fix'd by that Providence which you oppoſe, and of which you ſhall one day be fatally convinced; don't ſuppoſe that it will negligently paſs you by. † Tho you ſhould ſeek a ſhelter by hiding your ſelf in the deepeſt Caverns of the Earth; tho you ſhould have Wings, and could fly into the Heavens to hide your ſelf there; the Divine Providence would ſeize you every where; and you ſhall never avoid the Puniſhments you deſerve; whether in this World, or in Hell, or in ſome other place yet more terrible.*

God at the laſt Judgment renders to every Man according to his Works.

He afterwards ſhews, that not only they ſhall be puniſhed who deny the Divine Being, diſpute againſt Providence, or blaſpheme God, by ſaying he ſuffers himſelf to be bribed by the Offerings of the Wicked, but alſo ſuch as have heard theſe Blaſphemies; and yet neglect to bring the Authors of 'em before the Judges who are ſet to puniſh 'em. He alſo inſtitutes Penalties for thoſe who by their own private

The Puniſhment of impious Perſons ſtated.

The Puniſhment of ſuch as hear Blaſphemy without diſcovering it.

* Tom. 2. † This is what *David* ſays in almoſt the ſame Terms, Pſal. 139. 7, 8. *Whither ſhall I go from thy ſpirit? whither ſhall I flee from thy Preſence? if I aſcend up into Heaven thou art there, if I make my Bed in Hell, behold thou art there.*

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Particular Forms of worſhip condemned.

Authority teach or practice in their Houſes particular Forms of Worſhip, and to prevent this Inconveniency, he applies himſelf to diſcover the Cauſe of it. He ſays this commonly proceeds from Women, and weak Minds, when they find themſelves in any danger, or under any adverſe Circumſtances; or when on the contrary they meet with unexpected Proſperity, or are in ſome tranſport of Joy; or in fine, when their Imagination is diſturb'd by ſome fright, ſo that they fancy they have ſeen Spectres, either waking or ſleeping. For ſuch People as theſe when in this Condition, are wont to vow to offer the firſt thing that comes into their Heads: they promiſe Sacrifices and Images; and fill their Houſes with Chappels and Altars; or ſet up particular forms of Devotion, which by degrees degenerate into dreadful Superſtitions, or impious Novelties, which entirely ruin both Religion and good Manners; for what is it that can't enter into the head of a Man or Woman, that is weak or perverted? and 'tis for this reaſon *Plato* forbids Innovations in Worſhip, and makes this Law, *That no private perſon ſhould have either a Chappel or Altar in his Houſe, but when he has a mind to offer Sacrifices he muſt go into the publick Temples; he is to put his Victims and Offerings into the Hands of the Prieſts and Prieſteſſes, to whoſe Care the ſacred Altars are committed, there he muſt make his Prayers, where thoſe that come to worſhip may join with him. For it does not belong to every Man to conſecrate Altars; but 'tis the work of a very enlighten'd Mind.*

In the 10th Book of Laws. Tom. 2.

The Origin of Superſtitions.

They are mad, when they are merry. Wiſd. 14. 27.

Domeſtick Chappels and Altars forbidden.

To cure Men of Superſtition and Idolatry which then reigned ſo much in the World, *Plato* forgets nothing that might induce 'em to render God a rational Worſhip. For this purpoſe he endeavours to raiſe their Minds in giving them an Idea of God, which might in ſome ſort agree with his Eſſence, which mortal Eyes can't ſee but very imperfectly. The ſtrokes with which he forms this Idea are ſcatter'd up and down in all his Works. The principal

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of 'em which I have collected are these that follow.

God is one, eternal, immutable, incomprehensible Being. He created and dispos'd all things by his Wisdom; he maintains and preserves all things by his Providence; he is in all places, and no place can contain him. He is all things, and yet he is none of those things which are by him, and have received their being from him. For he is greater than Essence it self: he sees all things, knows all things, and penetrates the most secret thoughts; he fills the Capacity of the Deeps, and the Immensity of the Heavens; all Knowledg, Good, Vertue, Light, Life are only in him, and are Himself. He is at the same time infinitely Good and infinitely Just. He loves men with a singular Affection; and created 'em only to render 'em happy: But as he is Holiness and Justice it self he makes none happy but those who resemble him in Righteousness and Holiness: And punishes those who have corrupted the sacred Character he had impress'd on 'em by creating 'em after his own Image. *What God is.*

He says, none but God can cure all the Infirmities of Men.

He teaches that God nor only hates Liars, and perjur'd persons, but also such as swear vainly and unnecessarily, and who debase and profane the Majesty of his Name, by using it rashly on all occasions, whereas it ought to be mentioned with all possible Sanctity and Purity of Mind. *Lies, Perjury and profane Swearing abhor'd of God.*

The generality of Philosophers were divided about the Nature of the Chief Good: Some made it consist in the knowledg of Arts and Sciences, others in Pleasures, and others in Authority and Power. *Plato* opposes all these Errors; and shews that the Supreme Good is not to be found in the Sciences; seing these and Vices often appear together in the same Persons, and 'tis very common for Men to abuse 'em: He proves that Power can't render a Man happy without Justice; and shews that which Men call Pleasures, namely sensual Delights, are by no means *What Pleasures are.*

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means of the nature of that Pleaſure which can give us the Supreme Happineſs: For they are the Conſequence of Humane Weakneſs and Infirmity; and may be called the Daughters of Sorrow: they are always hatching but never exiſt. 'Tis therefore a ridiculous thing to make the chief Good conſiſt in that which has no Eſſence of it ſelf, but only ſprings from our Miſeries and Neceſſities. He moreover proves it by other Reaſons no leſs ſolid, which may be ſeen in their proper place.

In his Phileb. *which is entirely employ'd on this Subject. And in the* VI *Book of his Republick.*

He does not content himſelf to ſhew wherein the chief Good is not to be found; he alſo teaches where it is; and the force of his reaſoning is preciſely this: The Chief Good muſt be perfect, ſelf-exiſtent, ſelf-ſufficient, the firſt and laſt end of all things; and the only ſcope of all Mankind in general. Knowledg or Pleaſure are the only things in which one can with any ſhadow of Reaſon make the Chief Good conſiſt; but it can neither be found in Knowledg without Pleaſure, nor in Pleaſure without Knowledg: It muſt therefore of neceſſity conſiſt in that which unites theſe two things together, and poſſeſſes 'em in the higheſt degree, and that is God.

In the VI *Book of the Republick.* Tom. 2.

Nay, ſays he, That Knowledg and Truth of which God is the Cauſe can't be the Chief Good, *for they are infinitely leſs beautiful and leſs perfect than God, whoſe Image they do but very imperfectly repreſent; as Light is but a very imperfect repreſentation of the Sun. So that the Supreme Good, being greater, more auguſt and more perfect than Truth and Knowledg, can be no other than God himſelf.* Therefore it is not to be found but in God who is the ſole Treaſure and perfection of Light; and the Author of true and ſolid Pleaſures. Whence he infers that while we are on Earth, we can't acquire this Chief Good but after an imperfect manner; and ſhall not enjoy it fully till after Death; becauſe we can't till then know clearly what we knew only obſcurely during this Life: And this is one of his proofs for

In his Phedon.

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the Immortality of the Soul; namely becauſe it is capable of Action and Knowledg after Death.

But 'tis not enough for a Philoſopher to point out the Supreme Good, unleſs he alſo ſhew the way of obtaining it; and this is what *Plato* does with marvellous Solidity. For he proves that, to be Happy, we muſt be united to God; that in order to be united to him, we muſt reſemble him in Holineſs and Righteouſneſs; that to obtain theſe Gifts at his hand we muſt ask 'em in Prayer, and that our Prayers ought to be animated with Love; which he calls the Sureſt and moſt Effectual Courſe Men can take to lead 'em to Happineſs: for a bleſſed Immortality is the fruit of Love. Therefore a Learned Interpreter of *Plato* highly commends *Socrates* for having known, that to raiſe our Souls to the Enjoyment of God, we muſt take Reaſon and Love for our Guides. Reaſon teaches us the right way, and hinders us from wandering out of it, and Love by its ſweet Perſwaſions and inſinuating Graces, makes us find all things eaſy, and ſoftens the Labour and Toil, which is inſeperable from the Conflicts we muſt go through.

In his Banquet.

Maximus Tyrius.

He ſhews, there is nothing more natural to Mankind than Love. They naturally love every thing that is fair and beautiful, becauſe their Souls are deriv'd from the very Source of Beauty. But every thing that in ſome ſort reſembles this Primitive Beauty moves 'em more or leſs, according as their Souls are more or leſs ſtrictly united to their Bodies. So that thoſe whoſe Souls are moſt diſingaged in every Beauty adore that Sovereign Beauty whoſe compleat Idea they have, and for which indeed they were born. And this Adoration produces in 'em Temperance, Fortitude, Wiſdom, and all other Vertues. But thoſe who ſink down and wallow in Matter; and no longer preſerve any Idea of the Sovereign Beauty, run furiouſly after imperfect and tranſitory Beauties; and without Fear or Wit plunge themſelves into all ſorts of Filthineſs and Impurity.

In his Phedr.

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I can't here ſtand to remark on each Subject the great Truths which are taught by this Philoſopher and deſerve our Attention: What I propos'd to my ſelf was only to relate a few of 'em; to give ſome Idea of 'em, and hereby to excite the Curioſity of the Reader: The reſt will be more advantageouſly ſeen in their Source.

Plato regulates all the Civil Affions of Life.

After he has with wonderful Accuracy eſtabliſhed all that relates to Religious Worſhip; he in like manner provides for what concerns civil Matters. He creates Magiſtrates, propoſes Laws, and forgets nothing that may augment, and ſecure the welfare of the Common-wealth; for he is not content only to regulate Marriages, Divorces, the Education of Children, Wills, Guardian-ſhips, War, Peace, and other principal Matters; but deſcends into a ſurprizing Particularity. And as we may obſerve that God has not left ſo much as one part of the Univerſe without imprinting on it the Characters of his God-head, that Men might by no means be ignorant of it; ſo *Plato* has not left any part of humane Life, whether private or publick, without a Regulation by ſome Precept or Law, to prevent the Commiſſion of Faults and Injuries in it.

XIth *Book of Laws.* Tom. 2. *The Duty of ſuch as find a Treaſure.*

He determines what ought to be done with any thing one finds, which another has loſt. He ſays, *if he ſhould find a Treaſure he would not touch it, till he had conſulted the Diviners, and they had aſſured him he might appropriate it to himſelf. This Treaſure* (ſays he) *has ſome Owner; we muſt therefore wait till this Owner, or his Heirs come to demand it; for we ought to obey the Law which ſays, Thou ſhalt not take away that which thou haſt not laid down, and that other Law which is not leſs ancient. Thou ſhalt not take another Man's Goods. This Treaſure in our Coffers is not ſo valuable as the Progreſs we make in Vertue and Juſtice; when we have the Courage to deſpiſe it. Beſides, if we appropriate it to our own uſe, 'tis a String of Curſes to our Families.*

Becauſe

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Becauſe Injuſtice reigns chiefly in Trade; he is unmindful of nothing that may prevent it; and goes ſo far as to forbid the Seller * *to make two Words, and falſly to commend what he is about to ſell.* *Trade.*

To prevent the Manners of Foreigners from corrupting thoſe of his Citizens, and that when theſe are corrupted the Laws may not be render'd uſeleſs by 'em, he does not permit every one to travel indifferently; but is for having the State make choice of thoſe to whom this Liberty ſhall be granted. They muſt be above 40 Years of Age; they muſt be Men of Sobriety and Wiſdom, and capable of remarking what is good in other Commonwealths; and they muſt make a faithful report of Things at their return; that the Laws that are received may be augmented or corrected by their Memoirs, and the Government by this means be brought to greater perfection. *Travelling.*

Men rejoice when they are happy, and think themſelves happy when they rejoice. Hence it is that they have ſuch a propenſion to Pleaſure. God compaſſionately accommodates himſelf to this ſo natural Inclination, and extracting Good out of Evil makes uſe of it as a very proper means to confirm Men in what is Good; and that they might never loſe ſight of the Religion which he eſtabliſhed. So that to hinder 'em from throwing themſelves into thoſe Exceſſes to which Nature when abandon'd to it ſelf carries them, he was pleaſed to inſtitute Feaſts for his People by *Moſes*, and order'd him to regulate every thing to be obſerv'd in 'em. Tradition had preſerv'd ſome remembrance of theſe Inſtitutions, for ſome Veſtiges of 'em are found in *Plato*, who attributes 'em to the Egyptians in his IId Book of *Laws*, where he complains of the too great Liberty that was allow'd the Poets in all the Cities of *The Origi of Feaſts, Shows, and Muſick, &c.*

* *Solomon* condemn'd the ſame abuſe in the Buyer who ſlights what he is buying, and after he has got it, boaſts as if he had outwitted the Seller. *It is naught, it is naught (ſaith the Buyer) but when he is gone his way then he boaſts.* Prov. 20. 14.

" *Greece*,

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Greece, to keep young People under the Conduct of very pernicious Maxims by their Verſes. He affirms that it was otherwiſe in *Egypt*, where there were very wiſe Laws to hinder this Corruption. "The "ancient Egyptians (ſays he) knew that Children "ought to be early accuſtom'd to ſuch Geſtures, "Looks and Motions, as are honeſt and decent; "and that they ſhould not be ſuffer'd, either to hear "or learn any other Verſes, or Songs, but ſuch as "were fit to inſpire 'em with Vertue. Therefore "they took care to regulate the Dances and Songs "that belong'd to their Feaſts and Sacrifices. Nay, "they puſh'd this Matter yet farther; for they "never ſuffer'd any Painters or Statuaries to inno-"vate any thing in their Art, to invent any new "Subjects, or any new Habits. And hence it is "(ſays he) that in reſpect of what concerns theſe "Arts and Muſick, you ſhall find no Work through-"out all *Egypt* that has been made for ten thouſand "Years paſt, which is form'd any otherwiſe than "thoſe pieces which are made at preſent. They "are all alike, they are neither fairer, nor more de-"form'd. The Art remains ſtill the ſame, the Rules "of it the ſame. And there is nothing more ad-"mirable, or more worthy of a good Law-giver, "and of a wiſe Adminiſtrator of Governments than "to have regulated and fixed all theſe Matters that "have a regard to Pleaſure, and particularly that "which reſpects Muſick: And to do this is the "Work, either of God himſelf, or of ſome divine "Man. So that all their Dances, all their Poeſy, "all their Songs were ſanctified; and not the leaſt "thing was ſuffer'd which did not anſwer the de-"ſign of the eſtabliſh'd Religion, and which was "not worthy of the Feaſts that were celebrated by "'em. This indeed is a very remarkable Traditi-on; and *Plato* does not fail to make a very good Im-provement of it; for he purſues the ſame deſign; and inſtitutes Feaſts for his People, that during the time of their Relaxation from Labour, they might render

Tom. 2. *The care which the ancient Egyptians took to prevent all ſorts of Novelties.*

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render homage to God, and testify their Gratitude to him for all the benefits they received from his Divine Hand. He suffers nothing to be acted at these Feasts, but what was Sacred or Innocent. He forbids all such Poetry and Musick as might be injurious to the Honour of God, or dangerous to the Manners of Men; and only receives such as might tend to rectify and instruct the Minds of the People. The Ancient Hebrews used only Lyrick Poesie, which in singing the Praises of God, and those of Vertuous Men, raises the Courage, and excites Devotion. And this was also the only kind of Poesie in use among the first Greeks, as appears by a Passage of *Plutarch* in his Treatise of Musick. *The Ancient Greeks* (says he) *were unacquainted with the Musick of the Theatre, they employ'd this Art only in honouring the Gods, and in instructing of Youth; for there were then no Theatres in their Cities, Musick was reserv'd for the Temples where the Gods were honour'd in Songs, and where the Praises of vertuous Men were sung.* While *Plato* authorizes this Lyrick Poesie, he also receives other Poems which were already established, and which it was impossible to extirpate and destroy: But we shall see what precautious he takes to purge and to discharge 'em of that Poyson which render'd 'em so dangerous.

The Poesie of the Ancient Hebrews.

The Poesie of the First Greeks.

The Greeks being extreamly addicted to the pleasure of Musick, this inordinate Passion had made 'em receive all the Works of Poets and Musicians, which had at last so alter'd and transform'd the Ancient Poesie and Musick, that instead of that Wisdom, Gravity and Sanctity that reign'd in the Pleasures of their Ancestors, nothing was found in theirs but Folly, Effeminacy, and Impiety. *Plato* therefore seeks to re-establish this Ancient Purity, and is for a perpetual prohibition of any alteration in Musick. *It is not to be imagin'd* (says he) *what a weight and force there is in Plays and other Pleasures, either for the Support or Ruin of Discipline and*

VII *Book of Laws*, Tom. 2. *Of what importance it is to regulate Plays, and the Pleasures of the people.*

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Laws. If Alterations be ſuffer'd continally to be made in 'em; and young people be continually accuſtom'd to new Pleaſures, every day to have new Pieces, new Ornaments, and Dances; and to eſteem none but thoſe who can furniſh this unlimited Variety, there can be nothing more pernicious to a State, for this inſenſibly changes the Manners of young people; ſo that they can no longer endure any thing that is Ancient; and only value Novelties; and this opens a Door to all the moſt dangerous Errors both in reſpect of Politicks, and Religion.

The pernicious conſequences of the Guſt Men have for Novelties.

Theſe Alterations are dangerous in every thing; but eſpecially in Muſick, becauſe all Muſick being an Imitation, that only ought to be ſuffer'd, which imitates what is good and uſeful; the other being rather a Plague than a Play, which he explains after a ſenſible manner by this Example, which appears to me to deſerve our attention.

Tom. 2. *The way* Plato *takes to illuſtrate the horror of pernicious Plays.*

If we ſhould ſee (ſays he) *at our Sacrifices, after the Victims were conſumed in the Fire, a Man approach the Altars, and extravagantly utter Blaſphemies and Impieties; ſhould we not think all his Family would look upon this as a great Misfortune, and a very fatal Omen? That which is done in our Time in the publick Shows and Plays, is not much different from this. For after the Magiſtrates have Sacrificed, we ſee divers Choirs of Muſick come, and in the view of our Temples and Altars they utter moſt execrable things againſt theſe very Altars, contradict the Principles of Religion by their Impious Maxims, and affect the Souls of their Auditors by their indecent Expreſſions, laſcivious Dances, and their effeminate and voluptuous Tunes. Ought not this then to be aboliſhed, and the Poets oblig'd to ſubmit to other Rules? And ſince all Poets are not capable of knowing what is truly excellent and good; ought we not to make choice of ſuch who in their Imitations can follow the Idea of Beauty and Decency? That young people may receive improvement by every thing, as being in a very advantageous place, and that all which*

This paſſage is taken out of the III Book of his Repub.

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which ſtrikes their Eyes and Ears ariſing from a good ſpring, that is from a Subject which is excellent in it ſelf, may be like a good Air which having paſs'd through wholſome Places, carries health along with it, and may inſenſibly accuſtom them to love and imitate thoſe Diſcourſes, and conform all the Actions of their Lives to them.

To this purpoſe he makes the following Law. *Let none be ſo inſolent as to ſing any thing beſides our Sacred Hymns, or to alter and vary the received Dances any more than our other Laws. And if any one diſobey this Statute, let the Conſervators of the Laws, together with the Prieſts and Prieſteſſes take cognizance of it.* *The* VII *Book of Laws about Songs and Dances.*

To this Law he added another: *Let no Poet in his Imitations, depart from any of the Maxims which the City has received as good and juſt; nor let him preſume to ſhew his Compoſitions to any private Man * till they have been ſeen, and approv'd by Judges eſtabliſh'd for that purpoſe, and by the Conſervators of the Laws.* Tom. 2. *A Law about Poetry, and Poetical Imitations.* *Judges eſtabliſhed to judge of 'em.*

In the II Book of the Republick, he had made the ſame Law for thoſe Poets who compos'd the Fables that were taught to Children: He was for having Judges to approve the Good and reject the Evil. *Judges appointed to judge of Fables.*

He uſes the ſame Precautions about Comedies and Tragedies, as he does about Songs, Dances, and all other Imitations. He thinks Comedies neceſſary to make Men know what is ridiculous, and to expoſe Vices that are repreſented in 'em. *For* (ſays he) *one can't know what is comely and ſerious, unleſs one knows what is indecent and ridiculous. And to acquire Prudence and Wiſdom, we muſt know their* *Comedies judged neceſſary, and why,* VII *Book of Laws.*

* *Plato* took this too from the Tradition of the Ancient Hebrews, for they had Judges appointed to try all new Pieces which were made either in Proſe or Verſe, and theſe received only ſuch as were conformable to Religion, and rejected the reſt. They alſo prohibited the ſinging of Hymns and Songs by any other than the common and received Tunes. *Euſeb. preparat. Evangel.* XII 22. & 23.

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contraries. Not that any Man who has any tincture of Vertue can equally do what is good and evil, decent and indecent, but it's needful he ſhould know theſe things for fear he ſhould through ignorance fall into what is ridiculous, and ſhould do or ſay any thing unbecoming him. But we'll make uſe only of Slaves or Mercenary Strangers to make theſe Imitations, and all free Men and Women ſhall be forbidden to be concern'd in 'em, or to learn 'em.

Tragedies how receiv'd.

As for Tragical Poets (ſays he) *who boaſt of imitating great and ſerious Actions; when any of 'em come into our City, and ask if we are willing to receive 'em among us, and ſee their Tragedies, what anſwer ſhall we make theſe Divine Men? Methinks we ought to make 'em this return. Friends, we are employ'd in Tragedies as well as you, and we make the beſt and fineſt we can, for our Policy is only an imitation of the moſt refin'd and excellent way of living; this is the true ſort of Tragedy with which we are acquainted. So if you are Poets, we pretend to the ſame thing, and declare our ſelves your Rivals in that Noble Imitation which can be perfected only by the Law. Therefore do not hope to be ſo eaſily permitted to build Theatres in our publick Places, and to introduce Skilful Actors that ſhall extend their Voices beyond ours, and tell our Wives and Children, and all the people on the ſame Subjects, things directly oppoſite to our Inſtructions. We muſt be quite deſtitute of common Senſe, before we can give you permiſſion to Act, till the eſtabliſhed Judges have determined whether what you ſay is good and uſeful, and whether it ought to be made publick or not. Therefore, You tender Darlings of the ſoft Muſes, put your Compoſitions into the hands of the Judges, who will compare them with ours; and if what you ſay is better than what we ſay, we'll give you leave to Act; otherwiſe it can't poſſibly be done, and therefore 'tis in vain to expect it.*

Theſe Poets who in their writings contradicted receiv'd Maxims condemned.

Plato has treated this buſineſs of Plays and Shows thoroughly, becauſe 'tis a very important matter in relation

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relation to States; all he ſays of it is admirable, and deſerves to be carefully recollected. What I have recited is ſufficient to give a juſt Idea of it: Wiſe Men may make on it what Reflections they think fit: My ſcope has been only to ſhow that *Plato* after the Example of *Moſes*, would permit only ſuch Divertiſements as were decent, and tended to ſupport Religion, or at leaſt were not contrary to it. They who are for advancing farther, and for particularly examining the conformity the Laws of *Plato* have in many things, with thoſe that were given the People of God, will ſtill better diſcover this Reſemblance; which made *Clemens Alexandrinus* ſay, that *Moſes* aſſiſted *Plato* in making his Laws, and that *Plato* was only *Moſes* ſpeaking the Attick Language. Not but that ſome Laws are to be found in *Plato* very remote from the Spirit of *Moſes*, and very contrary to Equity: but the number of 'em is but ſmall.

The Emperour *Marcus Aurelius* had reaſon to ſay, That *ſuch a Commonwealth as* Plato's *is not to be expected in this World.* Not but that there had already been one which was ſtill better, and more wiſely conſtituted; and when *Antoninus* ſaid this there was one infinitely more perfect, of which the former was but a ſhadow; but it was the work of God; and none but God can put this Idea into Act, becauſe 'tis only he that can change the Hearts of Men: of which we have a very evident Proof. A great Emperour had a mind to eſtabliſh *Plato*'s Republick in his Territories, to which purpoſe he employ'd divers Philoſophers whoſe Knowledg was very extenſive, and their Eloquence very perſwaſive: but all his Efforts were in vain, he could never gain his end ſo much as to eſtabliſh it in one ſingle Village; whereas the Chriſtian Religion was eſtabliſhed by the Miniſtry of illiterate Men, and that in ſpite of the Emperours themſelves.

As for Phyſicks in which alſo Metaphyſicks are comprehended; *Plato* in the firſt place acknowledges that ſince we are but Men, we muſt not hope per- *Phyſicks.*

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fectly to gain the knowledg of Nature, and that all a Philoſopher can do is to find out Probabilities; pure and ſimple Truths being only known to God, who alone can diſcover 'em to Men. After this acknowledgment he divides Nature into two parts, *Spirit* which acts, and *Matter* upon which it acts.

He calls the Spirit which acts, a Being eternal, infinite, very good, immutable, which hath neither beginning nor end, but is always the ſame, and he calls Matter, a Maſs without form and void, which is always ready to be produc'd, and never exiſts. His Words are remarkable. *Firſt* (ſays he) *all theſe things ought to be well diſtinguiſhed, and we muſt well eſtabliſh what it is that always exiſts and is never produc'd; and what it is that never exiſts, and is always producing. The firſt is not conceived but by the Underſtanding aſſiſted by Reaſon. This we diſcern to be always one and the ſame. And the other is only opinable, that is known by Opinion aſſiſted by the Sentiment diveſted of Reaſon; which we ſee to be always producing, and dying without ever exiſting.* Therefore he gives Matter the Name of *Other*, becauſe of the continual Changes it undergoes: He alſo gives it the Name of *Neceſſity*, becauſe it only follows the order and determination of the Spirit which governs it.

In Timeus, Tom. 3.

Matter how known.

Why called Other and Neceſſity.

He alſo ſometimes calls Matter *Eternal*, which has given occaſion to ſome to accuſe him of believing it to have been with God from all Eternity. But a Philoſopher who in ſo many places maintains the unity of God could not fall into ſo groſs an Error: If Matter were Eternal, it muſt then be God, and ſo there would be two Gods, contrary to what he had laid down. When therefore *Plato* calls Matter *Eternal* he would not be underſtood as if it viſibly ſubſiſted from all Eternity, but that it ſubſiſted intelligibly in the eternal Idea of God; and in this reſpect the World is ſometimes ſaid to be *Eternal*. Let us ſee the very Terms *Plato* uſes, which will leave us no room to doubt what his Thoughts were. *The*

How ſaid to be Eternal.

Pattern

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Pattern of the World (says he) *is from all Eternity; and the World, this visible World is from the beginning of Time, and will always thus subsist alone.* *Plato* could not think Matter to be Eternal: seeing he affirms the Soul to be older than the Body; for if the Soul is older than the Body, the Body must needs have been created, and consequently can't be Eternal. And for this reason he calls God the Father or Creator, and Former of the World. By the Quality of Creator he signifies that he made the World out of Nothing, and by that of Former he signifies, that God after he had created it, gave it its Form and orderly Disposition. *Plato* derived this Idea from the Tradition of the Hebrews, of which the Greeks had some knowledg long before him; as appears from *Hesiod*'s speaking of the Birth of the Chaos. Perhaps also he had read these Words in in the Prophesy of *Isaiah*, *God himself that formed the Earth and made it, he hath established it.*

In his Timeus, *Tom.* 3.

The World made out of Nothing.

Chap. 45. 18.

Of this created Matter God formed the World, by separating and disposing the Elements, which having simple qualities of themselves, form by their different Union, and various Figures an infinite number of compounded Qualities: for Matter is divisible to Infinity.

The Universe must necessarily comprehend all sensible things; from whence *Plato* draws three Consequences: The first is that it can be but one: For there can be nothing beyond All. The second is that it is of a Spherical Figure; because besides that that is the most perfect of all Figures, 'tis the only one that can agree to a Being that comprehends any thing. And the third is that it can have no end but only by the Will of him who form'd it; for since the Change of all Beings can never proceed but from that which is without 'em, and since there is nothing out of the World, there is by consequence nothing that can destroy it but God in whom alone the World is contained.

Seeing the two first Qualities of the World are to be visible and palpable; and since there is nothing

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visible without Fire, nor solid without Earth, *Plato* says God at first created Earth and Fire. In which one may discern some Vestiges of those words in *Genesis*, *In the beginning God created the Heavens and the Earth.* For by the Heavens here most Interpreters understand the Empyrean Heaven, and not the Firmament.

It was very difficult, or rather impossible that two things so contrary should be long united. Therefore God contriv'd a way to hold them together by a *Medium*, which partaking of the Nature of them both, should make one *Whole* of them together with it self. But if one *Medium* is sufficient to join plain Points and Numbers, two are necessary to join solid Numbers. For Example; the Numbers Six and Twenty four, which are alike plain Numbers, may be united by one sole *Medium*, which is Twelve; that is to say Twelve is the proportional Number or *Mean* between Six and Twenty four; in like manner between Nine and Sixteen, the proportional Number is Twelve.

In Timeus, Tom. 3.

The Numbers Eighteen and Fifty four are alike solid Numbers, which cannot be united by one *Medium*; that is, one cannot find one sole proportional Number or Mean to 'em: So that there's need of two; as Twenty four and Thirty six; for Fifty four is to Thirty six as Thirty six is to Twenty four, and as Twenty four is to Eighteen.

'Tis the same with plain and solid Dimensions. If the World could have been plain, one *Medium* would have been sufficient for it; but being round, it has need of two to unite it. And 'tis for this reason that *Plato* says God put Air and Water between Fire and Earth; for the same proportion that is between Water and Earth is between Air and Fire; this Proportional Bond, is the Divine Bond that renders the World so solid, that it can never have an end but only by the Will of him who is the Author of it; on the contrary, the Alteration and Age of its Parts, serve to support and renew it.

But,

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But though the World in this State was ſolid, yet it ſtill wanted perfection, for no Body is perfect without Intelligence. Therefore God, who deſign'd the Univerſe ſhould be as perfect as it could be, gave it a Spirit, which *Plato* calls the Soul of the World, which governs in it, and preſerves Harmony in it, maugre the diſcord of the Elements. He ſays this Soul was created before the World; and perhaps he imagin'd this from a miſconſtruction of thoſe words in *Geneſis*. *And the Spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters.* 'Tis true, he alſo calls this Soul proportion, and Symmetry; which might induce one to ſuppoſe that he means nothing elſe by it, but the juſt Temperament of the Elements themſelves: But the definition he gives of the Soul, will not ſuffer his words to be taken in this ſenſe; for he ſays 'tis a Subſtance that participates of the indiviſible Subſtance, a Compoſition of *the ſame* and *the other*; that is, of the firſt Matter, and the Univerſal Spirit; and hereby he would ſhew that Matter was a *Medium* that contained an Immortal, Immaterial, and conſequently Indiviſible Spirit, and an Animal and Corporeal Spirit; juſt like our Bodies which are compos'd of three things, of *the ſame*, of *the other*, and of *Subſtance*, which he explains by very obſcure Examples taken from Numbers, and Muſick. And herein *Plato*'s Error conſiſted, namely in giving the World a Soul like ours, and ſtill more perfect. Therefore he calls the World God, but a *God that is created and diſſoluble*. So that he was ſo far however from confounding Nature with God himſelf, that he has thoroughly diſtinguiſhed them, for he calls God alone *the efficient Cauſe, or Power*; and he calls Nature *the Conſequent, which obeys the firſt Cauſe for the creation of Beings*; And ſubjects it entirely to the Government of that firſt Cauſe. *Plato* did not content himſelf in giving the World a Soul, he alſo gives one to the Heavens and to the Stars. And perhaps this falſe Idea of his, was occaſion'd by his miſ-

In his Phileb. Tom. 2.

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underſtanding of ſome Paſſages of the Prophets, for inſtance, that which God ſays in *Iſaiah. I have commanded all the Hoſt of the Heavens.* Or it may be, this Language of *Plato*'s is only Poetical; and being *Homer*'s Scholar and Rival, he was willing to animate every thing like his Maſter, who inſpires Life into the moſt inſenſible Beings, inſomuch that he gives a Soul to a Spear. And the Holy Prophets ſometimes ſpeak after the ſame manner.

Chap. 45. 12.

Thus Time and Motion had a beginning.

All the Pagan Philoſophers before *Plato*, had taught that Motion, and conſequently that Time was Eternal; and it was on this Principle that *Democritus* founded his Arguments when he maintain'd that all could not be created, and thence infer'd the Eternity of the World, *Plato* was the firſt who by a Beam of Truth, diſcover'd through this thick Darkneſs, that Time and Motion had a beginning as well as the Univerſe. For it being impoſſible that Matter ſhould be of it ſelf, as one muſt be forc'd to acknowledge, neither is it any more poſſible for Motion either to exiſt of it ſelf, or to be a Quality affix'd to Matter, which then would never reſt. Motion therefore muſt proceed from without, and was imprinted on Matter by the ſame Spirit that created it. *Plato* was ſo deeply ſenſible of this Truth, that he made uſe of it to diſſipate the Errors of that ſenſeleſs Philoſophy which had reign'd to his Time: Now he ſays, when God had created the World, and communicated to it the Motion that was moſt ſuitable; *He was extremely pleaſed to ſee his Work move, live, and almoſt reſemble the Immortal Gods themſelves.* (And for this reaſon *Plato* calls it God.) *And he would have render'd it more conformable to his eternal Idea, but that it was impoſſible to communicate Eternity to a created Being, therefore he took this expedient to create as it were a moving Image of Eternity, And in diſpoſing the Heavens he made this Image of Eternity, which is permanent in Being only; This Image which goes on by Numbers, that is to ſay, Time, which did not ſub-*

In his Timeus, Tom. 3.

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sist before the Creation of the World. Time not being capable of subsisting but with Motion, whereas Eternity subsists alone by it self, without being either Old or Young; and 'tis only of this that one can properly say *it is*; the Terms of past, present, and future, cannot agree to it, because they are fluid parts of Time, whose property it is to be always just producing, but never existing.

The improper Language we use about the Eternal Being.

We don't perceive (continues he) *that we very unfitly attribute to the Eternal Being these parts of Time, and the Terms* IT WAS *and* IT SHALL BE, *for we say of this true Being,* It was, is, and is to come. *But we ought always to say,* It is; *for this only agrees to it according to true Reason.* It was, and it shall be *ought never to be said but of that which is produced in Time: These are but Motions, that which always is, and is always the same, without any Change, can't be called either Old or Young at any time, nor receive any of the Modes which Birth or Production affixes to things that are moveable, and the Objects of Sense; these are the parts of Time which imitates Eternity, and proceeds by Number and Measure,* &c. *so that Time was created with the Heavens, that as they were produc'd together, so they might end together, if ever they come to be dissolved.*

This Truth is confirm'd by the Writings of the Saints, who teach that Time and Motion had a beginning, and must have an end. The Beauty of this Discovery, and the Strength of this proof, which may be called a Demonstration, did not hinder *Aristotle* from contradicting his Master in this point, and from maintaining his Error by the following Argument, which has nothing of Solidity in it. *If it be altogether impossible* (says he) *that there is, or can be imagin'd a Time without a present Instant; and if it be true, as it cannot be denied, that the present Instant is a sort of* Medium *which has a beginning and end, a beginning of the Future, and an end of the Past, Time must necessarily be from all Eternity,*

Aristotle's very subtile and false way of Arguing, in the 1st Chap. of his Physicks.

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Eternity, becauſe the moſt remote Time one can take, is in ſome preſent Inſtant; for in Time one can only take the preſent Inſtant: ſo that ſeeing the preſent Inſtant is a beginning and end, Time muſt needs have been from all Eternity; no perſon being able to aſſign a Time which has not been preceded by Time, and ſo ad infinitum. *And if Time is eternal, Motion muſt be ſo too, ſince Time is only a Paſſion of Motion.*

Eternity admits of neither Time nor Motion.

This is the Language of a Philoſopher, ſo blind that he could not conceive that the World was created, and that before the Creation there was neither Time nor Motion, but Eternity, in which nothing ran from the preſent to the paſt, but all was preſent and ſtable: God alone being before Time, in whom there is no ſucceſſive Courſe either of Time or Motion.

What Plato's Ideas were.

Before we purſue this Matter we muſt explain what *Plato* means, when he ſays God created the World according to that Eternal Pattern which he had conceived in himſelf. As an able Workman has in his Head the whole diſpoſition and form of his Work before he begins it; ſo that he works according to his Idea after ſuch a manner that what he performs is (if I may ſo ſay) only the Copy of that Original which he has imagined; the whole Work that ſubſiſts being a mere Imitation: After the like manner, God in creating the World only executed that eternal Idea he had conceived of it; for the World and all that it contains exiſted intelligibly in God, before it exiſted really in Nature. This is the meaning of *Plato*'s Ideas which the Pythagoreans and he had taken out of the Hiſtory of the Hebrews; where we ſee God gives *Moſes* the Models of all thoſe Works he would have him make: But it ought to be remember'd that theſe Ideas are univerſal and not particular; that is they comprehend the Species, as *Man*, and not the Individuals, as *Alexander*: And it muſt farther be minded that they are not a Being ſeparate from God, but are in God. This is the Im-

The Origin of theſe Ideas.

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Immaterial and Eternal Original upon which every thing was made, and indeed is nothing but the Divine Knowledg, the firſt Cauſe of all created Beings; for thoſe Ideas are in God his Notions, which are eternal and perfect of themſelves, and as *Alcinous* ſays, *Idea with reference to God is the Eternal Intelligence, and with reſpect to us, it is the firſt Intelligible; in reference to Matter it is Meaſure, in reference to the Univerſe 'tis the Exemplar, and in reſpect to it ſelf it is Eſſence.* If *Ariſtotle* had rightly unſtood this Doctrine, he would not have oppos'd it, nor have given ſo raſh a deciſion as he has done, affirming that to eſtabliſh theſe Ideas as the Exemplars of ſenſible things, is *to ſpeak to no purpoſe, and to amuſe ones ſelf in imagining Poetick Metaphors.* *Euſebius* was better acquainted with the excellency of it, for he ſays in expreſs Terms, that this Doctrine which teaches that there is an Intelligence which has taken all things from Incorporeal Ideas, which are their Patterns, was conceived by *Plato* with a great deal of Reaſon, and by very juſt and neceſſary Conſequences.

Ariſtotle conceived thoſe Ideas as Eſſences ſeparate from God.

In Prepar. Evang. lib. 3. cap. 6.

When God was pleas'd to create Time, he created the Sun and Moon, whoſe Courſe is the meaſure of Days, Nights, Months, Years and Seaſons, and gave motion to the other Celeſtial Spheres. He afterward proceeded to the creation of Animals, without which the World could not be perfect; and of theſe he was pleas'd to make as many Species as the World had parts; that is, Celeſtial, Aerial, Aquatile, and Terreſtial.

And God created the Demons (or Angels) thoſe Inferiour Intelligences, to whom he gave order to create three other ſorts of Animals, becauſe if he had created 'em himſelf they would have been Immortal; for all that proceeds immediately from God, muſt neceſſarily be Immortal in its Nature: So that theſe Intelligences created Man, that is they form'd the Humane Body, God having reſerved to himſelf the right of giving it a Soul, which he made

The Creation of Angels.

of

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of the same Nature with that of the World, only he made it less perfect. For (says he) it was not just that Man who was but a part of the Universe should be more perfect than the Universe it self, or so perfect. These were *Plato*'s Thoughts on the creation of Man, and 'tis not difficult to know the Source of this Opinion, in which there is such a Mixture of Truth and Error; for it springs from a misinterpretation of the Words of *Moses*. After God had created the Heavens, the Earth, the Stars, and the Celestial Intelligences, that is, the Angels, he says, *Let us make Man after our own Image.* Upon this the Egyptians, and Pythagoreans not understanding the Mystery hid under the Plural Number, thought God spoke to the Intelligences he had created, and said to them, *Let us now make Man after our Image; you in forming that part of him which must be mortal, and I in creating that which shall be of an immortal Nature.*

The Air fill'd with good and evil Angels. In his 10th Book of Laws, Tom. 2.

He maintains as a most certain Truth, that as there is an infinite number of Good Angels in the Heavens (that is in the Air) so there is also a multitude of Evil Ones, that seek nothing else but how to do mischief to Mankind. *Seeing we are agreed* (says he) *that the * Air is fill'd with good and bad Genii, which are entirely opposite to each other, † this occasions an Immortal Combate, and requires a continual Attention on our part: The Gods and the Good Angels are ready to help us, for we are their Possession.*

Plato adds that God at once created the Souls of all Mankind, who were to live in all Ages of the

* *Eusebius* amaz'd and surpriz'd at the Beauty of this Passage, shews that *Plato* could not have it but out of the Book of *Job*, who many Ages before him relates that the Devil appear'd before God with the Good Angels. † A very surprizing Truth to be found in the Writings of a Pagan, and the same which is admirably explain'd by St. *Paul*, when he says, Eph. 6. 12. *For we wrestle not against Flesh and Blood, but against Principalities, against Powers, against the Rulers of the Darkness of this World, against Spiritual Wickedness in high Places.*

World,

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World, and that he distributed them into all the Celestial Spheres, teaching them the Nature of all things, and giving them his Eternal Laws which he calls *Destiny*, and to which he also gives the name of *Necessity*, and sometimes that of *Fortune*; not that any thing is fortuitous, but only to denote, that this Destiny brings to pass an infinite Number of things, which are unforeseen by us, and which are commonly imputed to Chance, altho their Cause is designed and fixed. The Poets understood this, when they call'd Destiny, *that which has been once said*. In which they seem to have had some knowledg of what *David* says in the 65th *Psalm*. *God hath spoken once*, that is to say, he has spoken with an immutable Word; for Destiny is nothing but that Law which flows from the Will of God.

Destiny why call'd Necessity *and* Fortune.

Quod semel dictum est. Horat.

What Destiny is.

From this Creation of Souls before their Bodies, *Plato* draws his Opinion of *Reminiscence*. For if the Soul existed before the Body, it must have had in it all Notions, and by consequence all that we learn through the Course of our Life, is only the remembrance of what we had forgotten. For *to learn* is nothing else but to recover the knowledg we had before we came into the World, and which the Passions of the Body made us forget.

Reminiscence.

However *Plato* in his *Menon* seems not to be entirely convinc'd of the truth of this Opinion of *Reminiscence*; but to perceive that it might be reasonably objected, that God actually illuminates the Soul, and that by the Light he communicates to it he renders it capable of Seeing and Learning that which it never saw, or knew before. And this in all Appearance is the reason, that he does not establish it as an absolute Certainty, but only makes use of it to shew that we ought not to despair of Learning that of which we are ignorant.

From the Union of the Body and Soul result the Passions and Sensations. When the Soul is Mistress, she leads a Life of Temperance and Justice, and when she leaves the Body, she returns to the Star to which

The Passions and Sensations.

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which ſhe was formerly aſſigned; but when ſhe becomes a Slave, and plunges her ſelf into all ſorts of Corruption; ſhe ſuffers a Puniſhment tenfold more than all her Pollutions and Impurities, and after a thouſand years has the Liberty to chuſe what kind of Life ſhe likes beſt: if ſhe ſtill chuſes to live irregularly, ſhe goes to animate Beaſts, that is, ſhe becomes from day to day more and more vile and vitious, which continues till at laſt ſhe comes to acknowledg the Empire of Reaſon; and follows this Guide which is given to her; and ſo by purging her ſelf from all the Filth of the Elements, returns to her firſt State.

The Origin of falſe Opinions, Errors, Knowledg and wiſdom.

Moreover from the ſame Source *Plato* draws the Origin of the falſe Opinions, Errors, and all the Follies of Men, as alſo of their Knowledg and Wiſdom. When the Soul is as it were delug'd by the Torrent of Matter, it can no longer diſtinguiſh Truth; and is like a Man going with his head down, and his heels up, to whom all Objects are inverted.

When ſhe moderates the Courſe of this Torrent, ſo that what is *the ſame* is neither ſurmounted nor obſcur'd by the Miſts of what he calls *the other*: then ſhe ſees all things as they are; and being fortified by Study and Experience penetrates their Cauſes, and by thoſe means arrives at true Knowledg, and perfect Health, as much as 'tis poſſible in this Life.

Plato afterwards deſcends to the Conſideration of all the parts of a humane Body, to ſhew with what exactneſs they anſwer the deſign of Providence. And the Deſcription he makes of it is ſo fine, that *Longinus* calls it divine.

Plato not much skill'd in Anatomy.

The Excellency of this Deſcription does not conſiſt in the truth of his *Anatomick Diſcoveries*: for on the contrary *Plato* ſeems to have been leſs skill'd in *Anatomy* than his Predeceſſors; but it conſiſts in the Elegancy of his Expreſſions, in the juſt Relation he finds between all the parts of the Body of Man, and in the Reaſons he gives of their different uſe.

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One of the great Faults of which he has been reproach'd, was, for having said, that Drink passes through the Lungs. *Plutarch* has made an express Treatise to justify him in this by the Authority of the Poets and that of Physicians. That of the Poets is too weak: for when a Poet speaks of *watering the Lungs* for *drinking*, he conforms himself to the vulgar Opinion and Language: And that of Physicians is not strong enough to make an Error pass for Truth. But indeed *Plutarch* is mistaken when he affirms this to have been the Sentiment of *Plato*, and of *Hippocrates* too; for neither one nor t'other ever fell into this Error. On the contrary *Hippocrates* says, that Drink does not pass through the Lungs, but goes into the Stomach, and thence runs into the Bowels; He only asserts that a small insensible part of it slides into the *Aspera Arteria*, only to help to cool the Air which goes into the Lungs; and this likewise is what *Plato* means; nor could he have any other Thought, seeing he often in the same Treatise teaches, that the Stomach is made to receive all that we eat and drink; and that the natural Heat after it has mix'd, dissolv'd and divided the Meat and Drink, sends the Liquor into the Veins, which carry it to the Heart, and from thence into all the Body by the Pipes that proceed from that part. And the distribution of this Liquor of the Chyle which passes from the Stomach into the Veins he calls *Irrigation*. So that 'tis but a small insensible part of what we drink that goes into the Lungs; as *Hippocrates* and after him *Galen* have justified by Experience. *Plato justified.*

Plato afterwards treats of the wonderful things to be observ'd in the Sight and Hearing, which are the most perfect Senses. And in explaining the admirable Construction of the Eyes, he discovers the Causes of Waking and Sleep, and descends even to that of Dreams which may be said to be Material. For he says they that are in a deep Sleep have either no Dreams, or very short ones; because all their *The wonderful things that belong to the Sight and Hearing, and the use of both.*

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Senſes are at reſt: but they who are but half aſleep, if one may ſo ſpeak, do not fail of having Dreams; becauſe their Senſes being ſtill in motion, preſerve the Veſtiges of thoſe things that have mov'd 'em, and imprint 'em on the Imagination.

The true uſe oft he Eyes. He ſays that the Eyes firſt taught us Philoſophy, which is the greateſt favour Men can receive from the hand of God: and he is ſo well perſwaded that they are given us only for this end; that he makes no difficulty of affirming, that if a Man, who does not uſe 'em to this purpoſe, becomes blind, he has no reaſon to complain, becauſe his Eyes having been always uſeleſs to him, he has no loſs in loſing 'em.

Tom. 3. *In truth* (ſays he) *God has form'd our Eyes, only to contemplate the Works of his Providence, and to ſee the regular Motion of the Heavens which ſo conſtantly obey the Spirit that guides 'em, that ſo we might accuſtom our ſelves to love that which is Comely and Regular: and that we might learn to regulate all the Motions of our Souls, which are of the ſame Nature with that Divine Intelligence, but are diſorder'd by our Paſſions.*

The true uſe of the Voice and of the Hearing. He ſays the ſame of the Voice and of the Hearing; that the Tongue and the Ears are given us particularly that we might declare and hear the Wonders to be remark'd in the Works of God; and that Muſick was invented only to furniſh us, if we may ſo ſay, with Rule and Harmony. For becauſe is has a wonderful relation to all the Motions of our Souls, he ſays, *Wiſe Men make uſe of it, not as 'tis now us'd*

Tom. 3. *for fooliſh nay pernicious Mirth; but to calm and moderate the Paſſions, and to correct the horrible Diſcords which they occaſion.*

The formation of the Heart and its uſe. He ſays the Heart is the Source of the Veins, and the Fountain of the Blood which runs from thence with a rapid Courſe into all the other parts; and that it is as it were in a Fort guarded on all Sides; that ſo when the Choler comes to be inflam'd, when Reaſon gives it notice that it is threaten'd with ſome Miſchief from without by external Cauſes, or from

Tom. 3.

within

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within by the Diſorder or Tumult of the Paſſions; it may ſpeedily warn the whole Body of what paſſes, and diſpoſe it to obey its Orders, to prevent the Danger impending. *And becauſe God knew that the unexpected ſight of any terrible thing, and the motion of the Choler would make the Heart beat violently, he contriv'd a very uſeful Remedy for this ſort of Inflamation; and put the Lungs under it, the ſubſtance of which being ſoft and not furniſh'd with much Blood, and having little holes within it like a Spunge, ſerves as a Pillow to the Heart, inceſſantly refreſhes it with the Air and Moiſture which it attracts, and moderates that violent Heat which would otherwiſe conſume it.*

In the lower Ventricle where the Nouriſhment is made, are the Spleen and Liver; the Spleen is a hollow and ſoft Subſtance, and conſequently very proper to perform thoſe Functions which it has pleas'd God to aſſign it. For he thought fit, that it ſhould be (not the *Kitchen*, as 'tis expreſs'd in a corrupt Copy, but) *the Spunge to wipe and cleanſe the Inteſtines; and to take off all the Filth which gathers about the Liver in time of Sickneſs; and this ſwells and puffs it up; as it on the contrary flags, and returns to its former ſtate when the Body is cleans'd.* *The Functions of the Spleen and Liver.* Tom. 3. *Some have falſly read* μαγειεῖον *a Kitchen for* ἐκμαγεῖον, *a Spunge.*

As for the Liver he ſays it was deſtined to a uſe which deſerves to be related for its ſingularity: He tells us that becauſe God knew that when the Spirit was buſy in diſtributing the Aliment in this lower part of the Belly, it would be but little concern'd in what paſſed in the upper Region, and in the Seat of Reaſon, whoſe Orders it would never hear; he to provide againſt this Inconvenience, made the Liver of a hard Subſtance, having a mixture of Sweetneſs and Bitterneſs; and of a ſmooth and even Superficies like a Looking-Glaſs. When the Soul would advertiſe this Animal Spirit of what paſſes, ſhe by means of the Thoughts, imprints on this Superficies the Image of all things of which ſhe would give it information; and by theſe Images gives it either Tom. 3.

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Joy or Sorrow. When the Soul does not act upon this part, but leaves it at reſt, as during the time of Sleep, thoſe Gods who form'd the Body, or the great God himſelf imprints on this ſmooth Superficies the Images of ſuch things as muſt come to paſs, and theſe Images being carried to the Imagination produce Divination or Propheſy, the Seat of which the Ancients for this reaſon plac'd in the Liver; but *This* (ſays he) *never happens unleſs it be when that part of the Soul is not in a condition to obey the Spirit, which ought to guide it; for God has joined Propheſy with Madneſs; and 'tis eaſy to convince any one of this Truth, who conſiders that no perſon propheſies truly but when he is out of his Senſes, that is when God, or Sleep, or ſome Diſeaſe deprive him of the uſe of Reaſon; and becauſe 'tis only by Reaſon that Men can judge of things, therefore Prophets never * underſtand what they ſee; and we are therefore obliged to have recourſe to Interpreters, who not being tranſported with Paſſion are capable of explaining what the Prophets have ſeen, by Reaſonings founded on Experience.* But all this Conſtruction of the Liver looks more like one of *Pythagoras* his Enigmas, than a Phyſical Explication; and ſeems much leſs proper to prove that propheſy comes from God, than to diſcover that it is the effect of ſome Vapours of the lower Ventricle which darken and ſtain the Imagination.

In his Timæus. Tom. 3.

He endeavours to ſhew that God knowing Man would be intemperate in Eating and Drinking, and that nothing would be more capable of deſtroying him before he advanc'd to ripeneſs of Age, he made as it were a Labyrinth of Bowels in the lower Ventricle, that by their turnings and windings the Food might be hinder'd from paſſing off too ſoon; for if

Why the Bowels wind about. Tom. 3.

* This is one of *Plato*'s Errors, who abſurdly confounds Prophets divinely inſpir'd with falſe Prophets, and thereby gave occaſion to the Error of the *Montaniſts*. True Prophets did not ſpeak by Extaſy, but ſaw and underſtood what they declar'd, and were therefore call'd *Seers*.

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the Bowels were all ſtreight, the Food would be continually paſſing; and Men by this means render'd inſatiable would think of nothing elſe but eating, which would make 'em uncapable of applying themſelves to Learning and Philoſophy, and would ſpeedily occaſion their Death; the natural Heat not being ſufficient to digeſt ſo much Food, beſides that it would want time to do it.

After this he explains the nature, and production of the Fleſh, Blood, Bones, Muſcles, Sinews, Brain, Marrow, and all the other parts of which our Bodies are compos'd; he calls the Blood *the Food of the Fleſh*, and ſays the whole Body is encompaſs'd with Fleſh, like ſo much ſoft Wool, laid cloſe together, which ſerves to fortify it againſt the Injuries of the Air, and all other Accidents, as falls, *&c.*

The Conſtruction of the Head. Tom. 3.

In ſpeaking of the Conſtruction of the Head, he ſays 'tis both the moſt beautiful, and weakeſt of all the parts of the Body. That God indeed could have given Man a Head much better fortified with Bones, Sinews and Fleſh, which would have extremely prolong'd his Life, as well as made him lead it more commodiouſly; but becauſe it was not poſſible that a part cover'd over with a very hard Bone, a great many Sinews, and very thick Fleſh, ſhould have a very quick Senſe; and the Head was to be the Seat of Senſe, Reaſon and Prudence; God having well weigh'd the advantages of a very ſtrong and robuſt but ill-contriv'd Body, that is heavy and uncapable of Senſe and Prudence, againſt thoſe of a Body more feeble but more elegant, that is to ſay, lively and lightſome, he prefer'd this to the other, and choſe to give us a ſhort rather than a long Life; for the Spirit was not created for the Body, but the Body for the Spirit.

He goes on to ſpeak of Sanguification, Nutrition, Reſpiration, Tranſpiration, natural Heat, the diminution, and augmentation of the Body, which leads him to ſpeak of Old Age, Diſeaſes and Death, which happens, *when the Machine is worn out, and the*

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Strings that hold it together grow ſlack, and give the Soul liberty to fly out of her Priſon with extreme Pleaſure.

As for Diſeaſes he explains the Cauſes of them by the ſame Principles which *Hippocrates* had eſtabliſh'd before him. For he ſays Man being a Compound of the four Elements, Fire, Air, Earth, and Water, or which is the ſame thing, Cold, Hot, Moiſt, and Dry; the juſt Proportion and even Temperament of theſe 4 Qualities preſerve Union and Peace, from whence Health reſults; and on the contrary their unequal mixture which proceeds from Exceſs, Defect, or the Change of the Situation of ſome or other of 'em, produces Diſorder and Diviſion, the only ſource of Diſeaſes. For then that which was Cold becomes Hot, that which was Dry, Moiſt; and that which was Heavy Light, and the Blood being corrupted by this Alteration, as well as the Spirits, and overcharg'd with Acid, or Salt Particles, inſtead of producing New to nouriſh the Fleſh, breeds nothing but Choler Flegm, and Water, which generate divers ſorts of Fevers and other Diſtempers. Tom. 3.

The Diſeaſes of the Soul. From theſe Diſeaſes of the Body ſpring thoſe of the Soul which *Plato* divides into two ſorts, that of Folly, and that of Ignorance or Stupidity. Ignorance is properly the Soul's forgetfulneſs: and when great Pleaſure or exceſſive Sorrows take away Knowledg from the Soul, ſo that ſhe is not in a condition to underſtand any thing, this is Folly. For example, a Man whoſe Temper inclines him to Love, is always mad while the rage of this Paſſion laſts; he is therefore call'd a profligate Perſon, or a Debauchee, as if he willingly plung'd himſelf into this Diſorder; But he ought to be call'd a Fool, and look'd upon as a Diſeas'd Perſon; for according to *Socrates* no Man is vitious but againſt his will. This Man is carried away by his Conſtitution, and the ill Education he has had. And the ſame may be ſaid of all other ſorts of Senſuality.

Sorrow

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Sorrow likewiſe proceeds from the Intemperature of the Body, for it is caus'd by an acrimonious Flegm, and Bilious Humors which diſperſe themſelves through the Body, and not finding vent obſcure the Soul with their Vapours, diſturb her motion, and bring grievous Diſtempers upon her, but different according to the Parts on which they fix. *The Cauſe of Sorrow.*

To this Intemperature of the Body he joins the Intemperature of whole Cities, which by the pernicious Example of their corrupt Manners, and the wicked Diſcourſe which they ſuffer both in publick and in private, and in fine by the little Care they take to have young People well educated, frequently precipitate us into all theſe Miſchiefs. Thus our Corruption comes properly from two Cauſes that are abſolutly involuntary; which render us wicked againſt our Wills; And inſtead of accuſing us, there is reaſon only to accuſe our Parents and Teachers. *The Moral Intemperature of Cities.*

What *Plato* ſays of the ill Education of Youth, and the fatal Examples which whole Cities give them, is but too True, but what he adds, that our Corruption is involuntary on our own part ought not to be taken in a ſtrict Literal Senſe. For as *Ariſtotle* has very well obſerv'd, 'tis a great Error to ſay we are only vitious againſt our Wills. Sound Philoſophy and Religion teach us, that God has given Men a Liberty of choſing between Good and Evil, and that all vertuous or vicious Actions are purely voluntary. If it were not ſo it would be unreaſonable to blame Vice or commend Vertue, nor could any reaſon be aſſigned for the Eſtabliſhment of Rewards and Puniſhments, for none can be juſtly praiſed or diſpraiſed, only for what he did whether he would or no. How then did *Plato* underſtand this Notion of *Socrates*, to embrace it as he did? without doubt he underſtood (and 'tis what *Ariſtotle* did not comprehend) that God has given men all that Light that is neceſſary to direct 'em to obey the Law of Nature which he has engrav'd in their hearts; and to inform 'em of certain fundamental Truths, which enlighten the Univerſe like ſo many *How this Opinion of* Plato, *that we are wicked againſt our Wills, ought to be underſtood.*

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Torches; but Men have despised these Helps; and by this voluntary Contempt, are justly fallen into Blindness which hinders 'em from distinguishing Truth from Error, or at least from obeying it; and thus all the vitious Actions of Men are at the same time voluntary and involuntary; voluntary in their Origin and Source; for 'tis their own Choice that they have thrown off the Yoke of Vertue and Righteousness; and involuntary often in the execution; for in spite of the Remorse of their Consciences, they are led away by the miserable propension of their Hearts, which induces 'em to commit the Evil which they would not do. They are the Slaves of Sin which rules over 'em, and to the Service of which they have engag'd their Liberty.

Remedies for the Diseases of the Soul.

Plato comes next to shew the Remedies that are to be applied against these two sorts of Diseases of the Soul and Body; and first establishes this Incontestable Maxime; that whatsoever is Good is Beautiful; that Goodness consists in proportion and measure; and that if this be true in all sensible things, 'tis much more so in the Union of the Soul and Body: For from their just proportion spring Health and Vertue; as Diseases and Vices are produc'd by the contrary: If the Soul be too strong for the Body, she weakens it, wears it out, and very often causes such Maladies as baffle the Art of Physicians.

On the other side if the Body is stronger than the Soul; because it takes care only of it self, it grows, and fortifies it self daily, and leaves the Soul in an Oblivion, and as it were in a Lethargy, which brings on her a Stupidity and Ignorance which she cannot dissipate. Therefore to preserve the health of both parts, they both of 'em ought to be equally exercised. He that applies himself to Study ought not to despise the Exercises of the Body; and he who makes Bodily Exercises his principal business, ought not to neglect Meditation and Study. But in these two States we must take great care not to go from one Extreme to another; not to pass suddenly, for instance,

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ſtance, from great Reſt to great Labour. We ſhould imitate Nature whoſe Motions are always equal, without Catches, and Shocks. Now of all Motions the moſt Salutary is that which is made of ones ſelf in ones ſelf; becauſe 'tis Natural. That which comes from another Body is Detrimental; and the moſt miſchievous of all is that which by means of External Bodies, removes by parts a Body which was at Reſt.

Hence it follows, that the beſt Remedy, and moſt wholeſome Purgative is Exerciſe, that is to ſay that which they call * *Gymnaſtick*: After this comes the Exerciſe of the Horſe, or that of being carried any other way, as in a Litter or Boat, which the Ancients called *Vectatio*; For this Exerciſe is compos'd of Motion and Reſt; the third ſort is not good, but in preſſing Neceſſity, and no Man of Senſe will ever uſe it but in an Extremity; Such are Medicinal Purges: for we ſhould never irritate thoſe Diſeaſes that are not dangerous, by ſuch kind of Medicines. The formation of Diſeaſes is like that of Animals, they require a certain ſpace of time to bring 'em to perfection; they have their Periods; and if we attempt to oppoſe 'em by violent Remedies before the time of their declenſion, we often make many Diſtempers of one, or of a ſlight Diſeaſe an incurable one. We ought to prevent or attack them by a good Regiment, as much as opportunity will permit.

Plato divides the Soul into 3 parts; the Reaſonable part, the Irafcible part, and the Concupiſcible part. He places the firſt in the Brain, the ſecond in the Heart, and the third in the Liver; he alſo compares it to a Flying Chariot having two Horſes and a Charioteer; one of the Horſes is head-ſtrong and unruly, and the other gentle and governable: The Charioteer is Reaſon, which is to Command and Guide; the Unruly Horſe is the Concupiſcible part; for the Appetites know no Bridle or Reſtraint of

The Soul divided into 3 parts.

* Such as Wreſtling, Leaping, Running, *&c.*

Rea-

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Reaſon: and the gentle Horſe is the Iraſcible part, becauſe it obeys the Reaſon, and is ſerviceable to it on urgent Occaſions. When a Man does not moderate theſe two latter parts, and purge their Paſſions to reduce 'em to a uſeful Mediocrity, and ſubmit them to the former, he can have no other than Earthly and Mortal Opinions; and he renders himſelf Mortal, becauſe he fortifies in himſelf thoſe parts that are Mortal; whereas he that makes the firſt part reign over the two other; becauſe he has in a ſpecial manner adorn'd and cultivated that God which was given to him, that is his Underſtanding or Mind; and becauſe the Mind comes immediatly from the only true God, he is hereby united to the Source of Life, and already taſtes the firſt fruits of Immortality.

An Explication of this Diviſion. This Diviſion of the Soul deſerves to be explain'd for ſome have been mightily miſtaken to think that *Plato* made the Soul diviſible, or that he imagin'd there were divers Souls; as if he put as many Souls in the Body of Man, as there were Grecian Officers (if I may ſo ſpeak) in the famous Trojan Horſe. This Philoſopher did not fall into ſuch an Error as this; but on the contrary attacks it and expoſes all the Abſurdity of it, and with marvellous ſtrength of Argument eſtabliſhes the Simplicity and Indiviſibility of the Soul; but his deſign was to ſhow (as he explaines himſelf in his *Theætitus* and the 4th Book of his *Republick*) that there are ſome things that depend only on the Soul, ſuch are all the Acts of the Will; and that there are others which depend on the Corporeal Faculties; and theſe Corporeal Faculties or Powers compoſe thoſe two parts, that may be call'd the two Corporeal and Mortal parts of the Soul, *viz.* the *Concupiſcible* and *Iraſcible*, which cauſe all our Paſſions, and the ſeat of which he places in the Heart and Liver, which he looks upon as the two Sources of the Blood and Spirits, on which alone the Corporeal Faculties depend, and which alone excite all the Motions and Paſſions of the Body.

Thus.

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Thus according to *Plato* there is but one ſimple Soul without any diverſity of parts, the ſeat of which is in the Brain, whence it irradiates the whole Body by means of the Nerves, Bloud and Spirits; but its Motions, that is the Acts of the Will, may be oppoſed by the Motions, and Impulſions of the Body; and 'tis this which makes theſe Combates between the Superior and Inferior Soul, (that is betwixt the Soul and the Body) mention'd in the 4th Book of the *Republick*. This I ſay is *Plato's* Doctrin, by which 'tis eaſy to explain all the Faculties of the Soul, and to give the Reaſons of its Vices and Vertues, and to diſcover the Remedies that ought to be uſed to fortifie the one and weaken the other, and to correct all the Paſſions in reducing them to a uſeful Mediocrity; for there are none of 'em but what are good by Nature, and may be uſed to good advantage, when the Soul is Miſtreſs of 'em, and ſo regulates and conducts 'em.

The Creation of the firſt Woman, and of all Animals.

He next explains the Production of the firſt Woman, and that of Animals. Having underſtood by the Hiſtory of *Moſes*, that the firſt Man being caſt into a deep ſleep, God extracted the Woman from him; this gave riſe to all thoſe Imaginations, which he expoſes in his *Timeus*; where he teaches, that the firſt Woman, and all Animals ſprang from Man, but through that thick Darkneſs he has ſpread upon this Work of God, in explaining it after a Myſterious and Poetical manner, the Foot-ſteps of Ancient Truth are to be diſcovered; and one may perceive, that he thus obſcur'd and conceal'd 'em, only that he might thence draw a Doctrine uſeful to regulate the Manners of Men. His deſign is to engage Man always to render his Creator that Worſhip which is due to him; and to do nothing that may render him unworthy of that great Advantage of having been form'd by the Hands of God himſelf; therefore he repreſents to him, not only that he degenerates into a Woman, when he is unjuſt, timorous and voluptuous, but moreover that he ſinks into the Condition of

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of Animals. For when he is Inconſtant, Raſh and Unſteady, and amuſes himſelf about penetrating the Heavens by a vain Curioſity, imagining that only by the Organ of his Sight he is able to judg of all that appears there, he becomes a Bird: If he has no reliſh of true Philoſophy; but inſtead of contemplating the Heavens, that by the marvellous Workmanſhip of 'em, he might ſeek the knowledg of him that made them, he only thinks on Earthly Things, and how to gratify his ſenſual Deſires, he degenerates into a brute Beaſt, and is always fix'd to the Earth; if he be yet more corrupted, he becomes a Reptile, and always touches the Earth with all the parts of his Body; and in fine, if he puſh his Folly and Ignorance to the laſt Extremity, he becomes a Fiſh, unworthy to breath in the Air; and conſequently plung'd in the moſt filthy and troubled Element of all. This was the Metempſychoſis of which *Plato* ſpeaks, and I make no doubt, but this was the Sentiment of *Pythagoras*, and of the Egyptians, which has been made ridiculous in taking it very unjuſtly in a literal Senſe. For what Probability is there that Philoſophers, who never ſpoke without Enigmas ſhould with ſo much Simplicity explain ſo wonderful a Secret as that of the Paſſage of Souls into various Bodies of a different Species? And perhaps it would be no ill-founded Opinion that this Idea came into the head of *Pythagoras*, upon what happen'd in his time to King *Nebuchadnezzar*, who for his Sins was turn'd out among the Beaſts, and for ſeven Years grazed like an Ox.

What gave occaſion to the Opinion of a Metempſychoſis.

A Philoſopher who explain'd his Doctrine only by Enigmatick Expreſſions could not but be taken with this Idea, which naturally informs us, that Vice degrades us from our Dignity, and transforms us into Beaſts, more or leſs Savage, according as we are more or leſs vitious; and a certain ſign, that this was the ſenſe of this Metempſychoſis, is, that the Pythagorean Philoſophers conceiv'd it juſt after this manner; and proy'd that Man in his Eſſence is inferior

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inferior to God, and Angels, and ſuperior to Animals, Plants, and other Terreſtrial and Mortal Natures: and that as that Man who ſhould flatter himſelf that he ſhould become a God, or an Angel, would be infinitely miſtaken, not underſtanding the Limits of Nature; he that ſhould think he ſhould become a Beaſt for his Wickedneſs, or a Plant becauſe of his heavy and ſluggiſh Temper, would likewiſe be deceived, *being ignorant of the eſſential Form of the Soul, which can never alter; but being and continuing always Man, is ſaid to become a God or a Brute by Vertue or Vice, although by Nature it cannot be either the one or the other, and therefore is ſo only by reſemblance.* Hierocles *on the Verſes of* Pythagoras.

Moreover *Pythagoras* might take this Idea from the Ancient Hebrews, who gave Men ſuch Names as were deſcriptive of their Nature, calling them Wolves, Dogs, Swine, Serpents, Fiſhes, *&c.* as they remark'd in 'em ſuch Vices as render'd 'em very like thoſe Animals. Therefore the firſt Man that was celebrated for Piety, and began to call on the Name of the Lord was call'd *Enos*, that is to ſay, *a True Man*; as if there had been no true Man before him, * becauſe there was no pious Man. This is all, the Myſtery of *Pythagoras* his Metempſychoſis; which has been turn'd into a Monſter by a low literal Explication of it. *Plato* underſtood it in part, but he alter'd it in connecting it with an Error into which he fell, about the Return of Souls into this Life after a certain ſpace of time. As I take it, he conceiv'd that a Soul came divers times to animate the ſame Body, thus it was rather a Reſurrection ſeveral times, repeated, then a Metempſychoſis. But of this Matter we ſhall treat more largely in its place.

Some of *Plato*'s Interpreters have ſaid that in the Creation of Man, God order'd the Inferior Deities to make the Body, that ſo, becauſe all Evil was to proceed from Matter, he might not be charg'd with *Whence Evil comes, and whether it ſubſiſts of it ſelf.*

* *I ſuppoſe the Author means in that Generation; for otherwiſe 'tis evident, that* Abel *was a pious Man.*

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it, and that it might not be ſaid, that Evil came from God himſelf. But this expedient would have been very uſeleſs, for if Evil were a quality adherent to Matter, God having created this, the other muſt needs have come from him; though the Body had been created by inferior Deities; which is impious and very remote from *Plato*'s Thoughts. When this Philoſopher ſays Evils could not be baniſh'd from Nature, and that they aroſe from Neceſſity, that is from Matter; he had no deſign to ſignifiy that Matter was Evil of it ſelf; but he meant to ſhew, that as it is always oppoſite to the Nature of God, it cauſes all the Paſſions and all the Miſeries of Men; who by how much the more they approach it by ſo much the more diſtant they remove from God. For Matter does not only corrupt thoſe who immerſe themſelves in it, but alſo ſuch as look on it; becauſe every thing that inclines or turns it ſelf towards it, neceſſarily turns away from God, aud leaves Light for Darkneſs, which is a Principle confirm'd equally by Religion and Experience, ſo that 'tis unneceſſary to bring Proofs to ſupport it. It will be ſufficient to cite here *Plato*'s own words. *It is impoſſible my Dear* Theodore, *that Evils ſhould be entirely expel'd humane Society. For 'tis neceſſary there ſhould be always ſomething oppoſite to Good. Yet it muſt not be thought that Evil can ever approach the Deity, 'tis only annex'd to mortal Natures; and is always about the Earth which we inhabit, becauſe it ſprings only from Neceſſity. Therefore we ſhould endeavour to fly from hence as ſwiftly as we can. Now to fly away is to labour to unite our ſelves to God, as much as poſſible; and we can't be united to him, but by Wiſdom, Righteouſneſs and Holineſs.*

In his Theætetus. *Tom.* 1.

Evil does not ſpring from Matter.

In this Book of a *Republick*, he ſhews that Evil does not ſpring from Matter, but from Motion, which brings it to its firſt Confuſion and Diſorder. *The World* (ſays he) *had all good things from its Maker, but from the External Habitude, which it had before it had all that is Evil, wicked and vitious in Nature, and*

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and communicates it to Animals. So that by his Account, Evil is properly only a Return to the firſt Diſorder, an Irregularity, a Diſlocation, and Diſobedience, and conſequently ſubſiſts not by it ſelf; whereas Good ſubſiſts independantly of the things that poſſeſs it; for it ſubſiſts in God, who is the Author of all Good, and is Goodneſs it ſelf. But whence comes this Motion that leads to Diſorder? It proceeds not from Matter, ſeeing that is without quality. It comes according to *Plato* from the raſh and diſorder'd Spirit which heated and animated the firſt Matter, before God by framing the World, had render'd it capable of Order and Harmony by an Underſtanding.

By this we are to underſtand, that Evil is a privation of Order and Harmony, which proves true in all ſorts of Evil, and above all in thoſe of the Soul, that is in Vices which are the only proper Evils. When a man diſobeys the Law, one can't ſay his Diſobedience is a Being which exiſts and ſprings from the Law, but 'tis an Alienation from what the Law commands. The Law is Holy and the Commandment is Juſt and Good, but Concupiſcence has produc'd Sin. When a Son loves not his Father who has done him nothing but Good, one can't ſay this Averſion proceeds from the Father; on the contrary, 'tis only a Refuſal of Love and Submiſſion which he owes him, and which the Law of Nature teaches him. Juſt ſo the Evils of the Soul, are not a fault of Nature; but a fault of the Will, which being free uſes its liberty to reject that which is Good. So that Vices are only voluntary Averſions which alienate us from right Reaſon, in which alone Order, and Harmony conſiſt; and conſequently, as the Pythagoreans and Platoniſts knew very well there is no neceſſity of eſtabliſhing a Principle of Evil, whether we make it ſpring from Matter, or derive it from without; we need only one principle of Good which truely exiſts, and this is God. By his Eſſence he is ſeparated from Rational Subſtances but he com-

Evil does not exiſt of it ſelf.

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communicates and unites himself to them by Reason: to obey this Reason is Vertue and to disobey it, Vice. Thus our Bodies are neither the Cause of our Vices, nor that of our Vertues; * But our Souls are the Cause of both, as *Plato* very solidly proves in his Xth Book of *Laws*.

What Good, and Evil, Vertue and Vice are.

In what sense Plato calls Creatures Gods.

It has been charg'd on *Plato* as a Crime, that he gives the Name of God to Creatures: But besides that he has done nothing in this but what we find done in the Holy Scripture, where Men and Angels are called *Gods*; Never did any one better observe the infinite Sovereignty of the true God over mortal Creatures to whom he has given this Name, than *Plato* has done. Thus he feigns God speaking to 'em as their Supreme Lord. *Children of the Gods, all the Works that have gone out of my Hands are indissoluble as much as I please, and as long as I shall sustain 'em. Nat but that whatsoever has been join'd together is of a nature capable of being disunited, but it becomes not an infinitely good Creator to destroy his Work, when this Work has nothing of evil in it. You have been created, and consequently you can't be entirely Immortal, and Indissoluble; however you shall never be destroy'd, and Death shall have no dominion over you; my Will being a stronger Bond to ascertain your Immortality, than all that wherewith you have been bound at your Birth. We have yet three sorts of Animals to form of mortal Matter, without which the World would not be perfect, for to make it perfect it ought to contain Animals of every Species; but if I should create them my self, they would be equal to the Gods. Therefore that they may be mortal, and that the World may be compleated, do you form them your selves according to your Nature, by imitating the Power I display'd in forming you: and seeing the most excellent of 'em ought to have something Divine to render 'em worthy to rule the rest, and to engage*

In his Timæus, Tom. 3.

* Therefore the Holy Scripture commonly speaks of the Soul with reference to Vices and Vertues. *The Soul that sinneth, &c. The Soul that touch, &c.*

them

them to obey Laws and Juſtice; I will provide that Divine Seed which is the Soul. Do you finiſh this Compoſition, by adding that which is to be mortal; and by furniſhing it with neceſſary Aliments, raiſe them up and make 'em grow, and when they are deſtroyed receive them again into your Boſom.

Plato here after a very Magnificent and Poetical manner deſcribes how God created Man and the other Animals by means of ſecond Cauſes, which he calls Gods; and it is no difficult Matter to find in his Words the Beams of thoſe Eternal Truths which *Moſes* teaches us. *Plato* (after *Moſes*) brings God in as if ſpeaking to other Gods when he is about to create Man; though he did not comprehend the Myſtery hidden under thoſe divine Words. In *Plato* as well as in the Writings of *Moſes* we ſee Man was form'd after the Image of God; not as to his Body, but as to his Mind; that he was to rule over other Animals; and that he only is capable of rendering God true Worſhip. *Plato* teaches us after *Moſes* that theſe very Animals ſerve to perfectionate the Univerſe; contrary to the opinion of certain Heretiques, who accuſed God for having made many Animals that were either dangerous or uſeleſs. In fine we ſee in *Plato* as well as in the Holy Scriptures that Important Truth * that the Immortality of the Angels is not an effect of their Nature, but a Privilege of mere Grace, which depends only on the Divine Will.

Whether God can make himſelf viſible to Men.

'Tis ſurprizing that ſuch a Man as *Plato*, who underſtood theſe Great Truths, and ſpoke of God after ſo admirable a manner, as we ſhall ſee in divers places of this Treatiſe, ſhould notwithſtanding maintain, as he has done in the 11th Book of his *Republick*, *Tom.* 2. that God being perfection it ſelf, cannot ſhew himſelf to Men under any viſible Figure, and he reaſons

* This is what St. *Ambroſe* ſays in expreſs Terms in his 3d Book *De Fide*. *Nec & Angelus immortalis eſt naturaliter, cujus immortalitas eſt in voluntate Creatoris.* Angels themſelves are not Immortal by Nature, but their Immortality depends on the Will of their Creator.

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Plato's *false Reasoning.*

thus; *If God should metamorphose himself he would assume a Form more perfect than his own, or a Form less perfect. Now 'tis ridiculous to say he changes for the better, for then there would be something more perfect than he, which is absurd; and 'tis Impious to admit that he changes himself into something less perfect, for God can't degrade himself; besides if he should appear under any other Form than his own, he would lye, because he would appear to be what he is not. Hence therefore it must be concluded that he continues in his Simple Form, which alone is Beauty and Perfection it self.* And upon this he condemns *Homer* for having attributed to God those Visible Forms.

If *Plato* had only employ'd this Argument of his to beat down the ridiculous Metamorphoses which the Poets attributed to the Gods, he would have had Reason; but to make use of it to oppose the manner by which God has often render'd himself visible, *viz.* Under the Form of an Angel or Man, whom he created after his Image, and whose Figure he might take, without deceiving Men, or laying aside his Perfections, is an Error. And this did not escape the knowledg of his Disciple *Aristotle*, who though otherwise less illuminated in what belongs to the Divine Nature, understood better than *Plato* the Beauty and Truth of that Sentiment of *Homer*, who in the XIVth Book of his *Odysses* says *that the Gods, who can easily clothe themselves with all sorts of Forms, sometimes take the Figure of Travellers and go into Cities to be Witnesses both of the Sins of Men and of their Good Actions.* Instructed by this great Poet he understood that it is not unworthy of God to assume Humane Nature, to deliver Men from their Errors. Upon which his too Zealous Admirers have advanc'd that he had some presage of the Incarnation of the Messiah. But what an Honour is it to *Homer*, that his Notions agree better with the Truths contain'd in the Holy Scriptures, than those of the Greatest Philosophers. When God appear'd to Men under a visible Form he had both what was visible and what was invisible. But

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But to return to *Plato*'s Phyſicks. One may very well diſſent both from thoſe who will have 'em very perfect; and from the Sentiment of thoſe that Account 'em very defective. The former have too good an Opinion of 'em; ſeduc'd perhaps by the great pleaſure they have found in penetrating the great Obſcurities of his *Timæus*; and others ſpeak too meanly of 'em, becauſe they have not given themſelves time to ſound thoſe Deeps, having been diſcourag'd by the dryneſs of his Principles, which he does not give himſelf the trouble of unfolding; but leaves others the labour of explaining and finding out the meaning of 'em. But in this there is a Medium to be obſerv'd. 'Tis certain *Plato* knew the chief Principles of true Natural Philoſophy. This ſufficiently appears by what has been already ſaid on this Subject. We find in his *Timæus* an explication of the Nature of the Elements, only by the Diſpoſition and Configuration of the parts of Matter, which alſo cauſe the different Senſations and Affections of the Body. There we find the Explication of Colours, which are only the Reflexion of Light. By the different Mixture, by the diverſified Figure and Motion of the Elements, each of which has many different Qualities or Forms, he explains the Production and Nature of Minerals, Metals, Oils, Salt, Liquors, Meteors, *&c.* For Example, ſpeaking of the Loadſtone, and Amber, he ſays, *Their Vertue comes from the Motion of the Matter which goes out of their Pores.* But all this together can't make a well methodiz'd Syſtem of Phyſicks: Nor is it his deſign to give the World a Treatiſe of Phyſicks: He ſwiftly runs through that which is tranſitory, to find that which is permanent, and to dwell upon it; he forgets nothing that is neceſſary, but rejects whatſoever is uſeleſs or ſuperfluous; he ſo little deſigns to enter into a deep reſearch of this Matter, that he lets us know, that if any one has a mind to break off his Meditation from things that truly exiſt and abide, to apply himſelf

What Judgment may be made of Plato's Phyſicks.

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Natural Philosophy consider'd by Plato *as a Divertisement.*

to a more particular knowledg of such as are only transitory and momentany, and finds pleasure in so doing, it will not be difficult for him to satisfy himself in following his Principles; *and to give himself a Divertisement of Life*, which he calls *Wise and Moderate*.

By these Words *Plato* gives us to understand that he look'd upon this part of Natural Philosophy rather as a Play, than an Employment; and this oblig'd him, to give only a superficial Account of it; that he might more usefully employ his Time in searching for more important and Solid Truths. And one may say, that in this again he imitates *Moses*, who in the History of the Creation has wisely suppress'd whatsoever might flatter the Vanity and Curiosity of Men, to insist only on that which was proper to augment their Humility and Piety. Therefore we should be so far from wondering that Natural Philosophy was not rais'd to its perfection in those Ancient Times when it was look'd upon at best but as an Amusement more curious than useful, and when the greatest Men applied themselves only to Morality which is concern'd only about our true Happiness and Misery; that I know not whether we should not have more reason to be surpriz'd that it should be so much esteem'd in Ages wherein we ought even to make less account of it than *Plato* does. *Solomon* does not advise Men to *acquire Natural Philosophy* but *to get Wisdom*. For 'tis Wisdom only that teaches us to know God; and this is *Plato*'s Language, who to promote his Design always reasons morally in his Physical Discourses: and instead of insisting on the Consideration of Mechanique Reasons taken from the Motion, and Succession of Bodies, applies himself, as *Socrates* did before him, to discover the first Cause, and to penetrate the Designs of the Soveraign Spirit which governs the World; and endeavours to explain whole Nature by Harmony and Proportion; Seeking not so much to teach Men Physicks, as to give 'em great Prospects, and to elevate

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elevate their Minds. Nay *Socrates* formally says in *Phædon* that the manner of teaching Physicks by the Succession and Motion of Bodies is very defective, and causes more Errors than it cures; because by detaining the Mind too much upon Matter, and that which is but a Second Cause, it hinders it from raising it self up to God, who is the only true and first Cause of all things; and he blames *Anaxagoras*, who tho he knew this Truth, dissembles it in his practise, and deceives the expectation of his Readers. 'Tis such a Research as this that *Solomon* represents as *a very Evil and Dangerous Employment* and the Truth of this has been but too much confirm'd by Experience.

The Order of the Celestial Spheres.

Before we quit this Subject, let us see how he ranges the Celestial Spheres, and what Vertues he supposes them to display by their Influences. First he places the Earth as the Center of the World. 'Tis true *Theophrastus* writes, that in his Old Age he repented that he had given it that place, which is not suitable to it. He says it is the Boundary of the Rising and Setting of the Sun, and consequently the Instrument of Time, as the Planets are, and Guardian or Mother of the Day and Night. After the *Earth* he places the Sphere of the *Moon*, then that of the *Sun*, that of *Venus* and that of *Mercury*; after *Mercury* he places *Mars*, *Jupiter* and *Saturn*.

The Influences of the Stars.

He says that in the beginning after God had created the Souls of Men, he distributed them into all the Planets; by which he would signifie, that the Bodies which those Souls animated in the time mark'd out by Providence, should be subject to the Influences of those Stars. Which he explains more sensibly when he feigns that there are Three *Parcæ* the Daughters of Necessity, which turn a great Spindle, that is the Axle-tree of the World, with its Eight Spheres, whose Motions and Revolutions produce all things. Necessity is Destiny, which is nothing but the Order and Concatenation of Causes, which ought to produce such or such Effects. This Necessity has 3 Daughters

An Explication of the three Parcæ.

ters which denote the three differences of Time which is either Paſt, Preſent or Future. The firſt which is the Eldeſt is nam'd *Lacheſis* that is, *a Lot*, becauſe the Lots of all things have been regulated from all Eternity, that is before Time. The ſecond is *Clothon*, This is ſhe that executes, and adds the preſent to the paſt. And the third is *Atropos* which ſignifies that the future is no leſs certain or invariable than the two others; but is the Conſequence of one and and the ſame Law which never alters. Theſe *Parcæ* are cloth'd in white, and ſeated on Thrones with Crowns on their Heads, to ſignify on one hand their Purity and Innocence, and on the other the Dominion they exerciſe over all that is ſubjected to 'em; they are plac'd at equal diſtances over theſe Eight Spheres, upon each of which there is a *Siren* which Sings with all her might, and the *Parcæ* anſwer this Singing after ſuch a manner, that all theſe different Voices make but one Harmony. *Plato* would hereby ſignify that all things obey the Divine Law and concur to produce thoſe Effects, which are Conſequences of the Cauſes God has eſtabliſhed.

The Soul is not ſubject to Deſtiny.

But if our Bodies depend on theſe Planets and obey the Laws of this fatal Neceſſity, our Souls may preſerve themſelves independant, and only obey God, who is Maſter of Neceſſity it ſelf. The Planets may by their Influence produce in us ſuch or ſuch Manners, and by theſe ſuch or ſuch Actions or Paſſions; but if our Souls will, they have power to moderate and regulate 'em. And when the Soul does the conrrary, and ſuffers her ſelf to be carried down the Stream; ſhe deprives her ſelf of her own Liberty, and loſes all her Privileges. For this is that in which that Free will, that God has left her to denote her Origin, conſiſts: She can either ſubmit her ſelf to that Fatal Neceſſity which *Zoroaſter* calls an *Augmenting the power of Deſtiny*; or ſubject that to her ſelf, by uniting her ſelf to him, to whom all things are ſubject, and in whom alone ſhe can enjoy her Liberty; And this is what *Plato* means, when he

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he ſays a Prophet having taken the Lots out of the Lap of the firſt *Parcæ*, aſcended a Throne, and addreſſing himſelf to all the Souls that had been created, ſpoke to 'em in theſe Terms. *Hear what* Lacheſis *the Daughter of Neceſſity ſays. O Mortal Souls, here is the beginning of a New Period, or Life, You are going to animate Bodies that are deſtin'd to Death; Your Demon (or Angel) ſhall not make choice of you, but you ſhall chooſe your Demon (or Angel) your ſelves. Let that Soul therefore that has the firſt Lot, firſt chooſe the kind of Life which ſhe will lead by the Laws of Neceſſity, and ſo of the reſt. There is nothing but only Vertue that does not acknowledg her Laws: ſhe is free, and gives not her ſelf to any but ſuch as know how to honour her: Thus the fault is in the Soul which chooſes, and God is not to be blamed.* After this Proclamation, all imaginable ways of living are propos'd, and the Soul chooſes. *In the X Book of his Repub. Tom. 2.*

We cannot finiſh this Matter without ſpeaking ſomewhat of theſe Demons, aſſign'd as Guides to each Soul; and this Article would indeed require a long Chapter of it ſelf, or rather an entire Volume, if we would ſound the bottom of this Doctrine; but 'tis ſufficient for us here to know in general, that when *Plato* ſays the Soul immediately after her animating the Body, chooſes her Demon or Genius; his deſign is only to ſignify the Liberty of the Soul, and that ſhe is able to chooſe between Good and Evil. That is, that as we are compos'd of 2 different Natures, by one of which we partake of this groſs and Terreſtrial World, and by the other of the Intelligible World; by which we are raiſed to that which is moſt Sublime and Spiritual; If the Soul immerſes her ſelf in Matter, ſhe has a material Demon, that hinders her from raiſing her ſelf up to Celeſtial Things; and if on the contrary ſhe keeps her ſelf pure, and lives only by the Underſtanding, ſhe has a good Demon, or perfect Genius, which ſupports and hinders her from deſcending to that which is *How the choice of a Demon or Genius ought to be underſtood.*

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material and corruptible; if she changes her Life, she also changes her Demon; and after Death, the Demon that she chose, leads her either to her Reward or Punishment. This was *Plato*'s Doctrine, which he frequently delivers in Allegories very difficult to be understood, but by which he seems to have known, or at least had some Glances of very great Truths concerning the Nature and Difference of those Spirits, which are between God and Men, Truths which the Christian Religion has consecrated without divesting them of their Obscurity. For who is it that understands those different Orders of Spirits which St. *Paul* describes by those different Names, of Powers, Thrones, Principalities, and Mights? St. *Augustine* confesses he does not understand 'em, and St. *Ireneus* assures us that they cannot be understood. It is probable *Plato* had received almost the same Ideas from the Theology of the Hebrews, which we shall speak of in the Argument of *Socrates* his Apology; and it was without doubt out of respect to their Books, that he advanc'd that excellent Maxim, that in those matters we ought to receive nothing for Truth, but what is found conformable to the Word of God, and the Divine Oracles.

None ever prov'd the Immortality of the Soul better than *Plato*. His Proofs of it are to be seen in his *Phædrus*, in the X Book of his *Republick* and in his *Phædon*. In the mean time I can't choose but speak here of a seeming Contradiction which is found in his Writings. In *Phædrus* he says in expres Terms, *That the Soul is eternal, and that it can't perish, because it was not begotten:* And on the contrary he says in *Timæus*, *That the Soul was created before the Body, and that it was begotten by the best of intellectual and eternal Causes, as it is also the best of all things that are generated and temporal.*

A seeming Contradiction in Plato.

Plutarch to reconcile this Contradiction, into which he is sure *Plato* never fell, assures us that by this unbegotten and eternal Soul he understands that void

Plutarch endeavours to reconcile this Contradiction.

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void and disorderly Spirit which mov'd all things irregularly before the Constitution of the World; and on the contrary that he calls that the begotten Soul which God compos'd of that first Spirit and of the permanent and eternal Substance; of which he made a wise and regular Soul, because he put something of his own into it, and added Understanding to Sense, and Order and Harmony to Motion.

The Errors of Plutarch.

But at this rate the Soul would be a Compound of a foolish thing and a wise, which is the grossest of all Errors. It would likewise be a Composition of two things equally Eternal, which by their Union would constitute one entire begotten Substance, which is a Contradiction. In fine this void and precipitant Spirit which animated the first Matter is not Eternal in *Plato*'s Opinion, for he makes it a Creature, and calls it Eternal only in reference to Time, the Birth of which it preceded. Therefore to reconcile these two different Ideas which he gives of the Soul, I suppose when he calls it begotten he has regard simply to the Essence of it, which began to exist by the Will of God; and when he calls it Eternal, 'tis with respect to the Principle of it which is God, who communicates to it all its Qualities, and in whom it is properly Eternal.

The way of reconciling these two Ideas.

Plato not only proves the Immortality of the Soul, but also knew all the Consequences of it, as the Resurrection, and Final Judgment, when all Good Men shall be rewarded and the Wicked punished. Nay he penetrated so far into these Divine Truths, that his Expressions are entirely conformable to those of the Holy Prophets, and even to those of the Evangelists and Apostles. For he expressly observes that at the time of this Judgment *good Men shall be at the right hand of God, and the Wicked at the left, from whence they shall be thrown down into the Abyss and into outward Darkness, bound hand and foot*, where they shall be tormented, and torn by Spirits, which he calls Fire, and where nothing shall be heard but horrible Groaning and Howling.

The Consequences of Immortality known to Plato.

In the X Book of his Republick. Tom. 2.

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That the dead know what passes here in this World.

He taught as a certain Truth that the dead know what passes in this Life; For he says in express terms, *that Souls after they are separated from their Bodies have still some power by which they take care of humane Affairs. This Truth is prov'd by a long train of Reasons. We ought therefore to believe these so certain and Ancient Traditions: and to credit the Testimony of those Legislators who have transmitted them to us. Unless we will reproach them as so many Fools.* And in another place he says, *Hence I conclude, that the Dead retain some knowledge of what passes here below. Good Men have some sentiment before hand of this Matter; and the Wicked deny it: But the Presages of divine Men are more certain than those of such Miserable Wretches as are always immers'd in Vice.*

In the XI *Book of Laws* Tom. 2.

Tom. 3.

The Source of these Traditions.

Plato received all these Ideas from the Traditions of the Egyptians, who had 'em from the People of God, and the Ancient Patriarchs. But in process of Time, these Traditions were so corrupted by those Idolaters, and mix'd with so many Errors, that 'tis not to be wonder'd at that *Plato* has explain'd one and the same Truth by Descriptions so different and fabulous as those of his *Phædon*, his *Gorgias*, and the last Book of his *Republick*.

The Divinity of the Son of God known to Plato. Tom. 2.

Those who have carefully read the writings of this Philosopher, discover yet more surprising Truths in 'em; for they find that he believ'd the Divinity of the Son of God, which he has explain'd by Enigmas, that those Sublime Truths might not be expos'd to the Raillery of the Profane.

In his *Epinomis*, after he had spoken of the Honour due to the Sun and other Planets, as they were the wonderful Works of God on which he had printed the Character of his Omnipotence, and which in performing their Revolutions in the Time prescrib'd to 'em, contribute to the perfection of the Universe by this Obedience of theirs: He adds, *The most Divine WORD fram'd this Universe and render'd it visible. And that Man that is truly happy, first admires*

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nires this WORD, *and is afterward inflam'd with a desire of learning all that can be known by a mortal Nature, being convinc'd that this is the only way, to lead a happy Life here below, and after Death to arrive at those places that are prepar'd for Vertue; where he shall be truly initiated and united with Wisdom; and always enjoy the most wonderful Discoveries.* Here *Plato* very exquisitly maintains that the knowledg of the WORD leads to all sublime Discoveries. *For none knows the Father but by the Son.* And 'tis only by him that we can attain a Life of Bliss.

In the Letter he wrote to *Hermias*, *Erastus*, and *Coriscus* to exhort 'em to live in Peace, he says. *You must read my Letter all three together; and that you may profit by it, you ought to implore the Assistance of God the Soveraign Lord of all things that either are or shall be; and the Father of this Soveraign, who is the Cause of Beings. If we are truly Philosophers we shall know this God as clearly as Blessed Men are capable of knowing him.* *Letter* VI. *Tom.* 3.

Does not *Plato* in this manifestly follow the Opinion of the Hebrews? For whence could he receive this knowledg of God, the Father, and the Lord; of God the cause of Beings; but from their Writings, who taught him to give the Son the name of *Lord*, of which none of the Greeks before him had ever heard, or had the least Idea? *Euseb. præpar. Evang.* XI. 16.

Nor is it only pretended, that he had some knowledg of the *Word*, the Eternal Son of God, but some farther maintain, that he had some discovery of the Holy Spirit; and so had a certain Idea of the most Holy Trinity: For thus he writes to young *Dionysius*, *I must declare to* Archedemus, *that which is much more precious and divine; and which you have a very ardent desire to know; since you sent expressly to me on that Account. For as far as I understand by him you don't believe I have sufficiently explain'd what I think of the Nature of the first Principle; I must write of this to you in Enigmas, that if my Letter* *Plato had some Idea of the Holy Trinity.* *Letter* II. *Tom.* 3.

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ter ſhould be intercepted by Sea or Land, he that reads it may not be able to comprehend any thing. All things are round about their King; they exiſt by him, and he alone is the cauſe of good things: Second for ſecond things, and third for third.

In his *Epinomis*, and elſewhere, he eſtabliſhes for Principles, the firſt Good, the Word, or Underſtanding or Soul. The firſt Good is God; and when he calls God, Goodneſs, or the firſt Good, he had an Idea of this Truth, that Good is nothing but the Nature of God, and his Infinite Goodneſs. This Good he explains in Terms very well worth the reading. *As the Sun* (ſays he) *gives to viſible things, not only the faculty of being ſeen, but alſo, their Birth, Nouriſhment and Growth, juſt ſo this* Good, *not only makes intelligible things knowable, but alſo gives 'em being, although that is not Eſſence, but ſome other thing that infinitely ſurpaſſes Eſſence by its Power and Majeſty.*

Book VI of his Repub. Tom. 2.

The Word or Underſtanding is the Son of the firſt Good, who hath begotten him like himſelf. And the Soul which is the Term between the Father and the Son, is the Holy Spirit.

I don't know whether without having recourſe to theſe great Truths, we could by *Plato*'s Philoſophy explain theſe Paſſages which ſeem ſo ſtrange, ſo as to give 'em another ſenſe that ſhould be natural, and agreeable to his Principles. I muſt ſay, I very much doubt it. Nay, I am perſwaded it would be very great Temerity, or rather Impiety, to interpret 'em after any other manner after the Deciſion of ſo many Fathers of the Church and Eccleſiaſtick Writers. For they tell us in expreſs Terms, that *Plato* had this knowledg of the Father and the Son, and of him that proceeds from them both, namely the Holy Spirit.

St. Juſtin, *St.* Auguſtin, *St.* Jerom, *St.* Cyril, Euſebius, Theodoret, *St.* Clement, *&c.*

Origen is not content to aſſure us of the ſame thing, but accuſes *Celſus* for having purpoſely overlook'd the Paſſage of the 6th Letter, becauſe Jeſus Chriſt is plainly ſpoken of in it. Which proves, that the Chriſtians were not the only Perſons who found

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found these great Mysteries in *Plato*'s Writings; but that the Enemies of Christianity found 'em there as well as they, and were uneasy at the sight of 'em.

Let us not by our Darkness cast a shade over those Rays of Light which proceed from the Fountain of Light it self; but let us acknowledge that *Plato* not only knew all that Natural Reason could discover concerning God to a Philosopher; but was illuminated by supernatural Reason too. Having been instructed in the Books of the Hebrews, in those of the Prophets, and in the Traditions of the Egyptians, he became favourably dispos'd to receive the Seeds of these Eternal Truths; and was assisted by Grace, for St. *Augustin* asserts, that Jesus Christ revealed 'em to him. That which is deplorable is that he has corrupted 'em by his Reasonings. For he speaks of the Three Persons of the Deity as of Three Gods, and Three different Principles. Thus while the supreme Reason enlighten'd him on one side, Philosophy seduc'd him on the other: The common unhappiness of those who merely by Humane Reason go about to explain the Mysteries of God, which are not to be known but from himself, and from those he has truly inspir'd.

How Plato *has corrupted the Truths with which he was illuminated by God.*

That *Plato* had a particular knowledg of the Sacred Writings appears by many Passages in his Works, and by his Errors themselves; for the greatest part of his most erroneous Opinions proceed in some sort from that Source of Light which dazzled him, and on which he has spread so much Darkness. This several have observed before now. That of the Creation of Souls before Bodies seems to have had no other Foundation than that Passage of *Jeremiah*, where God says to this Holy Prophet. *Before I formed thee in the belly I knew thee*, This Philosopher not understanding that God calls things that are not as if they were; and that he knows not only all that is, but also all that shall ever be, built on this Text that Error of his, that Souls existed before Bodies.

Jer. 1. 5.

From the same Divine Writings he extracted all the

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the great Truths which he teaches, as when he says the *Name* of God is *he that is* for there's none but God that truly is. This Name of God, as St. *Auguſtin* obſerves, is not found in any profane Book more ancient than *Plato*; and this Philoſopher could not have it from any other Books than thoſe of *Moſes*.

Who is it that does not diſcern the ſtile of the Prophets in that place of *Phædon*; where he deſcribes a pure Earth which is above this of ours in Heaven, and in compariſon of which this we inhabit is no better than Dirt? In this every thing is corrupt, and we are encompaſs'd with Darkneſs; or if we ſee any Light, 'tis through great Clouds, and very thick Miſts: whereas in the other, the true Light is to be ſeen; and every thing in it is admirable. All things there ſhine with the glittering Luſtre of Gold, Jaſpers, Saphirs, and Emeralds; and thoſe that inhabit it enjoy a long Life which is not croſs'd with any incommodious Accident. The Ancients who diſcover'd the Truth hid under theſe Images, ſhow that they were extracted out of the Books of the holy Prophets, who call Heaven the City of God, and the Land of the Righteous; and prove, that the Names of theſe precious Stones are taken from the 54th Chapter of *Iſaiah*, where God promiſes to lay the Foundation of his Church with Saphirs, and Jaſpers.

So the LXXII *render it.*

I ſhould be too prolix if I ſhould here relate all that *Plato* has drawn from this Fountain. 'Tis ſufficient to know, that what we find in him of this kind, is ſo conſiderable, that it ought to render his Writings very precious to us; and that of all the Works of the Pagans, there is none more uſeful, or that can be more ſerviceable to eſtabliſh eternal Truths, to raiſe the Soul to the ſolid Contemplation of the divine Eſſence, and to manifeſt the Beauties of the ſacred Scriptures. And 'tis on theſe Accounts that he merited that great Encomium, given him by *Proclus*. *Truth* (ſays he) *is ſpread through all*

Book 1. *Chap.* 56.

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all Plato's *Dialogues, more obſcurely in ſome, and more clearly in others. We find in 'em every where grave, ſenſible, ſupernatural thoughts of the firſt Philoſophy, which carry thoſe up to the pure immaterial Eſſence of God, who are in ſome ſort in a condition, to participate of it. And as he who has created every thing in the World by his power, has in every part of this Univerſe plac'd Images of the Gods, which are ſo many Proofs of their Exiſtence, that all things in the World might turn towards the Deity, becauſe of the Union, and if I may ſo ſay, natural Relation that is between them; ſo the Mind of* Plato *being fill'd with the Deity, has diſperſed his Thoughts of God through all his Works. He would not ſuffer any ſingle Tract to be deſtitute of this Character, and without any thing ſpoken of God; that ſuch as are truly enflam'd with the Love of Divine things might receive ſome knowledg of the ſupreme Being from all his Writings, and ſo might have a Juſt Idea of every thing which cannot be known but in God who is Truth it ſelf.*

Having ſpoken of Natural Philoſophy and Morality let us paſs to the third part which is *Dialectick*. The Ancients write, that *Plato* perfected Philoſophy, by adding this part to Phyſicks and Ethicks: But by this they only mean he brought *Dialectick*, which is true Logick to its perfection. Indeed *Plato*'s Logick is more natural, more exact, and more ſolid than that which was in uſe before him, and than that the Rules of which have been publiſh'd after him. For he teaches more by examples, than Precepts: He always chooſes Subjects that are familiar and uſeful to Morality; and treates 'em not as a Doctor, and as they do in the Schools, by Methodical Diſcourſes and ſtudied Syllogiſms, but like a Man of Converſation by free Diſcourſes, which properly make the Character of Dialectick. Therefore *Plato* preſerv'd *Socrates* his method of Dialogue being fully convinc'd that Sciences ought to be taught by Word of Mouth, and not by Writing, becauſe Men *Dialectick.*

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are better perſuaded by the Tongue than the Pen; becauſe the Anſwers, and Objections of the Learner, not only ſhew what progreſs Truth makes in his Mind; but beſides give an occaſion of clearing up many Difficulties that lie in his way, and which can't all be foreſeen in Writing. *Plato* teaches better than any Man how to ſpeak with juſtneſs, to anſwer preciſely to what is asked, to lay down the State of a Queſtion exactly, and lead on the Argument directly. He ſhews perfectly well how to make accurate Diviſions, to define well, and to examine Definitions aright, that none may be ſuffer'd to eſcape that are not true.

He not only brought this Science to perfection but alſo regulated the ſtudy of it; for to avoid the unhappy Inconveniences that befal thoſe who apply themſelves to it too Young, and who commonly make uſe of it rather to contradict than ro inveſtigate Truth, he would have none apply themſelves to it, till they were above thirty Years of Age, and then would have 'em employ five Years in it, being perſwaded that on this alone depends all the Progreſs a Man is capable of making in the Sciences, and in the perfect knowledg of true and ſolid Good. And indeed, *Dialectick* being the Art of Reaſoning, 'tis not only the Foundation of all the Sciences, but the only Guide that can conduct Men to true Happineſs, by making 'em diſtinguiſh Truth from Error. And for this ſame Reaſon, near ſix hundred Years before *Plato*, the Holy Spirit exhorted Men to learn *Dialectick*, when he ſignifies by the Mouth of *Solomon*, *that all Science without Examination and Proof ſerves only to deceive Men.* And alſo *that the knowledg of a Fool, is but a Diſcourſe in the Air without Examination and Proof.* And for the ſame Reaſon St. *Paul* ſays, a Biſhop ought to *hold faſt the faithfull Word as he hath been taught, that he may be able by ſound doctrine, both to exhort, and to convince Gainſayers, who* by their falſe Principles *ſubvert whole Houſes, teaching things which they ought not.* And

At what Age Plato *would have Men ſtudy Dialectick.*

Tit. 1. 9. and 11.

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this is the work of Dialectick. For 'tis properly a Habitude, a Science which teaches to define what every thing is, in what it differs from another thing, or in what it resembles it; to search it out where it is, to know what makes the Essence of it, how many true Beings there are; what those things are which are not; and in what they differ from those that are: It treats of the true Good, and of that which is not so, it shews us how many things enter into the first Good, and how many are rank'd under its contrary; and leads us to distinguish that which is Eternal, from that which is but Temporal and Transitory; and this not by Reasonings founded on Opinion, but by Proofs drawn from Science. For it hinders the Mind from wandering after sensible things, and thereby fixes it on that which is intelligible, and by dissipating all sorts of Errors by its Light, feeds it as it were in the field of Truth. *Plotinus* says very well, that this is the most estimable part of Philosophy; and is not to be considered as the Instrument of a Philosopher, but as that which is essential to him. For it does not stop at simple Propositions and Rules, but passes on to things, and has all Beings for its Matter and Object; and by the Truth that is in it discerns Error which is always a Stranger to it.

The Definition of Dialectick.

If the Writings of the Ancient Hebrews assisted *Plato* in laying the Foundations of good Ethicks and Physicks, they have not been less serviceable to him in establishing the Principles of good Logick. These Principles consist in a right Imposition of Names, which ought to denote the Nature of things. For when the Nature of any thing is known 'tis easy to reason justly, and to establish the Truth. No Nation ever follow'd better Rules in this than the Hebrews, as appears by the Books of *Moses*, and the Writings of the Prophets. And therefore *Plato* confesses that the Greeks borrow'd the greatest part of the Names of things from the Barbarians (that is from the Hebrews) and acknowledges that this right

Plato took the Principles of true Dialectick from the Hebrews.

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Impoſition of Names proceeds from a more Divine Nature than that of Man.

The Character of a good Dialectician.

Plato ſays, that Man will never be a good Dialectician, who is not in a condition (they are his own Words) *to Give and Receive Reaſon.* He means that to be a Dialectician a Man ought to be able, not only to know the Truth, but to make it known to others, and perſwade 'em to embrace it. And for this Reaſon there are indeed two parts of Dialectick, namely Logick and Rhetorick. By the firſt we know, and by the ſecond we perſwade.

The true uſe of Logick and Rhetorick.

Since Logick and Rhetorick are the 2 parts of Dialectick, 'tis eaſy to ſee they ought only to be employ'd for Juſtice and Truth. If us'd to ſupport Error 'tis no longer Rhetorick nor Logick; as a Rule is no longer a Rule when it is bent to make an ill uſe of it. For a crooked Rule can no longer judge, either of it ſelf, or that which is ſtraight. Logick and Rhetorick teach us truly to reaſon and diſcourſe for and againſt. Not that two Contraries can be equally true; But this is to put us in a condition of anſwering thoſe who would abuſe 'em in favour of Injuſtice. None doubts that the ſole Object of Logick is Truth: And this is no leſs true of Rhetorick: And *Plato* very well ſays that *a Wiſe Man will never labour to render himſelf Dextrous to pleaſe Man, but to pleaſe the Gods.* For (he adds) *Prudence requires that we ſhould rather ſeek the favour of our Maſters, than of thoſe who are only our Companions in the ſervice we owe them.*

In his Phædrus, Tom. 3

Never did any one exceed *Plato* in ſhewing the uſe of true Rhetorick, of which he gives admirable Precepts: To ſhew the difference between this and its Counterfeit, he compares the firſt to the Medicinal Art, and the other to skill in Cookery. The Phyſician ſeeks only ſuch things as may conduce to the Health of the Body, Health being the thing he deſigns to procure; but the Cook is concern'd only for what may pleaſe the Taſte, without troubling his Head, whether 'tis healthful or hurtful. In like manner

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ner the true Orator, he says, seeks only to make those to whom he speaks better, and the counterfeit Orator has no other design than that of perswading 'em, whatever damage they suffer by it. *The difference between the true and counterfeit Orator.*

'Tis objected to him that a Man ought to make use of his Eloquence at any rate to acquire Reputation and Authority in his Country; and to bring it into subjection to him, if possible; to advance his Friends, to bring down his Enemies; and in fine (when great Calamities happen) to secure himself or others from danger; *Plato* answers all these Objections after an admirable manner, and by Principles that cannot be contested.

First he makes it appear that those who have the greatest Authority in their Countrey are the most unhappy, if they have not acquir'd it by just Means, and do not employ it to just Purposes.

He shews that Tyrants are so far from being Happy, and from having dominion over others, that they are very Miserable, and so many vile Slaves; who never do what they desire, even then when they do what they please.

He proves that 'tis much better to suffer Wrong than to do it; and that when a Man has once done it, 'tis much happier for him to be punish'd for it, than to escape the Penalty he has deserv'd.

As for what respects a Man's saving himself or securing others from great Danger; he shews 'tis not so considerable a thing as to deserve so much of our Esteem; for there are a great many things which often conduce to save Life, which yet are very inconsiderable in themselves. For Example (he says) the Art of Swimming is a thing very little esteem'd, and yet on many Occasions it preserves a Man from certain Death. The Art of a Pilot saves whole Families, and the whole Estates of divers Persons; yet a Pilot is not ordinarily much puff'd up on the account of this advantage; he does not think himself a very Considerable Man in a State, but contents himself with a moderate *In Gorgias, Tom. 1.*

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Salary, as 'tis reasonable he should, because he does not know whether he has done those whom he has preserv'd any great service, for besides that he returns 'em just such as he found 'em; It often happens that it might have been better for some of 'em to have perish'd in their Voyage.

The like may be said of the Art of Engineers, that of Carpenters, Brick-layers, Coachmen and many others; who often preserve the Lives of abundance of People; and yet there is no Goverment wherein the Laws allot, any very great Honors, or establish any very considerable Rewards for those that exercise 'em: So true is it that notwithstanding the love Men naturally bear to Life, it must be confess'd that the Art of preserving our selves or others is no such wonderful thing, as to be prefer'd to every thing besides. The only Art which merits our Esteem, and which alone can make a Man considered as a God, is that of saving Souls; and to save 'em, they must be purg'd from their Vices: for 'tis the greatest unhappiness in the World for a Man to pass into the other Life with his Soul loaded with Sins. Therefore a Good Man ought to employ all his Logick and Eloquence both to make himself better, and to render others so; and to put both himself and others in a Condition to appear before that Judg from whom nothing can be hid, who viewing Souls quite naked discovers the least scars that are left on 'em by Perjury, Injustice, Vanity, Lying, Cruelty, Debauchery, and all other Sins; and who, as he renders to every Man according to his Works, punishes those for a time, who have committed only such Sins as are cureable, that is which may be expiated, and condemns those to Eternal Torments who have been guilty of Mortal Sins; and by pushing their Wickedness to extremity have render'd themselves incurable, and have no sound part in 'em. This is the Danger from which 'tis so noble a thing to secure Men. This is the best Combate in the World, and the only

What that Art is which alone merits our Esteem.

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only one that deſerves to be undertaken even with the peril of one's Life: for is it fit we ſhould fear Men who can do no more than kill the Body?

Thoſe Legiſlators, Orators and Miniſters of State who have not employ'd their Eloquence to meliorate the People that were ſubject to 'em, were not true Orators, and conſequently were not truly righteous. This *Plato* proves by the Examples of *Pericles*, *Simon*, *Milciades* and *Themiſtocles*; who were ſo far from making the Athenians good Men that they render'd them yet more brutiſh and ſavage; and in fine, bore the Puniſhment of that little care they took of 'em. For all that befel 'em from the hands of the People, came on 'em through their own fault; like that which happens to an ill Groom, who ſuffers his Horſes to become more unlucky than when they were firſt committed to his keeping, and ſo at laſt is kick'd by 'em, and can no longer rule 'em. This is the Idea *Plato* had of Rhetorick, of which he gives excellent Precepts in his *Phedrus*, and *Gorgias*, Dialogues which can never be ſufficiently commended, and which furniſh us with the Maxims of which we have been diſcourſing.

When I ſay Rhetorick is one part of Dialectick, I don't forget that this is ſometimes oppos'd to the other; as we find in *Plato*'s own Writings in the beginning of *Gorgias*, where *Socrates* ſays to *Polus*, that he exercis'd himſelf more in that which is call'd Rhetorick, than in Dialectick. But 'tis eaſy to ſee that *Socrates* there, by Rhetorick, means that Art which has no regard to Truth, but aims only at a plauſible Appearance of Truth; and the Scope of which is only to adorn and embelliſh any Subject. When *Iſocrates* makes a Panegyrick on *Helena*, he only employs the figures of Rhetorick; and never troubles himſelf about the Proofs and Arguments of Dialectick. In a Word, an Orator is one who labours to excite or appeaſe the Paſſions, and to obtain his end ſeeks magnificent Words, and ſpe-

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cious Figures, and employs false Arguments as if they were true; and the Dialectician applies himself to Art, only to prove the Truth; as the Sophist has recourse to Art only to put off Falshood.

We now come to the manner in which *Plato* handles the Subjects of which he treats; and shall endeavour to discover the Beauties and Defects of his Stile.

After what manner Plato handles the Subjects of which he treats.

He is accus'd of never proposing his Questions simply and clearly, and of casting by this means a great deal of obscurity on his Dialogues. But to judge whether this Reproach is well or ill founded 'tis necessary to examine what belongs to Method. There are two sorts of Method; The first may be call'd simple and dry; such is that of Geometricians who endeavour only to propose the naked Truths, and to draw just Conclusions from their Propositions. This Method is very good, and extremely useful, when we have to do with Minds that are rational and free from all sorts of Prejudice: But is worth nothing when we deal with People prepossessed or unattentive, impatient or obstinate.

The Second Method which may be call'd *compounded* or *florid* is that of Orators; 'tis properly the first Method extended and disguised by all the Ornaments that can render Arguments agreeable, and takes away that rudeness and dryness from Precepts, which commonly hinder the reception of 'em. If we examine *Plato*'s works with reference to the first of these: 'Tis certain he does not at first dash distinctly propose the Question on which he treats. But instead of being reproached he ought to be commended for this: For he purposely rejected this Method to follow the other which is infinitely more useful, and has more of Art in it. By this means he cures a great many Passions, and destroys an infinite number of Prejudices, before they to whom he speaks, know what he aims at; and 'tis by this Course he convinces them with so much strength

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ſtrength of all the Truths he has a mind to teach.

But ſay ſome, to what purpoſe ſerve thoſe great Preambles which he ſets at the head of his Dialogues? Theſe are neceſſary to accompany his Deſign; and as *Plutarch* ſays when he ſpeaks of the Dialogue which *Plato* made of the Atlantick Iſland on *Solons* Memoirs; *Theſe are Superb gates and magnificent Courts with which he purpoſely embelliſhes his great Edifices; that nothing may be wanting to their Beauty, and that all may be equally ſplendid.* He acts like a great Prince who when he builds a fine Pallace, *adorns the Porch with Golden Pillars* to uſe the words of *Pindar*. For 'tis proper that what is firſt ſeen ſhould be ſplendid and magnificent; and ſhould promiſe all that greatneſs which is to be ſeen afterwards. *Plato's Preambles.*

If *Plato's* Preambles ſhould be excus'd for the ſake of their great Beauty, and for the genuine and admirable deſcriptions with which they abound; yet how can any one excuſe the frequent Digreſſions in which he engages himſelf? This is what is ſaid by thoſe who never had the Patience to read *Plato*; or elſe have read him very careleſsly. 'Tis true there are frequent Digreſſions in his Dialogues; but theſe Digreſſions never carry him entirely from his Subject; for he always employs them either to eſtabliſh ſome great Truth which he ſhall have occaſion for in the ſequel of his diſcourſe; or to prevent the Readers mind with Authorities and Examples, or in fine to divert, and refreſh him after a painful and ſerious reſearch; and in this *Plato* may be ſaid to be the Greateſt Inchanter that ever was in the World, for when he is giving you the proofs of the moſt neceſſary and ſolid Truths; he takes care at the ſame time to lead you into the ſweet Meadows, Groves and Vallies which the Muſes frequent. *His frequent Digreſſions.*

Beſides 'tis an inconteſtable Maxime that the Operations of the Mind are not like the Motions of an Arrow. An Arrow does not go well, unleſs it flee ſtraight forward; but the Mind makes no leſs pro-

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greſs when it turns aſide, or ſtops at a Subject, to conſider it well on every ſide, and by the different relations it has to other things, than when it goes on directly to its end. 'Tis for an Arrow to go, without turning, to the Mark we aim at; and it always miſſes its ſtroke, how little ſoever it diverts from it. But the Mind of Man is not oblig'd to proceed ſo directly; but is often engag'd to conſider ſuch Objects as are nearly allied to that it deſires to know; and to take a turn about them to examine 'em on all ſides. This Circular Motion is no leſs ſtreight than that of an Arrow; and theſe turnings and windings inſtead of leading us from the end, conduct us to it. This is ſo true that when we have been thinking *Plato* was wandering from his deſign by frequent Digreſſions; we are ſtrangely ſurprized to ſee, that that which ſeem'd to carry him from it does indeed after a wonderful manner lead him to it; and that the Truths he has explain'd in different places being laid together, form and compleat his Demonſtrations, which would have been neither certain nor right, if he had approach'd 'em by a direct Line.

He muſt never have read *Plato*, who accuſes him of being ignorant of the Method of Geometricians. He knew it perfectly well, and deſignedly forbears the uſe of it. A Learned Man, who is very well acquainted with *Plato*, has obſerv'd before me, that no Man can more accurately propoſe the State of a Queſtion, more exactly divide a Subject, and examine Definitions more nicely than he. He never forgets any of the things on which he has propos'd to treat; He always returns to his Subject, the ſight of which he has never loſt, what Digreſſion ſoever he makes. He often marks out the beginning and end of each part, and of every Digreſſion by Propoſitions and Concluſions; he often uſes Recapitulations; and when he keeps his proof at a diſtance, he always takes care to make you remember the State of the Queſtion: So that his Diſcourſe has at once the liberty

The Abbot Fleury in his Treatiſe of Studies.

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berty of Converſation, and the accuracy of the moſt Methodical Treatiſe. An Ancient Philoſopher has given this Commendation to *Plato*; that *of all the Philoſophers he is the moſt excellent and admirable for dividing and defining: which qualities denote him to be a very expert Logician.* Alcin. Ch. VI.

As for his Stile 'tis ſublime without being Impetuous and Rapid. 'Tis a great River the depth of which makes it ſmooth. The principal Cauſe of that Elevation which reigns in it, is that he imitates *Homer*, more than any other Writers; and has drawn from his Poeſy as from a living Spring that which has furniſh'd an infinite Number of Rivulets which he has made to run from it: Nay he is *Homer*'s Rival; and indeed ſeems to have heap'd up ſo many magnificent things in his Treatiſes of Philoſophy, and to have fallen ſo often upon Poetical Matters, and Expreſſions, only to diſpute the Prize with this great Poet with all his might, like a new Wreſtler who enters the Liſts againſt one that has already receiv'd all the Acclamations, and is the Admiration of all Mankind. This is the Judgment which *Longinus* makes of him; but ſince he goes not deep enough into the true Character of *Plato*, and underſtood but a part of it; That it may be better known, I hope I ſhall be permitted to explain it a little more throughly, by adhering to what our Ancient Maſters have ſaid of it. Plato's Stile.

There are ſo many different manners of compoſing, that indeed they are innumerable. For one may ſay, the Countenances of Men are not more different than their ways of Writing. 'Tis with this Art as 'tis with that of Painting, the Profeſſors of which make very different Mixtures with the ſame Colours, and Paint the ſame Subjects after a very different Manner. But though thoſe differences are ſo very numerous, when they are examined nicely and by detail, yet they may be reduc'd to three principal ones; which go under borrow'd Names, for want of proper ones. The Firſt is auſtere or rude Compoſition. Dionyſius Halicarn. *in his Treatiſe of Compoſition.*

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The Second is florid, or ſmooth. And the Third intermediate, which is compos'd of the other Two.

Auſtere or rude Compoſition, Dionyſ. pag. 22, &c.

Auſtere or rough Compoſition reſembles thoſe Ancient Buildings, the Stones of which are neither poliſh'd, nor artificially plac'd; but yet are well fix'd; and have more Solidity than Beauty, it has more of Nature than Art in it; and depends more on the Paſſion than Manners and Civility: It has nothing florid, 'tis great and rigid, if I may be permitted to uſe ſuch a Term; 'tis without Ornament; and all the Graces of it ſavour much of Antiquity. This is the true Character of *Pindar*, *Eſchylus* and *Thucydides*.

Smooth or florid Compoſition, p. 25. and 26.

The Second, which is ſmooth and florid, is almoſt entirely oppoſite to the other, It ſeeks the ſweeteſt and ſmootheſt Words; and avoids ſuch as are harſh and rough with all imaginable care. This ſavours more of Art than Nature, and depends more on polite Manners than on the Paſſion. This is the Character of *Heſiod*, *Sapho*, *Anacreon*, *Simonides*, and *Euripides* among the Poets, and of *Iſocrates* among the Orators. For of all that have written in Proſe none ever ſucceeded better than this Laſt.

Mix'd Compoſition made up of the 2 former, pag. 27.

The Third is made up of both together 'tis compounded of what is beſt in the two former; and therefore excels them both; for the perfection of Arts always conſiſts in a Medium, as well as that of Manners and Actions, and the whole Courſe of Life.

The Writers of this kind differ more among themſelves than thoſe that have follow'd the two former methods, becauſe of the different mixture they have made of thoſe two Characters; for ſome have fallen more on the rough way, and others more on the florid.

Homer, *Sophocles*, *Herodotus*, *Demoſthenes*, *Plato* and *Ariſtotle* wrote in this laſt kind; but without contradiction *Homer* is the moſt to be admired. There is no part of his Poems but is wonderfully diverſified by theſe 2 ſorts of Compoſition. They who have follow'd him

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him are more or less excellent; according as they more or less approach this great Model. And as *Plato* comes nearer to him than others, 'tis this that gives him his greatest Beauty.

The Foundation of these Three ways, as well as of all others is First the choice of Words; Secondly the regular placing of 'em, from which there results a different Harmony, and in fine the use of Figures, and all the other Ornaments of Discourse. *The Foundation of these 3 ways.*

The choice of Words is first in Order, but the regular Disposition of 'em is first in Beauty. This is so true, that the best chosen and noblest Words if thrown at a venture, without Method and Art, will quite spoil the Elegancy of the Thought; whereas the worst chosen and most vulgar Words will make an indifferent Thought pass, when Art has taken care to put them in good Order; To be throughly convinc'd of this Truth, a Man need only pick out some of the finest Passages to be found in the Orators and Poets, and alter the Order and Harmony of 'em without making any Alteration in the Words: and he'll destroy the Beauty and Force of 'em; for by this means the Figures, Colours, Passions and polite Manners that appear in 'em will be lost. Hence it is that the Beauties which shine in the Writings of these great Men can't be discern'd but by those that know all these differences. *Dionysius Halicarnasseus* with a great deal of reason compares the disposition of Words to *Homer*'s *Minerva*; for as this Goddess by touching *Ulysses* with her Ring made him appear one while little, deform'd, and like a Beggar depress'd with Misery and Age; and another while very great and marvellously beautiful; so the different placing of the same Words make the Thoughts appear one while poor and low, and another while rich and sublime. *The Choice of Words and the regular placing of 'em.* Dionys. Halicarn. *gives Examples of it in his Treatise of Composition,* P. 4. *and* 5.

Plato may be call'd Divine for this part, and if he were as happy in the choice of Words, as in the Disposition of 'em he would equal *Homer*, and exceed all other Writers; but he sometimes fails in his choice, *Plato term'd Divine for the disposition of words, and less happy in the choice of 'em.*

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choice, when he quits his ordinary Stile, to fall upon extraordinary and ſublime Expreſſions. While he keeps in a ſimple and natural way, nothing has more gracefulneſs, purity and ſmoothneſs than his Diction. 'Tis like the Chryſtal Stream of a clear River. He then uſes the moſt common Terms, he only ſtudies Accuracy and Perſpicuity, and contemns all foreign Ornaments; he only preſerves a little Air of Antiquity, which is almoſt inſenſible, and ſerves to ſet off his Elegancy, and by Numbers varied with wonderful Art; he every where ſpreads a charming Harmony. But when he would exceed himſelf, and affects to be great, the quite contrary ſometimes befalls him; for beſides that his Diction is leſs agreeable, leſs pure, and more embarraſs'd; he falls into Circumlocutions, which being ſcatter'd up and down without choice and without meaſure, have no Elegancy or Beauty; and only make a vain ſhow of a luxuriant richneſs of Language: Inſtead of words that are proper, and of common uſe, he ſeeks only for ſuch as are novel, foreign and antique; and inſtead of employing only ſuch Figures as are wiſe and grave, and eaſily underſtood; he is exceſſive in his Epithets, hard in his Metaphors, and extravagant in his Allegories. When I ſay this I don't pretend that this always happens to him; one muſt be either blind or ſtupid, not to be touch'd with an infinite number of Paſſages, in which he is as great and ſublime as poſſible, and his Stile riſes up to the Character of Wonderful. But I ſpeak this to ſhew that when he falls, 'tis only in that kind of Stile, in which 'tis impoſſible for a Man always to ſupport himſelf equally. For the great and magnificent way is ſlippery and dangerous; and he that will attain it muſt expoſe himſelf to Falls. And indeed none but a great Genius is capable of this noble Effort; and the Falls Men have had ſignify that they were led by a kind of Divine Ardour, which they could not govern. Therefore the ſublime Method though it has very little Foundation al-

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ways carries the Prize from the middle way, though it be never so happy and perfect.

It must moreover be said to the praise of *Plato*, that the places wherein he may be said to fall are very few in comparison of those in which he has succeeded to a wonder; and if we take notice of 'em, 'tis not so much to censure them, as to admire that a Man rais'd so high above the ordinary pitch of humane Nature, should not be able to preserve himself from Faults in those places where he might so easily have avoided them, and where he seems to have known 'em. For he sometimes confesses that what he says is not so much like a wise and orderly Discourse, as a Dithyrambick Poem; and that he speaks like a Man possess'd. This extravagant Enthusiasm is vicious, especially in Matters of Philosophy; and he ought to have corrected it, seeing he discern'd it; and was so careful and jealous of his Stile, that at fourscore Years of Age, he did not cease to give new touches once and again to his Dialogues, and took so much pains with 'em, that after his Death, the beginning of his Books of a *Republick* was found on his Writing-Tables, alter'd twenty several ways.

But it may be said this Fault pleas'd him, or that, because he fear'd the Simplicity of *Socrates* would not be always reliss'd, he had a mind to raise it by the Sublimity of *Thucydides* and *Gorgias*, however in imitating their Vertues, he did not take sufficient precaution against their Vices. This is the Judgment which *Dionysius Halicarnasseus* makes of him in his Treatise of the Ancient Orators; and he supports it in the Answer which he makes to the great *Pompey* who took *Plato*'s part. In this Answer he proves to him the Truth of this Censure, and makes it appear, that he is of the same mind himself, and farther shows, that the Ancients, as *Demetrius Phalereus*, and some others, had passed the same Judgment before him.

Longinus, who is so fine, so sure, and so exact a Critick

Critick was of the ſame Opinion ſome Ages before *Dionyſius Halicarnaſſeus*. He acknowledges as well as this Latter that *Plato* writes after a divine manner in abundance of places, and at the ſame time, proves, like him too, by palpable Inſtances, that he is ſometimes too figurative in his expreſſions; and that by a certain fury of diſcourſe he ſuffers himſelf to be tranſported to harſh and extravagant Metaphors, and to a vain allegorical Pomp, which can't chooſe but frequently languiſh. This is a defect which he might have avoided, as *Demetrius* ſays, if he had uſed proper Terms more frequently than Metaphors.

But to finiſh this Character in few words, by reſuming what has been already ſaid. In General there is nothing more harmonious and touching than *Plato*'s Diction; he joins the force of the greateſt Orators, with the Graces of the greateſt Poets; he is very fruitful and luxuriant: he ſo perfectly deſcribes Manners and Paſſions, and forms Characters ſo well, that all the Perſons he brings in every where appear what they ſeem'd to be at firſt view. There is nothing more perfect when he keeps himſelf within the Bounds of ordinary Language; but he ſometimes falls when he ſtrives to ſoar very high, tho his Falls are not common, and yet the places wherein he ſhows himſelf pompous and magnificient are very frequent; ſo that even in this kind of writing there are a thouſand things to be admir'd in his Books where there is one to condemn'd.

Having ſpoken of *Plato*'s Stile, we come to ſpeak a word or two of his Commentators, and Interpreters.

We have but two Latin Tranſlations of this Philoſopher's Works, that of *Marſilius Ficinus*, and that of *John de Serres*, who compos'd the Hiſtory of *France* under the Title of an Inventory (or Regiſter.) Neither of 'em will ever make *Plato* to be well underſtood. However the former ſeems to me the beſt for the literal Senſe, and 'tis certain, that it has fewer faults.

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faults. *Marſilius Ficinus* was a Learned and Laborious Man; but being too ſpeculative and abſtracted, he loſes all the advantage of his Tranſlation by his Explication, in which he ſtrains Allegories and Myſteries to an exorbitant degree. It would have been a great uneaſineſs to him to underſtand any thing ſimply, tho *Plato* often ſpeaks with great Simplicity; and by this means he endeavours to juſtify a great many Errors into which *Plato* fell; for he every where finds a ſenſe, not only commodious and excuſable, but orthodox; he always looks on him with a profound reſpect as a Man inſpir'd of God; and is perſwaded there is no Myſtery in the Chriſtian Religion, but he knew it: I don't ſay in the Writings of the Prophets only, but in thoſe of the Evangeliſts and Apoſtles.

John de Serres was a Man of leſs Ability than *Marſilius Ficinus*, nor did he underſtand Greek near ſo well as he, ſo that his Tranſlation abounds with Faults, and eſſential Faults too, which corrupt the Senſe: but he is yet more to blame for entirely changing the order of the Dialogues, and diſpoſing 'em into different Claſſes; not according to the Subjects, but the Titles of 'em, which are commonly falſe; which makes the Reader, when he ſeeks for that in the Dialogue which is promiſed in the Title, and does not find it, accuſe *Plato* of being very defective in his Proofs, and of wandering from his Subject; ſo that he has not the Patience to hear him. The only thing in his Work, that ſeems to me worthy of any great Commendation, is his ſmall Marginal Notes; in which he gives a naked diſcovery of *Plato*'s Method; for tho *Plato* was willing to conceal it, to render his Dialogues the more diverting; it was fit ſome Perſon ſhould give himſelf the trouble of unfolding this Art thoroughly, which the Readers would not always unravel of themſelves: This is a very great help, and indeed is very uſeful to make the Beauties of the Method *Plato* follow'd appear to good advantage.

See the Abbot Fleury's *Treatiſe of Studies*, pag. 297.

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In fine, if *Marſilius Ficinus* errs in running every where too far into Myſteries; *John de Serres* runs into the contrary Fault, in taking things too ſimply: for 'tis by this means he charges a great many very innocent things, and which may receive a good ſenſe to *Plato*'s Account, as ſo many Crimes.

The Commentaters of Plato.

Plato explains his Thoughts ſo clearly himſelf; that a Man needs nothing but Attention, not to loſe the train of his Reaſoning. The Obſcurities we find in 'em reſult either from the Cuſtoms of his Time, or the Opinions of the Ancient Philoſophers; into which Commentators give very little Light. The knowledg of 'em ought to be ſought in the reading of Ancient Authors, which are more uſeful to make a Man underſtand *Plato*, than all that have labour'd to explain his Doctrine. Theſe Commentators however are not to be ſlighted, but deſerve to be read for their own ſake, without any regard to *Plato*'s Philoſophy. At leaſt there are five of 'em, of which I may make this Account: *Maximus Tyrius* under the Emperour *Marcus Aurelius*, in the ſecond Century: *Plotinus* in the third, *Porphyrius* the Scholar of *Plotinus*, and *Iamblichus* the Scholar of *Porphyrius* in the fourth; and *Proclus* in the fifth.

The laſt was a very great Philoſopher, and ſo skillful in the Mechanicks, that he equal'd, and even ſurpaſſed *Archimedes* himſelf in divers things: But his Vanity was yet more remarkable than his Ingenuity; when to encourage the Emperour *Anaſtaſius*, to whom it had been predicted, that he ſhould be kill'd with a Clap of Thunder, he built a Tower for him that was to be Proof againſt the Artillery of Heaven: for this Tower prov'd uſeleſs; and the Emperour was kill'd with Thunder which he was ſo deſirous to eſcape. We have moreover ſix Books of this *Proclus* on *Plato*'s Theology, and Theological Inſtitutions. His Words are very difficult to be underſtood, becauſe he is very abſtracted. But when a Man can penetrate 'em, he'll find 'em very profound, and full of admirable things. As when he

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he explains what *Plato* says, that that which unites us to God is Love, Truth, and Faith; and shows Faith to be the only cause of Initiation. *For* (says he) *this Initiation is made neither by knowledg nor discerning, but by a Medium which is single, and stronger than all Knowledges, that is, by the silence which Faith inspires in raising up our Souls to God, and plunging them into that Sea, which can never be comprehended.* But he must be read with a great deal of Judgment and precaution; for these things that are so admirable are mix'd with a great many Errors, into which he was thrown by that hatred with which he was always animated against the Christians.

Iamblichus is considerable in that he perfectly well explains the Opinions of the Egyptians, and Chaldeans about divine things. Besides in explaining these Mysteries he often gives great Discoveries that may be usefully employ'd to elucidate abundance of Difficulties in the holy Scriptures; and is full of Maxims that may be of great use. The greatest fault of *Iamblichus* is, that in treating of these very sublime Subjects he often shows himself credulous and superstitious.

Porphyrius was of *Tyre*, he was call'd *Malcho*. And therefore *Longinus*, in his Letters, calls him *the King of Tyre*, because *Malcho*, in the Phenician Language, signifies *a King*, for the same reason he is nam'd *Porphyrius*, which signifies *one cloath'd with purple*; that is to say, a King. The Ancients have preserved to us many things which he wrote on the Philosophy of *Plato* and *Pythagoras*: but he was a Man of a wicked Mind, and very satyrical, and was moreover so inclin'd to Magick, that this sacrilegious Curiosity of his obscur'd the greatest Discoveries of Truth which he had received from *Plato*. His Treatise of Abstinence is the best, and most useful thing he compos'd.

Plotinus in my Opinion excels all the rest. Not but that he is often very abstracted and hard to be

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underſtood; but in general he is more intelligible than *Proclus*; and for Morality much Advantage may be reap'd from his Writings. And 'tis happy that his fineſt Treatiſes are the moſt plain and intelligible. *Longinus* ſays of him, that he has more clearly explain'd the Principles of *Plato* and *Pythagoras* than any Philoſopher before him. He ſays his Writings are worthy of the Eſteem, and Veneration of all Men; and adds, that though the greateſt part of the Matters on which he treats ſeem to him incomprehenſible; and do not affect him; he can never be weary in admiring his Stile, the Solidity of his Thoughts and Conceptions, the depth of his reſearches, and the truly Philoſophical manner in which he handles his ſubjects.

When *Longinus* ſays, he is not always affected with the Subjects which *Plotinus* handles, he principally reſpects what he wrote on Ideas. For *Longinus* had labour'd to refute *Porphyrius*, who was brought over to the Sentiment of *Plotinus* after having written againſt him; That is *Longinus* could not conceive the Doctrine of Ideas, and was of *Ariſtotle*'s ſentiment, who took what *Diogenes* had ſaid to ridicule this Opinion, too literally: For *Diogenes* being one day at Table with *Plato*; and being fallen in Converſation upon immaterial and eternal Exemplars, ſays he to *Plato*. *I ſee very well there is a Goblet and a Table, but I ſee neither Gobleity nor Tableity.* To which *Plato* anſwer'd, *'Tis becauſe thou haſt bodily Eyes which can ſee a Goblet and a Table, but not thoſe of the Mind, which alone ſee Gobleity and Tableity.*

Never did any Diſciple do more honour to his Maſter than *Plotinus* did to *Plato* both by his Manners and Doctrine.

It was he that firſt ſaid, *God was mov'd merely by his Mercy to give our Souls only Mortal Chains.* By which he ſignifies that it was an Effect of his Compaſſions that he gave us Bodies ſubject to Death; that ſo we might not always be expos'd to the Miſeries of this Life. He

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He was convinc'd that our Souls draw all their Light and Sagacity only from that intelligible Light which created 'em; that the Soul has no Nature ſuperior to it but that of God alone; and that the Angels and other Celeſtial Spirits derive their Happineſs and Knowledg from no other Source than that which enlightens us, and renders us happy. His Manners were yet more admirable than his Doctrine. He all his Life deſpis'd Vain-Glory, Riches and Pleaſures; and his Probity was ſo generally known; that the moſt conſiderable perſons of both Sexes, when they dyed, entruſted him with their Eſtates and Children; as not being able to find a more faithful Depoſitary, or more ſacred Aſylum.

Maximus Tyrius wrote on *Homer*'s Doctrine, and on the Matters of Philoſophy; almoſt all the Diſcourſes which we have of his do either directly or indirectly reſpect *Plato*'s Philoſophy. The Reading of 'em is very agreable and very uſeful: But they ſupply us with no more Aid for the underſtanding of the Difficulties of *Plato*, than all the reſt. And in this reſpect one may ſay the uſeleſsneſs of theſe Commentaries proves the truth of one of *Plato*'s Sentements, who held, that it ſerves to very little purpoſe to write on thoſe ſublime Sciences, and that the true manner of teaching 'em is by Converſation, which is the only way to perſwade a Man after ſuch a manner, that he ſhall not have the leaſt difficulty remain upon his Mind, and that he ſhall be capable of convincing another of the ſame thing: For we never well underſtand a Truth; if we are not in a condition on all Occaſions to make it known to ſuch as have all neceſſary Diſpoſitions to receive it. And this was likewiſe the reaſon that *Plato* was more known, and better underſtood at *Rome* in *Cicero*'s time than he is now. Becauſe he was read in the Company of Philoſophers, and nothing ſhortens Difficulties ſo much as Living Commentaries. Unhappily for us theſe living Commentaries are now very rare, or to ſpeak more plainly are

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not to be found. For of all our Philosophers there is not one who has closely applied himself to the reading of *Plato*, a Negligence not to be excus'd. If the reading of *Plato* should not render us more Learned, 'tis certain however that it might make us better, less proud, and more wise, not only with that Humane Wisdom which qualifies us externally to fill up all the Duties of our civil Life; but also with that soveraign Wisdom which disposes us to obey God, and to subject our selves to the Truths of Religion, and which alone makes up the true Character of a Philosopher.

Being therefore destitute of all help from living Commentaries, for the understanding of *Plato*; I apply my self to *Plato* himself, and shall endeavour to give a faithful Translation accompanied with some Remarks, in those places which are most difficult and of greatest Importance. It may be the Facility of reading him in this dress will attract some Readers. But however the success be, I shall never repent of having employ'd my time in translating some Treatises of a truly divine Philosopher since he had the glorious privileg of being in the hand of God an Instrument of Light and Grace for the Conversion of St. *Augustin*, and perhaps may be so to some of us.

The

The ARGUMENT OF THE First *ALCIBIADES.*

IN this Dialogue which is Intituled OF HUMANE NATURE, Plato *attempts to cure our Pride and Self-love, by ſetting the Infirmities and Defects of Humane Nature in the cleareſt Light; and by preſcribing the means which ought to be us'd to reform it, with the care we ought to take of our ſelves. The matter in queſtion therefore is to know what* We our Selves *are; and above all that part of the Dialogue which treats of this appears to be Divine. For here* Plato *teaches, that* Man is the reaſonable Soul, which participates of Underſtanding, and makes uſe of the Body. *The Soul as reaſonable makes uſe of her Reaſon to reflect on her ſelf, and to know her own Neceſſities; as ſhe participates of Underſtanding, ſhe makes uſe of this to raiſe her up toward God, and to know her ſelf in that reſplendent Light, in which only we can be able perfectly to view our ſelves; and to know what is good, profitable, lovely, juſt, in a word the true Good, of which that is the Fountain: And 'tis this knowledg alone that ſets us right, and which by directing our Actions renders them uſeful both to our ſelves and others. But that it may not be thought that it abſolutely depends on us to acquire this Perfection, he aſſures us that all our Efforts will be uſeleſs without the aſſiſtance of God. We ſhall find here beſides this other Truths as ſurprizing in a Pagan; for inſtance, that which he ſays of the two ſorts of Ignorance, one of which is good and t'other evil; and what he teaches us concerning particular things, that the knowledg of theſe is not ſuf-*

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ficient to produce the Peace and Union of States and Families; and that we have need of the knowledg of universal things, which alone produces Charity the Mother of Union. 'Tis not necessary here to set off all the Beauties of this Dialogue, I shall only remark in general, that all these Dialogues are as so many pieces of the Theatre; Comedy reigns in some of 'em, and Tragedy in others. This is of the latter kind; and in some sort resembles Sophocles *his* Oedipus. *For as in that Piece we see a Prince who from the highest Pinacle of Grandeur, and after he had been look'd upon as a God falls into a most deplorable state of Misery: We here in like manner see* Alcibiades, *after having been counted worthy of the greatest Honours, obliged to acknowledg that he deserves only to be a Slave. They that are shock'd at the passionate manner in which* Socrates *speaks to* Alcibiades *at the beginning of this Dialogue, will cease to be offended when they have read it out; for they'll then see 'tis a very innocent Passion; design'd only for the advancement of Vertue. Young People would be very happy, if they always found Friends that lov'd 'em as truly and piously as* Socrates *loved* Alcibiades; *for as* Plutarch *says,* He did not seek with him an Effeminate Pleasure unworthy of a Man, but cured the Corruption of his Soul, fill'd the Void of his Mind; and repress'd his extravagant Vanity. *He endeavour'd to lead him out of Darkness and conduct him to the true Light. 'Tis not difficult to fix the Time in which* Plato *supposes this Dialogue to have been made, since he tell us* Alcibiades *was then in the 20th Year of his Age; it must have been therefore in the 3d Year of the* LXXXVII *Olympiade, one Year before the death of* Pericles.

This Dialogue is μαιευτικὸς, *that is* Socrates *so manages the matter, as to make* Alcibiades *of himself find out the Truths which he has a mind to teach him.*

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THE

First *ALCIBIADES*,

OR

Of the Nature of Man.

Socrates, Alcibiades.

Socrates. O Son of *Clinias*, you are without doubt ſurpriz'd, that ſince I was the firſt that lov'd you, I ſhould likewiſe be the laſt; and that whereas others have purſued you with their importunate Viſits, I have been ſo many Years without ſpeaking to you. 'Tis no Humane Conſideration that has retained me; But a regard altogether * Divine; which I'll explain to you hereafter. At preſent while that God who conducts me lays me under no reſtraint; I make uſe of the permiſſion he gives me to accoſt you; and I hope our Converſation for the time to come will not be diſagreeable to him. I have hitherto obſerv'd with Joy how you have conducted your ſelf towards my Rivals; among that great number of proud and haughty Men who have adher'd to you, there is not one whom you have not ſhock'd by your lofty Carriage. And I am now willing to tell you the cauſe of the Contempt you have had for 'em. You think you have no need of any Man;

* *A Regard altogether divine*) he means he was not willing to ſpeak to him without the Permiſſion of God, under whoſe Conduct he is, and that God would not ſuffer him to ſpeak, during the great Tenderneſs of *Alcibiades* his Youth, which would have render'd all his Inſtructions uſeleſs. See the Argument of the Apology about the Genius that conducted *Socrates*.

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for liberally has Nature, as you suppose, indulged you with all the Goods both of Body and Mind. For first of all * you think your self to be one of the finest and best made Men in the World; and 'tis very certain in this you are not mistaken. In the second place you are sensible of the Advantage of † your birth; for you are of the most Illustrious House of *Athens*; which is the most considerable of all the Cities of *Greece*. On your Fathers side you have a great many very powerful Relations and Friends to support you on all Occasions: You have no less Number, nor less considerable in Quality on your Mother's side; and that which you think yet more augments your Reputation, is that your Father left you *Pericles* for your Guardian; whose Authority is so great, that he does what he pleases not only in this City, but likewise in all *Greece*, and among the most powerful of the Barbarous Nations. I might also speak of your Riches, if I did not know that these are the least occasion of your Vanity. ‡ All these great Advantages have inspired you with so much Pride, that you have despis'd all your Admirers as so many Inferiours not worthy of loving you. Accordingly they have all left you, and you have very well observ'd it; therefore I am very sure you can't sufficiently wonder what reasons I can have to continue in my former passion; and are considering what hope I can yet have to follow you after all my Rivals have retired.

The Pride of Alcibiades, *and the reason of it.*

* *Plutarch* reports, that the Beauty of *Alcibiades*, kept in a florid state, through all the Ages of his Life; and that the saying of *Euripides*, *That the Autumn of handsom Men is gay*, was verified in him.

† On the side of his Father *Clinias*, he descended from *Eurysaces*, the Son of *Ajax*; and on the side of his Mother *Dinomache*, he was *Alemæonides*, and descended from *Megacles*.

‡ The most noted and strongest Passions *Alcibiades* had, were a boundless Vanity which made him endeavour to carry all before him with an Air of Haughtiness, and an unlimited Ambition, which made either a superior, or equal, always seem intolerable to him; this made *Archestratus* say, *Greece could not bear two* Alcibiades, *Plutar.*

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Alcibiades. But one thing which without doubt you don't know, *Socrates*, is that you have prevented me but a Moment, and that I designed to speak to you first to ask the Reason of your Obstinacy. What do you mean, or what is it you hope for, that you trouble me after this manner, using your utmost diligence continually to attend me in every place whither I go? for in fine I can't enough wonder at your Deportment; and you'll do me a pleasure to tell me once for all to what you pretend.

Socrat. That is you'll freely hear me, seing you have a mind to know my Thoughts; I shall therefore now speak to you, as to one who will have patience to hear me, and will not take Occasion to get away from me.

Alcib. Yes, you may so.

Socrat. Consider well to what you engage your self; that you may not be surpriz'd, if I find it as hard for me to make an end, as it has been to begin.

Alcib. Speak, *Socrates*, I'll give you as much time as you please.

Socrat. Well then I'll obey you; and though it be a very difficult thing for a Man to speak to a Person he loves, who yet does not love him; I must take the Courage to tell you my thoughts. For my part, *Alcibiades*, if I had always seen you devoted to your Vanity and Grandeur, and in the design of living, as you have hitherto done, in your Luxury and Softness; I should also have long ago renounc'd my Passion for you; at least I flatter my self that I should have done so. But now I am going to discover to You your own Thoughts, which are very different from those you have had formerly; and by this you'll know that the reason of my obstinate persisting in following you up and down, was, to study You. I am ready to think, that if some God should all on a sudden say to you, *Alcibiades*; would you rather choose to live with all the Advantages you have at present, than to die, if you were withal forbidden to aspire to the Possession of yet greater

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for the future. I am ready to think, I say, that you would choose to die: So that this appears to be the hope with which you flatter your self, and which makes you in love with Life: You are perswaded, that you shall have no sooner harangued the Athenians, and that will be within a very little time, but you'll make 'em sensible you deserve to be honour'd more than *Pericles*, or any of our greatest Citizens; that you shall soon be Master of this City; and that your Power shall extend over all the Cities of *Greece*, and over the Barbarous Nations that inhabit our Continent. And if this God should farther say, *Alcibiades*, you shall be King of all *Europe*; but you shall not extend your Dominion over the Provinces of *Asia*; I believe you would not be willing to live for so small a Empire; unless you could fill the whole World with the noise of your Name. You esteem none but *Cyrus* and *Xerxes*; and as you are charm'd with their Glory, you propose them as Patterns for your imitation. These are the Views you have. I know it, and 'tis not mere conjecture. You very well know I say nothing but the Truth, and therefore perhaps you'll ask me; what respect, *Socrates*, has this Preamble of yours to that you had a mind to say to explain to me the reasons you have to follow me every where? I'll immediatly satisfy you of that, O Son of *Clinias*. 'Tis because the * great Projects you form in your head can never be put in Execution without my Assistance; so much Power have I over all your Affairs, and over your self too. And hence it is without doubt, that the God who governs me, has never suffer'd me to speak to you till now, and I have been long waiting for his Permission. Now therefore as you hope that, when you have convinc'd your Fellow-Citizens that you are worthy of the greatest Honours, they will make you Master of their Fortunes; I also hope you will make

* The Designs of the Ambitious can't succeed but by the Counsels of the Wise.

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me Master of your Conduct, when I have convinc'd you, that I am more worthy of this Honour than any other Person, and that you have neither Guardian, Friend nor Brother that can give you that great Power to which you aspire; there is none but I that can do it with the help of God. While you were Younger, and had not this great Ambition, God was not pleas'd to suffer me to speak to you, that my Words might not be thrown away. Now he gives me leave to break Silence; and you are indeed in a better Disposition to hear me.

Alcib. I confess, *Socrates*, * you seem to me a more strange Person since you have begun to speak than while you were silent; tho indeed I have always taken you for an odd sort of a Man. It seems then you know my thoughts perfectly well, so let it be; if I should tell you the contrary, I should have enough to do to convince you. But I pray tell me how you will be able to prove, that with your Assistance, I shall effect the great things I am projecting, and that I can do nothing without you?

Socrat. Do you ask me if I am capable of making a long Discourse † as they do whom you are wont to hear? You know that is not my manner. But if you would (tho never so little) comply with my way, I'll do all I can to convince you that I have advanced nothing but what is true.

Alcib. I am willing to comply with it, provided 'tis not very difficult.

Socrat. Is it so difficult a Matter to answer a few Questions?

Alcib. No, if that be all, I am willing to do it.

Socrat. Answer me then.

Alcib. Well interrogate me as soon as you please.

*The Wisdom of *Socrates* could not but seem mere Folly to *Alcibiades*, especially while *Socrates* promises him such great things, which he could not tell how to comprehend.

† He reproaches him for amusing himself too much in hearing the long Discourses of the Sophists. For *Alcibiades* pretended much to Eloquence, which made him so much relish those studied Discourses.

Socrat.

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Socrat. May we not suppose that you have always those great Thoughts which I have attributed to you?

Alcib. I agree to it; I shall at least have the satisfaction of hearing what you have to say to me.

Socrat. I believe I am not mistaken, you are preparing to go in a few days to the Assembly of the Athenians to make them participate of the Knowledge and Skill you have acquired. And if I should meet you at that instant and ask you, *Alcibiades*, what are the Matters about which you are going to advise the Athenians? Are they not such things as you know better than they? What would you answer me?

Alcib. Without doubt I should answer, 'tis about such things as I know better than they.

Socrat. For you would not know how to give good Counsel but in Matters that you know?

Alcib. How should any one give it in other things?

Socrat. And is it not certain, that you know nothing but what you have either learn'd of others, or what you have found out your self?

Alcib. What can one know otherwise?

Socrat. But have you learnt any thing of others, or found out any thing your self; when you have neither been willing to learn nor search into any thing?

Alcib. That cannot be.

Socrat. Have you ever thought it worth your while to endeavour to find out, or learn, what you believ'd you already understood?

Alcib. No certainly.

Socrat. There was a time then, in which you thought your self ignorant of what you now know?

Alcib. That is very true.

Socrat. But I pretty well know what are the things you have learn'd. If I forget any one of 'em mention it to me. You have learnt, (if my Memory don't deceive me) to read and write, to play on the

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the Harp; and to wreſtle: * but as for the Flute you did not value it. This is all you underſtand, unleſs you have learn'd ſome other thing that I never knew of. And yet † I don't think you have gone abroad either Day or Night, but I have been a Witneſs to the Steps you have taken.

Alcib. 'Tis very true, theſe are the only things I have learn'd.

Socrat. Will you then when the Athenians enter into a Deliberation about Writing, to know how that Art ought to be practis'd, riſe up to give 'em your advice?

Alcib. No ſurely.

Socrat. Shall it be when they conſult about the Different Tunes in Muſick?

Alcib. A fine Conſultation indeed!

Socrat. Nor are the Athenians us'd to deliberate on the various Turns us'd in Wreſtling:

Alcib. No certainly!

Socrat. What is it then you expect they will conſider, wherein you may give 'em advice? It muſt not be about the manner of building a Houſe neither; the meaneſt Brick-layer would be able to adviſe 'em how to do that better than you.

Alcib. He would ſo.

Socrat. Nor muſt it be about any point of Divination, you are not ſo well acquainted with that Buſineſs as every Diviner is, let him be ſmall or great, handſome or ugly, of high or low Birth.

Alcib. What does all that ſignify?

Socrat. Nor is it any matter whether he be rich or poor, for good Counſel proceeds from knowledg, and not from Riches. *Alcib.*

* He look'd upon it as an ignoble Inſtrument, and unworthy of the Application of a Free-man. But the principal Cauſe of this Averſion was, becauſe it ſpoil'd the graceful Air of his Countenance.

† *Alcibiades* was Night and Day beſieg'd by a corrupt ſort of Men, who made it their conſtant endeavour to ſeduce him. But *Socrates*, like a good Father, kept him always in his ſight, to ſecure him from all thoſe dangers, well knowing that none but himſelf was capable of preſerving him from ſo great Perils.

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Alcib. That's eaſily granted.

Socrat. And if the Athenians ſhould take into conſideration the ways and means of recovering their Health; do you think they would not ſend for a Phyſician to conſult him without giving themſelves any farther trouble?

Alcib. No doubt of it.

Socrat. When is it then, d'ye think, that you'll riſe up with any Colour of Reaſon to give 'em good Advice?

Alcib. When they deliberate on their Affairs.

Socrat. What, when they conſult about the building of Ships; to know what ſort of Veſſels they ſhould make?

Alcib. No, not that neither.

Socrat. For you never learnt to build Ships; That's the reaſon I ſuppoſe you will not ſpeak of that Matter; is it not?

Alcib. To be ſure, I'll ſay nothing on that Subject.

Socrat. When is it then that their Affairs will be ſo deliberated, that you'll put in with a Speech?

Alcib. When they have before 'em the buſineſs of Peace and War, or any other thing belonging to Goverment.

Socrat. You mean, when they conſider with what Nations 'tis proper for 'em to make War or Peace; and when and how it ought to be made?

Alcib. You hit it.

Socrat. Peace or War ought to be made with thoſe Nations with whom 'tis beſt to make either the one or the other; and when the beſt Occaſion offers, and alſo after the beſt Manner; and as long as it continues to be beſt.

Alcib. True.

Socrat. If the Athenians ſhould conſult with what Wreſtlers 'tis beſt to take the Lock, and what others 'tis beſt to deal with * at Armes-end without clo-

* Tis a kind of Wreſtling *Hippocrates* ſpeaks of in his 11th Book of Diet, Chap. XI. *To wreſtle only with the Arms, without taking hold of the body, makes one lean, and draws the Fleſh upward.*

ſing

ſing in to 'em, and when and how theſe different Exerciſes ought to be perform'd, ſhould you give better advice in theſe Matters than the Maſter of the Wreſtling-ground?

Alcib. No Queſtion but he would give the beſt Counſel in this caſe.

Socrat. Can you tell me what this Wreſtling-Maſter would principally regard in giving his Inſtructions, with whom, when and how theſe different Exerciſes ought to be perform'd? Would he not have reſpect only to what is beſt?

Alcib. Without doubt he would.

Socrat. Then he would order 'em to be perform'd as often as it ſhould be beſt ſo to do; and on ſuch Occaſions as ſhould be moſt proper.

Alcib. Very true.

Socrat. He that Sings ought ſometimes to joine his Voice with the Harp; and ſometimes to dance as he Plays and Sings, and in all this he ſhould conduct himſelf by what is beſt.

Alcib. That is moſt certain.

Socrat. Seeing then there is a Beſt in ſinging, and in playing on Inſtruments as well as in Wreſtling, how will you call this Beſt? For as for that of Wreſtling, all the World calls it the moſt *Gymnaſtick*.

Alcib. I don't underſtand you.

Socrat. Endeavour to follow me; for my part I ſhould anſwer that this Beſt, is that which is always the Beſt, and is not that which is always the beſt, that which is moſt according to the Rules of the Art it ſelf?

Alcib. You have reaſon.

Socrat. What is this Art or Wreſtling? is it not the *Gymnaſtick* Art?

Alcib. Yes.

Socrat. What I have been ſaying, is that that which is beſt in the Art of Wreſtling, is call'd the moſt *Gymnaſtick*.

Alcib. This is what you have already ſaid.

Socrat. And this is Right.

Alcib.

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Alcib. Very Right.

Socrat. Come then, do you also endeavour to give me a right answer. How do you call that Art, which teaches to Sing, to play on the Harp, and to dance well? Can't you tell me that?

Alcib. No indeed *Socrates*.

Socrat. Try if you can't hit on't in this way. How do you call the Goddesses, that preside over this Art?

Alcib. You mean the Muses.

Socrat. Very well. Let us see then what name this Art has derived from them.

Alcib. O, 'tis Musick you speak of.

Socrat. Very right; and as I told you that which was perform'd accotding to the Rules of the Art of Wrestling or of the *Gymnasium* is call'd *Gymnastick*; tell me also how you call that which is according to the Rules of this other Art.

Alcib. I call it *Musical*, and say such a thing is done *Musically*.

Socrat. Very good. And in the Art of making War and in that of making Peace, what is that which is best, and how do you call it? Seing as to those two other Arts you say that which is best in the one is that which is most Gymnastick, and that which is best in the other is that which is most Musical; try now in like manner to tell me the name of that which is best in the Arts we are now upon.

Alcib. Indeed *Socrates*, I can't tell.

Socrat. But if any one should hear you discoursing, and giving Advice about several sorts of Food, and saying that is better than this, both for the Season and Quality of it? and should ask you, *Alcibiades*, what is it that you call better? would it not be a shame, if you could not answer, that you mean by better, that which is more wholesome. Yet 'tis not your profession to be a Physician. And is it not a yet greater shame that you know not how to give an answer in things you profess to know, and about which you pretend to give Advice, as understanding them better than others? Does not this cover you with Confusion?

Alcib.

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Alcib. I confeſs it does.

Socrat. Apply your Mind to it then; and endeavour to give me an Account what is the deſign of that better thing, which we ſeek in the Art of making Peace or War with thoſe with whom we ought to be either in War or Peace.

Alcib. I know not how to find it out, what Effort ſoever I make.

Socrat. What don't you know that when we make War we complain of ſomething that has been done to us by thoſe againſt whom we take up Arms? And are you ignorant of the Name we give to the thing of which we complain?

Alcib. I know on ſuch Occaſions we ſay, they have deceived us, they have inſulted us; they have taken away our property.

Socrat. Very well, when one of theſe things befalls us, I pray explain to me the different manner in which they may happen.

Alcib. You mean, *Socrates* that they may befal us juſtly or unjuſtly.

Socrat. I do ſo.

Alcib. And that makes an infinite difference.

Socrat. Againſt what People then ſhall the Athenians declare War by your Advice? ſhall it be againſt ſuch as follow the Rules of Juſtice, or ſuch as act unjuſtly?

Alcib. A Pretty Queſtion, *Socrates*; if any one ſhould be capable of thinking it needful to make War with thoſe that follow the Rules of Juſtice; do you think he would dare to own it?

Socrat. Becauſe, you'll ſay, that is not conformable to the Laws.

Alcib. No, doubtleſs; 'tis neither juſt, nor honorable.

Socrat. You'll always then have Juſtice in view in all you Counſels?

Alcib. That is very neceſſary.

Socrat. But is not that better thing about which I was juſt now enquiring of you on the Subject of

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Peace or War, *viz.* to know with whom, when and how War and Peace ſhould be made, * always the moſt juſt?

Alcib. I am of that mind.

Socrat. How comes this to paſs then, my dear *Alcibiades*, is it that you perceive not that you are ignorant of what is juſt, or is it that I perceive not that you have learn'd it, and that you have ſecretly attended ſome Maſter who has taught you to diſtinguiſh well between what is moſt juſt, and what is moſt unjuſt? Who is this Maſter; I pray tell me, that you may put me under his Care, and recommend me to him?

Alcib. Theſe are your common Ironies, *Socrates*.

Socrat. No, I ſwear it by that God who preſides over our Friendſhip, and whom I would leaſt offend by Perjury. I very ſeriouſly entreat you, if you have a Maſter, tell me who he is?

Alcib. And what if I have none, do you think I could not otherwiſe know what is juſt and unjuſt?

Socrat. You know it if you have found it out your ſelf.

Alcib. Do you think I have not found it out?

Socrat. I am perſwaded you have found it if you have ſought for it.

Alcib. D'ye think I have not ſought for it?

Socrat. You have ſought for it, if you have believed your ſelf ignorant of it.

Alcib. Do you then imagine there was not a time when I was ignorant of it?

Socrat. You ſpeak better than you think, but can you then preciſely aſſign me the Time, when you believed you did not know what was juſt and unjuſt? Let us ſee, was it the laſt year that you ſought for the knowledge of this being throughly convinced of your Ignorance in this Matter? Or did you then think you knew it? Tell the truth, that our Con-

* It is not ſufficient to know what is juſt, we ſhould know what is moſt juſt, and this point is very difficult to be found: this is not within the reach of little Politicians. *M. Le Fevre.*

verſation

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verſation may not appear vain and trifling.

Alcib. The laſt year I believed I knew it.

Socrat. And did you not think the ſame, three, four or five years ago?

Alcib. Yes.

Socrat. And before that time you were no more than a Child, were you?

Alcib. Very true.

Socrat. And at that time when you were but a Child, I am very ſure you thought you knew it.

Alcib. How are you ſo ſure of that?

Socrat. Becauſe during your Child-hood, when you were with your Maſters and elſewhere; and * when you play'd at Dice, or any other play; I have very often obſerved you did not heſitate to determine what was juſt, or unjuſt, and to tell the firſt of your Play-fellows that offended you, with a great deal of plainneſs and aſſurance, that he was baſe and unfair, and did you a great deal † of Injuſtice. Is not this True?

Alcib. What ſhould I have done then do you think when any Injuſtice was done me?

Socrat. If you were ignorant that what was offer'd you was unjuſt, you might then have ask'd what you ſhould have done.

Alcib. But I was not at all ignorant of that, for I very well knew the Injuſtice that was done me.

Socrat. By this you ſee then, that when you were but a Child you thought you knew what was Juſt and Unjuſt.

Alcib. I thought I knew it; and ſo I really did.

Socrat. At what time did you find this out? for it was not when you thought you knew it.

Alcib. No. Doubtleſs.

Socrat. At what time then do you think you were

* See what *Alcibiades* did one day as he was playing at Dice, as 'tis reported by *Plutarch* in the beginning of his Life.

† When Children trick'd one another in their play, the ordinary Term they us'd at *Athens* was ἀδικεῖς you do me Injuſtice, or as we ſay *You do me wrong*. There is a very expreſs Inſtance of it, in *Ariſtophanes* his Clouds. *M. Le Fevre.*

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ignorant of it? Consider, reckon. I am much affraid you'll not be able to find that time.

Alcib. Indeed *Socrates* I can't give you an Account of it.

Socrat. Then you have not found out of your self the knowledge of what is Just and Unjust?

Alcib. So it seems, *Socrates.*

Socrat. You just now acknowledged that you had not learned it of others neither: and if you have neither found it out your self, nor learn'd it of others, how came you to know it? whence had it you?

Alcib. But perhaps I mistook my self, and did not answer you well, when I told you I had found it out my self.

Socrat. How did you learn it then?

Alcib. I learn'd it as others did.

For it must be enquir'd how, and of whom others learn'd it, and that goes ad Infinitum.

Socrat. Then we are to begin again, tell me of whom you learn'd it.

Alcib. I learn'd it of the People.

Socrat. Now you quote a bad Master.

Alcib. What is not the People capable of teaching it?

Socrat. So far from that, that they are not capable of teaching one to judge right * of a Game at Tables; and that is much less important and less difficult, than to understand Justice; don't you think so as well as I?

Alcib. Yes without doubt.

Socrat. And if they know not how to teach you things of little or no consequence, how should they teach you things of this Importance and Solidity?

Alcib. I am of your mind; yet the people are capable of teaching a great many things much more solid, than any thing that belongs to this Play.

Socrat. What are those?

Alcib. Our Language for Instance; I learn'd that

* This play was neither our Draughts nor Chess; but a more Philosophical Game, for it taught the motions of the Heavens, the course of the Sun, that of the Moon, the Eclipses, *&c. Plato* says in his *Phedrus*, it was invented by the Egyptians.

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only of the People; I can't name you any one ſingle Maſter I had for it; I am altogether oblig'd to the people for it, whom yet you account ſo bad a Maſter.

Socrat. This is a very different caſe. * In this the people is a very Excellent Maſter; and we have always Reaſon to apply our ſelves to 'em on this Account.

Alcib. Why?

Socrat. Becauſe they have every thing that the beſt Maſters ought to have.

Alcib. Why, what have they?

Socrat. Ought not they that would teach others any thing, firſt to know it well themſelves?

Alcib. Who doubts it?

Socrat. Ought not they who know any thing well to agree about what they know, and never diſpute about it; for if they ſhould diſpute about it, would you believe 'em to be well inſtructed in it? and could they be able to teach it to others?

Alcib. By no means.

Socrat. Do you ſee the people diſagree about what a Stone and a Stick is? Ask all our Citizens that queſtion, they'll anſwer you alike, and when they go about to take up a Stone or a Stick, they'll all run to the ſame thing, and ſo of the reſt. For I underſtand this is what you mean by knowing the Language; all our Citizens conſtantly agree about this both with one another, and with themſelves. Of all our Greek Cities there is not one that diſputes about the Signification and uſe of Words. So that the People are very good to teach us the Tongue; and we can't do better than to learn of 'em, but if inſtead of deſiring to learn what a Horſe is, we would know what a good Horſe is; would the People, do you think, be capable of informing us?

Alcib. No certainly.

Socrat. For one certain ſign that they don't know

* This was true at *Athens* eſpecially, where all the Citizens ſpeaking perfectly well, and there being no different uſe of Words, as now adays among us, the people was an Excellent Maſter for the ground of the Language. Therefore *Ariſtophanes* ſays, the *firſt Comer was a Child's Maſter.*

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it, and that they know not how to teach it, is that they can't agree about it among themselves. In like manner if we desire to know, not what a Man is, but what a sound or unsound Man is; would the People be in a Condition to teach us this?

Alcib. Still less than the other.

Socrat. And when you should see 'em agree so little among themselves; would you not judge 'em to be very bad Instructors?

Alcib. Without any difficulty.

Socrat. And do you think the People agree better with themselves or others about what is just and unjust?

Alcib. No indeed *Socrates.*

Socrat. You believe then they agree least of all about that?

Alcib. I am thoroughly convinc'd of it.

Socrat. Have you ever seen or read that to maintain that a thing is sound or unsound, Men have taken up Arms against each other, and knock'd one another o'th' head?

Alcib. What a folly must that be!

Socrat. Well, if you have not seen it, at least you have read that this has happen'd to maintain that a thing is Just or Unjust. For you have read *Homer's Odyssée* and *Iliade.* *Alcib.* Yes Certainly.

The cause of the Trojan War, and of all other Wars is Ignorance and Injustice.

Socrat. Is not the difference Men have always had about Justice and Injustice, the foundation of those Poems? Was it not this difference that caused so many Battles and Slaughters between the Greeks and Trojans? was it not this that made *Ulysses* undergo so many Dangers and so much Toil, and that ruin'd *Penelope*'s Lovers?

Alcib. You say right.

Socrat. Was it not this same difference that destroy'd so many Athenians, Lacedemonians, and Beotians at the famous † Battel of *Tanagra*, and after

* This great Battle was fought the last year of the LXXX *Olympiade.* The Athenian Captain, who gain'd it, was nam'd *Myronides. Socrates* was then 12 years of Age, or therabout. *M. Le Fevre.*

that

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that again at the * Battle of *Coronea* where your Father was kill'd ?

Alcib. Who can deny this ?

Socrat. Shall we then dare to ſay the people knows a thing well, about which they diſpute with ſo much Animoſity, that they are carried to the moſt fatal Extremities ?

Alcib. No certainly.

Socrat. Very good ! And yet are not theſe the Maſters you cite, when at the ſame time you acknowledge their Ignorance ?

Alcib. I confeſs it.

Socrat. What Probability then is there that you ſhould know what is Juſt and Unjuſt, about which you appear ſo uncertain and fluctuating ; and which you confeſs you have neither learn'd of others, nor found out your ſelf ?

Alcib. According to what you ſay there is no Probability of it at all.

Socrat. How ! according to what I ſay ? You ſpeak not right, *Alcibiades*, ſay rather 'tis according to what you ſay your ſelf.

Alcib. How ! is it not you that ſay, I know nothing at all of what belongs to Juſtice and Injuſtice ?

Socrat. No, indeed, 'tis not I.

Alcib. Who then ? Is it I ?

Socrat. Yes, 'tis your ſelf.

Alcib. How ſo ?

Socrat. I'll tell you how ſo ; and you will agree with me. If I ſhould ask you which is the greateſt Number, one, or two ; you would immediatly anſwer two ; and if I ſhould again ask you how much greater this Number is than the other ; you would likewiſe anſwer, that 'tis greater by one.

Alcib. Very true.

* This Battle of *Coronea* was fought the ſecond year of the LXXXIII Olymp. Here the brave *Tolmides* was kill'd ; after which the Athenians were driven out of *Beotia*. *Socrates* was then 22 years of Age. This Battle of *Coronea* has often through miſtake, been confounded with that of *Cheronea*. *M. Le Fevre.*

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Socrat. Which of us two would it be then that would say two is more than one; would it be I?

Alcib. No, 'twould be I.

Socrat. For it was I that ask'd, and you that answer'd. Is it not the same thing in the present Question? *Alcib.* That's certain.

Socrat If I should ask you what Letters compose *Socrates* his Name, and you should tell 'em me one after another, which of us two would tell them?

Alcib. I should do it without doubt.

Socrat. For in a Discourse which is spent in Questions and Answers; he that asks never affirms, but always he that answers. 'Tis I that have ask'd you, and 'tis you that have answer'd, 'tis you therefore that have affirm'd the things you have said.

This proves the Usefulness of this Method.

Alcib. This must be granted.

Socrat. 'Tis your self that have said that the fine *Alcibiades* the Son of *Clinias*, not knowing what is Just and Unjust, and yet thinking he knows it very well, is going to the Assembly of the Athenians to give them his Advice about such things as he knows nothing of; Is it not so?

Alcib. 'Tis even so.

Socrat. One may then apply to you, *Alcibiades*, that saying of *Euripides*. *'Tis thy self that has named it.* For it is not I that have spoken it, but your self; and you are to blame to charge it on me.

'Tis in the Tragedy of Hippolytus.

Alcib. You have Reason.

Socrat. Believe me, *Alcibiades*, 'tis a wild Enterprize to have a mind to go teach the Athenians that which you do not know your self, and about which you have neglected to inform your self.

Alcib. I fancy, *Socrates*, the Athenians, and all the rest of the Greeks very rarely examine in their Counsel, what is most Just or Unjust; for they are satisfied that is very evident. And therefore without amusing themselves with this vain Enquiry they only consider what is most advantageous and useful; and Utility and Justice are very different things; since there have always been people in the World

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World that have found themſelves very proſperous in the Commiſſion of great Injuſtice; and others who have ſucceeded very ill, in the exerciſe of Juſtice.

Socrat. What do you * think then that, if what is Uſeful and what is Juſt are very different, as you ſay they are, you know what is uſeful to Men, and why it is ſo?

Alcib. What ſhould hinder me, *Socrates*; Unleſs you would ask me of whom I learn'd this too; or how I found it out my ſelf?

Socrat. Is your proceeding juſt, *Alcibiades*, ſuppoſing what you ſay is not right, as that may very well be; and that 'tis very eaſy to refute you by the ſame Reaſons which I have already employ'd? You would have new Proofs, and freſh Demonſtrations, and treat the former as old Clothes, which you are not willing to wear any longer. You are ſtill for having ſomething entirely new; but for my part, without following you in your Stragglings and Eſcapes, I ſhall ask you, as I have already done, whence you came to know what Utility is; and who was your Inſtructor: In a word I ask you all I have ask'd you before. 'Tis very certain you'll anſwer me too after the ſame manner you have done, and that you'll not be able to ſhew me either that you have learn'd of others, to know what is uſeful, or that you have found it out your ſelf. But becauſe you are very nice, and don't love to hear the ſame thing twice, I am willing to drop this Queſtion whether you know what is uſeful to the Athenians or no. But if what is juſt and what is uſeful are one and the ſame thing; or if they are very different as you ſay, why have you not prov'd it to me? Prove it me, either by interrogating me as I have dealt with you; or in making me a fine Diſcourſe which may ſet the Matter in a clear Light.

* If what is uſeful, and what is juſt, were different things, yet if one knew what is Uſeful, one might alſo know what is Juſt: For we know Contraries by their Contraries. But they are not different, and *Socrates* is going to prove it. *Alcibiades* knows no more what is uſeful than what is juſt.

Alcib.

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Alcib. But, *Socrates* I know not whether I am capable of ſpeaking before you.

Socrat. My dear *Alcibiades*, imagine me to be the Aſſembly, ſuppoſe me to be the People: When you are among them, muſt you not endeavour to perſwade every one of 'em?

Alcib. Yes.

Socrat. And when a Man knows a thing well, is it not equal to him to demonſtrate to this and that Perſon one after another; or to prove it to divers Perſons all at once; as one that teaches Reading or Arithmetick can equally inſtruct one or more Scholars together?

Alcib. That's certain.

Socrat. And conſequently of whatſoever you are capable of perſuading many you may very eaſily perſuade one ſingle Perſon. But of what can a Man perſuade others, is it not of that which he knows himſelf?

Alcib. Without doubt.

Socrat. What other difference is there between an Orator that ſpeaks to a multitude of People, and a Man that diſcourſes with his Friend in familiar Converſation, but that the former perſuades a great Number of People at once, and the latter perſuades but one?

Alcib. 'Tis likely there may be no other difference.

Socrat. Come then; Since he who is capable of proving what he knows to many, is by a much ſtronger Reaſon capable of proving it to one ſingle perſon; diſplay here all your Eloquence to me, and endeavour to ſhew me that what is juſt is not always uſeful.

Alcib. You are very urgent, *Socrates.*

Socrat. I am ſo urgent, that I'll preſently prove to you the contrary of that which you refuſe to prove to me.

Alcib. Do ſo.

Socrat. Only anſwer me.

Alcib. Ha! Nothing but Queſtions; let me intreat you to ſpeak your ſelf alone. *Socrat.*

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Socrat. What are you not willing to be convinc'd ?

Alcib. Yes with all my heart.

Socrat. When you your ſelf ſhall grant, and affirm to me that what I advance is true, will you not be convinc'd ?

Alcib. I think I ſhall.

Socrat. Anſwer me then : And if you your ſelf don't ſay that what is juſt is always uſeful, never believe any Man living that ſhall tell you ſo.

Alcib. Agreed, I am ready to anſwer you, for I ſhall receive no damage by it.

Socrat. You are a Prophet, *Alcibiades*; but tell me ; do you think there are ſome juſt things which are uſeful, and others which are not ſo ?

Alcib. Yes certainly.

Socrat. Do you think too that ſome of them are comely and honorable, and others the quite contrary ?

Alcib. How do you ſay ?

Socrat. I ask you for inſtance, if a Man who does an Action that is ſhameful, does an Action that is juſt ?

Alcib. I am very far from ſuch a thought.

Socrat. You believe then that whatſoever is juſt is comely.

Alcib. I am entirely convinc'd of that.

Socrat. But is every thing that is comely and honorable good ? or do you think there are ſome comely and honorable things that are Good, and others that are Evil ?

Alcib. For my part, *Socrates* I think there are ſome honorable things that are Evil.

Socrat. And by conſequence that there are ſome ſhameful things that are Good ?

Alcib. Yes.

Socrat. See if I underſtand you well. It has often happen'd in Battles, that one Man in attempting to ſuccour his Friend, or Relation, has receiv'd a great many Wounds, or has been kill'd ; and another, by abandoning his Relation, or Friend, has ſav'd his Life : Is not this your meaning ?

Alcib. 'Tis the very thing I would ſay.

Alcibiades is afraid of Socrates his Queſtions, which ſhews this to be the beſt method to convince and refute.

Socrat.

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Socrat. The ſuccour a Man gives to his Friend is a comely and honourable thing, in that he endeavours to ſave one whom he is oblig'd to ſave; and is not this what we call Valour.

Alcib. Yes.

Socrat. And this very Succour is an evil thing, in that it is the cauſe of a Man's receiving Wounds, or of being kill'd?

Alcib. Yes, without doubt.

Socrat. * But is not Valour one thing, and Death another?

Alcib. Yes certainly.

Socrat. This Succour then which a Man gives to his Friend, is not at the ſame time an honourable and an evil thing in the ſame reſpect.

Alcib. So I think.

Socrat. But obſerve, if that which renders this Action comely, is not that which alſo renders it good: for you have your ſelf acknowledg'd that in reſpect of Valour this Action was comely. Let us now examine whether Valour is a Good or an Evil. And I'll ſhew you the way to make this Examen aright. Do you deſire for your ſelf Goods or Evils?

Alcib. Goods without doubt.

Socrat. And the greateſt?

Alcib. Yes, you may be ſure on't.

Socrat. And would you not ſuffer any one to deprive you of 'em?

Alcib. Why ſhould I ſuffer that?

Socrat. What do you think of Valour? at what rate do you value it? is there any good in the World for which you would be depriv'd of it?

Alcib. No, not Life it ſelf. What to be a Coward? I would a thouſand times rather chooſe to dye.

* *Socrates* means, that Valour and Death being two very different things, 'tis ridiculous to judg of one by the other: But each of 'em ought to be examin'd by it ſelf. The former of theſe is the thing under debate, and not the latter. This is extreamly ingenious; and *Alcibiades* did not expect ſuch a very quick Repartee.

Socrat.

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Socrat. Then Cowardiſe ſeems to you the greateſt of all Evils?

Alcib. Yes.

Socrat. And more to be fear'd than Death it ſelf?

Alcib. Moſt certainly.

Socrat. Are not Life and Valour the Contraries to Death and Cowardiſe?

Alcib. Who doubts it?

Socrat. You deſire the former, and by no means wiſh for the latter; is it not becauſe you find thoſe very good, and theſe very evil?

Alcib. Yes doubtleſs.

Socrat. You have your ſelf acknowledg'd, that the Succour a Man gives to his Friend in Battle is a comely and honourable Action; if it be conſider'd with reſpect to the good that is in it, which is Valour.

Alcib. I have acknowledg'd it.

Socrat. And that 'tis an evil Action, when conſider'd with reſpect to the Evil that attends it, that is Wounds and Death.

Alcib. I confeſs it.

Socrat. * Then it hence follows, that we ought to call each Action according to what it produces; we ought to call it Good, if Good ſprings from it; and Evil, if Evil ariſe out of it?

Alcib. So it ſeems to me.

Socrat. Is not an Action comely in that it is Good, and ſhameful in that it is Evil?

Alcib. That's beyond Contradiction.

Socrat. When you ſay then that the Succour a Man gives his Friend in a Battle is a comely Action, and at the ſame time an evil Action, 'tis as if you ſhould ſay, 'tis Evil tho it be Good.

Alcib. Indeed I think what you ſay is true.

Socrat. Then there is nothing comely and honour-

* This Maxim is falſe in *Alcibiades* his ſenſe, but very true in that of *Socrates:* for nothing can ever ſpring from a good Action but Good, as nothing but Evil can ſpring from an evil one.

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able which is Evil so far as it is comely and honourable; nor is any thing which is shameful good, so far as it is shameful.

Alcib. So I think.

Happiness is always the fruit of good Actions.

Socrat. Let us seek for another Proof of this Truth. Are not all that do good Actions happy? Can they be happy, unless it be by the Possession of Good? Is not this Possession of Good the fruit of a good Life? And consequently is not Happiness necessarily for them that do good Actions?

Alcib. Who can deny it?

Socrat. * Then Happiness is a comely and honorable thing. Hence it follows that what is comely and what is good are never two different things, as we just now agreed, and that whatsoever we take to be comely, we shall also take to be good; if we look narrowly into it.

Alcib. This is absolutely necessary.

Socrat. What do you say then, is that which is good useful, or not?

Alcib. Yes, it is useful.

Socrat. Do you remember what we said when we spoke of Justice, and about what we agreed?

Alcib. I think we agreed that all Men that do just Actions, must needs do what is comely and honorable.

Socrat. Then that which is comely is good?

Alcib. Yes.

Socrat. Then that which is good is useful?

Alcib. That's certain.

Socrat. And consequently whatsoever 'is just is useful? *Alcib.* So it seems.

Socrat. Take good Notice that 'tis your self who affirm these Truths; for I for my part, only ask Questions. *Alcib.* I acknowledge it.

Socrat. If any one then thinking he well understood the Nature of Justice should go into the Assembly of the Athenians, or Parthians if you please, (to lay the Scene more remote) and should tell 'em he

* And consequently Happiness can't be the fruit of an ill Life and of ill Actions.

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certainly knows that juſt Actions are ſometimes Evil; would not you laugh at him, who have juſt now granted and acknowledg'd that Juſtice and Utility are one and the ſame thing?

Alcib. I ſolemnly proteſt to you *Socrates*, that I know not what I ſay, nor where I am; for theſe things appear to me ſometimes one way and ſometimes another, according as you interrogate me.

Socrat. Don't you know the Cauſe of this diſorder?

Alcib. No, I know nothing at all of it.

Socrat. And if any one ſhould ask you if you have three Eyes, or four Hands, do you think you ſhould anſwer ſometimes after one manner and ſometimes after another? or would you not anſwer him always after the ſame manner?

Alcib. Tho I begin to be diffident of my ſelf, yet I think I ſhould always anſwer the ſame thing.

Socrat. And is not this becauſe you know very well you have but two Eyes and two Hands?

Alcib. I think ſo.

Socrat. Since then you anſwer ſo differently whether you will or no about the ſame thing, 'tis a certain ſign that you are ignorant of it.

Alcib. So one would think.

Socrat. You confeſs then that your thoughts are uncertain and fluctuating about what is juſt and unjuſt; honorable or diſhonorable, good or evil, uſeful or the contrary. And is it not evident from hence that this uncertainty ſprings only from your ignorance? *Uncertainty always comes from Ignorance.*

Alcib. 'Tis evident.

Socrat. Then 'tis a certain Maxim that the Mind is always fluctuating and uncertain about every thing it does not know?

Alcib. It cannot be otherwiſe.

Socrat * But do you know how to mount up to Heaven?

* After he had ſhown *Alcibiades*, that Ignorance is the cauſe of all the Errors of Mankind; he goes about to prove to him, that Men ought not to be accus'd of Ignorance in general, for if one kind of it is Evil, there is another kind Good, and this he maintains very ſolidly.

Alcib.

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Alcib. No, I proteſt.

Socrat. Are you in any doubt, or does your Mind fluctuate about this?

Alcib. Not in the leaſt.

Socrat. Do you know the reaſon of this, or would you have me tell it you?

Alcib. Tell it me.

Socrat. 'Tis becauſe as you don't know how to mount up to Heaven; ſo you don't think you know it neither.

Alcib. How is that?

Socrat. Let You and I examine this. When you are ignorant of a thing, and you know you are ignorant of it, are you uncertain and fluctuating about this? For Example, about the Art of Cookery? Don't you know you are ignorant of it? Do you then amuſe your ſelf in reaſoning about the manner of dreſſing Meat, and ſpeak ſometimes one way, and ſometimes another, don't you rather ſuffer the Cook to take his own way?

Alcib. Yes certainly.

Socrat. And if you were on board a Ship, would you concern your ſelf to give advice to turn the Helm to the right, or left; and when you don't underſtand the *Art of Navigation*, would you ſpeak about it ſometimes after one faſhion, and ſometimes after another? Would you not rather be quiet, and leave the Pilot to ſteer?

Alcib. To be ſure I ſhould leave that to him.

Socrat. Then you are never fluctuating and uncertain about things you don't know, provided you know that you don't know 'em?

Alcib. So it ſeems.

Socrat. By this then you very well diſcern that all the faults we commit proceed only from this ſort of ignorance, which makes us think we know that of which we are indeed ignorant.

Alcib. How do you ſay?

Socrat. I ſay that which induces us to attempt a thing is the thought we have that we know how to do

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do it; for when we are convinc'd that we don't know it, we leave it to others. *Alcib.* That is certain.

Socrat. Thus they who are under this laſt ſort of ignorance never commit any fault, becauſe they leave to others the care of ſuch things as they know not how to do themſelves.

Alcib. That's true.

Socrat. Who are they then that commit faults? 'Tis not they that know things?

Alcib. No certainly.

Socrat. Seing 'tis neither they that know things, nor they who while they are ignorant of 'em, know that they are ignorant; it neceſſarily follows that 'tis they who while they are ignorant of 'em, yet think they know 'em: can it be any others?

Alcib. No 'tis only they.

Socrat. Well then this muſt be the ignorance which is ſhameful and the Cauſe of all Evils.

Alcib. True.

Socrat. And when this Ignorance happens to be about things of very great conſequence, is it not very pernicious, and very ſhameful?

Alcib. It cannot be denied.

Socrat. But can you name me any thing that is of greater conſequence, than what is juſt, what is honorable, what is good, and what is uſeful?

Alcib. No certainly.

Socrat. Is it not about theſe things that you your ſelf ſay you are fluctuating and uncertain? Is not this Uncertainty a ſure ſign, as we have ſaid already, not only that you are ignorant of theſe things that are ſo great and important; but alſo that while you are ignorant of 'em, you think you know 'em?

Alcib. I am affraid this is but too true.

Socrat. Oh *Alcibiades*! In what a deplorable condition then are you! * I dare not mention it, yet

* He does not mention it immediately. *Alcibiades* is not yet in a condition to bear the horrour of it: But he'll mention it at length, when he has diſpos'd and prepar'd the young Man to receive this Thunder-clap.

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seeing we are alone 'tis necessary I should tell it you. My dear *Alcibiades* you are under a very shameful kind of Ignorance, as appears by your Words, and your own Testimony against your self. And this is the Reason you throw your self with so much precipitancy into the Government; before you are instructed in what belongs to it. But you are not the only Person who has fallen under this Unhappiness; 'tis common to you with the greatest part of those who have intermedled with the Affairs of the Commonwealth. I can except but a small Number. Nay it may be your Tutor *Pericles* is the only Person that is to be exempted.

Alcib. And, *Socrates*, 'tis likewise said, he did not become so accomplished of himself; but that he had a great deal of Conversation with many great Men, such as *Pythoclides*, and *Anaxagoras*; and to this very day, as old as he is, he spends whole days with * *Damon*, to inform himself still more and more.

Socrat. † Did you ever see any one, who perfectly knew a thing, and yet could not teach it another? Your Reading-Master taught you what he knew; and taught it whom he pleas'd. And you that have learn'd it of him might teach it another. The same may be said of a Musick-Master, and of a Master of Exercises.

Alcib. This is certain.

Socrat. For the best sign that one knows a thing well is to be in a condition to teach it others.

Alcib. So I think.

* This is he of whom *Plutarch* speaks in the Life of *Pericles*; under the specious Veil of Musick he hid his Profession, which was to teach Politicks. The People perceived this, and banish'd him with the Sentence of the Ostracism.

† Upon what *Alcibiades* had just said, that *Pericles* had render'd himself accomplished by the Conversation of Philosophers and Sophists, *Socrates* would intimate to him, that this Conversation was very useless for the acquiring of Vertue, in which true Accomplishment consists. And this he ingeniously proves by the Example of *Pericles* himself, who had not been able to teach his own Children any thing; a sure sign that he had learn'd no great Matter of his Sophists.

Socrat.

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Socrat. But can you name me any one whom *Pericles* has accompliſhed? Let's begin with his own Children.

Alcib. What does this prove, *Socrates*, if *Pericles* his Children were Block-heads?

Socrat. And your Brother *Clinias*?

Alcib. A fine Proof indeed! you talk to me of a Fool.

Socrat. If *Clinias* is a Fool, and the Children of *Pericles* were Block-heads; how came it to paſs that *Pericles* neglected ſuch good natural Parts as yours, and taught you nothing?

Alcib. I am the only cauſe of it my ſelf, in not attending at all to what he ſaid to me.

Socrat. But among all the Athenians and Strangers, whether Freemen or Slaves, can you name me one whom the Converſation of *Pericles* has render'd more accompliſh'd, as I'll name you a *Pythodorus*, the Son of *Iſolochus*, and a *Callias*, the Son of *Calliades*, who became very great Men in *Zeno*'s School, at the Expence of *a hundred Minas*. *About 200l. Sterling.*

Alcib. I can't name you one.

Socrat. * That's very well; but what will you do with your ſelf, *Alcibiades*? will you continue as you are, or will you at laſt take ſome care of your ſelf.

Alcib. 'Tis a general Affair, *Socrates*, and concerns me no more than others. For I underſtand all you ſay, and agree with you. Yes, all that concern themſelves with the Affairs of the Republick, are a Company of ignorant People, excepting a very ſmall number.

Socrat. And what then?

Alcib. If they were Men of great Accompliſhments, it would be neceſſary for one that ſhould pretend to equal, or ſurpaſs 'em, to learn, and exerciſe

This Sentiment of Alcibiades is that which ſtill to this day ruins moſt young Men.

* *Socrates* is not willing now to puſh on this Queſtion which he has ſtarted, whether Vertue may be taught. The Queſtion is too general, and he'll treat of it elſe where; here he keeps cloſe to his Subject, which is to confound the Pride of *Alcibiades*.

erciſe himſelf, and after that to enter the Liſts as Wreſtlers do; but ſeeing they don't fail to intermeddle with Government, tho endu'd with very indifferent and common Qualities; what need is there for a Man to give himſelf ſo much trouble in Learning and Exerciſe? I am well aſſur'd that with the Aſſiſtance of Nature alone, I ſhall excel 'em all.

Socrat. Ah my dear *Alcibiades*, what have you now ſaid? what Sentiment is this ſo unworthy of that noble Air, and all the other Advantages, which you poſſeſs!

Alcib. What do you mean, *Socrates*, when you ſpeak thus?

Socrat. Alas! I am inconſolable, both on your Account, and my own, I have ſo great an Affection for you, if——

Alcib. If what?

Socrat. If you think you have only ſuch kind of People to conteſt with, and to ſurpaſs.

Alcib. Whom then would you have me ſtrive to ſurpaſs?

Socrat. Again! Is this a Queſtion becoming a Man of a great Spirit?

Alcib. What do you mean? Are not thoſe the only Perſons I have to deal with?

An admirable Leſſon, which Socrates gives Alcibiades

Socrat. If you were to guide a Man of War, which was to fight in a little time; would you be content if you were more expert in *Navigation*, than all the Sailers you had on board you? Would you not rather propoſe to your ſelf to acquire all neceſſary Qualities, and to ſurpaſs all the greateſt Pilots on the Enemy's ſide, without meaſuring your ſelf as you do now with thoſe of your own Party, above whom you ſhould endeavour to raiſe your ſelf to that Degree, that they ſhould not have ſo much as a thought of diſputing any advantage with you, but finding themſelves abſolutely inferior to you, ſhould only think of fighting under your Command? Theſe are the Sentiments that ſhould animate you, if you deſign'd

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design'd to do any thing great, and worthy, both of your self, and your Country.

Alcib. Why this is all I design.

Socrat. This must needs be a glorious thing indeed *Alcibiades*, to be a braver Man than our Soldiers! Ought you not rather constantly to set the Generals of our Enemies before your Eyes, that you may excel them in Capacity, and greatness of Courage? and should you not study and labour to this End; always endeavouring to equal the greatest Persons?

Alc. Who then are these great Generals, *Socrates*?

Socrat. Don't you know our City is almost continually in War, either with the Lacedemonians, or with the Great King? *The King of Persia.*

Alcib. I know it.

Socrat. If then you think to put your self at the head of the Athenians, you must also prepare your self to receive the Attacks of the † Kings of *Lacedemonia*, and of the King of *Persia*. † *For there were two at a time.*

Alcib. You may be in the right.

Socrat. No, Alas! No my dear *Alcibiades*. * You have only to think of excelling a *Midias*, who is so accomplish'd a Man for feeding of Quailes; and others of the same Rank, that seek to intrude themselves into the Government, who by their Stupidity and Ignorance shew (as our good Women would say) that they have not yet quitted the Slave, but retain him still under their long Hair; and who with their barbarous Language are come rather to corrupt the City by their servile Flatteries, than to govern it. These are the People you must set before you without thinking of your self; that when you are

* *Plutarch* is of use to make us understand the bitter Satyr, that is hid under these Words, for he informs us that *Alcibiades* applied himself to feed Quailes, like this *Midias*, witness that which he let fly out of his Bosom in an open place, and which was caught again by a Master of a Ship, nam'd *Antiochus*, who had the favour of *Alcibiades* ever after, in so much, that he left him the Command of a Fleet in his Absence, which had like to have ruin'd the Affairs of the Athenians.

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to engage in such great Battles, you may go, without having ever learn'd any thing of what you ought to know, without being exercis'd at all, without making any preparation, in a word, that without having ever given your self the least trouble, you may go in this Condition to put your self at the head of the Athenians.

Alcib. Socrates, I believe all you say is true. Yet I fancy the Generals of *Lacedemonia*, and of the King of *Persia*, are like other Generals.

What Socrates is now going to say is one of the finest things Antiquity has left us.

Socrat. Ah my dear *Alcibiades*, pray observe what an Opinion that of yours is?

Alcib. Why so?

Socrat. In the first place, which of these two Opinions do you think will be most advantagous to you, and will engage you to conduct your self with the greatest Care; whether to form to your self a great Idea of those Men, which may render 'em formidable, or to take 'em, as you do, for ordinary Men, that have no advantage above you?

Alcib. Doubtless that of forming to my self a great Idea of 'em.

Socrat. Do you think then 'tis an Evil for you to conduct your self with care?

Alcib. On the contrary I am persuaded it will be a very great Good.

Socrat. Then this Opinion which you have conceived already appears to be a very great Evil.

Alcib. I confess it.

Socrat. But besides this 'tis false, and I'll presently demonstrate this to you.

Alcib. How so?

Socrat. Whom do you account the best Men; those who are of high Birth, or such as are of mean Extraction?

Alc. Without doubt, those who are of high Birth.

Socrat. And don't you think, they that have had a good Education join'd to their high Birth have every thing that is necessary for the Perfection of Vertue?

Alcib.

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Alcib. That is certain.

Socrat. By comparing therefore our Condition with theirs, let us ſee firſt of all if the Kings of *Lacedemonia*, and the King of *Perſia* are of meaner Birth than we: Don't we know that the former deſcend from *Hercules*, and the latter from *Achemenes*, and that *Hercules* and *Achemenes* deſcend from *Jupiter*?

Achemenes, *the Son of* Perſeus.

Alcib. And does not our Family, *Socrates*, deſcend from *Euryſaces*, and does not *Euryſaces* carry his Line up as far as *Jupiter*?

Socrat. * And does not ours, my dear *Alcibiades*, if you take it that way, deſcend from *Dedalus*? and does not *Dedalus* likewiſe carry us back as far as *Vulcan Jupiter*'s Son? But the difference between them and us is, that they reaſcend as far as *Jupiter* by a continual Gradation of Kings without any Interruption: The former have been the Kings of *Argos* and *Lacedemonia*, and the latter have always reign'd in *Perſia*, and have often poſſeſs'd the Throne of *Aſia*, as they do now, whereas our Anceſtors were only private Perſons like us. And if to do Honor to your Anceſtors, you were oblig'd to ſhew *Artaxerxes* the Country of *Euryſaces*, or that of *Eacus*, which is ſtill more remote, what occaſion of laughter would you not give him in pointing out to him two little Iſlands not much bigger than one's hand? Since then we are oblig'd to give place in point of birth; let us ſee if we are not likewiſe inferior to 'em in reſpect of Education. Have you never been told what great Advantages the *Lacedemonian* Kings have in this, whoſe Wives are kept publickly by the *Ephori*, that they may be certain, as much as 'tis poſſible, that they produce no Princes but of the Race of *Hercules*? And the King of *Perſia* is ſo far beyond the Kings of *Lacedemonia* in this reſpect, that it has never yet been ſo much as ſuſpected, that the Queen could have a Child that might not be

Egina *and* Salamina.

* This is a piece of Rallery of *Socrates*, as we ſhall ſee when we come to his *Eutyphron*.

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the King's Son. Therefore she is not guarded; all the Guards she has are Terror and Majesty. When she is deliver'd of her first Son, who is to succeed to the Crown; all the Nations that are spread over that great Emprice celebrate his Birth; after which that day is annually one of their greatest Festivals; in all the Provinces of *Asia* there are then nothing but Sacrifices and Feasts; whereas when we are born, my dear *Alcibiades*; that Expression of the Comick Poet may be applied to us.

The News scarce to our nearest Neighbours comes.

When the young Prince is wean'd he is not left in the hands of Women, but is committed to the Care of the most Vertuous Eunuchs of the Court whose business it is to form and fashion his Body, that he may be brought to the best shape that can be; and this employ brings them abundance of Honor. When the Prince is seven years old he is put into the hands of the Gentlemen of the Horse who begin to carry him a Hunting: at fourteen years of Age, he comes under the Charge of those who are called the King's Preceptors; These are the four greatest Lords, and the most accomplish'd Men of all *Persia*; they are taken in the Vigour of their Age; one passes for the most Learned, another for the most Just, the third for the Wisest, and the fourth for the most Valiant. The first teaches him the Magick of *Zoroaster* the Son of *Oromazus*, in which is comprehended all the worship of the Gods, he teaches him likewise the Laws of the Kingdom and all the Duties of a good King. The second teaches him always to speak the Truth, tho against himself. The third instructs him, not to suffer himself at any time to be overcome by his Passions; that he may always maintain his Freedom, and his Royalty, in having constantly an absolute Dominion over himself, as well as over his People: And the fourth teaches him not to fear either Dangers, or Death; because if he should become timorous, from a King he would degenerate into a Slave. Whereas, *Alcibiades*, for your

Zoroaster *was a Magus, and King of Bactriana; he wrote divers Volumes on Magick, which contained Religion, Physick and Astrology, he liv'd in the time of Ninus, and of Noah.*

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your part what Preceptor have you had? *Pericles* left you in the hands of *Zopyrus* a vile Thracian Slave, who was indeed unfit for every thing besides, because of his old Age. I would here recount to you all the consequent Matters relating to the Education of your Antagonists, but that I should be too long; and the Specimen I have given you is sufficient to make you easily judg of the rest. * No Person took care of you at your Birth more than of any other Athenian; no Body takes any pains about your Education; unless you have some one who concerns himself with it, because he sincerely loves you. And if you consider the Riches of the Persians, the Magnificence of their Habits, the prodigious Expence they make in Perfumes and Essences, the multitude of Slaves that surround 'em, all their Luxury, Finery and Politeness, you'll see your self so little, that you'll be quite asham'd of your self. Will you but cast your Eyes on the Temperance of the Lacedemonians, on their Modesty, Easiness, Sweetness, Magnanimity, their good disposition of Mind under all the Accidents of Life, their Valour, Firmness and Constancy in Labours, their Noble Emulation, and love of Glory? In all these great Qualities you'll find your self a Child in comparison of them. Again, if you would have us take notice of their Riches, and think your self something under this head; I am willing to speak to it, to make you remember who you are, and whence you came. There is no Comparison between us and the Lacedemonians, they are abundantly more wealthy. Shall any of us dare to compare our Lands with those of *Sparta*, and *Messene*; which are much larger and better, and maintain an infinite number of Slaves, without counting the *Ilotes*? Who can number that excellent Race of Horses, and those other sorts of Cattle which feed in

Socrates means himself.

The Qualities of the Lacedemonians.

* 'Tis certain, the Athenians gave their Children no Governers, but Slaves, or such as were enfranchis'd; this appears by the Greek Comedies, which are left us, and by the Comedies of *Plautus* and *Terence*. *M. Le Fevre.*

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the Paſtures of *Meſſene?* whereas we inhabit a dry and barren Countrey: But I paſs by all theſe things. Would you ſpeak of Gold and Silver? I tell you all *Greece* together has not near ſo much as *Lacedemonia* alone; for the Money of all *Greece*, and very often that of the Barbarians too has for ſeveral Ages gone into *Lacedemonia*, and never come out again. So that one might very well ſay, in alluſion to what is ſaid by the Fox to the Lion in *Eſop*'s Fables. *I ſee the Track of all the Money that is gone into* Lacedemonia, *but I ſee no Track that ſignifies there's any gone out from thence.* 'Tis certain the Commons of *Lacedemonia* are richer than any other Commons in *Greece:* And the Kings are richer than all the reſt of the Lacedemonians put together; for theſe pay their Kings immenſe Taxes, which extremely augment their Revenues. But if the Wealth of the Lacedemonians appears ſo great in compariſon of that of the other Greeks, 'tis nothing when compar'd with that of the King of *Perſia.* I heard a Man worthy of Credit, who had been one of the Ambaſſadors that was ſent to that Prince, ſay, he had travell'd a great way in a very fine and fruitful Countrey, which the Inhabitants call'd *the Queen's Girdle*, that he made another large Journey in another Countrey as pleaſant, which they call'd *the Queen's Veil*, and that he paſs'd through a great many other fine Provinces, that were deſtin'd only to furniſh that Princeſs with Clothes, and had their ſeveral Names from the things they were to provide. So that if any ſhould go, and ſay to *Amaſtris*, the Wife of *Xerxes*, the King's Mother; *There is at* Athens *a Citizen whoſe whole Eſtate is not above* 300 *Acres of Land which he poſſeſſes in the Town of* Erquies, *and who is the Son of* Dinomache; *whoſe Clothes and Jewels altogether; are ſcarce worth fifty Minæ; this Citizen is preparing to make War with your Son.* What do you think ſhe would ſay? *This Man founds the Succeſs of his Deſigns on his Application, Experience, and great Wiſdom; for theſe are the only things*

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things that make the Greeks eſteem'd in the World? But if one ſhould ſay to her, *This* Alcibiades *is a young Man, not yet twenty years of Age, who is very ignorant, has no manner of Experience, and who, when a certain Friend of his whom he paſſionately loves, repreſents to him, that he ought above all things to cultivate himſelf, to labour, meditate, to exerciſe himſelf; and after having acquir'd the Capacity that is neceſſary, might engage in War with the great King; will not believe a word of the Matter, and ſays he's fit enough for this as he is already.* How great would be the wonder of this Princeſs? Would ſhe not ask; *on what then does this young Giddy-brains depend?* and if we ſhould tell her, *he depends on his Beauty; his fine Shape, his Nobility, and fortunate Birth*; would ſhe not take us for Fools, conſidering the great Advantages the Kings of *Perſia* have in all this above us? But without going any higher, do you think *Lampyto*, the Daughter of *Leotychidas*, the Wife of *Archidamus*, and Mother of *Agis*, who were all born Kings of *Lacedemonia*, would be leſs aſtoniſhed, if one ſhould tell her, that as ill educated as you have been, you don't ſcruple to trouble your head with a deſign of making War with her Son? Alas! Is it not a horrible ſhame, that the very Women among our Enemies know better than we what we ought to be to undertake to make War with them with any likelihood of Succeſs? Follow my Advice then, my dear *Alcibiades*, and obey the Precept which is written on the Gate of the Temple of *Delphos*. *Know thy ſelf.* For the Enemies you have to deal with are ſuch as I repreſent 'em to you, and not ſuch as you imagine 'em to be. The only means of conquering 'em are Application, and Skill: If you renounce theſe ſo neceſſary Qualities, renounce the Glory too, of which you are ſo paſſionately ambitious.

Alcib. Can you then explain to me, *Socrates*, how I ought to cultivate my ſelf? for no Man whatever ſpeaks more truly to me than you.

Socrat. I can without doubt, but this does not re-

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ſpect you alone; this concerns us all how many ſoever we are. We ought to ſeek the means of making our ſelves better; and I ſpeak no more on your Account than on my own, who have no leſs need of Inſtruction than you, and have only one advantage above you.

Alcib. What is that?

Socrat. 'Tis this, my Tutor is wiſer and better than *Pericles*, who is yours.

God the beſt Tutor of Men.

Alcib. Who is this Tutor of yours?

Socrat. 'Tis God who never permitted me to ſpeak to you before this Day, and 'tis in purſuance of his Inſpirations that I now tell you, that you'll never arrive at the Reputation you deſire, but by me.

Alcib. You jeſt, *Socrates.*

Socrat. It may be ſo. But in fine 'tis ſtill a great Truth, that we have great need to take care of our ſelves. All Men need this, and we yet more than others.

Alcib. You ſpeak no Untruth, ſo far as it concerns me, *Socrates.*

Socrat. Nor in what concerns me neither.

Alcib. What ſhall we do then?

Socrat. Now is the time to throw off Lazineſs and Softneſs.

Alcib. 'Tis very true, *Socrates.*

Socrat. Come then, let us examine what it is we would become. Tell me, Would we not render our ſelves * very good?

Alcib. Yes.

Socrat. In what ſort of Vertue?

Alcib. In that Vertue that renders a Man good and fit?

Socrat. For what?

Alcib. For Buſineſs.

Socrat. What Buſineſs? The managing of a Horſe?

* But there are many different ſorts of Goodneſs, and upon this *Socrates* is going to enlarge. For the word *Good* in Greek ſignifies, Accompliſh'd, Excellent, improv'd in any Art or Science, or Vertuous. And the word *Evil*, by the Rule of Contraries, has as many Significations. This Remark is neceſſary for the underſtanding of what follows. *M. Le Fevre.*

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It can't be that, for that belongs to Quarries. Is it Navigation? not that neither, for that belongs to Pilots. What Buſineſs is it then?

Alcib. The Buſineſs in which our beſt Athenians are employ'd.

Socrat. What do you mean by our beſt Athenians? Are they the Prudent or Imprudent?

Alcib. The Prudent.

Soc. So that according to you when a Man is Prudent in any thing, he is good and fit for that thing; and the Imprudent are very bad for it.

Alcib. Without doubt.

Socrat. A Shoe-maker has all the prudence neceſſary for making of Shoes. And therefore he is good for that.

Alcib. 'Tis right.

Socrat. But he is very Imprudent for making of Clothes, and conſequently is a bad Taylor.

Alcib. That's certain.

Socrat. This ſame Man then is both Good and Bad?

Alcib. So it ſeems.

Socrat. It follows from this principle that your Athenians whom you call Good and Honeſt Men are bad too.

Alcib. That is not what I mean.

Socrat. What do you mean then by the good Athenians?

Alcib. They that know how to govern.

Socrat. To govern what? Horſes?

Alcib. No.

Socrat. Men?

Alcib. Yes.

Socrat. What ſick Men, Pilots, or Mowers?

Alcib. No, none of theſe.

Socrat. Whom then? Thoſe that do ſomething, or thoſe who do nothing?

Alcib. Thoſe that do ſomething.

Socrat. Thoſe that do what? Endeavour to explain your ſelf and make me underſtand your meaning.

Alcib. Thoſe that live together, and make uſe one of another; as we live in Cities. *Socrat.*

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For the Politicians command the Magistrates and these the rest of the Citizens.

Socrat. According to you then the Good Athenians are such as know how to command such Men as make use of Men.

Alcib. I mean so.

Socrat. Is it those that know how to command the Masters of Gallies who make use of Rowers?

Alcib. No.

Soc. Because this belongs to Pilots. Is it then those that know how to command the Players on the Flute who make use of Musicians and Dancers? No doubtless, for this belongs to the Masters of the Choirs.

The Masters of the Choirs regulated the Musicians, and in their place it was the Players on the Flute.

Alcib. That's certain.

Socrat. What do you mean then by knowing how to command such Men as make use of other Men?

Alcib. I mean 'tis to command Men that live together under the same Laws, and Polity.

Socrat. What is this Art then that teaches to command 'em? If I should ask you what is the Art which teaches to command all the Rowers of the same Vessel, what answer would you give me?

Alcib. That 'tis the Pilot's Art.

Socrat. And if I should ask you what is the Art that teaches to command Musicians and Dancers?

Alcib. I would answer you, 'tis the Art of the Masters of the Choirs.

Soc. How then do you call this Art, which teaches to command those who make the same Politick Body, and live together under the same Government?

Alcib. 'Tis the Art of giving good Counsel.

Socrat. How? What then is the Art of Pilots the Art of giving bad Counsel? Is it not their design to give good?

Alc. Yes certainly to save those that are in the ship.

Soc. You say very well; of what good Counsel then do you speak; and to what does it tend?

Alcib. It tends to preserve the City, and to make it better policied.

Socrat. But what is it that preserves Cities, and makes 'em better policied? What is it that ought or ought not to be in 'em? As if you should ask me what

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what it is that ought or ought not to be in a Body to make it ſound and in good health; I would immediately anſwer you, that that which ought to be in it is Health; and that which ought not to be in it is Sickneſs: Don't you think ſo as well as I?

Alcib. I think the very ſame.

Socrat. And if you ſhould ask me the ſame thing of the Eye, I ſhould anſwer you after the ſame manner that the Eye is in a good condition, when it has all that is neceſſary for Sight, and when nothing hinders it from ſeeing. And the very ſame of the Ears, that they are very well, when they have every thing they need to hear well, and no diſpoſition to Deafneſs.

Alcib. True.

Socrat. And now for a City, what is it which by its Preſence or Abſence makes it to be in a better condition, better policied and better govern'd?

Alcib. I think, *Socrates*, 'tis when Amity is well eſtabliſh'd among the Citizens, and Hatred and Diviſion are baniſhed out of the City.

Socrat. What do you call Amity, is it Concord or Diſcord?

Alcib. 'Tis Concord certainly.

Socrat. What Art is that which makes Cities accord, for example about Numbers?

Alcib. 'Tis Arithmetick.

Socrat. And is it this that makes particular perſons accord one with another, and each one with himſelf?

Alcib. Without doubt.

Socrat. And how do you call that Art which makes each one agree with himſelf about the length of a Span or Cubit, is it not the Art of Meaſuring?

Alcib. Yes doubtleſs.

Socrat. Then Cities and particular perſons accord by means of this Art. And is it not the ſame thing about Weight?

Alcib. The very ſame.

Socrat. And what is that Concord of which you ſpeak, in what does it conſiſt, and what is the Art that

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that produces it? Is the Concord of a City the same that makes a particular person accord with himself and others?

Alcib. I think so.

Socrat. What is it? Don't be weary in answering me, but charitably instruct me.

Alcib. I think it is this Amity and Concord, that makes Parents agree with their Children, one Brother with another, and the Wife with her Husband.

Socrat. But do you think a Husband can agree well with his Wife, and that they will accord perfectly about the Tapistry which she works, and he knows not how to make?

Alcib. No, certainly.

Socrat. Nor is there any need of it; for 'tis Women's work. No more is it possible that a Woman should agree with her Husband about the use of Arms; for she knows not what belongs to it: This being a Science which appertains only to Men.

Alcib. 'Tis true.

Socrat. You agree then that there are some Sciences which are destin'd only for Women, and others which are reserv'd for Men.

Alcib. Who can deny it?

Socrat. It is not possible that Women should accord with their Husbands about all these Sciences.

Alcib. That's certain.

Socrat. And consequently there will be no Amity, seeing Amity is nothing but Concord.

Alcib. I am of your mind.

Socrat. So that when a Woman does what she ought to do, she will not be loved by her husband; and when a husband does what he ought to do, he will not be loved by his Wife?

Alcib. This is a certain consequence.

Soc. Then that which make Cities well policied, is not, for every one to follow his own employment in 'em.

Alcib. However *Socrates*, methinks ——

Socrat.

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Socrat. How do you say? Can a City be well policied without having Amity in it, are we not agreed that it is by Amity that a City is well regulated, and that otherwise there is nothing but Disorder and Confusion?

Alcib. But yet methinks, 'tis this very thing that produces Amity, namely that every one mind his own Business.

Socrat. You said the contrary but just now. But I must endeavour to understand you, what do you say? That Concord well established produces Amity? What can there be Concord about things which some know, and others don't understand?

Alcib. That's impossible.

Socrat. When every one does what he ought to do, does every one do what is just or what is unjust?

Alcib. A pretty Question! every one then does what is Just.

Socrat. Hence it follows that when all the Citizens do what is Just, yet they can't love one another.

Alcib. * The consequence is necessary.

Socrat. What then is this Amity or Concord, that can accomplish and make us capable of giving good Counsel; so that we may be of the Number of those whom you call your best Citizens? for I can't comprehend what it is, or in whom 'tis to be found. Sometimes 'tis to be found in certain persons, and

* This consequence is very certain: *Alcibiades* acknowledges it, but he does not yet understand the Reason of it. I have given a hint of it in the Argument; but 'tis fit to explain *Socrates* his thought here at length; his design is to shew that when Men precisely do only their own business, they only take care of what belongs to themselves; and so limit themselves to the knowledge of particular things and do not rise up to that of the essence of universal things; which is the only knowledge that produces Union and Concord, whereas the Knowledge merely of particular things produces Disorder and Division. Therefore to make Concord reign in a state 'tis not enough for every one to take care of what he has; he must take care of himself too. This care will teach him to love his Neighbour as himself; and 'tis only this Love, which has God for its Principle, that can produce Concord and Union.

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sometimes 'tis not to be found in 'em, as it seems by your Words.

Alcib. Socrates, I solemnly protest to you, I know not what I say my self: And have run a great risque in being a long time in an ill Condition, without perceiving it.

Soc. Don't be discourag'd, *Alcibiades*, if you should not perceive in what Condition you are till you are 50 years of Age, it would be a difficult matter for you to recover your self out of it, and to take care of your self; but now at your years 'tis the fittest time for you to feel your Distemper after the manner you do.

Alcib. But when a Man feels his Distemper what must he do?

Without the help of God Men can't reform.

Socrat. You need only answer to some Questions, *Alcibiades*, which if you do, I hope by the help of God, both you and I shall become better than we are, at least if my Prophesie is to be believ'd.

Alc. If there needs nothing but to answer you to bring it about, I'll promise you your Prophesie shall prove true.

Soc. Come then. What is it to take care of one's self so that when we think we take care of our selves the most, it may not often happen to us without our knowledg to take care of quite another thing? What must a Man do to take care of himself? does he take care of himself, when he takes care of the things that belong to him? *Alcib.* * I think so.

Soc. How? does a Man take care of his feet, when he takes care of the things that belongs to his feet?

Alcib. I don't understand you.

Socrat. Do you know nothing that properly belongs to the hand? To what part of the Body do the Rings appertain, is it not to the Fingers?

Socrat. Yes doubtless.

Soc. And in like manner the Shoes belong to the Feet. *Alcib.* Very true.

* *Alcibiades* answers according to the principles that are almost generally receiv'd. Men think they take care of themselves, when they take care of the things that belong to 'em; but they are grosly mistaken: And *Socrates* is going to confound this Error with great Solidity. That which is *mine* is not *my self*. *Soc.*

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Socrat. Do we then take care of our Feet, when we take care of our Shoes?

Alcib. Indeed *Socrates* I don't yet underſtand you.

Soc. What do you mean then by taking care of a thing? Is it not to make it better than it was? What Art is it then that makes our Shoes better?

Alcib. 'Tis the Shoemaker's Art.

In Greece the Shoemakers mended Shoes as well as made 'em.

Socrat. 'Tis by the Shoemaker's Art then that we take care of our Shoes: Is it it by the ſame Art too that we take care of our Feet; or is it by ſome other Art that we make our Feet better?

Alcib. Without doubt that's done by another Art.

Socrat. Don't we make our Feet better by another Art, which meliorates the whole Body? And is not this the Gymnaſtick Art?

For Exerciſe ſtrengthens all the parts of the Body.

Alcib. Yes certainly.

Socrat. 'Tis then by the Gymnaſtick Art that we take care of our Feet; and by the Shoemaker's Art, that we take care of the things that belong to our Feet? 'Tis by the Gymnaſtick Art we take care of our Hands; and by the Gold-ſmith's Art that we take care of the things that belong to our Hands. 'Tis by the Gymnaſtick Art that we take care of our Bodies; and by the Weaver's Art, and many other Arts that we take care of the things that appertain to our Bodies.

Alcib. This is beyond all doubt.

Soc. And conſequently the Art by which we take care of our ſelves is not the ſame with that whereby we take care of the things that belongs to us.

Alcib. So it ſeems.

Soc. Hence it follows that when you take care of the things that belong to you, you do not take care of your ſelf.

Alcib. That's certain.

Socrat. For 'tis not by the ſame Art that we take care of our ſelves, and of the things that belongs to us.

Alcib. I ackowledge it.

Socrat. By what Art is it then that we take care of our ſelves;

Alcib. I cannot tell.

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Socrat. We are already agreed that it is not that by which we can make any of those things that belong to us better: But that by which we can meliorate our selves. *Alcib.* 'Tis true.

Socrat. Can we know the Art of making Shoes better, if we don't first know what a Shoe is; or the Art of taking care of Rings, if we don't know first what a Ring is?

Alcib. No that can't be.

S. Can we then know what Art it is that makes us better; if we don't first know what we our selves are?

Alcib. 'Tis absolutely impossible.

Socrat. But is it a very easy thing to know ones self; and was it some ignorant Person that wrote that Trivial Precept on the Gate of *Apollo*'s Temple at *Delphos*? Or is it on the contrary a thing of great difficulty, and which is not given to every Man?

Alcib. For my part, *Socrates*; I have often thonght it was given to all Men: and yet it has often seem'd to me to be a thing of very great difficulty.

Soc. But, *Alcibiades*; Let it be easy or difficult; 'tis still certain that when once we know it; we imediately and easily know what care we ought to take of our selves. Whereas while we are ignorant of it; we shall never come to the knowledg of the Nature of this Care.

Alcib. That is beyond all doubt.

Socrat. Come on then; by what means shall we find out the * Essence of things to speak universally? By

* This universal Essence of things, αὐτοτοαυτὸ, is the Divine Intelligence, the Eternal Idea, the only cause of Beings, and the singular Essence, αὐτοέκαστον, is the thing form'd on this Idea. So that there are two ways of knowing one's self: The first is to know the Divine Intelligence; and to descend from that to the Soul, by following the designs which the All-wise Creator had in creating it: and the other is simply to know the Soul as a Being different from the Body, and to be convinc'd that that alone is the Man. The first is the most perfect: However *Socrates* leaves this at present; and applies himself only to the second, which is more easy: but he afterwards resumes it, and from the knowledg of the Soul raises *Alcibiades* to the Consideration of the Eternal Idea, in which alone, as in the true Light a Man may perfectly see his Soul, and all that belongs to it. The whole Argument of *Socrates* is worthy the most solid Theology.

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this we ſhall ſoon find what we are our ſelves; and if we are ignorant of this Eſſence we ſhall always be ignorant of our ſelves.

Alcib. You ſay right.

Socrat. Follow me cloſe then I conjure you in the Name of God: With whom are you now diſcourſing, is it with ſome other perſon or with me?

Alcib. No 'tis with you.

Soc. And I in like manner diſcourſe with none but You, 'Tis *Socrates* that now ſpeaks, and *Alcibiades* that hears. *Alcib.* True.

Soc. 'Tis by uſing Words that *Socrates* ſpeaks; for to ſpeak, and to uſe words is one and the ſame thing.

Alcib. 'Tis ſo without doubt.

Socrat. Are not He who uſes a thing, and the Thing which he uſes, different?

Alcib. How do you ſay?

Socrat. For Example, a Shoemaker, who uſes Knives, Laſts and other Tools, cuts with his Knife and is different from the Knife with which he cuts. A Man that plays on the Harp is not the ſame thing with the Harp on which he plays.

Alcib. That's certain.

Socrat. This is what I ask'd you juſt now, whether he that uſes a thing, and the thing he uſes, always ſeem to you two different things?

Alcib. So they ſeem to me.

Socrat. * But the Shoemaker does not only uſe his Tools, but his Hands too.

Alcib. That's beyond all doubt.

Socrat. He alſo uſes his Eyes.

Alcib. That's certain.

Socrat. We are agreed that he who uſes a thing, is always different from the thing he uſes.

Alcib. That is agreed between us.

Soc. So that the Shoemaker and the Harper are ſome other thing than the Hands and Eyes which they both uſe.

Alcib. That's plain.

* He deſigns to prove, that the Body is no leſs an Inſtrument of the Soul, than all the other remoter Inſtruments which it uſes.

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Socrat. Man uſes his Body.

Alcib. Who doubts it?

Soc. That which uſes a thing is different from the thing which is uſed.

Alcib. Yes.

Soc. Man then is a different thing from his Body?

Alcib. I believe it.

Socrat. What is Man then?

Alcib. Indeed, *Socrates*, I can't tell.

Soc. You can at leaſt tell me that Man is that which uſes the Body.

Alcib. That's true.

Socrat. Is there any thing that uſes the Body beſides the Soul?

Alcib. No nothing elſe.

Socrat. 'Tis that that governs.

Alcib. Moſt certainly.

Soc. I believe there's no Man but is forc'd to confeſs--

Alcib. What?

Soc. That Man is one of theſe three things, either the Soul or the Body, or the Compound of 'em both. Now we are agreed that Man is that which commands the Body.

Alcib. That we are.

Soc. What is Man then? Does the Body command it ſelf? No. For we have ſaid 'tis the Man that commands that. So that the Body is not the Man.

Alcib. So it ſeems.

Socrat. Is it then the Compound that commands the Body? and ſhall this Compound be the Man?

Alcib. That may be.

Socrat. Nothing leſs. For ſince one of 'em does not command as we have already ſaid, * 'tis impoſſible they both ſhould command together.

Alcib. 'Tis very true.

Socrat. Seing then neither the Body, nor the Compound

* For beſides that this is a Contradiction; ſeeing that which does not command would then command; there is not a third thing for theſe two to command together. If the Soul and the Body both command, what is it that is under their Command?

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ponnd of Soul and Body are the Man; 'tis absolutely necessary either that Man is Nothing at all, or that the Soul alone is the Man.

Alcib. Most certainly.

Socrat. Shall I demonstrate to you yet more clearly that the Soul alone is the Man?

Alcib. No, I protest, this is sufficiently prov'd.

Socrat. We have not yet founded this Truth with all the Accuracy it deserves; but 'tis sufficiently prov'd, and that may serve. We shall sound it farther, and penetrate it better; when we have found out what we just now quitted, because it requir'd a longer Investigation.

Alcib. What is that?

Socrat. 'Tis what we said but now; that 'tis necessary we would first seek to know the very essence of things to speak universally; instead of which we have stop'd to examine and know the Essence of a particular thing; and perhaps that is sufficient. For we can find nothing that is more properly, and precisely our selves than our Souls.

Alcib. That's very certain.

Socrat. So then this is a principle very well establish'd that when you and I converse together, by making use of Discourse; 'tis my Soul that converses with yours. And this is what we said just now, that *Sacrates* speaks to *Alcibiades*, by addressing Words not to the Body which is expos'd to my Eyes, but to *Alcibiades* himself, whom I do not see, that is, to his Soul.

Alcib. This is evident.

Socrat. He then who requires us to know our selves, requires us to know our Souls.

Alcib. I believe it.

Socrat. He who knows his Body only, knows that which belongs to him, but does not know himself. Thus a Physician as a Physician, does not know himself, nor a Wrestling-Master as a Wrestling-Master, nor a Husband-Man as a Husband-Man. All persons of these Professions, and those of the like Nature,

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are so far from knowing themselves, * that they do not know particularly what belongs to 'em; and their Art makes 'em adhere to what is yet more forreign to 'em than that which properly belongs to 'em. For they know only those things that appertain to the Body, and by which they cure, and preserve it in health.

Alcib. All this is very true.

Socrat. If therefore it be a piece of Wisdom to know one's self, There is no Man of any of these Professions who is wise by his Art.

Alcib. I am of the same Mind.

Soc. † And 'tis for this reason all these Arts appear vile and sordid, and consequently unworthy of a good Man.

Alcib. 'Tis very true.

Socrat. Well then to return to our Principle, every Man that takes care of his Body, takes care of that which belongs to him, and not of himself.

Alcib. I grant it.

Socrat. Every Man that loves Riches, loves neither himself, nor that which belongs to him, but loves a thing which is yet more forreign to him, *And which only respects that which belongs to him.*

Alcib. I think so.

To labour only to heap up Treasures is to manage one's Affairs ill.

Socrat. Then according to this principle one may affirm, that he who employs his Care to heap up Riches, does not manage his Affairs well.

Alcib. 'Tis most certainly so.

Socrat. If any one has been in love with the Body of *Alcibiades*, that Person has not been in love with

* Physicians and Masters of Exercise indeed apply themselves to know the Body; but they know it only to a certain degree: For as *Hippocrates* says in his Treatise of the Ancient Art of Medicine, they content themselves with knowing what Man is, with respect to what he eats and drinks, and to the Exercises he performs: and what may occur to him from any of these things. So that they only know some certain Qualities of Matter, but not the Essence of it. 'Tis more easy to know the Essence of the Soul, than that of the Body.

† The only Art truly worthy of a good Man, is that of knowing, and labouring to perfectionate himself.

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Alcibiades, but with one of those things that appertain to him.

Alcib. I am convinc'd of it.

Socrat. That Person who is in love with *Alcibiades*, must be one that is in love with his Soul.

Alcib. That's a necessary Consequence of your Principle.

Socrat. And this is the Reason that that Person who only loves your Body, retires when the beauty of this Body begins to decay.

Alcib. 'Tis true.

Socrat. But one that loves your Soul never retires * while you make any progress in Vertue; and every day make your self still a better Man.

Alcib. That is very likely.

Socrat. And this likewise is the reason that I am the only Person that does not leave you, but continue constant after the flower of your Beauty is faded, and all your Admirers are retir'd.

Alcib. You very much oblige me, *Socrates*; and I entreat you not to abandon me.

Socrat. Labour then with all your Might to become every day more and more beautiful. *By beautiful he means vertuous.*

Alcib. I'll labour to become so.

Socrat. As Matters stand with you, 'tis easy to judg that *Alcibiades*, the Son of *Clinias*, never had nor has yet more than only one true Lover; and this faithful Lover is the † lovely *Socrates*, the Son of *Sophroniscus* and *Phenareta*.

Alcib. 'Tis very true.

Socrat. But did you not tell me when I met you; that I prevented you but one moment, and that you had a design to speak to me, to know why I was the only Person that had not left you.

Alcib. I told you so, and 'tis true.

Socrat. You now know the reason of it; 'tis be-

* So this Passage ought to be translated. The Latin Interpreters have made a mistake here, not remembring ἕως has often the Signification of the present time. *M. Le Fevre.*

† He jokes on his own deformity and low Birth, which he opposes to the Beauty, fine Air, and Nobility of his Rivals.

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cauſe I always lov'd you, and others only lov'd what belongs to you. The Beauty of that which belongs to you begins to decay, whereas your own Beauty begins to flouriſh. And if you don't ſuffer your ſelf to be corrupted by the People, and become more deform'd: I'll not forſake you as long as I live. But I very much fear, ſince you are ſo much * in love with the applauſe of the People, that you'll deſtroy your ſelf by this unhappy Diſpoſition, as it has been the Lot of a great many of our beſt Athenians. For the People of the Magnanimous *Erectheus* have a fair outſide. But we ought to look into 'em, and remove that fair covering which hides 'em from us. Believe me then, *Alcibiades*, and take the Precautions I give you.

More deformed, that is more vicious.

Erectheus *was one of the firſt Kings of* Athens.

Alcib. What Precautions?

Socrat. To exerciſe your ſelf, and be inſtructed in what is neceſſary to be known before you intermeddle with the Affairs of the Common-wealth; that you may be always fortified with an Antidote; and that you may not periſh in ſo contagious, and fatal a Converſation.

Alcib. All you ſay is very well, *Socrates*; But endeavour to explain to me, by what means we may be able to take care of our ſelves.

Socrat. That's done already, for firſt of all we have prov'd what Man is, and that with good reaſon; becauſe we fear'd, if that were not well known, we ſhould take care of ſomething quite different from our ſelves, without perceiving it. We afterwards agreed that we ought to take care of our Souls; that this is the only end we ſhould propoſe to our ſelves; and that the care of the Body, and of that which appertains to it, as Riches, ſhould be left to others.

Alcib. Can any one deny this?

* He was ſo in love with the People, that he did not ceaſe to beſtow Gifts on 'em, and to preſent 'em with Shows and Plays. *Plutarch* ſpeaks of a Diſtribution of Money, which he made when he was very young, and carried Quailes in his Boſom.

Socrat.

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Socrat. How can we understand this Truth * more clearly, and evidently? For when we have set it in its true Light, 'tis very certain, that we shall know our selves perfectly well: Let us then in the Name of the Gods endeavour to understand well the Precept of *Delphos*, of which we have already spoken. For we don't yet well comprehend all its Force. *Know thy self.*

Alcib. What Force? What do you mean?

Socrat. I'm going to communicate to you what I take to be the meaning of that Inscription, and the Precept it includes. 'Tis hardly possible to make you understand it by any other comparison than this, which is taken from the sight. *Alc.* How do you say?

Socrat. Observe well what I say. If this Inscription spoke to the Eye, as it speaks to the Man, and should say to it, *Know thy self*: what should we think it required of it? Should we not think it required it to look upon it self in something in which the Eye might see it self?

Alcib. That's evident.

Soc. Let us then seek for this thing, in which, as we behold our selves in it, we may see both it, and our selves.

Alcib. We may see our selves in a Looking-glass, and in other Bodies of the like kind.

Socrat. You say very well. Is not there likewise some little part of the Eye, which has the same Effect as a Looking-glass?

Alcib. Yes certainly there is.

Socrat. You have observed then, that as often as you look into an Eye, you see your own Image, as in a Glass, in that little part which is call'd by a Name which signifies a † Baby, be-

* *M. Le Fevre* had reason to say, that ἐναργέστερα ought to be read for ἐναργέστατα, and that it should be translated *more clearly*. *Socrates* is now going to resume the Proposition he had quitted, which was to know the universal Essence of things; and all he is going to say on this Subject is incomparably fine.

† There is a fault in the Greek, which I wonder to find left there; for what sense has κορυφὴν here, which signifies *the top of a thing?* It ought to be read κόρην that is the Apple of the Eye. κόρη, *pupilla*, a Poppet or Baby.

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cauſe 'tis the Image of him that looks on it.

Alcib. 'Tis true.

Socrat. Then an Eye, that it may ſee into another Eye, ought to look into this part of it, which is the moſt beautiful, and which alone has the faculty of ſeeing.

Alcib. Who doubts it?

Socrat. For if he ſhould fix his Looks on any other part of the Body of Man, or on any other Object, unleſs it were like this part of the Eye which ſees, it would ſee nothing of it ſelf.

Alcib. You are in the right.

Socrat. Therefore an Eye that would ſee it ſelf, ought to look into another Eye, and into that part of the Eye, in which all the Vertue of it reſides, that is, the Sight.

Alcib. That's certain.

In what we ſhould look upon our ſelves to know our ſelves well.

Socrat. My dear *Alcibiades*, is it not juſt ſo with the Soul? Ought it not to look into the Soul to ſee it ſelf, and into that * part of the Soul, in which all its Vertues, that is to ſay Wiſdom is ingenerated? or elſe ought it not to behold it ſelf in ſome other thing yet more noble, which this part of the Soul in ſome ſort reſembles?

Alcib. So methinks, *Socrates*.

Socrat. But can we find any part of the Soul which is more divine than that in which Knowledg and Wiſdom reſide.

Alcib. No certainly.

* That is into our **Intellect or Underſtanding.** We ought ſtrictly to remark with what Wiſdom *Socrates* here expreſſes himſelf. In ſpeaking of the Soul of Man, he acknowledges, that Wiſdom is ingenerated in it, that is, that it comes to it from without; for it is not its own Light; this is deriv'd into it from God. And a few Lines lower, as he ſpeaks of the Divine Intelligence, he does not chooſe to ſay, in which Knowledg and Wiſdom are ingenerated; but ſays he, *in which they reſide*, becauſe it is Wiſdom it ſelf, and the Source of Wiſdom. The Latin Interpreters, who did not pry into this Accuracy of *Socrates* have ſpoiled all the beauty of theſe Paſſages by their Tranſlations. More Attention and Fidelity ought to have been uſed in handling Theological Truths.

Socrat.

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Socrat. 'Tis then in this Soul, of which ours is but the Image, 'tis in this divine Soul we ought to behold our ſelves, and to contemplate the whole Deity in it, that is to ſay God, and Wiſdom; if we would know our ſelves perfectly. *We muſt behold our ſelves in God to know our ſelves well.*

Alcib. This ſeems very probable.

Socrat. To know one's ſelf is Wiſdom, as we have both agreed.

Alcib. 'Tis true.

Socrat. While we don't know our ſelves, nor are wiſe with this Wiſdom; we can't know either our Goods or our Evils; for it is not poſſible that he who knows not *Alcibiades*, ſhould know that what belongs to *Alcibiades*, does indeed appertain to him.

Alcib. 'Tis impoſſible.

Socrat. 'Tis only by knowing our ſelves that we come to know that that which belongs to us does indeed appertain to us. And if we know not what belongs to us; neither ſhall we know what has reference to the things that belong to us.

Alcib. I confeſs it.

Socrat. We therefore juſt now did ill to agree, that there are ſome Perſons, who tho' they don't know themſelves, yet know that which belongs to them, without knowing the things that appertain to that which belongs to them. For theſe three Knowledges; to know one's ſelf, to know that which belongs to one; and to know the things that appertain to that which belongs to one, are link'd together, they are the Action of the ſame Man, and the Effect of one and the ſame Art.

Alcib. 'Tis very likely.

Socrat. Now that Man that knows not the things that belong to himſelf neither will know thoſe that belong to others.

Alcib. That's evident.

Socrat. And if he knows not what belongs to others, neither will he know what belongs to the City.

Alcib. That's a certain Conſequence.

Socrat. Therefore ſuch a Man can never be a good States

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States Man; nay he can't be so much as a Good Master to govern a Family; what do I say? He can't so much as govern himself; for he knows not what he does; and if he knows not what he does, 'tis impossible he should be free from Faults.

Alcib. That is impossible indeed.

Socrat. And if he commits Faults, does he not do ill both in private and in publick? If he does ill, is he not Miserable? and as he is Miserable, does he not involve those that obey him in his Misfortunes?

Alcib. Who can deny it?

The Wicked can't be happy.

Socrat. Then 'tis not possible that he who is neither Good nor Wise, should be Happy.

Alcib. No certainly.

Socrat. Then all vicious Persons are Miserable.

Alcib. I acknowledge it.

Socrat. Then a Man can't deliver himself from his Misery by Riches, but by Wisdom.

Alcib. That's certain.

The Happiness of Cities and States consists in Vertue.

Socrat. So that, My Dear *Alcibiades*, Cities have no need either of Walls, or Ships, or Arsenals, or Troops or Grandeur to make 'em happy; the only thing they need is Vertue. And if you would manage the affairs of the Commonwealth well, you must give your Citizens Vertue.

Alcib. This is an evident Truth.

Socrat. But can a Man give that which he has not?

Alcib. How should he?

Socrat. Then you ought first of all to consider how to acquire Vertue; and so must every Man who desires to take care not only of himself, and the things that belong to him; but also of the City, and the things that belong to that.

Alcib. This is beyond all doubt.

Socrat. Therefore you ought not to consider how to acquire for your self or your City a large extent of Empire and the absolute power of doing what you please; but only how to acquire Wisdom and Justice.

Alcib. I believe what you say.

Socrat.

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Socrat. For if you and your City govern your selves wisely and justly, you will please God.

We can't please God but by Wisdom and Justice.

Alc. I am well convinc'd of that.

Socrat. And you'll govern your selves wisely and justly, if, as I just now told you, you behold your selves always in the Deity; in that splendid Light, which alone is capable of giving you the knowledge of the Truth.

If we would conduct our selves wisely and justly we must behold our selves in God

Alcib. This seems very reasonable.

Socrat. For while you behold your selves in this Light; you will see your selves; and will see and know your True Goods.

Alcib. Without doubt.

Socrat. And so you will always do what is Good.

Alcib. Most certainly.

Soc. If you always do what is good, I dare answer for it, and warrant you, you shall be always happy.

Happiness is the certain recompence of good Actions.

Alcib. Your warrant is very good in this case, *Socrates.*

Socrat. But if you govern your selves unjustly, and instead of beholding the Deity, and True Light you look into that which is without God and full of Darkness, you will do nothing but the Works of Darkness, and such as are full of Impiety; and it can't be otherwise, because you will not know your self.

Those that look on Darkness do nothing but the works of Darkness.

Alcib. I am of the same mind.

Socrat. My dear *Alcibiades*, represent to your self a Person that has * a Power to do any thing he pleases, and yet has no Judgment; what is to be expected from him? and what Mischief is there that will not befal him? For example, suppose a sick Man has power to do whatever comes into his Head, has no understanding in Physick; is in a rage against every Body, so that no Person dares speak to him or restrain him; what will be the event of this? He will without doubt destroy his Body, and render himself incurable.

The terrible effects of absolute Power, when not attended with Wisdom.

* When Wisdom is wanting, absolute Power always transports Men beyond the Limits of their Duty, and induces 'em to trample Religion and Justice under their Feet.

Alcib.

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Alcib. 'Tis very true.

Socrat. Suppoſe ſome Perſon in a Ship, who has not the Judgment and Skill of a Pilot, ſhould yet have the liberty to do what he thinks fit: You your ſelf ſee what muſt certainly befal him and thoſe that abandon themſelves to his Conduct.

Alcib. They muſt all neceſſarily periſh.

The ruine of Cities and States is certain when Vertue does not reign in 'em.

Socrat. The caſe is the ſame with Cities, Republicks, and all States; if deſtitute of Vertue their Ruine is certain.

Alcib. 'Tis impoſſible it ſhould be otherwiſe.

Socrat. Conſequently, my dear *Alcibiades*, if you would be happy; your buſineſs is not to acquire a large extent of Empire for your ſelf or your Republick; but to acquire Vertue.

Alcib. Very true.

'Tis more advantageous for vicious Perſons to obey than command.

Socrat. * And before this Vertue is acquir'd, 'tis better and more advantageous, I don't ſay for a Child, but for a Man to obey him, who is the moſt Vertu[illegible], than to command.

Alcib. I am of the ſame mind.

Soc. And what is beſt is alſo moſt beautiful.

Alcib. Without doubt.

Socrat. That which is moſt beautiful is likewiſe moſt becoming, and ſuitable.

Alcib. That's beyond diſpute.

A vicious Perſon ought to be a Slave.

Soc. 'Tis then becoming and ſuitable to a vicious Perſon to be a Slave, for that is beſt for him.

Alcib. Moſt certainly.

The baſeneſs of Vice.

Socrat. Then Vice is a vile thing, and ſuitable to a Slave.

Alcib. So it ſeems.

The Nobility of Vertue.

Socrat. And Vertue is a noble thing, and ſuits only with a free Man.

* After *Socrates* has confounded the Pride of *Alcibiades*, he gives a finiſhing ſtroke to lay him low, in reducing him to pronounce this terrible Sentence againſt himſelf, that he's only worthy to be a Slave, becauſe he has no Vertue, ſince 'tis Vertue alone that makes Men free.

Alcib.

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Alcib. That can't be contested.

Socrat. Then this Vileness ought to be avoided, which only suites with Slaves.

Alcib. Most certainly, *Socrates.*

Socrat. Well then, my dear *Alcibiades*; do you now perceive in what condition you are? Are you in this noble Disposition of Mind so becoming a Man of your Birth; or———

Alcib. * Ah, *Socrates*, I perceive very well, I am in the Condition, you speak of.

Socrat. But do you know how to deliver your self out of this Condition, which I dare not name, when I speak of a Man of your make?

Alcib. Yes I do.

Soc. Well, how can you deliver your self?

Alcib. I shall deliver my self, if *Socrates* pleases.

Socrat. You don't say well, *Alcibiades.*

Alcib. What should I say then?

Socrat. You should say, if God pleases.

We can do nothing without the help of God.

Alcib. Well then, I say if God pleases; and I add, let us for the future change Persons; you shall personate me, and I you; that is to say, I'll now † make my Court to you, as you have hitherto made yours to me.

Socrat. If so my dear *Alcibiades*, what is reported of the Stork may be said of the love I have for

* 'Tis upon this, without doubt, that *Plutarch* says, *Alcibiades* struck with the victorious Reasons of *Socrates*, was like a Cock, that after a long fight, hangs the Wing and yields himself conquer'd, and that *Socrates* by his ingenious Discourses touch'd him to the quick, and made him pour out a flood of Tears.

† This Passage is corrupted in the Text. It should be read, ὡς ὑπὸ σοῦ ἐπαιδαγωγήθην, or ὡς σὺ ἐμὲ ἐπαιδαγώγησας. *I'll be your Pedagogue* or Schoolmaster, *as you have been mine.* We see *Socrates* has been constantly following *Alcibiades* as his Schoolmaster; for the future *Alcibiades* designs to follow *Socrates* in his Turn; but it will be to learn of him and not to teach him. In *Greece* they had Schoolmasters for their Children, because they went to publick Schools, and there were no private Masters but for Persons of the first Quality; and they made use of 'em but rarely. M. *le Fevre.* In the Translation 'twas requisite to put an equivalent Term, because the Word *Pedagogue* or *Schoolmaster* would not have sounded well.

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you; for after it has hatch'd and nouriſhed a little *Winged Love* in your Boſom; This little Love ſhall take his turn to cheriſh and nouriſh that in his old Age.

Alcib. It ſhall ſo; and from this day I'll apply my ſelf to Righteouſneſs.

Socrat. I deſire you may through the whole courſe of your Life, perſevere in this deſign * but I confeſs I fear it very much. Not that I diſtruſt your Good Temper; but the force of the Examples that reign in this City occaſion theſe apprehenſions. I tremble for fear they ſhould be too ſtrong for you and me too.

* The Event prov'd that this fear of *Socrates* was but too well founded. *Alcibiades* with all his good Temper, and with his great Qualities, entirely ruin'd himſelf, and did a World of miſchief to the Athenians. He abandon'd himſelf to Pleaſures; immers'd himſelf in Luxury; and made Spoil on all hands, without any reſpect to Honour or Decency: and if he did ill in ſeizing, he did ſtill worſe in ſpending, to furniſh matter for his Intemperance and Debauches. Inſtead of following the Rules of Juſtice, he govern'd after a licentious manner, full of Diſſolution, and mix'd with Treachery and Deceit; and gave himſelf up to extravagant Fits of Anger, which occaſioned great Miſchiefs. All which proceeded from his forſaking *Lyceus*, and forgetting the wiſe Leſſons of *Socrates*. *Alcibiades* his Diſeaſe became incureable when he had left this Phyſician. It ſeiz'd him like a violent Fever, overturn'd his Underſtanding, and made him as it were run mad. From *Lyceus* it drove him to the Aſſembly of the Athenians; from that Aſſembly it forc'd him to Sea, from the Sea to *Sicily*, from thence to *Lacedemonia*, from *Lacedemonia* to the *Perſians*, from the *Perſians* to *Samos*, from *Samos* to *Athens*, from *Athens* again into the *Helleſpont*; and from thence in fine it brought him to be confin'd in a Town of *Phrygia* where he liv'd obſcurely in the Embraces of a debauch'd Woman, and was at laſt miſerably kill'd.

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The ARGUMENT OF THE Second *ALCIBIADES.*

Piety is the only Spring of our Happineſs, and 'tis Prayer alone that nouriſhes Piety: By this we keep up a continual Correſpondence with God, repreſent our Neceſſities to him, and draw down his Favours upon us. So that the Eſſence of Religion conſiſts in Prayer. For Prayers are properly the Sallies of a Soul penetrated with Piety, diſcovering its Miſery to God, in order to requeſt a Remedy. But our Paſſions fill our Minds with ſo much Darkneſs, that we know neither our Goods, nor our Evils, but following our own Deſires every day offer ſuch Petitions to God, as would be fatal to us, and would become real Curſes if God ſhould harken to us. Therefore there is nothing of ſo great Importance as Prayer; nothing that requires ſo much Prudence and Attention, and yet we go about nothing with ſo much Temerity and Negligence. Plato *here vigorouſly oppoſes this Abuſe; and teaches, that if we would pray well we muſt learn to know our Goods and Evils; that the Knowledg of this is only taught by God; and conſequently that 'tis God alone that can diſſipate the Darkneſs of our Souls, and teach us to pray. Till then we can't ſafely make any Prayers of our ſelves, without being expos'd to great Dangers. But are we in the mean time to continue without Prayer, tho we are in continual need of the Divine Aſſiſtance? There would be Stupidity or Pride in this kind of Inaction. Certainly it would be more eligible for the Soul to continue in ſilence, than to ask Evils of God, when ſhe deſires to ask Good; but God has given her ſome help under this Ignorance, in inſpiring even during the*

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time of Darkneſs, a Prayer which teaches us to abandon our ſelves to him, and to requeſt of him, that he would do his own Will in us, and not ours. Of all the Prayers Men are capable of making, this is the moſt agreeable to God, and this Socrates *would have men continually make. When God has once enlighten'd and inſtructed us, we ſhall then ask of him what we think neceſſary; for ſeeing we ſhall ſpeak only by his Spirit we ſhall requeſt of him that which is truly Good; which he is always willing to grant; and will never fail to give it, becauſe he truly loves us. This is what* Socrates *deſigns to teach in this Dialogue, which may be term'd Sacred; ſince it is full of Maxims, very worthy of Chriſtianity it ſelf; and very uſeful both for Politicks and Religion. As when* Socrates *ſays, all the Sciences in the World without the Knowledg of that which is very good, are pernicious, inſtead of being uſeful; when he teaches us, that God is not to be corrupted by Bribes, and that he does not regard the Sacrifices, and Offerings of the wicked; but the Righteouſneſs and Holineſs of thoſe that invoke him: And when he aſſures us, that God is free and has a ſoveraign Power to hear, or reject our Supplications; whence it follows, that when he hears them, he ſhews us an Act of Grace, and not of ſtrict Juſtice. Here are many other Beauties which may be eaſily remark'd, becauſe they very ſenſibly and obviouſly offer themſelves. This Dialogue is a kind of Continuation of the precedent. As in the former,* Alcibiades *ſeem'd to underſtand but little with reſpect to humane Affairs; in this he appears to be very ignorant in divine things; for there is ſo great a Connexion between 'em; that thoſe that are ignorant of the one, are neceſſarily ignorant of the other, as* Socrates *demonſtrates, when he ſhews, that to know God, to know one's ſelf, and to know what appertains to our ſelves, and what to others, is the Effect of one and the ſame Art. We may obſerve by the way, as we have done before; that this Dialogue is ſuſtain'd as all the reſt are, by Action. And this Dramatick*

Air

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Air, is that which animates it, and is one of its greateſt Beauties.

All that is farther neceſſary to be known, is at what time Plato *ſuppoſes it to be made. If we follow his Interpreters, they make him fall into a very ridiculous Inconveniency. For after he had ſaid* Archelaus, *King of* Macedonia *was kill'd, he ſpeaks of* Pericles *as of a Perſon yet alive, contrary to what is certainly known, namely, that* Archelaus *ſurviv'd* Pericles, *and was not aſſaſſinated till Twenty years after his Death; and contrary to what* Plato *himſelf ſays, in his* Gorgias *and* Theages. *We ſhall ſee in the Notes what led* Plato's *Interpreters into this Miſtake. In the mean time it may be maintain'd, that* Socrates *held theſe Diſcourſes with* Alcibiades, *the firſt year of the* 93 *Olympiade; for* Perdiccas *reign'd* 13 *years after the death of* Pericles, *who died the laſt year of the* 87 *Olympiade.* Archelaus, *who kill'd* Perdiccas, *reign'd ſeven years, and then was kill'd the laſt year of the* 92 *Olympiade. This naturally leads us to the time of this Dialogue. They that make* Archelaus *to have reign'd* 16 *Years, or* Perdiccas 23, *make* Archelaus *ſurvive* Alcibiades *and* Socrates.

This Dialogue is of the ſame Character with the precedent, μαιευτικὸς, *that is,* Socrates *here makes* Alcibiades *find out the Truths which he deſigns to teach him. 'Tis alſo a Moral Dialogue, as well as the former.*

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THE Second *ALCIBIADES*, OR Of Prayer.

Socrates, *Alcibiades*.

Socrates. *Alcibiades*, are you going into this Temple to ſay your Prayers?

Alcib. Yes *Socrates*, that is my deſign.

Socrat. Indeed you ſeem very thoughtful; I ſee your Eyes are fix'd on the Ground like a Man that's thinking on ſome very ſerious Matter.

Alcib. What ſhould I think on, *Socrates*?

Socrat. What ſhould you think on? on ſome very important thing, I ſuppoſe; for I beſeech you in the Name of God, tell me, whether when we addreſs our Prayers to the Gods, either in publick or private, do they not grant us ſome things, and refuſe us others? do they not hear ſome Perſons, and reject others?

Alc. That's very true.

Prayer requires a great deal of Wiſdom and Prudence.

Socrat. Don't you think then, that Prayer requires a great deal of Precaution and Prudence, leſt before we are aware we ask the Gods great Evils, while we think we are requeſting what is good; and leſt they ſhould be diſpos'd to grant what is requeſted of 'em; as they granted *Oedipus*, his Petition, who pray'd that his Children might decide their Rights by the Sword. This unhappy Father, who might have pray'd to the Gods to remove from him the Miſchiefs that oppreſs'd him, drew new Miſeries on him-

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himself by his horrible Imprecations; for his Petitions were heard, and this prov'd a source of terrible Calamities to his Family, the particulars of which I need not relate to you.

Alcib. But *Socrates*, you tell me of a Mad Man, can you believe any Man in his Senses would have made such kind of Prayers?

Soc. Then to be mad you think is oppos'd to being wise.

Alcib. Most certainly.

Socrat. Don't you think, that some Men are Fools, and others Wise?

Alcib. Yes.

Socrat. Come then, let us endeavour to know and distinguish 'em well; for you agree that there are some that are foolish, others that are wise, and others that are mad.

Alcib. I do so.

Soc. Are not some People in health, and others sick?

Alcib. That's certain.

Socrat. These are not the same Persons.

Alcib. No certainly.

Socrat. Is there a third sort, who are neither sick nor in health?

Alcib. * No. That can't be.

Socrat. For a Man must necessarily be in health or sick, there is no Medium.

Alcib. So I think.

Socrat. But is it the same thing with respect to Wisdom and Folly in your opinion?

Alcib. How do you say?

Socrat. I ask you if a Man must necessarily be either foolish or wise; or is there a certain Medium which makes one become neither a wise Man nor a Fool?

* If one were dispos'd to Criticize, one might say, there is a third State which is that of Convalescence, in which Men have not yet recover'd Health, neither are properly sick. But at bottom, this is not true, for one who is recovering is no longer under the Power of Sickness, but is in the way of Health.

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Alcib. * No. There's no Medium.

Socrat. Then One muſt neceſſarily be one or t'other.

Alcib. So I think.

Socrat. Did you not juſt now grant that Madneſs is oppoſite to Wiſdom?

Alcib. Yes.

Socrat. And that there is no Medium, to put a Man into ſuch a Condition as to be neither wiſe nor fooliſh?

Alcib. I did grant it.

Socrat. But is it poſſible for the ſame thing to have two Contraries oppos'd to it?

Alcib. By no means.

Socrat. Then Folly and Madneſs will appear to be one and the ſame thing.

Alcib. So methinks.

Socrat. Then if we ſay all Fools are mad, we ſhall ſay right.

Alcib. Certainly.

Socrat. Without going any farther; Among all the Men of your Age, if there are any Fools, as without doubt there are, and ſome of a longer ſtanding, (for, I pray, don't you find wiſe Men are very rare in this City and Fools very numerous) would you call theſe Fools mad?

Alcib. Without any Scruple.

The Difficulty which Socrates oppoſes to what Alcibiades has juſt granted.

Socrat. But do you think we ſhould be very ſafe among ſo many mad Men; and that we ſhould not before now have born the puniſhment of ſuch Converſation; in ſuffering from 'em whatever might be expected from mad Men? Have a care what you ſay,

* To this 'tis objected, that there is a certain *Medium* between Vertue and Vice, which is the State of ſuch as are, neither vicious, nor vertuous, as *Tacitus* ſays of *Galba*, *magis extra Vitia quàm cum Virtutibus*. But 'tis eaſy to ſee, that this Expreſſion of *Tacitus* is not true, but only in the common Language of the World, which makes only a ſuperficial Judgment, without penetrating deeply into things, and ſo calls none vicious but thoſe who practiſe groſs Vices; and is falſe, when we ſpeak with a Philoſophick Accuracy. Wherever Vertue is not, there Vice muſt neceſſarily be. The ſame may be ſaid of Wiſdom and Folly. Every Man who is not Wiſe, can be no other than a Fool.

there-

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therefore, my dear *Alcibiades*; leſt this matter be otherwiſe than you pretend.

Alcib. Well then how is it? for I perceive it may be otherwiſe than I ſay.

Socrat. I think ſo too; and we muſt examine the Matter after this Manner. *Alc.* After what Manner?

Socrat. I'm going to tell you; Some Perſons are ſick, are they not? *Alcib.* Who doubts it?

Socrat. Is it abſolutely neceſſary, that every one that is ſick, ſhould have the Gout or Fever, or ſore Eyes? and don't you think he may be free from all theſe Diſtempers and yet be ſick of another Diſeaſe? For there are divers kinds of Diſeaſes, beſides theſe. *A Solution of this difficulty.*

Alcib. So I think.

Socrat. You believe every Diſtemper of the Eyes is a Diſeaſe, but you don't think every Diſeaſe is a Diſtemper of the Eyes.

Alc. No certainly, but yet I don't ſee what that proves.

Socrat. But if you'll follow me, I am perſwaded, we ſhall find that preſently. *You know that ſaying of the Poet* * Two Men that go together.

Alcib. I follow you with all my might, *Socrates*.

Socrat. Are we not agreed that every Diſtemper of the Eyes is a Diſeaſe, and that every Diſeaſe is not a Diſtemper of the Eyes?

* *Plato* often intermixes Sentences of the Poets in his Diſcourſes without giving any notice when he does it. To underſtand this Paſſage well, and to know all its Elegancy; 'tis neceſſary to remember the Words *Homer* puts into *Diomedes* his Mouth, when *Neſtor* propoſes to ſend Spies into the *Trojan Camp*. For he ſpeaks thus, *My Courage prompts me to go into the Enemies Army, but if any one would accompany me, I ſhould go with greater Boldneſs and Confidence; for two Men that go together, take a better view of things, one ſees what the other does not obſerve: One Man alone, tho he want not Prudence, yet has always leſs Vigour and Activity in his Mind.* Iliad. K. ver. 224. So that here is a manifeſt Alluſion to this Paſſage. *Homer* ſays σὺν δύο ἐρχομένω, *Two Men that go together*. And *Plato* ſays σὺν δύο σκοπουμένω, *Two Men that examine together*. But becauſe *Homer* is not now ſo well known as he was in *Plato*'s time, I have elucidated the Paſſage in the Tranſlation, by adding, *you know that Saying of the Poet*. Without which the Alluſion would not have been perceiveable. The Latin Tranſlators have ſlip'd over it without perceiving it.

Alcib.

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Alcib. In that we are agreed.

Soc. And that with good Reaſon; for all that have a Fever are ſick; but all that are ſick, have not a Fever, or the Gout, or ſore Eyes. All theſe Afflictions are Diſeaſes, but Phyſicians aſſure us that they are ſo many different Diſeaſes by their Effects; for they are not allalike; and they don't deal with them all after the ſame manner; but according to the Nature and Violence of 'em. Are there not a great many ſorts of Artificers? There are Shoemakers, Bricklayers, Architects, Carvers, Painters, and a multitude of others, whom I need not name; work is divided among 'em. They are all Artificers, but they are not all Carvers or Architects. *Alcib.* 'Tis true.

Socrat. In like manner Folly is divided among Men, thoſe that have the greateſt ſhare of it we call mad, or diſtracted. Thoſe that have a degree leſs we call Fools, and Stupid; but while Men ſeek to hide theſe Vices under honourable and ſpecious Names; they call the former Men of Magnanimity, and Courage; and they call the others Men of Simplicity; or elſe they ſay they have no harm in 'em; but have little Experience, and much Youth. You'll find a great many other Names beſides theſe with which they palliate their weak ſide. But theſe are ſo many ſorts of Folly, which differ only as one Art does from another, and one Diſeaſe from another. Don't you think ſo as well as I?

Folly is divided among Men, as Labour and Induſtry is ſhar'd among 'em.

Alcib. I am of the ſame mind with you.

Socrat. To return then to our Subject; Our firſt deſign was exactly to know and diſtinguiſh the Fooliſh from the Wiſe; for we agreed that ſome Men are Wiſe and others Fooliſh, did we not?

Alcib. Yes, in that we agreed.

Socrat. Don't you call him wiſe who knows what he ought to ſay or do, and him fooliſh who knows neither one nor t'other? *Alc.* Yes certainly.

Socrat. Are they, who know not what they ought to ſay or do, ignorant that they ſay and do what they ought not?

The definition of a Wiſe Man and a Fool.

Alcib.

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Alcib. I think ſo.

Socrat. I told you *Oedipus* was of that number: But you'll yet find in our time a multitude of People, who without being tranſported with an Emotion of Anger like him will requeſt of God real Evils while they think they are asking real Goods. For as for *Oedipus*; if he did not ask for what was Good neither did he think he ask'd it; whereas others every day do the quite contrary; and without going any farther, *Alcibiades*, if the God to whom you are going to pray, ſhould appear ſuddenly to you, and before you have open'd your Lips ſhould ask you, if you would be content to be the Tyrant of *Athens*, or (if that ſeem too little for you) of all *Greece*; or if you were not yet ſatisfied, ſhould promiſe you all *Europe* together; and fully to gratifie your Ambition, ſhould add, that that very day all the World ſhould know that *Alcibiades* the Son of *Clinias* is King; I am perſwaded you would go out of the Temple with abundance of Joy, as one that has juſt received the greateſt of all Goods.

Alcib. And, *Socrates*, I verily believe, there's no Man but he would be tranſported with Joy, if the ſame thing ſhould happen to him.

Socrat. But you would not give your Life for the Empire of the *Greeks*, nor for that of the *Barbarians*.

Alcib. No certainly; to what purpoſe? for then I could not enjoy that Empire.

Socrat. But ſuppoſe you could enjoy it, would you do it, if this Enjoyment were to be fatal to you?

Alcib. No, neither would I do it, on that Condition.

Socrat. Then by this you ſee very well, that it is not ſafe to accept, or deſire what one does not know; if it be true, that it may bring great Miſchiefs upon us, or even make us loſe our Lives: For I could name to you a great many of thoſe Ambitious Men, who having paſſionately deſir'd the Tyranny, and ſpar'd nothing to obtain it, as the greateſt

There is a great deal of danger in asking and receiving what we know not.

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greateſt of all Goods; yet have deriv'd no other Advantage from this great Elevation, than to be expos'd to the Stratagems of their Enemies, who have aſſaſſinated them on the Throne. 'Tis impoſſible but you muſt have heard of that Tragical Story that has lately happen'd. * *Archelaus*, the King of *Macedonia* had a Favorite whom he lov'd with an unbounded Paſſion; this Favorite, who was yet more in love with the Throne of *Archelaus*, than this Prince was with him, kill'd him to fill up his place, flattering himſelf that he ſhould be the happieſt Man in the World: But he had ſcarce enjoy'd the Tyranny 3 or 4 days, when he was cut off by others that were poſſeſs'd with the ſame Ambition. And among our Athenians (for theſe are Examples which come not to us by hear-ſay; but ſuch as we have ſeen with our Eyes) how many have there been, who, after they had ardently aſpir'd to be Generals of the Army, and had obtain'd what they deſir'd, have been put to death, or baniſhed? How many others who have ſeem'd more happy, have paſs'd through innumerable Dangers, and been expos'd to continual Fears, not only during the time of their being Generals, but alſo after their return into their Country, where they have all their Life-time had a more cruel Siege to maintain againſt envious Detractors, than all thoſe they ſuſtain'd in War againſt the Enemies of the State? So that the greateſt part of 'em wiſh'd they had never been any more than private Men, rather than to have had the Command of Armies at ſo dear a rate. If all theſe Dangers and Fatigues would produce a Man any advantage in the end; there would be ſome reaſon for him to to expoſe himſelf to 'em, but 'tis the quite contrary. What I ſay of Honours, I ſay alſo of Children. How many People have we ſeen, who after they

* *Archelaus* was the natural Son of *Perdiccas*. He kill'd his Father, his Uncle *Alcetas* and his Son. He afterwards kill'd the Legitimate Son of *Perdiccas*; and after he had poſſeſs'd the Throne 7 years, was aſſaſſinated by his Favorite *Crateus*.

have

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have importunately desir'd of God, that he would give them Children, and have accordingly obtain'd 'em, have by this means precipitated themselves into terrible Miseries and Troubles: For some of 'em have spent their whole Life in Sorrow and Bitterness; because their Children have prov'd wicked; and others who have had such as have prov'd good have been no more happy than the former, because they have lost them for the most part in the Flower of their Age: So that they had much rather never have had 'em. Now tho all these Miseries, and many others, are very obvious, and common; yet there's scarce a Man to be found, who would refuse these false Goods, if God should give 'em him; or who would cease to importune him for 'em, if he were assur'd he should obtain 'em by his Prayers. The generality of Men would not refuse, either the Tyranny, or the Command of Armies, or any other great Honours, which yet are certainly much more pernicious than useful; but would request 'em of God, if they did not spontaneously offer themselves to 'em. But wait a moment, and you'll hear 'em sing a *Palinodia*, and offer Petitions quite contrary to the former. For my part, I confess, I can't choose but think, that Men are really to blame, *in complaining of the Gods, and accusing 'em of being the Cause of the Miseries they suffer; for 'tis themselves, who by their Faults, or rather by their Follies,*

A Recantation.

This is a Passage of Homer, in the 1st Book of his Odyss. at the beginning.

In spite of Fate draw Mischiefs on themselves.

And therefore, *Alcibiades*, that Ancient Poet seems to me to have had a great deal of Sense and Reason, who having (as I think) very imprudent Friends, whom he saw every day going on in a Course of asking of God such things as seem'd good to them, and yet were very bad for 'em, compos'd for 'em this Prayer, and gave it 'em. *Great God, give us the Good Things that are necessary for us, whether we ask 'em or not; and keep evil things from us, even when we ask 'em of thee.* This seems to be a most Excellent and very safe Prayer. If you have any thing

An admirable Prayer of an unknown Author.

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thing to object against it, do not hide it from me.

Alcib. 'Tis hard to contradict what is well spoken. The only reflection I make on it, *Socrates*, Is how many Evils are brought upon Mankind by Ignorance. For we don't so much as perceive that 'tis this that not only makes us every day do such things as are fatal to us; but (which is most deplorable) engages us to ask our own unhappiness of God; and this is what no Man can tell how to imagine. There's no Person but thinks himself capable of asking such things of God, as are very useful for him, and very uncapable of desiring such as are pernicious to him; for this would not be a Prayer, but a real Imprecation.

Socrat. Hold a little, my dear *Alcibiades*, 'tis possible there may be found some Person wiser than you and I, who might with good Reason reprehend us, and tell us we are very much in the wrong thus to blame Ignorance, without adding what sort of Ignorance it is that we condemn, and in what it consists. For if Ignorance is bad in some things, 'tis good in others.

Ignorance is sometimes good.

Alcib. How do you say, *Socrates*, is there any thing of what kind soever of which 'tis more useful to be ignorant, than to know it?

Socrat. So I think, and you think otherwise.

Alcib. That I do I protest.

Socrat. Yet I shall never believe you capable of being irritated against your Mother with the fury either of an *Orestes*, or an *Alcmæon*, or any the like *Parricides*; if there have been any others who have committed the same Crimes.

Alcib. Ah! *Socrates*, I intreat you in the Name of God alter your discourse.

Socrat. *Alcibiades*, you are to blame to desire that of me, of me, I say, who tell you, I don't think you capable of committing those Crimes. You could do no more if I accus'd you of 'em. But since these Actions appear so abominable to you, that one must not name 'em unless there be an absolute necessity of it; with all my heart, so let it be. I only

ly ask you, do you think, if *Oreſtes* had been in his Senſes, and had known what was good, and uſeful for him, he would have dar'd to do what he did?

Alcib. No certainly.

Socrat. Neither he nor any body elſe would have done it.

Alcib. That's moſt certain.

Socrat. Then in my Opinion this Ignorance of what is good and uſeful is a great Evil.

Alcib. I am of the ſame Mind.

Socrat. And that either in *Oreſtes*, or any other Perſon.

Alcib. I am fully perſuaded of that.

Socrat. Let us examine this matter yet a little farther. Suppoſe then * it had formerly come into your Head on a ſudden, that it was a very good and laudable Action for you to go and kill *Pericles* your Tutor and Friend; and that you had taken a Dagger, and gone directly to his Door, to ask if he were at Home, as having a deſign againſt him alone, and not any other; and that you had been told he was within. I don't mean by this that you could ever have been capable of committing ſo horrible an Action;

* The Latin Interpreters have tranſlated this Paſſage, as if *Plato* had ſaid, *if it ſhould come into your head of a ſudden, to go and kill* Pericles *your Tutor and Friend*, not conſidering that they make *Plato* fall into a very ridiculous Fault. For to ſpeak thus, *Pericles* muſt have been ſtill living. And *Plato* had been ſaying, that *Archelaus*, King of *Macedonia*, had been aſſaſſinated, and we know *Pericles* died 20 years before. How then ſhall this Contradiction be reconcil'd? How ſhall we ſecure *Plato* from this Fault of which he is not guilty: ſeeing he ſpeaks the contrary in *Gorgias* and *Theages*? There's no great difficulty in the Matter, 'tis only to tranſlate as the Greek Terms will bear; *if it had formerly come into your head on a ſudden*, that is, *if while* Pericles *was living*, &c. By this means we not only prevent a great miſtake, in regard of the time, but alſo eſcape a great Fault againſt the Rules of Decency. For that *Pericles* ſhould be yet alive when *Socrates* ſpeaks thus to *Alcibiades*, is a harſh and odious Suppoſition; but ſuppoſing *Pericles* to be dead, it has not the ſame harſhneſs in it. *Atheneus* would not have forgot to improve this Paſſage to ſtrengthen his Chicanerie againſt *Plato*'s *Gorgias*, if he had not very well underſtood that it would bear another Interpretation beſides that given it by his Tranſlators.

but

but I make this Suppoſition to ſhew you that there's nothing hinders, but a Man who knows not what is comely and honourable may be in a diſpoſition of taking that for very Good, which is in it ſelf very Evil; Don't you think ſo as well as I?

Alcib. I am perfectly of the ſame Mind.

Socrat. To go on then; ſuppoſing you had been told *Pericles* was at Home, and you had gone in, and ſeen him, but not known him, and imagined that you ſaw ſome body elſe; would you have had the Boldneſs to kill him? No certainly, for your deſign would have been only againſt him; and every time you had been at his Houſe on the ſame Deſign, and had miſtaken him for another, you would not have done him the leaſt Injury.

Alcib. That's very certain.

Socrat. What then? Do you think *Oreſtes* would have laid his Parricidial Hands on his Mother, if he had miſtaken her for another?

Alcib. No doubtleſs.

Socrat. For he did not deſign to kill the firſt Woman he met, nor the Mother of this or that Perſon; but had a mind to kill his own Mother.

Alcib. You ſay right.

Socrat. Then this ſort of Ignorance is very good for thoſe that are in ſuch a diſpoſition of mind as his, and have ſuch kind of Fancies in their Heads.

Alcib. So I think.

Socrat. By this then you plainly ſee, that on ſome Occaſions, and in ſome Perſons whoſe Minds are diſpos'd after a certain manner, Ignorance is a Good and not an Evil, as you juſt now ſuppos'd.

Alcib. I perceive it very well.

Socrat. If you will take the pains to examine what I am now going to ſay, how ſtrange ſoever it may at firſt ſeem to you, it may be you'll be of the ſame mind with me.

** All the Sciences are uſeleſs without the knowledge of that which is very good.*

Alcib. Well, *Socrates*, What is it?

Socrat. 'Tis true, that poſſibly all the *Sciences without the knowledg of that which is very good, are

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are ſeldom of uſe to thoſe that poſſeſs 'em, nay moſt commonly are pernicious to 'em. Follow me a little in your Thoughts, I entreat you. When we are about to ſay or do any thing; Is it not altogether neceſſary, either that we really know what we are going to do or ſay, or at leaſt that we think we know it?

Alcib. Without doubt.

Socrat. According to this Principle the Orators who every Day adviſe the People, give them advice about what they know, or at leaſt think they know. Some give 'em counſel about Peace and War, others about the Walls that ought to be built, about the Fortifications, Gates, and Arſenals. In a word, all, that the City does for it ſelf, or againſt another City, is not done but by the advice of Orators.

Alcib. 'Tis true.

Socrat. Obſerve well what follows; and ſee if I can finiſh my proof: Don't you divide the People into wiſe Men and Fools? *Alcib.* Yes.

Socrat. Don't you call the greateſt number Fools, and the leaſt wiſe Men? *Alcib.* Yes

Socrat. Is it not with reference to ſomething that you call 'em ſo?

Alcib. Moſt certainly.

Socrat. Do you then call him a wiſe Man who can give this Counſel without knowing what is beſt, or in what time it is beſt?

Alcib. No certainly.

Socrat. Nor do you call him wiſe, who can make War, but knows not when nor how, nor how long 'tis beſt ſo to do.

Alcib. No, not I.

Socrat. Neither do you call thoſe Magiſtrates wiſe, who know how to put to death, to fine, and to baniſh; and yet know not when or on what Occaſions theſe puniſhments are beſt and moſt juſt.

Alcib. No indeed.

Socrat. Well then, when any one knows well how to do all theſe things, and theſe Sciences are accompanied with the knowledge of that which is very

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good (and this is the same with the knowledge of that which is very useful, as you have granted) we call this Man wise, and say he is very capable to advise and conduct himself, and govern the Commonwealth. And we say directly the contrary of him who does not add the knowledge of that which is good to these Sciences.

He is going to prove that to be skilful in the Art a Man professes is not sufficient to merit the name of a wise Man.

Alcib. This must be granted.

Socr. When a Man knows how to mount a Horse, to draw a Bow, to Wrestle, in a word to perform any of the like Exercises; or is well instructed in any other Art, how do you call him, when he knows perfectly well what is most conformable to the Art he professes? Don't you call him a Querry that employs himself in managing of Horses, him Wrestler that makes it his business to Wrestle, and him a Musician who understands Musick, and so of the rest? Don't you give 'em all such Names as are deriv'd from their Art, and are suitable to it? or do you give them other Appellations?

Alcib. We give 'em only such Names as are taken from their Art.

Socrat. Do you think 'tis of absolute necessity that he who well understands the Art of which he makes Profession, should also be a wise Man; or shall we say he may be far from that Character?

Alcib. He may be very far from it *Socrates.*

Socrat. * What will you say of a *Republick* compos'd of Wrestlers, Pipers, Archers, and other such kind of People mingled with such Persons as we have been speaking of, some of whom know how to make War, others to condemn to Death; and with those States-Men, who are bloated with pride on the Account of their pretended Capacity in Politicks? Supposing all these People to have knowledge of what is very good, and that there is but one single

* This is a subtile Satyr against the Republick of the *Athenians*, in which all Arts and Sciences were seen to flourish, but the knowledg of what is very good was not to be found there; and therefore nothing but Confusion and Disorder was to be seen among 'em.

Man

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Man among 'em all who knows either on what Occaſion or with whom each of theſe different Arts ought to be uſed?

Alcib. I ſhould ſay, *Socrates*, that would be a very ill-compos'd Commonwealth.

Socrat. Much more would you ſay ſo, when you ſaw every one full of Ambition, and ſtriving to engroſs the greateſt part of Affairs to himſelf; that he might ſtill exceed himſelf, and become every Day more powerful in that part of the Government which is the moſt Noble; and if you ſhould at the ſame time ſee every one making horrible Miſtakes againſt the knowledge of what is very good, both on his own account and that of the Commonwealth; becauſe he conducts himſelf by Opinion without Underſtanding. This being the State of the caſe, ſhould we not have great Reaſon to ſay that ſuch a *Republick* can't chooſe but be full of Diſorder and Injuſtice?

Alcib. This is manifeſtly true.

Socrat. Have we not agreed that it is abſolutely neceſſary for us either to believe we know, or elſe really to know what we are about to do or ſay without any farther Deliberation?

Alcib. That has been agreed between us.

Socrat. * Have we not likewiſe acknowledged, that when any Man does that which he knows, or thinks he knows; provided he poſſeſſes the knowledge of that which is very good, great advantage hence accrues both to himſelf and to the State.

Alcib. Who can doubt that?

Socrat. And that when 'tis otherwiſe, the contrary enſues.

Alcib. That's evident.

Soc. Do you ſtill perſiſt in the ſame Sentiments?

Alcib. I do.

Socrat. Have you not ſaid, that the greateſt number is that of Fools, and that of wiſe Men the leaſt?

Alcib. Yes, and I ſay the ſame ſtill.

* The knowledg of that which is very good conducts and directs us not only in the things we know, but alſo in thoſe we know not.

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Socrat. Did we not upon this ſay, that the greateſt number keep at a diſtance from that which is good, becauſe they uſually abandon themſelves to Opinion without Underſtanding.

Alcib. Yes, ſo we ſaid.

Socrat. Then 'tis uſeful for this great number to know nothing, and to believe they know nothing, becauſe what they know, or believe they know they will be willing to put in Execution, and in ſo doing, inſtead of gaining any advantage, they will receive great prejudice. *Alcib.* You ſay true.

Soc. By this then you ſee very well, that I had reaſon when I told you juſt now, that poſſibly all Sciences, without the knowledge of what is very good, were ſeldom uſeful to thoſe that poſſeſs'd 'em, but were moſt commonly very pernicious to 'em. Were you not then ſenſible of this Truth?

Alcib. I was not then ſenſible of it, *Socrates*, but now I am.

Socrat. Then a City which would be well govern'd and a Soul that would live well applies it ſelf only to this Science; as a Sick Man commits himſelf to his Phyſician; and as a Sailer, that would arrive ſafe at his Port, obeys his Pilot. * Without this the greater Fortune, Men or States enjoy, the

* This is one of the moſt difficult places in *Plato*; *Marſilius Ficinus*, and *De Serres* have tranſlated it very ill, and have rather obſcur'd than interpreted it. However *Ficinus* ſuſpected that it was corrupted, tho he could not correct it. I am of opinion that we ſhould read μὲν for μὴ, and γὰ for γὰρ. But that is not all, the principal Fault in the Text conſiſts in the Word ψυχῆς which makes a very ill Senſe, we muſt therefore neceſſarily read πνεῦς, and take away the Point. *Plato*'s Senſe is, that without the knowledg of what is very good, the greater Fortune a Soul or a City enjoys, the greater Crimes will they commit to ſatiate their Paſſions. The Corruption came from the Word ψυχὴν which is 3 or 4 Lines higher. But *Plato* ſpeaks no more of the Soul than he does of the City, and conſequently could not repeat ψυχῆς. He certainly wrote πνεῦς, and this mode of Speech ἐπιρρέον τὸ τῆς πνεῦς is very elegant, *quo magis fortuna afflaverit*, properly, *the more Fortune blows on their Poop.* The Beauty of this Principle, and the Truth which it contains, prove the neceſſity of reſtoring the Senſe after this manner; The greater Fortune wicked Men have, the greater Sins do they commit.

great-

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greater Crimes will they commit, either to acquire Riches, or to augment their Power, or ſatiate their Paſſions. He that poſſeſſes all the Arts and Sciences, and is deſtitute of this, will be driven about and toſs'd by each of them, and be really batter'd with a furious Tempeſt; and having neither Helm nor Pilot, 'tis impoſſible he ſhould go very far, and his ruine muſt needs be near. Methinks what the Poet ſpeaks of one whom he would diſpraiſe may be applied to him. * *He knew* (ſays he) *many things, but knew 'em all amiſs.*

The more proſperous Men are the greater Crimes they commit, if they have not the knowledg of what is very good.

Alcib. How can one make ſuch an application as this, *Socrates*? for my part, I don't think there is any Juſtneſs in it.

Socrat. On the contrary I ſay there is a great deal of Juſtneſs in it. For my dear *Alcibiades*, 'tis a ſort of Enigma. *Homer* and the other Poets are full of 'em. For all Poeſie is naturally enigmatick, and 'tis not given to every Man to penetrate thoſe Obſcurities; and if beſides its being Enigmatick, it be handled by envious Poets, who inſtead of diſcovering their Wiſdom to us, only ſeek to hide it from us; 'tis then almoſt impoſſible to ſound their Thoughts. But you'll never accuſe *Homer* that moſt Wiſe, and Divine Poet of being ignorant that 'tis impoſſible to know amiſs what one knows; 'tis he that ſays of *Margites*, that † *he knew many things but knew 'em all amiſs*, and he ſpeaks enigmatically, for he puts [*he knew*] for *his Learning* and [*amiſs*] for *unhappy*; which terms could not well enter into the Compoſition of his Verſe; but what he certainly meant by

All Poeſie is Enigmatick.

* Or thus, To a great Sum his Knowledg did amount,
But all he knew turn'd to an ill Account.

† *Homer* made a Poem againſt one *Margites*, who knew much, and yet ſpent his Life in Idleneſs and Debauchery, a certain ſign that he did not poſſeſs the knowledg of what is very good. This Poem which was made up of a mixture of Heroick and Iambick Verſes is loſt: In which *Homer* turn'd the pungent Railleries of thoſe Satyrical Pieces which were in vogue before him into pleaſant Stories and Jeſts; and by this means was the firſt that gave us any ſtrokes of Comedy: See the 4th Chapter of *Ariſtotle* of the Art of Poetry.

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All the Sciences are unhappy without the knowledge of what is good.

it, is that *Margites* had a great deal of Learning and Knowledge, and that this was an unhappy or unfortunate knowledge to him. If this knowledge was unfortunate to him he must needs have been a poor Man, if we will adhere to what has been said.

Alcib. So I think, *Socrates*, I should scarce yield to the most evident Truths, if I should not grant that.

Socrat. You have reason. But, *Alcibiades*, I entreat you, let us assure our selves of the Truth. You see how many Doubts and Uncertainties present themselves. You have your share of 'em, for you go sometimes to the right and sometimes to the left. That which seems true to you this Minute you receive as such; and the very next Moment 'tis quite another thing in your Opinion. Let us endeavour to know where to fix. And as I have already said, if the God to whom you are going to pray, should suddenly appear to you, and should ask you before you have begun your Prayers, if you would be satisfied that he should grant you some one of those things we first spoke of; or rather supposing he should permit you to make your request; which would you think most safe and most advantageous to you, whether to receive what he should give you, or to obtain what you should ask of him?

Alcib. I solemnly protest, *Socrates*, I know not how to answer you: For nothing seems to me to be more foolish, and more to be avoided with the greatest Care, than to run the risque of asking real Evils of God, while one thinks one is asking true Goods of him, and thereby to expose one's self, as you have very well said, to retract the next moment, and make new Requests quite contrary to the former.

Socrat. Is it not for this Reason that that Ancient Poet I was speaking of in the beginning of our Discourse; and who understood these things better than we, would have us end our Prayers with these Words, *And keep evil things from us, even when we ask 'em of thee?*

Alcib. So I suppose.

Socrat.

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Socrat. In like manner the Lacedemonians, whether they imitate this Poet, or have of themſelves found out this Truth, make both in publick and private a Prayer much like it. For they deſire the Gods *to give 'em that which is Comely with that which is Good.* They were never heard to make any other Prayer; and yet they are as happy as any People in the World; and if they have ſometimes ſeen an Interruption in the Courſe of their Succeſſes; however none can juſtly blame their Prayer. For the Gods are free, and it depends on their Will, whether they will grant what is deſir'd of 'em, or give what is contrary to it. And on this occaſion I'll tell you another Story, which I have often heard related by ſome antient People. The Athenians being engag'd formerly in a War with the Lacedemonians, it happen'd that they were always beat in every Battle that was fought: Being deeply concern'd at this Misfortune, and ſeeking Means to divert theſe Miſeries that impended, at laſt after divers Conſultations they thought it the beſt Expedient to ſend to the Oracle of *Ammon*, to enquire of him the Reaſon of their Misfortunes, and to pray him to tell 'em why the Gods granted Victory rather to the Lacedemonians, than to the Athenians, who every day offer'd 'em a great Number of choicer Sacrifices, who enriched their Temples with nobler Offerings, who annually made more magnificent, and more devout Proceſſions in their Honour, and in a word who themſelves alone were at greater Expence in their Worſhip than all the reſt of the Greeks together. Whereas (ſaid they) the Lacedemonians have no regard to theſe Ceremonies, they are ſo covetous in reference to the Gods, that they offer them mutilated Victims, and are at much leſs charge in every thing that concerns Religion than the Athenians, tho they infinitely exceed 'em in Riches. After they had thus preſented their Reaſons, they ask'd how thoſe Miſeries that preſs'd their City might be diverted. The Prophet gave 'em no immediate anſwer,

The Prayer of the Lacedemonians.

God is free and can either bear or reject our prayers without being unjuſt.

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ſwer, for doubtleſs the God would not permit him to give any. But after ſome time, recalling the Ambaſſador, he told him. *This is the Anſwer* Ammon *gives the Athenians; he loves the Benedictions of the Lacedemonians much more than all the Sacrifices of the Greeks.* This was all he ſaid. By the *Benedictions* of the Lacedemonians, I ſuppoſe, he only meant their Prayers, which indeed are more perfect than thoſe of any other People. For as for the reſt of the Greeks, ſome of 'em indeed offer'd Bulls with gilded Horns, and others conſecrated rich Oblations to the Gods; but at the ſame time requeſted in their Prayers whatever their Paſſions ſuggeſted, without informing themſelves, whether what they ask'd was Good or Evil. But the Gods, who hear their Blaſphemies, are not pleas'd with thoſe magnificent Proceſſions, nor do they accept their coſtly Sacrifices. Therefore nothing requires ſo much Precaution and Attention as Prayer; to know what we ought to ſay, and what not. You'll find many other things in *Homer*, which amount to the ſame thing with the Story I have been telling you. For he ſays, the *Trojans*, when they built a Fort, *offer'd whole Hecatombes to the Immortal Gods, that the Winds carried a pleaſant Odour from Earth to Heaven, and yet that the Gods refus'd to accept all this, but rejected it, becauſe they had an Averſion for the ſacred City of* Troy, *for* Priamus, *and all his People.* So that it was to no purpoſe for 'em to offer Sacrifices, and make Preſents to the Gods that hated 'em; for the Deity is not to be corrupted by Bribes, like a covetous Uſurer. And we ſhould be Fools, if we ſhould pretend by this means to render our ſelves more agreable to the Gods than the Lacedemonians. For it would be a very horrible and moſt unworthy thing for the Gods to have more regard to our Gifts and Sacrifices, than to our Souls, in diſtinguiſhing thoſe that are truly holy and righteous. But they have regard only to our Souls, and not at all to our Proceſſions, or Sacrifices, upon which the moſt profligate Per-

Prayers, called Benedictions.

God is not to be corrupted by Bribes.

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Perſons, and thoſe Cities whoſe Sins both againſt God and Man, ariſe to the greateſt height, commonly value themſelves more than good Men. Nor do the Gods ever ſuffer themſelves to be biaſs'd by Preſents, but deſpiſe all thoſe things as *the God* himſelf, and his Prophet have aſſur'd us. *God only regards the Souls of them that offer Sacrifices to him.*

So that it ſeems plain that nothing is ſo precious as Wiſdom and Juſtice both in the ſight of Gods and Men. And none are truly juſt and truly wiſe but thoſe who both in their Words and Actions know how to acquit themſelves of their Duty both to the Gods and to Men. Therefore I would now willingly know what your Sentiments are about what I have been ſaying. *In what true Juſtice, and true Wiſdom conſiſt.*

Alcib. For my part, *Socrates* I can't chooſe but conform my Sentiments in this matter to yours, and thoſe of that God of whom we have been ſpeaking. Would it be reaſonable for me to go about to oppoſe my weak Underſtanding to that of a God, and to contradict his Oracles?

Socrat. Don't you remember you told me you were in great perplexity; for fear you ſhould at unawares pray for Evil things while you deſign'd only to ask for Good?

Alcib. I remember it very well, *Socrates.*

Socrat. You ſee 'tis not at all ſafe for you to go and pray in the Temple, in the Condition you are in, leſt the God hearing your Blaſphemies ſhould reject your Sacrifices, and to puniſh you, ſhould give you what you would not have: I am therefore of the mind that 'tis much better for you to be ſilent, for I know you very well. Your Pride, for that's the ſofteſt Name I can give your Imprudence, your Pride I ſay, probably will not permit you to uſe the Prayer of the Lacedemonians. Therefore 'tis altogether neceſſary you ſhould wait for ſome Perſon to teach you how you ought to behave your ſelf both towards the Gods and Men.

Alcib. And when will that time come, *Socrates*? and who is he that will inſtruct me? with what pleaſure ſhould I look upon him! *Socrat.*

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That is God.

Socrat. He will do it, who takes a true Care of you. But methinks, as we read in *Homer*, that *Minerva* diſſipated the Miſt that cover'd *Diomedes* his Eyes, and hinder'd him from diſtinguiſhing God from Man, ſo 'tis neceſſary he ſhould in the firſt place ſcatter the Darkneſs that covers your Soul, and afterwards give you thoſe remedies that are neceſſary to put you in a condition of diſcerning Good and Evil; for at preſent you know not how to make a difference between 'em.

'Tis God alone can diſſipate the Darkneſs of the Mind.

Alcib. Let him ſcatter then, let him deſtroy this Darkneſs of mine, and whatever elſe he pleaſes; I abandon my ſelf to his conduct; and am very ready to obey all his Commands, provided I may but be made better by 'em.

Socrat. Do not doubt of that. For this Governour I tell you of, has a Singular Affection for you.

God has a ſingular Love for Men.

Alcib. I think I muſt defer my Sacrifice to that time.

Socrat. You have reaſon, 'tis more ſafe ſo to do than to run ſo great a Riſque.

Alcib. Well then I'll defer it, *Socrates*; and to expreſs my Thankfulneſs for the good counſel you have given me, give me leave to place on your Head this Crown which I wear on mine. We'll preſent other Crowns to the Gods, and all the Service we owe 'em, when I ſee that happy Day; it will not be long before it come, if they pleaſe.

Socrat. I receive this Favour with very great pleaſure; and ſhall always kindly accept whatever comes from you. And as *Creon* (in *Euripides*) ſeeing *Tireſias* approach him with a Crown of Gold, which was the firſt Fruits of the Spoils of the Enemy, and with which the Athenians had honour'd him for his Art, ſaid, *I take this Crown which is the ſign of Victory for a good Omen; for you ſee, we are alſo in a great ſtorm of War*; ſo I muſt ſay I take the honour I receive at your hand for a happy preſage; for I am in no leſs a Tempeſt than *Creon*, while I am endeavouring to gain the Victory over all your Lovers.

'Tis in Euripides *his* Phœnicians.

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The ARGUMENT OF THEAGES.

THE *Ancients cited this Dialogue under the Title of* Wiſdom, *or that of* Philoſophy, *as may be ſeen in* Diogenes Laertius: *But how old ſoever theſe Titles are, they were given by Philoſophers that were unacquainted with the Deſign of* Socrates, *who here propoſes only to treat of the Education of Children, which is the Baſis and Foundation of Philoſophy. As Plants do not thrive well, unleſs it be in Ground that is well prepar'd, and which has been variouſly manured, and alſo receives the benign Influences of the Heavens; ſo Vertues will not grow, unleſs in a Soul well cultivated, and under the Influences of the divine Favour: On this good Education, not only the Happineſs of Families depends, but alſo that of Cities, Republicks, and all States; this is what* Socrates *endeavours to maintain in this Dialogue. The young People of the beſt Families of* Athens, *dazzled with the Glory of* Cimon, Themiſtocles, *and* Pericles; *and full of vain Ambition, thought of nothing but of adhering to the Sophiſts, who promiſed to make 'em very great Politicians, and to put 'em into a Capacity of governing the Athenians and their Allies. Their Parents were tinctur'd with the ſame Folly: The wiſeſt of 'em were thoſe that fear'd the Conſequences of this Ambition, and only diſcover'd the Dangers to which their Children were expos'd by the Corruption of thoſe that inſtructed Youth.* Socrates *here diſcourſes with a Father and a Son of this Character. The Son aims only*

to

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to make himſelf a good Tyrant; *and the Father does not blame this Ambition of his Son, provided he avoided the Corruption that reigned at that time. All the Buſineſs is to find a good Maſter.* Socrates *makes an admirable Improvement of this Diſpoſition of theirs, to ſhew, that one Man can never teach another true Wiſdom, which alone makes Men govern well; but that the ſpecial Favour of God is requiſite to this purpoſe, without which all the Endeavours of Maſters and Schollars too prove uſeleſs; and this he confirms by Examples. This is the true Subject of this Dialogue, in which we find divers ſurprizing Truths which ſhall be explain'd in their place. This Converſation paſs'd that year, in which the Athenians were beat at* Epheſus *by* Tiſaphernus; *which was the 4th year of the 92d Olympiade, 407 years before the birth of Chriſt.* Plato *being 20 years of Age, was then the Diſciple of* Socrates.

The Character of this Dialogue is the ſame with that of the two former.

THE-

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THEAGES,

OR

Of Wiſdom.

Demodocus, Socrates, Theages.

Demod. SOcrates, I have a great mind to diſcourſe with you a little in private, if you are at leiſure; and if you are not, I entreat you to take a little time for my Sake, unleſs your Buſineſs is very urgent.

Soc. I have always leiſure, and more to ſerve you than any other Perſon; if you have a mind to diſcourſe with me, I am ready for you.

Dem. Shall we retire into the Porch of the Temple of *Jupiter Elutherius?*

Soc. What you pleaſe.

We need the help of a God, who is a Saviour, when we take Advice about the Education of Youth.

Dem. * Let us go then, *Socrates*, Methinks Animals, and even Man himſelf are like Plants: For we who manure the Earth know by experience that 'tis eaſy to prepare all things neceſſary before we plant; but when that which we have planted is come up, the care and pains we muſt take about it is very great and troubleſome. 'Tis the ſame with Men: And I judge of others by my ſelf. There's my Son; ever ſince he has been born, his Education will not ſuffer me to reſt one moment, but keeps me in continual fear. Without entering into any particular

* In the Original *Demodocus* ſpeaks like a good honeſt Countrey Man, who is wholly taken up with Husbandry: But I don't think it neceſſary to make my Tranſlation ſpeak after that manner.

account

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account of all the occasions of Fear I have concerning him, I'll tell you one which has but very lately appear'd; And that is an Ambition he has, which indeed is not dishonourable, but is a very nice and dangerous thing, and makes me afraid. He would fain fall upon the study of * Wisdom. Probably some of his Companions, and some young People of our Town who frequent *Athens*, give him an acconnt of some Discourses they have heard, which have disturb'd his Brain. For he's so full of Emulation that he continually torments me with importunate Intreaties, that I would give a piece of Money to some Sophist to accomplish him. 'Tis not the Charge that I fear; but I see this Passion of his will expose him to great danger. Hitherto I have restrained him by amusing him with good Words; but now that I suppose I can be Master of him no longer; I think the best course I can take is to consent to let him take his own course, for fear the Conversation he may have in secret and without my knowledg should corrupt him. Therefore I am now come to *Athens* to put him under the Tuition of some Sophist; and 'tis very happy that I have met you; for you are the Person whom above all others I should wish to consult upon this Affair. If therefore you have any Advice to give me; I earnestly intreat it of you; and you are too just to refuse me.

Advice is sacred, and consequently ought not to be lightly given: but wellthought on.

Soc. But have you not often heard, *Demodocus*, that Advice is a Sacred Thing: and if it is Sacred in all other occasions of Life, 'tis much more so in this; for of all things, on which a Man can ask advice, there is nothing more Divine than that which respects the Education of Children. First then, let You and I agree, what it is precisely that you desire, and about what we are to consult, lest I understand one thing and you another (as it may often happen); and so at the end of our Discourse we both appear

Nothing is more divine than what belongs to the Education of Children.

* Wisdom is a Word that signifies divers things, as Knowledg, Skill, Vertue. *Plato* uses it for that Science which teaches how to govern States.

ridicu-

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ridiculous to our ſelves for having talk'd ſo long without underſtanding one another.

Dem. You ſay right, *Socrates.*

Soc. I ſay right, ay certainly——And yet I don't ſay ſo right as I thought, but retract in part; for it comes into my Mind, that this young Man may have a deſire very different from that which we think he has; which would render us ſtill more ridiculous for conſulting about quite another thing than the Object of his Wiſhes. 'Tis beſt therefore to begin with him, and ask him what it is that he deſires.

Dem. Yes, certainly, that's the beſt way.

Soc. But, I pray, what is this fine young Man's Name?

Dem. His Name is *Theages.*

Soc. * What an excellent, and ſacred Name have you given him! Well, then *Theages*, you deſire to become wiſe, and you urge your Father to find you a Man, whoſe Converſation may furniſh you with that Wiſdom, with which you are ſo much in Love?

Theag. Yes.

Soc. Who are thoſe Perſons you call wiſe, are they ſuch as are skillful in what they have learn'd, or the ignorant?

The. Such as are skillful.

Soc. What! has not your Father caus'd you to be inſtructed in every thing, that the Children of our beſt Citizens learn, as to read, to play on Muſical Inſtruments, to wreſtle, and to perform all other Exerciſes?

The. Yes, my Father has caus'd me to be taught all this.

Soc. Well then! and do you think there is any other Science, in which your Father is oblig'd to cauſe you to be inſtructed?

The. Yes without doubt.

* The Athenians were very careful to give fine Sacred Names to their Children: But all Names are falſe, when they don't deſcribe the Character of thoſe to whom they are given.

Soc.

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Soc. What Science is that? Tell me, that I may render you ſome Service in the Matter.

The. My Father very well knows it; for I have very often told him of it; but he is pleas'd to ſpeak after ſuch a manner to you, as if he did not know what I deſir'd. There's no day paſſes, but he diſputes with me, and ſtill refuſes to commit me to the Care of ſome skillful Man.

Soc. But all that you have hitherto ſaid to him, has paſt only between you two. Now therefore take me for an Arbitrator; and before me declare what Science it is you have a mind to attain. For if you were willing to learn that Science which teaches how to ſteer Ships, and I ſhould ask you, *Theages*, what Science is it in which you complain your Father is not willing to have you inſtructed? Would you not immediately anſwer me, that 'tis the Science of Pilots?

The. Yes doubtleſs.

Soc. And if you were willing to learn the Art which teaches how to drive Chariots, would you not in like manner tell me, 'tis that of Charioteers?

The. I ſhould tell you the very ſame thing.

Soc. Has that of which you are ſo deſirous a Name, or has it none?

The. I believe it has a Name.

Soc. Do you know it then without knowing the Name of it?

The. I know it, and I know the Name of it too.

Soc. Tell me what it is then.

The. What other Name can it have than that of *Science*?

This Name is too general, and does not ſufficiently explain the thing enquir'd after, as Socrates is going to ſhew.

Soc. But is not the Art of *Charioteers* alſo a Science; what do you think 'tis a piece of Ignorance?

The. No certainly.

Soc. Then 'tis a Science; what is the uſe of it? Does it not teach us to guide the Horſes that are faſten'd to a Chariot?

The. Moſt certainly.

Soc. And is not the Art of Pilots alſo a Science?

The. So I think.

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Soc. Is it not that which teaches us how to guide ſhips?

The. The very ſame.

Soc. Well what is that which you have a mind to learn, and what does that teach us to govern?

The. I think it teaches us to govern Men.

Soc. What, ſick Men?

The. No.

Soc. For that belongs to the Medicinal-Art, does it not?

The. Who doubts it?

Soc. Well then does it teach us to regulate the Choir of Muſicians?

The. Not at all.

Soc. For that properly appertains to Muſick.

The. True.

Soc. But does it teach us to govern thoſe who perform the Exerciſes?

The. No more than the others.

Soc. For that belongs to the Gymnaſtick Art. What ſort of Men then does it teach us to govern? Explain your ſelf clearly as I have done on the other Sciences.

The. It teaches us to govern thoſe who are in the City.

Soc. But are there not Sick Men too in the City?

The. Without doubt there are, but I don't mean them, I ſpeak of the other Citizens.

Soc. Let's ſee, if I underſtand well of what Art you ſpeak, I think you don't ſpeak of that which teaches us to govern Mowers, Vine-dreſſers, Plow-Men, Sowers, and Threſhers; for that belongs to Husbandry. Nor do you ſpeak of that which teaches us to govern thoſe that handle the Saw, the Plane, and the Lathe: for that belongs to the Joyner's Art. But you ſpeak of the Art that teaches to govern not only theſe but all other Artificers, and all private Perſons both Men and Women: Perhaps this is the Science you mean.

The. 'Tis the very ſame, I had no deſign to ſpeak of any other.

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Soc. But, I pray, answer me, did *Ægisthus* who kill'd *Agamemnon* at *Argos*, govern those sorts of People, Artificers and private Persons, both Men and Women; or others?

The. He govern'd only such as these; are there any other to be govern'd?

Soc. Did not *Peleus* the Son of *Eacus* likewise govern these at *Phthia*? And did not *Periander* the Son of *Cypselus* rule 'em at *Corinth*? Did not *Archelaus* the Son of *Perdiccas*, who some few years since ascended the Throne of *Macedonia*, also command these sorts of People? And did not * *Hippias* the Son of *Pisistratus*, who govern'd in this City, rule our Citizens in like manner?

It was 5 or 6 years before.

He was kill'd at the end of this very Year.

The. Who doubts it?

Soc. Tell me, what do you call † *Bacis*, the Sybile and our *Amphilytus*; *when you would denote their profession.*

The. What should we call 'em but Deviners?

Soc. Very well. Answer me after the same manner about these: What do you call *Hippias*, and *Periander*, when you would denote their profession by the Dominion they Exercise?

The. Tyrants, I think; what other Name can we give 'em?

Soc. Then every one who desires to command all the People in this City, desires to acquire a Dominion like theirs, a Tyrannical Dominion, and to become a Tyrant. *The.* I think so.

* *Hippias*, the Son of *Pisistratus* was Tyrant of *Athens* four years; according to *Thucydides* he succeeded his Father, and not *Hipparchus*. After he had reigned 4 years he was banished; and 20 years after his Exile was kill'd at the Battle of *Marathon*, where he bore Arms for the Persians.

† *Bacis* was a Prophet who long before *Xerxes* made a Descent into *Greece*, predicted to the People all that should befal 'em. *Herodotus* relates some of his Prophecies in his VIII Book; and looks upon 'em to be so formal and plain, since their Accomplishment, that he says, he neither dares accuse these Oracles of Falshood himself, nor suffer others so to do, or to refuse to give Credit to 'em. *Aristophanes* speaks of this Deviner in his *Comedy of Peace*. As for *Amphilytus*, I know nothing of him.

Soc.

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Soc. This then is the Science with which you are so much in Love.

The. That is a natural Consequence of what I have said.

Soc. You are a Villain! Do you desire to become our Tyrant; and have the boldness to complain that your Father does not put you under the Conduct of some Person that may qualifie you for Tyrany? ‡ And you, *Demodocus*; who know your Son's Ambition, and have wherewith to send him to be accomplish'd in this fine Science which he desires, are not you asham'd to envy him this Happiness; and not to provide him some great Master? But since he now complains of you, as you see, in my Presence; let us consider whither to send him, and if we know any one whose Conversation may make him an accomplish'd Tyrant.

Dem. Socrates, I beg of you for God's sake let us consider it together. For on such an occasion as this we have need of good Advice.

Demodocus *takes this in earnest, which* Socrates *spoke ironically.*

Soc. Hold a little, let us first know of him what he thinks of the Matter.

Dem. You may ask him what you please.

Soc. Theages, if we had to do with *Euripides*, who somewhere says,

Wise are the Tyrants, who with th' wise Converse.

and should ask him, *Euripides*, in what do you say Tyrants become wise by the Conversation of wise Men? If instead of that he should tell us,

Wise are the Plow-men, who with th' wise Converse,

we should not fail to ask him, in what are the Plow-men render'd wise? Do you think he would give us any other answer than that they are render'd wise in that which belongs to Husbandry?

The. No: He would give no other Answer.

‡ This is an Ironie of *Socrates* founded on what *Demodocus* said at the beginning of this Discourse, *viz.* that his Son had an Ambition that was not dishonourable. *Marsilius Ficinus* and *De Serres* were equally mistaken here; and not perceiving the Ironie corrupted this Passage by their Translation.

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Soc. And if he ſhould tell us,

Wiſe are the Cooks, who with the wiſe Converſe, and we ſhould ask him wherein they are made wiſe? What do you think he would anſwer? Would he not ſay they are made wiſe in the Art of Cookery?

The. Without doubt.

Soc. And if he ſhould ſay,

Wiſe are the Wreſtlers, who with th' wiſe Converſe:

Would he not upon the Repetition of the ſame Queſtion give us the ſame Reply, that they are made expert in the Art of Wreſtling? *The.* Yes certainly.

Soc. This being ſo, ſince he tells us,

Wiſe are the Tyrants, who with th' wiſe Converſe:

If we ſhould ask him, *Euripides*, in what are thoſe Tyrants render'd wiſe? What anſwer do you think he would make us? in what would he make this Wiſdom conſiſt? *The.* I proteſt I can't tell.

Soc. Shall I tell you then?

The. With all my heart, if you pleaſe.

Soc. He would ſay they were made wiſe in that Art which *Anacreon* tells us, * the wiſe *Callicrete* knew perfectly well. Don't you remember his Songs?

The. I do remember it.

Soc. Well then don't you deſire to be committed to the Care of ſome Man, who is of the ſame Profeſſion with this Virgin of *Cyane*, and knows like her the Art of forming Tyrants, that you may become our Tyrant, aud that of the whole City?

The. Socrates, you have play'd and jeſted on me a great while.

Soc. How! Don't you ſay you deſire to acquire that Science which will teach you to govern all the Citizens? Can you govern them without becoming their Tyrant?

The. I could heartily wiſh to become the Tyrant

* This was a Virgin who employ'd her ſelf in teaching Politicks, as *Aſpaſia*, *Diotima*, and ſome others did after her. The Verſes which *Anacreon* made on her are loſt.

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of all Mankind, and if that be too much, at leaſt of the greareſt part of 'em; and I believe, *Socrates*, you would have the ſame Ambition as well as all other Men: Nay perhaps it would ſo little content you to be a Tyrant, that you would be a God; but I did not tell you that that was the thing I deſir'd.

This is founded on what Socrates was wont to ſay that Men ſhould labour to make themſelves like God.

Soc. What is it you deſire? Don't you ſay you deſire to govern Citizens?

The. Not to govern them by force as Tyrants do, but by their own Conſent, as thoſe great Men have done which we have had in this City.

Soc. What! as *Themiſtocles*, *Pericles*, *Cimon*, and other great Politicians have done?

The. Yes.

Soc. Well then, if you had a mind to become very expert in the Art of Horſeman-ſhip, to what Men do you think you ought to apply your ſelf to become a good Horſe-man? Would you go to any other than Querries?

The. No cerrainly.

Soc. Would you not make choice of the beſt Querries; thoſe that have the greateſt Number of Horſes; and ſuch as ride not only their own Horſes, but thoſe of other Men?

The. Without doubt I ſhould chooſe ſuch.

Soc. And if you would become very expert at ſhooting, would you not addreſs your ſelf to the beſt Archers; and to ſuch as beſt know how to uſe all ſorts of Bows and Arrows?

The. Yes, certainly.

Soc. Tell me then, ſince you have a mind to become expert in Politicks, do you think you can acquire this Skill in addreſſing your ſelf to any beſide great Politicians, who have a depth of Judgment in this Science, and know how to conduct, not only their own City, but many others as well of the Greeks as the Barbarians? Or do you think by converſing with any other ſort of Perſons, to become as expert as theſe great Men?

The. Socrates. I have heard talk of ſome Diſ-

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courſes of yours; which you made (as 'tis ſaid) to ſhew, that * the Sons of theſe great Politicians were no better than the Sons of Coblers; and as far as I can judg, 'tis an undeniable Truth. I ſhould therefore be a great Fool to believe that any one of 'em, could give me his Wiſdom, which he did not communicate to his own Son, and which he ought to have beſtow'd on him much rather, if he were capable of doing it, than on a Stranger.

Soc. What would yo do then, *Theages*, if you had a Son that follow'd you ſo cloſely every day, telling you he had a mind to be a great Painter? and complained continually that you who were his Father, would not be at the leaſt expence to ſatisfy his deſire; while on the other ſide he deſpis'd the moſt excellent Maſters, and refus'd to go to School to 'em to learn their Art? I ſay the ſame if he had a mind to play well on the Flute, or to be an excellent Harper; ſhould you know any other way to gratify him, or any other People to ſend him to; when he ſhould refuſe ſuch Maſters?

The. For my part I know not what could be done.

Soc. This is exactly the ſame courſe that you take with your Father: How then can you be ſurpriz'd and complain, that he knows not what to do with you, nor where to ſend you to make you an Accompliſh'd Man? *For it lies wholly at your own Door.* If you will, he will immediately put you under the Conduct of our beſt Maſters; and ſuch as are moſt expert in Politicks; You have nothing to do but to chooſe your Teacher; They'll ask nothing of you. So that you may ſave your Money, and acquire with them more Reputation among the People, † than you can obtain in the Converſation of any other.

* All thoſe great Politicians could not teach their Children to be wiſe; a ſure ſign that Wiſdom can't be taught; there is nothing of it in Man, but what God puts into him, as *Socrates* proves more at large in his *Menon*.

† For the common People are very ill Judges, and may be eaſily deceiv'd, they conſtantly take thoſe Men for the moſt wiſe and skilful, who are moſt bold and inſolent.

The.

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The. Well then, *Socrates*, are not you likewise one of those Great Men? if you'll suffer me to attend you 'tis enough, I'll seek for no other Master.

Soc. What is that you say *Theages?*

Dem. Ah *Socrates*, My Son has said very well, and you would do me a great Kindness! No, I have no greater Happiness than to see my Son pleas'd with your Company; and that you are so good as to permit him to take this Liberty. I am asham'd to say how much I desire it; but I entreat you both for God's sake, you, *Socrates*, to receive my Son; and you, Son, never to seek any other Master than *Socrates*. By this means you'll both deliver me from my greatest Trouble and Fears. For I am continually ready to die with Fear lest my Son should fall into the Hands of some Person that will corrupt him.

Socrates was then perhaps the only Person at Athens, with whom a Man might trust his Children without danger.

The. Well, Sir, you may lay aside your Fears on my account, if you are but happy enough to persuade *Socrates*, and engage him to be troubled with me.

Dem. Son, you have Reason. I'll now apply my self to none but you, *Socrates*; and not to amuse you with superfluous Discourse; I am ready to give my self up to you, and all that I have in the World: You may entirely dispose of me, if you will love my *Theages*, and procure him all that good, you are capable of doing him.

Soc. I don't wonder, *Demodocus*, that you are so very importunate, if you believe your Son may receive Advantage from me; for I know nothing about which a wise Father ought to be more earnest and careful than about what concerns his Son; and what may make him a good Man. But that which surprizes me, and which I can't comprehend, is, how you came to think me capable of rendring you this great peice of Service, and of forming him into a good Citizen: And how came he to imagine me to be in a better Condition of assisting him than his Father? For in the first place you have liv'd longer in the World than I; you have exercised the Principal Offices, and are the most considerable Person in your

What ought to be the greatest care of a wise Father.

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For the City was compos'd of divers Towns or Burroughs.

Town; and none is more honour'd or esteem'd than you, in all the rest of the City. Neither you nor your Son see any of these Advantages in me. But if *Theages* despises the Conversation of our Politicians; and is looking after those Persons who promise to educate Youth well, we have here *Prodicus* of *Ceos*, *Gorgias* the *Leontine*, *Polus* of *Agrigentum*, and divers others, who are of so great Ability, that as they go their Rounds from City to City, they make a shift to persuade the young People of all the noblest and richest Families, who might be instructed *Gratis* by one of their own Citizens whom they would please to choose; they make a shift I say, to persuade 'em to renounce those of their own City; and to adhere to them, tho' they must pay 'em great Summs, and after all think themselves under great Obligations to 'em. * These are the Men that you, and your Son should choose, instead of thinking of me; for I know none of those polite and happy Sciences: I would indeed understand 'em with all my heart, but I have always profess'd to acknowledge that I know nothing (as I may say) unless it be one little Science † which only respects Love. And I for my part, dare boast of being more profound in this Science, such as it is, than any of my Predecessors, or those of the present Age.

The. Sir, you see very well, *Socrates* will not trouble himself with me; if he would, I should very readily put my self under his Conduct; but he jests when he thus speaks of himself; for I know divers of my Equals, and others of a more advanc'd Age then mine; who before they attended to him had no great matter of merit; but since they have enjoy'd

* This is an Ironie which *Socrates* uses to ridicule that excessive eagerness, with which the Athenians ran to these Sophists, who were good for nothing but to corrupt their Minds.

† *Socrates* means, that he was only fit to inspire Men with the Love of Wisdom. Without this Love all is dead. This is a Principle of Life, and, as he elsewhere says, the most speedy, most certain and most efficacious help which God has given Men to bring 'em to supream Happiness.

his

his Converſation are in a little time become the fineſt Men in the World; and far ſurpaſs thoſe to whom they were much inferior before.

Soc. Theages, Do you know how this comes to paſs?

The. Yes truly I know it very well, and if you were will-willing; I ſhould ſoon be like thoſe young Men, and ſhould have no occaſion to envy 'em.

Soc. You are miſtaken, my dear *Theages*, and are very far from the truth; which I am now going to inform you * I have had by the Favour of God, ever ſince I was born, a Genius that always accompanies, and governs me. This Genius is a Voice which whenever it ſpeaks to me always diverts me from what I have a mind to do, and never prompts me to it. When any one of my Friends communicates any deſign to me, if I hear this Voice, 'tis a certain ſign that God does not approve of this deſign, but would divert him from it. I'll name ſeveral Perſons to you, who are Witneſſes of what I ſay. You know the Gallant *Charmides*, *Glaucon's* Son: He came to me one day to acquaint me with a deſign he had to go and contend at the † *Nemean* Games. He had no ſooner begun to communicate this Matter to me, but I heard the Voice; Therefore I endeavour'd to diſſuade him from it, and ſaid thus to him; as ſoon as you began to open your Mouth I heard the Voice of the Genius that guides me, therefore I entreat you not to go. He replied, perhaps this Voice advertiſes you that I ſhall not be Crown'd: but if I don't obtain the Victory, I ſhall however exerciſe my ſelf; I ſhall engage with the reſt, and that is enough. With theſe words he left me, and went to the aboveſaid Exerciſes. You may know

* I *have had by the Favour of God*, the Greek ſays Θείᾳ μοίρᾳ *by a Divine Lot*, that is to ſpeak properly *by Predeſtination*; and conſequently by the favour of God. μοῖρα is here the ſame thing as κλῆρος in the Writings of St. *Paul*, as that Learned and Pious Perſon who has lately made a ſmall extract of *Plato* has obſerv'd before me.

† One of the four famous Games of *Greece*, which were celebrated once in three Years near the City of *Nemea* in *Peloponneſus* in honour of *Archemorus*.

from

from his own Mouth what befel him, and it well deserves your Notice. And if you would ask *Clitomacus*, the Brother of * *Timarchus*, what this latter told him when he was going to dye for having despis'd the Admonition of my good Genius; and again what was said to him by *Evathlus* who was so famous for running Races, and who entertained *Timarchus* when he fled, he would tell you that *Timarchus* said to him in express Terms——

The. What did he say to him, *Socrates?*

Soc. I am going to die because I would not believe Socrates. And if you are curious to know the Story, I'll tell it you. When *Timarchus* rose from Table with *Philemon* the Son of *Philemonides*, to go and kill *Nicias* the Son of *Heroscamander*, for none but they two were in the Conspiracy, as he rose up he said to me, *What do you say to me*, Socrates? *you have nothing to do but to stay all here and drink together; I am obliged to be gone, but will return in a moment if I can.* Upon this I heard the Voice, and immediately calling him back said to him, I beg you would not go out, my good Genius has given his wonted Signal. Upon which he stayed: But some time after rises up again, and says: *Socrates I am going.* The Voice was repeated, and I stop'd him again. In fine because he would escape me he rose up the third time without saying any thing to me; and taking his Opportunity when my Thoughts were otherwise employ'd, he slip'd out, and did that which brought him to his End; This was the reason he told his Brother he was going to die because he would not believe me. You may also learn from many of our Citizens what I told 'em about the Expedition of *Sicily*, and the Shocks that our Army would receive there. But not to mention things that are past, of which you may be easily inform'd by those that know 'em perfectly well; You may now

Under the Government of Alcibiades *and* Nicias.

* I suppose this is *Timarchus* of *Cheronea* who desir'd to be interr'd near one of *Socrates* his Sons who died a little before. I could never find any footstep of this History elsewhere.

make

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make tryal of this Signal which my good *Genius* commonly gives me, that you may see whether he speaks true. For when the brave *Sannion* went for the Army I heard this Voice; and he is now going with * *Thrasyllus* against *Ephesus*, and the other Cities of *Ionia*; I am perswaded he'll dye there, or some Misfortune will befal him; and † I very much fear that Enterprize will not succeed. I have told you all this to make you comprehend, that even for those who are willing to adhere to me, all depends on this good Genius that governs me. ‖ For those whom he opposes can never derive any advantage from me: I can't so much as have any Conversation with 'em. There are many whom he does not hinder me from seeing; and yet these make no greater proficiency than the former; but those, whose Conversation with me is approv'd and favour'd by this good Genius are such as you told me of just now; who in a very little time make a very great progress; in some this Progress is stable and permanent, and takes deep Root; and in others 'tis but for a time; That is while they are with me they advance after a surprizing manner; but they no sooner leave me but they return to their former Condition; and don't at all differ from the Generality of Men. This is what happen'd to *Aristides*, the Son of *Lysimachus*,

* *Thrasyllus* was chosen General with *Thrasybulus* the 4th year of the 92 Olympiade.

† Indeed the Athenians were beaten and repuls'd at *Ephesus*. *Xenoph. Book* I. Therefore *Plutarch* says in the Life of *Alcibiades* that *Thrasyllus* his Army was terribly gall'd under the Walls of *Ephesus*: and that in memory of this Defeat the *Ephesians* erected a Trophy of Brass to the shame of the *Athenians*.

‖ A remarkable Passage. Here are four Stages of Men. Some are rejected of God for their Wickedness, which can't be hid from him, others are tolerated for a time; God gives 'em time to see, and learn, but they are not attentive, and 'tis only their own fault, that they make no progress. Others are approv'd, but these last succeed very differently: In some the good Seed falling into good Ground takes deep root, and in others it flourishes but for a time; as the Gospel says of those who receive the Word in stony Places or among Thorns. This is the Truth *Socrates* designs to teach in this Place.

and

and Grandſon to *Ariſtides*, while he was with me he made a very ſtrange Progreſs in a very ſhort time but being oblig'd to go in ſome Expedition, he embark'd: At his return he found that * *Thucydides* the Son of *Meleſias*, and Grandſon of *Thucydides* had been willing to be acquainted with me; but it happen'd the day before, I know not how, that he fell out with me for ſome Words we had in diſputing. Now *Ariſtides* coming to ſee me, after the firſt Compliments; *Socrates*, ſays he, *I am juſt now told that* Thucydides *is angry with you, and acts with a great deal of Haughtineſs as if he were ſomewhat more than ordinary* 'Tis *true*, ſaid I. † *Ha*, Replied he, *what does he no longer remember what a Slave he was before he ſaw you? 'Tis very likely he has forgotten it*, ſaid I. *Truly Socrates*, added he, *A very ridiculous thing has happen'd to me.* I preſently ask'd him what it was. 'Tis *this*, ſaid he. *Before I went for the Army, I was capable of diſcourſing with Men of the greateſt ſenſe; and was not inferiour to any of 'em in Converſation. I made as handſome a figure as another; and always kept company with the* ‖ *beſt and moſt polite Men I could find. Whereas now 'tis quite contrary, I carefully avoid 'em, I am ſo much aſhamed of my Ignorance.* I ask'd him if this Faculty had left him ſuddenly or gradually. He anſwer'd me, *that it left him gradualy. Well how did you come by it*, ſaid I, *was it while you were Learning ſomething of me, or ſome other way? I'll tell you Socrates*, reply'd he, *'Tis a thing that will ſeem incredible, but yet 'tis very true:* ‡ *I could never learn any thing of you, as you know very well.*

* The Grand-Son of *Thucydides* who rivall'd *Pericles* in the Government.

† Men are no better than vile Slaves before they have attended to Philoſophical Diſcourſes.

‖ *Socrates* calls thoſe good and polite, who ſpent their time in diſcourſing on ſolid and agreeable Subjects.

‡ He means he learn'd nothing that had made a deep and laſting Impreſſion on his Mind, he had Opinions only, and not Science ſince he had been by himſelf, but was more knowing when he was with *Socrates*.

How

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However I made some proficiency, if I was but in the same House * *where you were, tho' not in the same Room; when I could be in the same Room I advanc'd still more; and whenever you spoke, I sensibly found my self improve yet more when I had my Eyes upon you, than when I look'd another way: But this Progress was incomparably greater, when I sat near you and touch'd you, whereas now all this* Habit *is utterly vanish'd.* Thus you see, *Theages*, what sort of Conversation is to be had with me. † If it please God, you'll advance considerably, and in a very little time; otherwise your Endeavours will be fruitless. Judge then if it be not more advantagous, and safe for you to apply your self to one of those Masters who are constantly succesful with all their Scholars, than to follow me, with all the hazards you must run. *A handsom Banter on the Sophists.*

The. I'll tell you, *Socrates*, what we ought to do in my Opinion. When we begin to live together, let us try this God that conducts us: If he approves our Conversation; I am at the top of my Wishes: if he disapproves it; let us immediately consider what Course to take, and whether I ought to seek another Master, or should endeavour to appease this God * by Prayers, by Sacrifices, or any other Expiations, which our Deviners teach.

Dem. Don't oppose the young Man's Desires any longer. *Theages* speaks very well.

Soc. If you think 'tis best to do so; with all my heart. I agree with you.

* There are four Degrees of Light, according as you more or less approach wise Men. 'Tis something to lodg in the same House, 'tis a little more to be in the same Room; 'tis a yet greater advantage to have one's Eyes always upon 'em; that so one may loose none of their Words, but the greatest benefit of all, is to be near 'em, and if I may so speak, to be always glew'd to 'em. Few Persons are so confirm'd in Wisdom, that they can lose sight of 'em with Impunity, and without great damage. These different Degrees are still more remarkable in proportion to the Approach we make to the divine Wisdom. I believe this is all the Mystery *Socrates* designs to teach here. We see admirable Proofs of this Truth in the Writings of the Saints.

† For all the Good we either do, or receive, comes from God.

* There are but three ways Men can use to appease the Anger of God, Prayers, Sacrifices, and Purifications. The

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The ARGUMENT OF EUTYPHRON.

IN all times, and in all Religions there have been ſuperſtitious Perſons and Hipocrites. Both theſe have offer'd almoſt the ſame Injury to God, and equally hurt Religion. Plato introduces one of theſe Characters in this Dialogue; for 'tis not eaſy to determine whether Eutyphron acts ſuperſtitiouſly or hypocritically; the former is moſt probable, Eutyphron goes about to accuſe his own Father of Murder; This is a very unnatural ſtep: But on the other hand 'tis the ſtep of a Man who conſults not Fleſh and Blood; when the Queſtion is about doing an Action ſo agreeable to God as that of bringing a Criminal to Puniſhment. The Buſineſs in hand therefore here is to examine this Action to know if it be juſt. And Plato renews this Diſcourſe to ridicule the falſe Religions of the Pagans, and the Plurality of Gods, together with the reſt of their Fables: And to ſhew, that they who then paſt for the moſt intelligent Perſons in Matters of Religion, had indeed no knowledg of it, and render'd God only falſe Worſhip, which diſhonour'd him. This is as great a Deſign as he could have; and he executes it with marvellous Addreſs, to which purpoſe the Perſon againſt whom Socrates had diſputed ſerves extremely well. For Eutyphron was no ordinary Man; he was a Deviner, and conſequently cloth'd with the Character, and entruſted with the Office of inſtructing others in Religion. Nothing can be more ingenious, and natural than the beginning of this Dialogue, where Plato with

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with great Simplicity and Modesty, and without the least appearance of Affectation, discovers at first view, not only the Character of Eutyphron, *and that of all superstitious Persons, who by their Religious Mistakes are commonly carried to the Commission of all sorts of Injuries and Crimes; but also that of* Socrates, *that of his Persecutors, and in general, that of the Athenians. This Dialogue is full of excellent Precepts of Morality and Religion. There's a great deal of Ingenuity and Subtilty in it: The lively Descriptions, the frequent Ironies, and satyrical Strokes admirably diversify it. Was there ever seen a more subtile piece of Satyr than that which* Plato *makes against* Melitus? *He is not content to mention his Name, and in what part of the City he was born; but likewise draws his Picture, and yet all these Indications can't make him known to* Eutyphron. *He that accuses* Socrates, *and thinks himself capable of reforming the Commonwealth, by shewing what it is that corrupts Youth, and overthrows Religion, is neither known to him whom he accuses, nor to the Ministers of that Religion of which he pretends to be the great Support. All the other like Strokes will be easily observ'd in Reading, and the Beauty of the Character of the superstitious Man, who believes a thing only because he believes it, and who is always near the Truth without ever attaining it, will be plainly discern'd. The Reader will see with Pleasure, that* Eutyphron *is a good honest Man, who has upright Intentions, but is so full of respect for the Fables that have been taught him, that he receives 'em all as sacred without ever entertaining the least suspicion concerning 'em; he is so swell'd with Pride, and full of that precipitant Confidence, which Superstition commonly inspires, that he publishes his Visions as certain Truths, not to be contradicted by any Man. And* Socrates, *who makes, as if he were willing to be instructed, receives his Doctrine with refin'd Ironies, and ambiguous Railleries; and at length confutes it with abundance of Strength and Solidity.*

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EUTYPHRON,

OR

Of Holineſs.

Eutyphron, Socrates.

This King's Porch was a place on the right ſide of the Ceramique, *where one of the nine* Archons, *who was called the King, preſided for the ſpace of a Year, and took Cogniſeance of the Affairs of* Orphans, *and of* Outrages *that were committed againſt Religion.*

Eut. WHat News *Socrates?* What have you left the Company of *Lyceus* to come hither into the King's Porch? you have no buſineſs to bring you hither, as I have.

Soc. 'Tis ſomewhat worſe than buſineſs, *Eutyphron,* the *Athenians* call it an Accuſation.

Eut. How do you ſay? then 'tis likely ſome body accuſes you, * for I can never believe you would accuſe any one.

Soc. You are in the right.

Eut. Well who is your Accuſer?

Soc. I don't know very well my ſelf, I take him to be a Young Man who is not yet known, I think his Name is *Melitus,* he is of the Town of *Pitheus*; If you remember any one of that Quarter of the City who beats that Name, who has Lank Hair, a Thin Beard and a Crooked Noſe, that is the Man.

Eut. I don't remember any ſuch Perſon, *Socrates,* but I pray, what is the Charge he brings againſt you?

Soc. What is the Charge? Why 'tis ſuch a one as ſhews him to be no Ordinary Man. For 'tis no

* This is very remarkable. *Eutyphron* who is going to accuſe his own Father can't believe that *Socrates* is capable of accuſing any Man. *Plato* makes uſe either of the precipitancy of this Superſtitious Man, or of the good opinion he has of himſelf, to inſinuate that at *Athens* honeſt Men never drove the Trade of Accuſers.

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little thing to be so knowing in such Important and Sublime matters, at an Age so little advanc'd as his. He says he knows how our Youth are corrupted, and who they are that corrupt 'em. He seems to be some able Man who has taken notice of my Ignorance, and is come to accuse me for having corrupted his Companions; and to bring me before the City as our Common Mother. And it must be confess'd, he seems the only Person that knows how to lay the foundations of good Policy. For 'tis reasonable that a States-Man should always begin with the Education of Young People, to render them as Vertuous as may be; as a Good Gardiner bestowes his first Labour and Care on the Young Plants, and then passes on to the others, *Melitus* doubtless takes the same Course, and begins by cutting us up who hinder the Young Plants from sprouting and improving. After this without doubt he'll extend his beneficent Labours to those Plants that are more advanc'd; and will by this means do the greatest kindness imaginable to the City. This is what may be expected from a Person that knows so well how to begin at the right end.

The Education of Youth is the Foundation of good Policy.

Eut. I should be glad to see it, *Socrates*, but I tremble for fear of the Contrary, * for in attacking you he seems to me to attack the City in the most sacred part of it: But I pray tell me what he says you do thus to corrupt Young People.

Soc. He says I do such things as at first hearing must needs seem absurd and impossible, for he says I am Forger of Gods, that I introduce New Gods, and do not believe the Old ones. This is the Charge he has against me.

Eut. I understand you; 'tis because you say you have a Genius that dayly guides you. Upon this he accuses you of introducing new Opinions in Re-

* The Greek says, *in injuring you he labours to ruine the City, and begins by the Fire-side.* It was a Proverb in *Greece*, *to begin by the Fire-side*, when they spoke of beginning with what was most excellent and sacred; for the Fire side contain'd the Domestick Gods. So that this was a great Encomium of *Socrates*. Wise Men are to Cities what Domestick Gods are to Families.

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ligion, and comes to defame you in this Court, well knowing that the Mob is always ready to receive this sort of Calumnies. What do not I my self meet with, when in publick Assemblies I speak of Divine things, and predict what shall come to pass? They all laugh at me as a Fool; not that any one of the things I have foretold has fail'd of its Accomplishment; but the Business is this, they envy all such as we are. And what remains for us to do? The best way is never to trouble our Heads about it; but to go on still in our own way.

Soc. My dear *Eutyphron*, is it so great an Unhappiness to be laugh'd at? For at bottom I believe the Athenians don't much trouble their Heads to examine whether a Man has a great Capacity or not; provided he does not go about to teach others what he knows. But I believe if a Man should make it his business to teach, they would be down-right Angry, either out of Envy as you intimate, or for some other Reason that we know not.

The Character of the Athenians which agrees well with the Account St. Luke gives us of 'em in the Acts of the Apostles.

Eut. I have no mind to try to my Cost, as you do, what Sentiments they have of me.

Soc. That's another Matter; * It may be you are very reserv'd, and do not willingly communicate your Wisdom to others, whereas I am afraid they think the ove I bear to all Mankind engages me too freely to teach 'em all I know, not only without asking a Reward, but even by preventing them, and pressing 'em to hear me. But if they would content themselves with laughing at me, as you say they do at you, it would be no unpleasant thing to spend some hours in this Court in Laughing and Divertisement; but if they take up the Matter in earnest, none but you Deviners know what will be the Event of it.

Eut. Perhaps you may sustain no damage, but may

* *Socrates* makes use of the Confession which he has drawn out of *Eutyphron*, to show by this Deviner the Character of those who were set up to teach Religion. They neither taught, nor refused any thing, but through fear left the People in Superstition and Ignorance.

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come to a happy Iſſue in your Buſineſs, as well as I in mine.

Soc. Have you buſineſs here then? are you Defendant or Plaintiff?

Eut. I am Plaintiff.

Soc. Whom do you proſecute?

Eut. If I ſhould tell you, you would take me for a Fool.

Soc. How! Do you proſecute one that can't be taken? Has he got Wings?

Eut. The Perſon I proſecute, inſtead of having Wings, is ſo old that he can ſcarce walk.

Soc. Who is he?

Eut. 'Tis my Father.

Soc. Your Father!

Eut. Yes my Father.

Soc. Of what do you accuſe him?

Eut. Of Murder.

Soc. Of Murder, good God! That's an Accuſation indeed above the comprehenſion of the People, who will never conceive that it can be juſt: an ordinary Man would have enough to do to give it any tolerable Colour. * This is a thing that belongs only to him who is arriv'd at the higheſt pitch of Wiſdom.

Eut. You ſay true, *Socrates*, it belongs only to ſuch a Perſon.

Soc. Is it any one of your Relations that your Father has kill'd? Without doubt it muſt be ſo; for you would not proſecute your Father in a Court of Juſtice for the ſake of a Stranger.

Eut. What an Abſurdity is that, *Socrates*, to think that in this reſpect there is any difference between a Relation and a Stranger! The thing is equal; that which ought chiefly to be conſider'd, is to examine whether the Perſon that has kill'd him, did

A falſe Principle: for Juſtice puſh'd too far becomes Injuſtice and Impiety.

* From this Principle of *Socrates* it follows by a juſt conſequence, that it is only God's Province to command and authorize ſuch Actions as appear ſevere and cruel to Nature, which is a great Truth.

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it juſtly or unjuſtly. If it was juſtly, he ought not to be put to any trouble, but if unjuſtly, you are oblig'd to proſecute him, whatever Friendſhip or Relation there is between you. To have the leaſt Converſation with him is to make your ſelf an Accomplice of his Crime, and ſo it is not to proſecute him to bring him to Puniſhment, which alone can purifie and expiate you both. But to apprize you of the Fact. The deceaſed was one of our Farmers, who rented a piece of Land of us when we dwelt at *Naxus*: This Man having one day drank too much fell into a paſſion, and was ſo tranſported with Rage againſt one of our Slaves that he kill'd him. My Father order'd him to be caſt into a deep Pit with his Hands and Feet bound, and immediately ſent hither to conſult * one of thoſe who have the Inſpection of Religious Matters, and Caſes of Conſcience, to know what he ſhould do with him, and in the mean time neglected this poor Priſoner, and left him without ſuſtenance, as an Aſſaſſin whoſe Life was of no Conſequence; ſo that he dyed: Hunger, Cold and the Weight of his Chains kill'd him, before the Perſon my Father had ſent return'd. Upon this our whole Family falls upon me, becauſe I for the ſake of an Aſſaſſin, accuſe my Father of Murder, which they pretend he has not committed; and if he had, they maintain I ought not to proſecute him, becauſe the deceaſed was a Villain and a Murderer, and beſides they ſay 'tis an impious Action for a Son to prefer a Criminal Proceſs againſt his Father; ſo blind are they about divine things, and ſo uncapable of diſcerning what is Profane and Impious, from what is Juſt and Holy.

Soc. But, I pray, *Eutyphron*, do you your ſelf think you ſo accurately underſtand all Divine things, and that you can ſo preciſely diſtinguiſh between what

* In *Greece* there were Interpreters of divine things, who were publick Perſons, to whom the People addreſs'd themſelves in all weighty Caſes. Thoſe who were any thing devout would not undertake the leaſt thing without having firſt conſulted them.

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is Holy, and what is Profane, that the State of the Caſe being as you ſay, you can proſecute your Father without fearing to commit an impious Action?

Eut. Elſe I ſhould be very uneaſy; and *Eutyphron* would ſcarce have any advantage above other Men, if he did not underſtand all theſe things perfectly well.

Soc. O admirable *Eutyphron*, I ſee then the beſt Courſe I can take, is to become your Diſciple, and before the Determination of my Proceſs, to let *Melitus* know, that I have hitherto look'd upon it as the greateſt advantage in the World, to have a good Underſtanding in Divine Things, and to be well inſtructed in Religion; but now ſeeing he accuſes me of falling into Error, and of raſhly introducing new Opinions about the Deity, I have put my ſelf into your School. So that, *Melitus* (I'll ſay) if you acknowledge *Eutyphron*, to be a Perſon of Ability in thoſe Matters, and that he has good Notions; I declare to you I have embrac'd the ſame Sentiments. Therefore forbear to proſecute me any farther. And if on the contrary, you think *Eutyphron* is not Orthodox, cauſe the Maſter to be call'd in queſtion before you meddle with the Scholar; he is the cauſe of all this Miſchief, 'tis he that ruins both his Father and Me. He ruins me in teaching me a falſe Religion, and he ruins his Father in proſecuting him by the Principles of this ſame Religion, which you account ſo pernicious; and if he continues to proſecute me without any regard to my Requeſt, or leaves me to purſue you, you will not fail to make your Appearance, and to ſpeak the ſame thing which I ſhall have ſignified to him.

'Tis the greateſt Advantage in the World to be well inſtructed in Religion.

Eut. Upon my Word, *Socrates*, if he is ſo impudent as to attack me, I ſhall ſoon find his weak ſide, and ſhall at leaſt run but half the Danger.

Soc. I know it very well, and that is the reaſon I am ſo deſirous of being your Diſciple, being well aſſur'd, that no Perſon is ſo bold as to dare look

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you in the face; no not *Melitus* himſelf; who looks ſo intently, and who can ſee ſo well to the bottom of my Soul, that he accuſes me of Impiety.

In the mean time then, tell me, I beſeech you what you juſt now affirm'd, and which you know ſo well, *viz.* what is Holy and Juſt, Impious and Unjuſt, in reſpect of *killing Men* for Inſtance, and ſo in all other Subjects that may offer themſelves to us. Is not Sanctity always like it ſelf in all ſorts of Actions, and is not Impiety, which is it's conttary, always the ſame too, ſo that the ſame Idea, the ſame Character of Impiety is always found in every thing which is impious?

Eut. 'Tis certainly ſo, *Socrates.*

Soc. What is it then that you call Pious and Holy, Profane and Impious?

Eut. I call that Pious and Holy, for Example, which I am doing to day, namely to proſecute every Man who commits Murder, Sacrilege, and ſuch other Crimes, whether it be Father, Mother, Brother, or any other Perſon. And I call it an impious thing to ſuffer the Criminal quietly to enjoy his Crime. I pray, *Socrates*, mind well what I ſay; I'll give you very certain Proofs, that my Definition is * conformable to the Law. I have already mention'd it to many Perſons, and have made 'em confeſs, that there is nothing more juſt, than not to ſpare a wicked Man, let him be who he will: All Men are convinc'd that *Jupiter* is the beſt and moſt juſt of all the Gods, and all agree, that he put his Father in Chains, becauſe he, contrary to all manner of Juſtice devour'd his Children. *Saturn* had before treated his Father with yet greater Severity for ſome other Fault. And yet People cry out againſt me, when I proſecute my Father for an Atrocious Act of Injuſtice; and they fall into a manifeſt Contradicti-

A wrong Definition which ſprings from blind Zeal.

* 'Tis ſo indeed; but it is ill applied here; and is not true on all Occaſions, as it is not on this. That which *Eutyphron* here calls the Law, is the Law of Nature, which teaches us to imitate God in all we know of him.

on,

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on, in judging so differently of the Actions of those Gods, and mine, * in which I had no other design than that of imitating them.

Soc. Is this the thing, *Eutyphron*, which has brought me to day to this Bar; because when I am told these Tales of the Gods I can't hear 'em without Pain? Is this the Crime with which I am going to be charg'd? If you who are so able in Matters of Religion agree with the People in this, and believe these Stories 'tis absolutely necessary that I should believe 'em too, who confess ingenuously that I know nothing of these Matters; shall I pretend to be wiser than my Teachers, and make head against them? Therefore I beg of you in the name of that God who presides over Friendship, do not deceive me, do you believe all these things you say?

Eut. I not only believe these, but others too that are more surprizing, of which the People are wholly ignorant.

Doubtless he means those Mysteries which were known only to those that were initiated.

Soc. You seriously believe then that there are great Quarrels, Animosities and Wars among the Gods? You believe all those others Passions reign among 'em, which are so surprizing, and are represented by Poets and Painters in their Poems and Pictures, which are expos'd to view in all parts of our Temples; and † are wrought with various Colours in that mysterious Tapistry, which is carried in procession to the Citadel every fifth Year, during the *Panathenea*? must we receive all these things as so many great Truths, *Eutyphron*.

The Feast of Minerva.

Eut. Not only these, *Socrates*, but a great many others besides, as I told you just now, which I will

* The imitation of those false Gods could only produce very ill Actions, as the Poets themselves have acknowledged.

† This Tapistry was the Sail of *Minerva*'s Ship, on which the Principal Actions of this Goddess were describ'd in Needle-work; which after it had been expos'd in the Ship at the beginning of the Feast, was carried in Procession. The Ship was roll'd along on firm Ground to the Temple of *Ceres* at *Eleusine*, from whence it was brought back, and carried to the Citadel; and the Statue of the Goddess was at last adorn'd with it.

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explain to you if you pleaſe; and upon my word they'll make you wonder.

Soc. No, they will not make me wonder much, but you may explain 'em to me another time when you are more at leiſure; I pray endeavour now to explain to me what I ask'd you a little more clearly; for you have not yet fully anſwer'd my Queſtion, you have not taught me what Holineſs is. You have only told me that that is a holy thing which you do in accuſing your Father of Murder.

Eut. And I have told you the Truth,

Soc. It may be ſo; but are there not a great many other things which you call Holy?

Eut. Without doubt there are.

Soc. I intreat you therefore to remember that what I ask'd you was not to teach me one or two holy Things among a great many others that are ſo too; but to give me a clear and diſtinct Idea of the Nature of Holineſs, and of that which cauſes all holy Things to be holy. For you told me your ſelf, that there is only one and the ſame Character which makes all holy Things to be what they are; as there is one that makes Wickedneſs to be always Wickedneſs: don't you remember it?

Eut. O ho, yes, I remember it.

Soc. Then teach me to know what this Character is, that I may have it always before my Eyes, and may uſe it as the true Model, and real Original, that ſo I may be in a Condition to affirm of every thing which I ſee you or others do, that that which reſembles it is holy, and that which does not reſemble it is wicked.

Eut. If that's it you deſire, *Socrates*, I am ready to ſatisfie you. *Soc.* Truly that's what I would have.

A Second Definition of Holineſs.

Eut. I ſay then that Holineſs is that which is agreable to the Gods, and Wickedneſs is that which is diſagreable to 'em.

Soc. Very well, *Eutyphron*, you have at laſt anſwer'd me preciſely according to my Queſtion. But I don't yet know whether you ſpeak true: However ſurely

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ſurely you will know how to convince me of the Truth of what you advance.

Eut. I'll anſwer you.

Soc. Come then, let us lay down what we ſay plainly. A holy Thing, or a holy Man, is a Thing, or a Man that is agreable to God; a wicked Thing, or a wicked Man, is a Man, or Thing that is diſagreable to him; thus what is Holy and what is Wicked are directly oppoſite; are they not?

Eut. That's beyond contradiction.

Soc. I think this is very well lay'd down.

Eut. I think ſo too, *Socrates.*

Soc. But have we not alſo affirm'd that * the Gods have frequent Animoſities and Contentions among themſelves, and are often embroil'd and divided one againſt another? *Eut.* Yes, without doubt.

Soc. Therefore let us now examine what may be the Occaſion of that difference of Sentiments that produces thoſe Quarrels and that Enmity among 'em. If you and I ſhould diſpute about Numbers, to know which was the greater, would this difference make us Enemies, and carry us to all manner of Exceſſes and Violences? Should we not immediately ſet our ſelves to reckon, that we might preſently be of the ſame Mind?

Eut. 'Tis very true, we ſhould ſo.

Soc. And if we ſhould diſpute about the different bigneſs of Bodies, ſhould we not preſently go about meaſuring 'em, and would not that ſoon put an end to our Diſpute?

Eut. It would ſo.

Soc. And if we ſhould conteſt about Weight, would not our Difference be ſoon determin'd by means of a pair of Scales?

Eut. No doubt of it.

Soc. Well then, what is there, about which, if we ſhould come to diſpute without having a certain Rule to which we might recur, we ſhould be-

* *Socrates* refutes this Definition of Holineſs, by ſhewing that it can't ſubſiſt with their Theology.

come

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come irreconcileable Enemies, and fall into an extravagant Paſſion one againſt the other? Perhaps none of theſe things at preſent occurs to your Mind. I'll tell you ſome of 'em, and you ſhall judge whether I am in the right. Is it not what is Juſt and Unjuſt, Comely and Indecent, Good and Evil? Are not not theſe the things about which we every day differ, and not finding a ſufficient Rule to make us accord, we fall into the greateſt Enmity? When I ſay *We* I ſpeak of all Mankind in general.

Eut. That indeed is the true Cauſe of all our Lawſuites, and all our Wars.

Soc. And if it be true, that the Gods are at Variance among themſelves about any thing, muſt it not neceſſarily be ſome one of theſe?

Eut. It muſt needs be ſo.

Soc. * According to you then, Excellent *Eutyphron*, the Gods are divided about what is Juſt and Unjuſt, Comely and Indecent; Good and Evil. For if they did not conteſt about theſe things, they would have no occaſion of wrangling, but would be always united; would they not? *Eut.* You ſay very right.

Soc. And the things which each God takes to be Comely, Good and Juſt, are lov'd by him, and the contrary hated.

Eut. Moſt certainly.

Soc. According to you then one and the ſame thing ſeems Juſt to ſome of them and Unjuſt to others, ſeeing Wars and Seditions are ſtir'd up among 'em by ſuch Diſputes as theſe. Is it not ſo?

Eut. 'Tis ſo without doubt.

Soc. Hence it follows, that one and the ſame thing is the object both of the Love and Hatred of the Gods, and is at the ſame time pleaſing and diſpleaſing to 'em.

Eut. So it ſeems.

Soc. And conſequently, according to you, what is Holy and Profane are the ſame thing.

Eut. I grant, this conſequence may be Juſt.

* *Socrates* handſomly ridicules thoſe Gods, who know not what Juſtice and Injuſtice, Vice and Vertue are.

Soc.

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Soc. Than you have not anſwer'd my Queſtion, Incomparable *Eutyphron*; for I did not ask you what it was that at the ſame time was Holy and Profane, Pleaſing and Diſpleaſing to the Gods. So that I foreſee 'tis poſſible without a Miracle, that the Action you are about to day in proſecuting your Father to bring him to Puniſhment, may pleaſe *Jupiter*, and at the ſame time may diſpleaſe *Cælus* and *Saturn*; may be approv'd by *Vulcan*, and diſapprov'd by *Juno*, and ſo of the reſt of the Gods who may be of different Sentiments.

Eut. But *Socrates*, I ſuppoſe there's no diſpute about this among the Gods, nor does any one of 'em pretend, that he who has kill'd a Man unjuſtly ſhould be ſuffer'd to go unpuniſh'd.

Soc. Neither is there any Man that pretends to that: Did you ever ſee any one that dar'd put the matter in Queſtion, whether he that had willfully murder'd a Man, or committed any other Act of Injuſtice, ought to be puniſh'd or not?

Eut. We every where hear and ſee ſcarce any thing elſe before the Tribunals but Perſons who have committed Acts of Injuſtice, ſaying and doing what they can to avoid Puniſhment.

Soc. But do the Perſons of whom you ſpeak, *Eutyphron*, confeſs that they have done thoſe Acts of Injuſtice of which they are accus'd; and after this Confeſſion maintain that they ought not to be puniſh'd?

Eut. They have no Mind to confeſs ſo, *Socrates*.

Soc. Then they do not ſay and do all they can; for they dare neither maintain nor aſſert, that when their Injuſtice is manifeſt, and ſufficiently atteſted, they ought not to be chaſtiz'd for it. Is it not ſo?

Eut. 'Tis very true.

Soc. They don't put the Matter in Queſtion, whether he that is guilty of Injuſtice ought to be puniſh'd; No body doubts of that; but that about which they diſpute is the Nature of Injuſtice, to determine in what, how, and on what Occaſion it is committed.

Eut.

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Eut. That's certain.

Soc. And is it not the ſame in Heaven, if it be true, as you have aſſerted that the Gods are at Variance about what is Juſt and Unjuſt? Do not ſome of 'em affirm that others of 'em are Unjuſt, and don't the latter maintain the Contrary. For there is no one among them no more than among us who dare advance ſuch a Notion as this, that he that commits Injuſtice ought not to be puniſh'd.

Eut. All you ſay is true, *Socrates*, at leaſt in general.

Soc. You may ſay in particular too. For 'tis about particular Actions that both Men and Gods diſpute every day; if it be true that the Gods diſpute about any thing: Do not ſome ſay ſuch an Action is Juſt, and others that 'tis Unjuſt?

Eut. Yes Doubtleſs.

Soc. Come then, my dear *Eutyphron*, for my particular Inſtruction tell me what certain Proof you have that the Gods all diſapprove the Death of your Farmer, who after he had ſo barbarouſly knock'd his fellow ſervant on the head, was laid in Irons, and ſo periſh'd before your Father had receiv'd the anſwer which he expected from *Athens*. Demonſtrate to me that on this occaſion 'tis a pious and juſt Action for a Son to accuſe his Father of Murder, and to endeavour to bring him to Puniſhment for it; and ſee if you can fairly and evidently prove to me, that the Action of ſuch a Son is pleaſing to the Gods. If you do this I ſhall never ceaſe to admire and celebrate your Capacity as long as I live.

Eut. This is ſomewhat difficult indeed; to prove it to you. For my part I could prove it as evidently as———————

Soc. I underſtand you. That is to ſay, You think I have a duller head than any of your Judges; for as to them, there's no difficulty in the Caſe, you'll make it appear to them that your Farmer was unjuſtly kill'd, and that all the Gods diſapprove your Father's Action.

Eut.

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Eut. I'll make it appear to 'em at clear as the Light, provided they will but hear me.

Soc. Oh! They will not fail to hear you, * provided you make a fine Speech to 'em. But I'll tell you what Reflection I just now made, while I was hearkning to what you said; I said within my self; suppose it were possible for *Eutyphron* to persuade me that all the Gods are of the Mind that this Farmer was unjustly kill'd; should I be ever the wiser, should I understand, better than I do, what is Holy and what Profane? The Death of this Farmer is displeasing to the Gods, as he pretends, I'll grant it; but this is not a definition of what is Holy, and its contrary, seeing the Gods are divided; and that which is disagreable to some of them is agreable to others: Very well, I pass that, *Eutyphron*: I am willing to suppose that all the Gods account your Father's Action unjust, and that they all abhor it: I pray then let us correct our Definition a little, and say, *That which all the Gods condemn is Profane, and that which all the Gods approve is Holy: and that which is approv'd by some of 'em, and disapprov'd by others, is neither one nor t'other, or rather is both together.* Shall we stand by this Definition of what is Holy and what Profane?

Eut. What should hinder us, *Socrates*?

Soc. For my part I'll not hinder it; but do you see your self if this suites your Opinion; and if upon this Principle you can instruct me better in what you have been endeavouring to teach me.

Eut. And for my part I shall make no Difficulty of asserting, that that is Holy which all the Gods approve, and that Profane, which they all disapprove.

Soc. Examine this Definition to see if it be true, or shall we receive it without any Ceremony? and

* *Socrates* reproaches the Athenians, that they lov'd to hear such as could talk finely, and did not much trouble their Heads about the Truth of Things: We learn from the Sacred History that this was the Character of the Athenians; they spent their Time in hearing either Novelists or Orators.

shall

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ſhall we have that reſpect for our ſelves and others, as to give our Aſſent to all our Imaginations and Fancies; ſo that for a Man to tell us a thing is ſo, ſhall be ſufficient to gain our Belief; or is it neceſſary to examine what is ſaid to us?

Eut. Without doubt we ſhould examine it; and I am well aſſur'd that what we have laid down is a good Poſition.

Soc. That we ſhall ſee preſently. Hear me a little. * Is that which is Holy belov'd of the Gods, becauſe it is Holy, or is it Holy, becauſe it is belov'd of 'em?

Eut. I don't well underſtand what you ſay, *Socrates.*

Soc. I'll endeavour to explain my ſelf. Don't we ſay, that a thing is carried, and that a thing carries? that a thing is ſeen, and that a thing ſees; that a thing is mov'd, and that a thing moves it? and the like to Infinity? Do you conceive that they are different? and do you underſtand in what they differ?

Eut. I think I do.

Soc. Is not the thing belov'd different from that which loves?

Eut. A pretty Queſtion indeed!

Soc. Tell me then is the thing, which is carried, carried becauſe one carries it; or for ſome other Reaſon?

Eut. Becauſe one carries it; without doubt.

Soc. And the thing mov'd is mov'd becauſe one moves it; and the thing ſeen becauſe one ſees it?

Eut. Moſt certainly,

* This Thought is too high for *Eutyphron*, who conceiving Holineſs as a thing diſtinct from God, could not tell how to comprehend that which is Holy is at the ſame time lov'd of God, becauſe it is Holy; and Holy becauſe lov'd of God: For Holineſs comes from God, *Sanctitas primitiva*; and the Holineſs of Men is the effect of the Divine Communion, which *Socrates* underſtood, and of which he elſewhere ſpeaks. So that *Socrates* here ſpeaks with reference to the groſs manner of conceiving the things of Religion which was to be found in ignorant Men; who judg'd of this as of all other things in which the Relatives are very different, as that which is lov'd is different from that which loves, that which is moved is different from that which moves it, *&c.*

Soc:

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Soc. Then it is not true that one ſees a thing becauſe it is ſeen, but on the contrary 'tis ſeen becauſe one ſees it. 'Tis not true that one moves a thing becauſe 'tis mov'd, but it is mov'd becauſe one moves it: Nor is it true, that one carries a thing becauſe 'tis carried, but 'tis carried becauſe one carries it: Do you underſtand me now? Is this plain enough? My meaning is, that one does not do a thing becauſe it is done, but that it is done becauſe one does it? that a Being which ſuffers does not ſuffer becauſe it is paſſive; but is paſſive becauſe it ſuffers. Is not this true?

Eut. Who doubts it?

Soc. Is not that which is lov'd ſomething that is done, or that ſuffers?

Eut. Certainly.

Soc. Then 'tis with that which is lov'd as 'tis with all other things; 'tis not becauſe it is lov'd that one loves it, but one the contrary 'tis becauſe one loves it that it is lov'd.

Eut. That's as clear as the Light.

Soc. What ſhall we ſay then of that which is Holy, my dear *Eutyphron*? ſhall we not ſay, it is belov'd of the Gods, as you have aſſerted?

Eut. Yes certainly.

Soc. But is it belov'd becauſe it is Holy, or is it for ſome other Reaſon?

Eut. 'Tis for no other Reaſon.

Soc. Then it is belov'd becauſe it is Holy; but it is not Holy becauſe it is belov'd. *It is belov'd ſo far as it is Holy. 'Tis this Quality that renders it amable.*

Eut. So I think.

Soc. But is it not belov'd of the Gods becauſe the Gods love it?

Eut. Who can deny it?

Soc. * Then that which is belov'd of God is not the ſame with that which is Holy, nor that which

* This is evident, ſeing what is Holy is lov'd only becauſe it is Holy; and that which is lov'd is lov'd only becauſe one loves it, there muſt needs be a difference between theſe two, *viz.* what is *Lov'd* and what is *Holy*.

is

is Holy the ſame with that which is belov'd, as yo ſay; but they are very different.

Eut. How then, *Socrates?*

Soc. Becauſe we are agreed that that which i Holy is belov'd becauſe it is Holy, and that it i not true that it is Holy becauſe it is belov'd; an we not agreed in that?

Eut. I confeſs it.

Soc. We are farther agreed that that which is be lov'd of the Gods is belov'd of 'em only becauſ they love it; and that it is not true, to ſay the love it, becauſe it is belov'd.

Eut. That's right.

Soc. * But, my dear *Eutyphron*, if that which is belov'd of the Gods, and that which is Holy were the ſame thing, ſeeing that which is Holy is belov'd only becauſe it is Holy, It would follow that the Gods ſhould love that which they love, only becauſe it is belov'd of 'em: And on the other hand, if that which is belov'd of the Gods were lov'd only becauſe they love it, than it would be true likewiſe to ſay, that which is Holy, is Holy, only becauſe 'tis belov'd of them. By this therefore you ſee that thoſe two terms, *belov'd of the Gods* and *Holy* are very different. One is belov'd becauſe the Gods *love him*, and another is lov'd only becauſe he deſerves to be lov'd. Thus, my dear *Eutyphron*, when you ſhould have given me an exact anſwer what it is to be Holy, to be ſure you were not willing to explain to me wherein the Eſſence of it conſiſts by an accurate Definition, but were content to ſhew one of its Qualities, which is that of being belov'd of the Gods, but you have not given me an Account of the Nature of it. I conjure you therefore, if you think fit, diſcover this great ſecret to me, and beginning with it from its very Principle, teach me preciſely to know what *Holineſs* is, without having reſpect to any thing

* For if theſe two Terms *Belov'd* and *Holy* were the ſame thing, one might be put for t'other, whence all that Abſurdity would follow which *Socrates* repreſents here.

that

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that is adventitious, as whether it be belov'd of the Gods or not. For we ſhall have no diſpute about that. Come then, tell me freely; what is it to be *Holy*, and what to be *Profane*.

For when one knows the Nature of a thing, one may eaſily know whether it be lov'd or hated of God.

Eut. But, *Socrates* I know not how to explain my Thoughts to you on this Subject; for all that we lay down vaniſhes from us, and does not continue fix'd and ſtable in what Condition ſoever we put it.

Soc. All the Principles, *Eutyphron*, which you have eſtabliſh'd are ſomewhat like * the Figures of *Dedalus* one of my Anceſtors. If I had aſſerted 'em to be ſure you would not have fail'd to jeer and reproach me, as if I had deriv'd this pretty Quality of making things that ſlip out of a Man's Hands, when he thinks he holds 'em faſteſt: But it unhappily falls out that 'tis you that have aſſerted 'em. Therefore I muſt ſeek for ſome other turns of Raillery, for 'tis certain your Principles give us the ſlip, as you ſee very well.

Eut. For my part, *Socrates*, I need not ſeek any other turn of Raillery: that ſuites you perfectly well: for 'tis not I that inſpire our reaſonings with this Inſtability, which hinders 'em from fixing, but you are the *Dedalus*. If I were alone, I tell you they would continue firm and ſteady.

Soc. Then I am more expert in my Art than *Dedalus* was, he could only give this Mobility to his own Works, whereas it ſeems I give it not only to my own, but alſo to thoſe of other Men: and that which is yet more ſtrange is that I am thus expert againſt my will; for I ſhould much rather chooſe

* *Dedalus* was an excellent Carver, who made Statues that had Springs within 'em, by means of which they would ſtart out and go along as if they had been alive. There were two ſorts of 'em, as appears by what is ſaid in *Menon*. What *Socrates* ſays here of *Dedalus*, that he was one of his Anceſtors, is only in Raillery. *Dedalus* deſcended from the Kings of *Athens*; and *Socrates* was very far from having the Vanity of pretending to be of that Family. His meaning is only this, that he knew how to make himſelf Wings, as *Dedalus* did, to fly towards Heaven, and to raiſe his Mind to the knowledg of divine Things. This Matter was ſpoken of in the firſt *Alcibiades*.

to have my Discourses continue fix'd and unmovable, than to have all the Riches of *Tantalus* together with all the Skill of *Dedalus* my Progenitor. But enough of this Jesting. Seeing you are afraid of the Trouble, I'll endeavour to ease you, and to open a shorter way to conduct my self to the knowledge of what is Holy. And you shall see if it does not appear to be of absolute necessity that whatever is Holy is Just. *Eut.* It cannot be otherwise.

Soc. Do you think whatever is Just is Holy, or whatever is Holy is Just? or do you suppose that that which is Just is not always Holy; but only that there are some Just things that are Holy, and others which are not so?

Eut. I can't well comprehend what you mean, *Socrates.*

Soc. And yet you have two great Advantages above me; having both more Youth, and more Capacity than I. But, as I just now told you, swimming in the Delicious abundance of your Wisdom, you are afraid of putting your self to much trouble. Shake off, I beseech you, this effeminate Softness, and apply your self a little to thinking; what I say is not very hard to be understood. For I say just the contrary to what the Poet asserts, who to excuse himself for not singing the Praises of *Jupiter*, says,

Shame every where keeps company with Fear.

I am not at all of his Mind; shall I tell you in what?

Eut. You'll oblige me in so doing.

Soc. I think 'tis not true that Shame always accompanies Fear; for I think we every Day see People in Fear of Sickness and Poverty, who yet are not at all asham'd of the things they fear. Don't you think so too?

Eut. I am of the same Mind.

Soc. On the contrary Fear always follows Shame; for is there any one who is asham'd, and put into Confusion by any Action, who does not at the same time fear the dishonour that is the Consequence of it?

Eut. It can't be otherwise, he must be afraid of it.

Soc.

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Soc. Then it is not true to say,

Shame every where keeps company with Fear,

But we should say,

Fear every where keeps company with Shame.

for 'tis false that shame is continually found with fear, fear having more extent than shame: indeed shame is one part of fear, as the unequal is one part of Number. Wherever you find a number you do not necessarily find it unequal; but wherever it is unequal, there you necessarily find a Number. Do you understand me now?

Eut. Very well.

Soc. This is what I just now ask'd you; *viz.* if wherever that which is Just is to be found, there is also that which is Holy; and if wherever that which is Holy is to be found, there is also that which is Just? Now it appears that that which is Holy is not always found with that which is Just; for that which is Holy is a part of that which is Just. Shall we then lay this down as a Principle, or are you of a different Sentiment?

Eut. 'Tis a Principle that can't be contested.

Soc. Now mind what follows: if that which is Holy is a part of that which is Just; we must find out what part of that which is Just that which is Holy is. As if you should ask me what part of Number is that which is equal, and what Number is it? I should answer, that it is * the *Isoscele*, and not the *Scalene*: Don't you think so as well as I?

Eut. Yes certainly.

Soc. Now do you in like manner see if you can inform me what part of that which is just that which is Holy is; that I may let *Melitus* know, that 'tis best for him to forbear to do me any farther Injustice in accusing me of Impiety, me, who, I say, have been perfectly instructed by you what Piety and Holiness, and their Contraries are.

* The *Isoscele* signifies that which has two equal sides, for the even Number divides it self into two equal parts. And the *Scalene* is that which has two unequal Sides.

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A third Definition which at bottom has something of Truth in it, but these false Teachers had not right Conceptions of it.

Eut. For my part, *Socrates*, I think that Holiness and Piety is † that part of what is Just which concerns the Care and Worship of the Gods, and that all the rest of it is that which properly respects Men.

Soc. Very well: Yet there is some little Matter still wanting. For I do not well understand what you mean by this Word [*Care*] Is this Care of the Gods the same with that which we take about all other things? For we every day say, that none but a Querry knows how to take care of a Horse, and to look well after him, do we not?

Eut. Yes doubtless.

Soc. Then the Care of Horses properly belongs to the Querry's Art.

Eut. It does so.

Soc. All Men are not fit to take care of Dogs, and to look after them, but only the Hunts-man.

Eut. None but he.

Soc. Then the Care of Dogs properly belongs to the Art of Hunting.

Eut. Without doubt it does.

Soc. And it belongs to the Grazier to take care of Oxen.

Eut. True.

Soc. Now Holiness and Piety is the Care of the Gods; Is not this what you say?

Eut. Yes, certainly.

Soc. Has not all Care for its end, the good and advantage of that which is taken care of? Don't you every day see that the Horses which an able Querry takes Care of become better, and more fit for service than others?

Eut. Yes, without doubt.

Soc. Does not the care which a good Hunts-man takes of Dogs, and that which a good Grazier

† This is true: but the Pagans had false Ideas of it; because they did not understand that this care of God which consists on our part in obeying him, in conforming to his holy Will, and in resigning our selves to him, was preceded by his care of us in creating us, and in enlightening our Minds; and this is what *Socrates* teaches in other places.

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takes of Oxen make both the one and the other better? and may not the like be said of all other Care? Or can you think that Care tends to hurt and spoil that which is taken care of? *Eut.* No certainly.

Soc. Then it tends to make it better.

Eut. That's right.

Soc. Then Holiness being the Care we take of the Gods, tends to their Advantage; and so the end of it must be to make 'em better. But would you dare to assert when you do any holy Action, that you make any one of the Gods better by it?

Men are incapable of doing any thing to the advantage of God.

Eut. I am far enough from uttering such horrid Blasphemy.

Soc. Nor do I think you have any such Thought; I am very far from such a Supposition: and 'tis for this Reason I ask'd you what this Care of the Gods is, being persuaded that was not your meaning.

Eut. You have done me Justice, *Socrates*,

Soc. So much for that: But tell me then, what sort of Care of the Gods is Holiness?

Eut. 'Tis of the Nature of that Care which Servants take of their Masters.

Soc. I understand you, that is to say, Holiness is a kind of Servant to the Gods.

Eut. You hit it.

Soc. Can you tell me what Physicians operate by Means of the Art of Medicine which is their Servant? Do not they restore Health? *Eut.* Yes.

Soc. What do the Ship-Carpenters, who are in Ports do; and what do our Architects perform by the Ministry of their Servant? Don't the former build Ships and the latter Houses?

Eut. Yes certainly.

Soc. * What then do the Gods perform by the Ministry of their Servant? For you must certainly know

* *Socrates* would hereby insinuate what he elsewhere teaches, that God by the Ministry of Holiness works the Conversion of Souls, that this Conversion produces Love, and that this Love engages us to render him that which appertains to him, and which we cannot innocently refuse him.

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this, since you pretend to know Religion better than any Man in the World beside.

Eut. And I have Reason to make that pretence.

Soc. Tell me then, I beseech you, what wonderful work is it that the Gods perform by making use of our Service?

Eut. They perform many very great and wonderful things.

Soc. The Generals of our Army perform many great Things too; but yet there is always one thing that is the Principal, and that is the Victory they obtain in Battel; Is it not?

Eut. 'Tis so.

Soc. And the Graziers do many good things, but the Principal is that of supplying Mankind with Food by their Labour. *Eut.* I grant it.

Soc. Well then, of all those good Things which the Gods operate by the Ministry of our Holiness, what is the Principal?

Eut. I just now told you, *Socrates*, that there needs more time and pains to arrive at an accurate knowledge of all these Things. All that I can tell you in general, is, that to please the Gods by Prayers and Sacrifices, is that which we call Holiness. And * in this consists the Welfare of Families and Cities, whereas to displease the Gods, is Impiety which utterly ruines and subverts every thing.

Soc. Indeed, *Eutyphron*, you might have told me what I ask'd in fewer words, if you had pleas'd. 'Tis easy to see you have no Mind to instruct me, for when you seem to be just in the way to do it, you presently strike off again; if you had but answer'd me a Word more, I had very well understood the Nature of Holiness. But now, (for he that asks must follow him who is ask'd) don't you say, Holiness is the Art of sacrificing and praying? *Eut.* Yes that I do.

Soc. To sacrifice, is to give to the Gods. To pray is to ask of 'em. *Eut.* 'Tis right, *Socrates*.

* In what the Safety or Ruine of Families, Cities and States consists, even by the Confession of the blindest Pagans.

Soc.

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Soc. It follows then from your Diſcourſes, that Holineſs is * the Science of giving to the Gods, and asking of them.

A fourth Definition which is very true; but the Truth of which theſe falſe Teachers did not underſtand.

Eut. Socrates, you perfectly comprehend my meaning.

Soc. 'Tis becauſe I am in love with your Wiſdom, and give my ſelf up entirely to it. You need not fear that I ſhall let one of your Words fall to the Ground. Tell me then what is this Art of pleaſing the Gods? Do you ſay it is to give to 'em and to aſk of 'em?

Eut. Moſt certainly.

Soc. To aſk well, muſt we not aſk ſuch things as we have need to receive of them?

Eut. And what then?

Soc. And to give well, muſt we not give them in exchange ſuch Things as they have need to receive of us? For it would be a Folly to give any one ſuch Things as he does not want, but are entirely uſeleſs to him. *Eut.* You ſay very well.

Soc. Holineſs, my dear *Eutyphron*, is then a kind of Traffick betwixt the Gods and Men.

Eut. Let it be ſo, if you will have it ſo.

Soc. I would not have it ſo, if it be not ſo: But tell me, what advantage do the Gods receive from the Preſents which we make 'em? For the advantage we derive from them is very evident ſince we have not the leaſt Good, but what proceds from their Liberality. Of what advantage then are our Offerings to the Gods? Are we ſo crafty, as to draw all the Profit of this Commerce to our ſelves, while they derive no Advantage from it?

All the Goods of Men come from God.

Eut. Socrates, do you think the Gods can ever draw any advantage from the Things they receive from us?

* This fourth Definition is admirable. *Socrates* deſigns by it to ſhew that Holineſs leads us to aſk of God, his Spirit, his Aſſiſtance and Grace; and to aſk even our ſelves of him; for 'tis on him our very Being depends; and that it alſo engages us to give our ſelves to him. And this makes up the whole of Religion.

Soc. To what purpoſe then do all our Offerings ſerve?

Eut. They ſerve to ſignifie our Veneration, and Reſpect to 'em, and the deſire we have to pleaſe 'em.

Soc. Then Holineſs does not profit, but pleaſe the Gods?

Eut. Yes without doubt.

Soc. Then that which is Holy is only that which pleaſes the Gods.

Eut. 'Tis only that.

Soc. When you ſpeak thus to me, do you wonder that your Diſcourſe is not fix'd and ſteady; and dare you accuſe me of being the *Dedalus*, that gives it this continual Motion; You, I ſay, who are a thouſand times more ingenious than that great Artiſt, and give your Words a thouſand different Turns? Don't you find that your Diſcourſe makes only a Circle. You remember very well, that that which is Holy and that which is agreable to the Gods were not counted the ſame Thing by us juſt now; but were acknowledg'd to be very different. Don't you remember this?

Eut. I do.

Soc. Well, and don't you conſider that you now ſay, that which is Holy is that which pleaſes the Gods. Is not what pleaſes 'em agreable to 'em?

Eut. Moſt certainly.

Soc. Then one of theſe two Things muſt be granted, Either that we did not well diſtinguiſh juſt now; or if we did, that we are now fallen into a falſe definition.

Eut. That's plain.

Soc. Then we muſt begin all again, in our enquiry after Holineſs; for I ſhall not be weary nor diſcourag'd till you have inform'd me what it is. I beg you would not deſpiſe me; but bend your Mind with all the Application you can to teach me the truth, for you know it, if any Man alive does; and I will not let you go, like another *Proteus*, till you have inſtructed me. For if you had not a perfect

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Knowledge of what is Holy and Profane, doubtleſs you would never for the ſake of a wretched Farmer have undertaken to accuſe your Father of Murder, when the good old Man ſtoops under the Burden of Age, and has already one Foot in the Grave: But would have been ſeiz'd with Horrour to ſee your ſelf about to commit (it may be) an impious Act, and would have fear'd the Gods, and reſpected Men. So that I cannot doubt but you think you know perfectly well, what Holineſs, and its Contrary are. Inform me therefore, moſt Excellent *Eutyphron*, and do not hide your Thoughts from me.

What it is to fear God, and reſpect Men.

Eut. We'll reſerve it for another time, * for now I am a little in haſte, and 'tis time for me to leave you.

Obſerve the Pride of this Superſtitious Man, he is juſt confounded and yet he always thinks himſelf capable of teaching what he does not know himſelf.

Soc. Alas, my dear *Eutyphron*, what do you intend to do! This haſty Motion of yours raviſhes from me the greateſt and ſweeteſt of all my hopes. For I flatter'd my ſelf, that after I had learn'd of you, what Holineſs is, and its Contrary, I ſhould eaſily have got out of *Melitus* his Clutches, by making it plainly appear to him, that *Eutyphron* had perfectly inſtructed me in Divine Things, that Ignorance ſhould never more prompt me to introduce of my one Head new Opinions about the Deity; and that my Life ſhould be more holy for the future.

* The Ancients inform us that *Eutyphron* got ſome advantage by this Converſation of *Socrates*: for he drop'd his Proſecution, and let his Father alone. By which 'tis eaſy to ſee, that theſe Dialogues of *Plato* were not made upon feign'd Subjects, but had a very true and real Foundation, as well as thoſe which *Xenophon* has preſerv'd to us.

An

An Abridgment of the First *ALCIBIADES*, or Of the Nature of Man.

Alcibiades was one of the most ambitious and most Haughty Men in the World. His Birth, his Beauty, his Riches, and the Credit of his Tutor *Pericles*, had so puffed him up, that he thought no Person so worthy as himself to command the Athenians, and to go to their first Assembly to get himself declar'd their Captain-General. His proud and arrogant Carriage had driven away all his Lovers, who being taken only with his Beauty, were at length discourag'd by the cold Reception he gave 'em. *Socrates* was the only Person, who loving him more truly than the rest (for he lov'd him only to make him vertuous) could never be wearied out: This makes the beginning of this Dialogue.

Socrates tells *Alcibiades*, that he doubts not but he is surpriz'd to see, that as he was the first, so he is also the last of his Lovers: and that tho he was never troublesome to him, during his tender Youth, he should now follow him every where to discourse with him, without fearing the same disdainful Treatment which he gave his Rivals. *Alcibiades* confesses, he thinks it strange that he should persist in his Affection, and that he can't comprehend upon what Foundation he builds, that he should have any Hope remaining, after all his Rivals had lost theirs. *Socrates* tells him he'll give him an Account of his Reasons,

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ſons, tho it be a difficult thing to ſpeak to a Perſon whom one loves, and of whom one is not belov'd. He tells him then, that if he had ſeen him likely to ſpend his whole Life in Softneſs, Lazineſs, and all the Amuſements of Youth, he ſhould have ceas'd loving him. But that as he ſaw him paſſionately aſpiring after Glory, the love he bore to him was renew'd and augmented; that he came to offer him all neceſſary Helps, becauſe of all the Lovers he had had, he was the only Perſon who was able to ſerve him in his Ambition; and that by this means he might know the difference between ſuch as love only Corporal Beauty, that frail and withering Flower, and one that loves only the Beauty of the Soul, which being perfect is the true Image of the Deity.

This great Promiſe fixes the reſtleſs Humor of this ambitious young Man, and diſpoſes him to hear what he had to ſay.

Socrates immediatly throws him into the midſt of that Aſſembly, whether he was going to get himſelf declar'd General of the Athenians; and with abundance of addreſs, ſhows him, that inſtead of that great Ability with which he flatter'd himſelf, he had indeed nothing in him but the Prejudices of his Youth, accompanied with a great deal of Arrogance and Preſumption. When you are in that Aſſembly (ſays he) you'll riſe up to ſpeak without doubt of ſuch Things as you know rather than any other Matrers; for otherwiſe how could you preſume to ſpeak? But a Man knows nothing but what he has either found out himſelf, or learn'd of ſome other Perſon. I don't know any thing that you have found out your ſelf, your Knowledge is not by Infuſion; and all the Knowlege you have learn'd, is only to write, to play on the Muſick, and to perform your Exerciſes, and none of theſe Things are talk'd of in the Council. Therefore when will you go? and what will you go for? It muſt not be when they diſcourſe of Buildings; the meaneſt Brick-layer would ſpeak better than you on that Subject: Nor muſt it be when

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when they are considering any Prodigies, or any Point of Divination, for that's the Business of the Diviners; and so of other Things.

Alcibiades being press'd, answers, that he'll speak when the Athenians deliberate on their Affairs.

The Matter then in Question, is how to explain what is meant by the Affairs of the Athenians.

Alcibiades says, 'tis Peace and War, and all that belongs to the highest Politicks.

Then, it must be (replies *Socrates*) when they are considering with whom, and at what time 'tis best to be at Peace, or War. But as Masters in all Arts and Sciences seek what is best and most convenient; so in Peace and War, that ought to be sought out which is best and most advantageous, that is to say, most Just; and in order to find it, 'tis necessary to know in what these consist. In what then do they consist?

Alcibiades knows not what to answer. How! (says *Socrates*,) Are you going to the Assembly of the Athenians to give 'em your Advice about Peace and War, and yet know not why War or Peace should be made?

Alcibiades answers, that War is made, either to repel some Insult, or to recover some Good.

This is something (says *Socrates*) but 'tis not all. For 'tis necessary to know, whether the Evil that is done us, is done justly or unjustly; on this Knowledge depends the knowledge of what is best and most advantageous; that which is Best being always most Just. So that on these Matters we ought to have an exact Knowledge of Justice, and to keep it always in view; and this is a thing of which you are ignorant, for of whom should you have learn'd it?

Justice (replies *Alcibiades*) may be known without a Master.

Yes, says *Socrates*, provided it be sought after: But no Man seeks for what he thinks he knows; and at every Degree of our Age we think we know what Justice is, because we speak of it throughout the whole

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whole course of our Life, and nothing is more common than to hear Children complaining of the Wrongs and Injuries that are done 'em. So that we continually speak of Justice without having learn'd what it is either of our selves or others, and consequently without knowing it.

Alcibiades thinks to extricate himself out of this Difficulty by saying he learn'd it of the People.

That's a very bad Master, says *Socrates*, how should the People teach what they know not themselves? They have no Knowledge of Justice but by their Prejudices, as you have; and one certain sign that they are ignorant of it, is, that they are always at variance on this Subject, and that 'tis this difference alone that causes the Wars that desolate the World. For if the People would agree about what is Just, and Unjust, they would always live in Peace.

Alcibiades endeavours to get rid of this Difficulty, in saying that 'tis rarely deliberated in Councils whether a thing is Just or Unjust, but only whether it be Useful; for Justice and Utility (says he) are not always the same things: Seeing some notorious Acts of Injustice have been very advantageous; and a great many Persons have been destroy'd for having acted justly. Which is too true a Draught of the Politicks of most Princes. *Socrates* refutes this mischievous Opinion, and shews, that an Action can't be useful and advantageous, unless it be Comely and Just. He first tells him, he could prove to him, by the same Arguments that he had us'd, that he knows not what is useful any more than he does what is just, since he had neither learn'd it of any one, nor found it out of himself. But not to offend a Person so nice and tender; (for *Alcibiades* being accustom'd to the diversified and florid Discourses of the Sophists, did not like to hear the same thing twice, but lov'd Change and Variety in Language as well as in his Clothes) *Socrates* takes another Course, and asks him, if that which is Comely or Honourable is always good, or whether it sometimes ceases to be so.

Alcibiades

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Alcibiades answers, that there are Comely and Honorable Things, which are sometimes Evil. For Example, in a Battle, when a Man succours his Friend and is kill'd in the Action, this Action is Honourable but 'tis Fatal. Another abandons his Friend, and escapes danger; this Action is Evil but 'tis useful.

Socrates answers, that the succour a Man gives his Friend is, that which is call'd Valour, which is a thing quite different from Death, and that therefore these ought to be consider'd seperately. So that the Question is whether Valour be a Good or an Evil.

Alcibiades answers, that 'tis a great Good, and that he would not preserve his Life upon the Condition of being a Coward.

Then (says *Socrates*) you confess that Cowardise is a greater Evil than Death: So that Valour is a greater Good than Life, and consequently the Action of succouring one's Friend is good, consider'd as abstracted from all its consequences; if it is Good it is Honourable, and it can't be Honourable, without being useful; for whatsoever is Comely is Good, and that which is Good is Useful; there being nothing that is Comely and Honourable that can be Evil so far as it is Honourable; nor any thing which is Shameful, that can be Good so far as it is Shameful, which he proves by this invincible Argument: Those that do good Actions are happy: Men can't be happy but by the Possession of Good; the Possession of Good is the Consequence of a good Life; therefore Happiness necessarily attends those that do good Actions; so that Happiness is a Comely and Honourable Thing, and consequently that which is good, that which is comely, and that which is useful, are never different one from another. Therefore Justice being Comely and Good can't be oppos'd to Utility.

Alcibiades not only grants all these Truths; but is the Person that affirms 'em; for he is convinc'd by himself, and 'tis himself that makes the Answers. He therefore admires how it comes to pass that the Things about which *Socrates* interrogates him, appear

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to him with quite another aſpect than they had done before: Hereupon he asks how it comes about, that upon the ſame Subject he is forc'd to anſwer ſometimes after one manner, and ſometimes after another.

Socrates informs him that this proceeds from his Ignorance, becauſe we never contradict our ſelves in the Things we know; but 'tis impoſſible for the Mind not to err in thoſe Things of which we are ignorant. But this does not ariſe abſolutely from Ignorance; ſince 'tis certain we never commit any Fault in Things of which we are ignorant, provided we know our own Ignorance; but it ſprings from a conceal'd Ignorance, when we think we know what indeed we do not underſtand. And this was exactly the Caſe of *Alcibiades*, who was going to intermeddle with Affairs of State in which he had not been inſtructed. A deplorable Condition! But ſuch as was common to him with almoſt all that had govern'd the Athenians, only *Pericles* perhaps may be excepted.

Alcibiades obſerves that *Pericles* did not arrive at ſo great a Capacity of himſelf; but had acquir'd his great *Abilities* in the Converſation of Philoſophers and Politicians. For ſtill (ſays he) as old as he is, he converſes with *Damon* the greateſt of all our Politicians.

Socrates, who perceives the Tendency of this Anſwer of *Alcibiades*, inſinuates to him, that the Company of thoſe great Men was very uſeful for the Acquirement of Vertue, in which true Accompliſhment alone conſiſts. And this he proves by the Example of *Pericles* himſelf, who had not been able to teach his own Children any thing, a ſure ſign that Vertue cannot be taught, and that he himſelf had not learn'd it from Men, becauſe 'tis the Gift of God, and there is nothing of Good in us, but what he implants; but this being too general a Queſtion he reſerves it to be treated elſewhere, and confining himſelf to his Subject, he carries on his Deſign, which is to confound the Pride of *Alcibiades*. Therefore he

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he asks him how he intends to diſpoſe of himſelf: *Alcibiades* anſwers, that he'll endeavour to get himſelf inſtructed; but at the ſame time gives him to underſtand, that ſince they who then concern'd themſelves in Affairs of State were moſt of 'em ignorant Perſons, he ſhould not be oblig'd to give himſelf ſo much trouble to excel 'em; and that ſince he had good Natural Parts it would be an eaſy matter for him to out-do 'em.

Socrates amaz'd at the baſeneſs of this Sentiment, which is but too common, gives him an admirable Leſſon upon it. He repreſents to him, that nothing is more unworthy of a great Mind, than for a Man to propoſe to himſelf only to ſurpaſs ignorant People and Slaves: That a Stateſman will never ſerve his Countrey well, if he is not a greater Man, not only than the Citizens whom he governs, but alſo than their Enemies; that the Athenians being commonly in War with the Lacedemonians, or the King of *Perſia*; he ought to ſtrive to excel thoſe Enemies in Capacity and Vertue.

Alcibiades like a young Spark full of Vanity, asks if the Kings of *Lacedemonia*, and the King of *Perſia* were not made like other Men.

Socrates ſhews him, that if it were ſo, he ought to form a great Idea of 'em in his Mind; that ſo he might take the greater care of himſelf, and render himſelf ſtill more Accompliſh'd. But that there was ſo little Truth in this, *viz.* that they were made like other men, that no Perſons in the world ſeem'd ſo great as they, either for Birth, or Education, or the extent of their Dominions. And to mortify *Alcibiades* the more, he oppoſes the manner of his Birth and Education to that of the Kings of *Perſia*. When a King of *Perſia* is born (ſays *Socrates*) all the People that are ſpread over that vaſt Empire celebrate his Nativity, and afterwards that Day is annually kept as one of their greateſt Feſtivals, ſo that in all the Provinces of *Aſia*, nothing is to be ſeen but Sacrifices and Feaſts: Whereas (ſays he) when we are born, my Dear *Alcibiades*,

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cibiades, that Paſſage of the Comick Poet may be applied to us.

The News ſcarce to our neareſt Neighbours comes.

When the Child is born he is nurs'd under the Conduct of the moſt vertuous Eunuchs, who ſhape and faſhion his Body. When he is about ſeven Years of Age they begin to let him ſee Horſes, and to put him under the Care of Querries. He performs his Exerciſes till he is fourteen, and from that Age they give him four of the greateſt, and moſt vertuous Lords of the Country. The firſt teaches him Piety; the ſecond forms his Mind to Truth and Juſtice; the third inſtructs him to be free, and to conquer his Paſſions; and the laſt teaches him to deſpiſe Dangers and Death: For if a King ſhould be fearful he would become a Slave. Whereas you *Alcibiades*, have been brought up by a vile *Thracian* Slave, who was good for no other Office, becauſe of his extream old Age. As for Riches, there is ſtill as great a Diſproportion; the Lacedemonians being richer than all *Greece* together, and yet having an Eſtate but like that of a private Man in compariſon of the King of *Perſia*. In fine (ſays he) there is ſo great a diſparity in every thing, between theſe Kings and you, that if one ſhould go and tell the Mother of King *Agis*, or the Mother of *Artaxerxes*, that a Citizen of *Athens*, nam'd *Alcibiades*, was preparing to go and make War in their Country, they would certainly imagine that long Exerciſe, great Experience, and a conſummate Wiſdom had inſpir'd you with ſo great a Deſign. But how would they be ſurpriz'd, if they ſhould be told that 'tis no ſuch Matter! that you are young, ignorant and preſumptuous; that you never would take care to cultivate your Mind, and that you have no other Fund to carry on ſo great a Deſign, but your Beauty, your fine Shape, your Extraction, your Riches, and the Advantages of a happy Genius! They would look upon you as a Fool, becauſe in all theſe things the Lacedemoni-

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ans and Perſians infinitely ſurpaſs us. Is it not a very ſhameful thing, that the very Women among our Enemies know better than you your ſelf what you ought to be, to attempt to make War againſt 'em with any hope of Succeſs? Don't think therefore that you have to do with ordinary Men. But imagine you have the greateſt Project in the World in your head; and either renounce your Ambition, or rouze from this Stupidity into which you have caſt your ſelf. The Glory with which you are ſo much charm'd is not acquir'd without a great deal of Toil and Labour; and if you would attain it you muſt take care of your ſelf; that is, you muſt endeavour to become very good.

But ſince the Word *Good* is a general Term, that ſignifies ſeveral very different things, the Queſtion is in what ſuch a Man as *Alcibiades* ought to endeavour to become good. He anſwers, that 'tis in doing thoſe things which the beſt Citizens ought to do. The beſt Citizens (he ſays) are thoſe whom we call wiſe and prudent; and Wiſdom and Prudence are neceſſary to all Arts: Thus the Anſwer of *Alcibiades* is yet too indefinite. Who then are the beſt Citizens? *Alcibiades* again anſwers, that they are thoſe who know how to command Men that live under the ſame Government, who mutually aſſiſt each other; but what is this Science that teaches how to command Men who make one and the ſame Political Body, and what is its end? *Alcibiades* ſays 'tis good Counſel, and that the end of governing well is to procure the Welfare of the People.

Socrates asks him what ought to be done to govern a State well. *Alcibiades* anſwers, that Amity and Concord ſhould be made to reign in it.

The Queſtion then is what Art produces this Amity or Concord in States. *Alcibiades* anſwers, that this is brought about when every Man minds his own Buſineſs.

This is not a ſufficient Anſwer, and *Socrates* refutes it with a great deal of Addreſs and Solidity,

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by ſhowing that when every Man only minds his own Affairs, Amity can't be among 'em, becauſe there's no Concord. For how ſhould they accord about things which are known to ſome of 'em, and unknown to others?

Alcibiades is ſo embarraſs'd that he is oblig'd to deny a Truth which he had before acknowledg'd, and to confeſs, that when the Citizens do that which is juſt, yet they can't tell how to love one another. He does not ſee what *Socrates* aims at: His Deſign is to ſhew, that when Men only mind their Affairs, they take care only of what belongs to themſelves, and ſo confine themſelves to the knowledg of particular things, and don't aſcend to that of the Eſſence of univerſal things, the only knowledg that produces Charity the Mother of Union and Concord: Whereas the knowledg only of particular things, produces Diſorder and Diviſion.

So that to make Concord reign in a State, 'tis not enough that every one takes care of what appertains to himſelf, he muſt alſo take care of himſelf; theſe being two very different Arts. For the Art by which we take care of our ſelves is not the ſame with that by which we take care of that which appertains to us. Now to take care of one's ſelf is to know one's ſelf: But what is it to know one's ſelf? Juſt as an Artificer uſes his Tools, ſo a Man makes uſe of his Body. So that the Body is not the Man, for the Body can't uſe and govern it ſelf. Nor is the Compound the Man, for if one of the things of which we are compounded does not govern, 'tis impoſſible they ſhould govern both together: And conſequently, ſince neither the Body, nor the compound of Soul and Body together are the Man, it muſt be the Soul alone: 'Tis then only neceſſary that we know the Soul, and take care of that, if we would become truly wiſe. For to take care of our Bodies is to take care of what belongs to us; but to take care of our Souls is to take care of our ſelves; to be employed with the Care of amaſſing Riches, is

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to be employ'd about things ſtill more remote than thoſe that appertain to us. Thus they who love *Alcibiades* his Body, don't love *Alcibiades* himſelf, but that which belongs to *Alcibiades*. To love *Alcibiades* is to love his Soul, to love that which is himſelf, and not that which belongs to him. Therefore we ſee thoſe that love only his Body, retire from him when the Beauty of this Body is fading; and thoſe who love his Soul, do not ceaſe to love him as long as he is vertuous, and labours by this Means to render himſelf as lovely as poſſible; and this (ſays *Socrates*) is the Cauſe of the Inconſtancy of my Rivals, and of my Steadineſs.

But what muſt we do to come to the ſight and knowledg of our Souls? *Socrates* ſpeaks divinely to *Alcibiades* on this occaſion. As our Eye, (ſays he) can't ſee it ſelf but in the Objects that repreſent it, or in another Eye; that is, in that part of the Eye, which is the moſt excellent, namely that wherein the Sight is: So the Soul to ſee and know it ſelf, muſt view it ſelf in that part of the Soul in which Wiſdom and Vertue are generated, or rather in that Soul, of which ours is but the Image, and in which Wiſdom, Vertue and Prudence are found in their ſovereign Perfection, that is, in God. For 'tis by this means only that the Soul can know God, and her Self, which is true Wiſdom. When ſhe knows her ſelf, ſhe'll alſo know what belongs to her; for we muſt firſt know our Selves before we can know what belongs to us. She'll likewiſe know whatever reſpects the things that belong to her, and what reſpects the things that belong to others. For one Art is ſufficient for all this, and this Art is the true ſort of Prudence.

He therefore that is ignorant of himſelf, is ignorant of that which appertains both to himſelf and others, and not knowing what belongs to others, he knows not what belongs to the Common-wealth, and conſequently can't be a good Miniſter of State. Nay he is not capable to govern a Family, nor ſo much as

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to conduct himself, for because he is ignorant, 'tis impossible but he must commit faults; in commiting faults, he does ill, in doing ill he is miserable, and renders those miserable who obey him. Thus he who is not wise or prudent cannot be happy, and he who is wicked can't but be miserable. So that the happiness of a City depends neither on its Riches, nor the strength of its Fortifications, nor the great number of its Troops, nor its Galleys, nor the magnificence of its Arsenals, but on Vertue, without which there is nothing but Misery in the World.

Therefore to govern a State well, 'tis necessary to provide Vertue for those that compose it, and to endeavour to communicate it to 'em. And consequently, *Alcibiades*, to satisfie your Ambition, you ought not to think of acquiring great Dominion and exorbitant Power, either for your self, or your Republick, but that Justice and Prudence for which you have so much occasion. For while you, and others act justly and prudently, you'll please God, who is the Source of true Felicity; and you'll govern your self after this Manner; if (as I just now told you) you constantly look upon the Deity, that Light in which alone you can know your self and all that belongs to you. But if you govern your self unjustly, and turn away your Eyes from the Deity to unite your self to dark Objects, you'll neither know your your self at all, nor the things that belong to you: And your Actions will be nothing but Works of Darkness; and the more Power you have, the more unhappy you'll be. *Alcibiades* can't dissent from these great Truths. But *Socrates* does not stop here; but gives the finishing stroke to mortifie his Pride in asking him, whether it is not more for the Advantage of those who are not yet endued with Vertue, to obey such as are better than themselves, than to be abandon'd to their own Conduct: And (says he) is not that which is most profitable most beautiful, and that which is most beautiful most becoming, and sutable? *Alcibiades* agrees to this. Then (says

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Socrates) 'tis becoming that vicious Persons should be Slaves, and be made to obey; and consequently Vice is a base thing, and suitable to a Slave, as on the contrary Vertue is beautiful, and suitable to a Free-man. In what a Condition then are you?

Alcibiades is sensible what he means, and confesses he is not worthy of any thing but Slavery, but hopes in a little time to get rid of his Vices, if *Socrates* pleases.

You don't speak well (replies *Socrates*;) you ought to say, if God pleases, for we can do nothing without him.

Well then (says *Alcibiades*) I say (if God pleases) and I add, let us for the future change Persons; and as you have hitherto made your Court to me, I'll for the future make mine to you. I'll follow you wherever you go, and I solemnly protest to you, I'll now carefully apply my self to Righteousness.

I wish you may (says *Socrates* concluding the Discourse.) But whatever good Opinion I have of you; I am affraid of the Contagion of our Republick, and can't but tremble at the Examples that reign in it, lest they should be too strong for you and me too. For 'tis a very difficult Matter to be wise in the midst of so blind and corrupt a People.

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An Abridgment of the Second *Alcibiades*, or Of Prayer.

Socrates meets *Alcibiades* going into a Temple to pray, and seeing him very pensive, and with his Eyes fix'd on the Earth, he asks him on what he was thinking. What should I think on? (replies *Alcibiades* very faintly) being more concern'd about his ambitious Designs than his Prayers. It must be on some very important Matters, (says *Socrates*) for since 'tis certain, that the Gods often hear our Prayers, there's nothing that requires more Prudence and Wisdom than to pray well; so as not to request Evils of 'em, while we think we are asking Goods; or not to ask Evils of 'em willingly and knowingly as *Oedipus* did, whom *Euripides* brings in Praying that his Children might decide their rights by the Sword.

You tell me of a mad Man (says *Alcibiades*) does any Man, who is in his senses make such Prayers as those to the Gods?

Hereupon *Socrates* asks him if being mad is not oppos'd to being Prudent: If Men are not wise or foolish, as they are either in Health or Sick: for as there is no Medium between Health and Sickness, neither is there any between Wisdom and Folly. To which *Alcibiades* agrees.

Since Madness then is oppos'd to Wisdom, says *Socrates*, Folly and Madness are but one and the same thing.

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For one ſingle Subject can't have two contraries oppos'd to it, and conſequently every Fool is Mad. And ſeeing there are always a thouſand Fools to one wiſe-Man in the World, while we live in it we are among mad Men.

The only thing that can militate againſt this Principle, is that it would be impoſſible to live among ſo great a Number of mad Men; and the wiſe, whoſe Number is but ſmall, could never eſcape their Fury. And yet wiſe Men live in Cities, therefore it ſeems not true to ſay they live with mad Men. This is what *Socrates* objects againſt the Truth which he has made *Alcibiades* acknowledge: But he reſolves this Difficulty in ſhewing that there are divers Degrees of Folly, as there are divers ſorts of Diſeaſes: The Fever is a Diſeaſe, but every Diſeaſe is not the Fever. 'Tis juſt ſo with Folly. All mad Men are Fools, but all Fools are not mad. A Diſeaſe is a Genius which comprehends many Species. Folly or Imprudence in like manner comprehends many Species, which differ in degree. As Men have divided Arts and Trades among 'em, ſo they have ſhar'd Folly among themſelves too; thoſe who have the greateſt ſhare of it are ſaid to be diſtracted and mad; and they who have ſomewhat leſs are call'd Fools and ſtupid. But becauſe Men ſeek to hide theſe Vices under ſpecious Names, they call the former Men of Magnanimity, and of great Spirit; and they call the others Simple, or elſe they ſay they are harmleſs Men, but have little Experience and much Youth. There are beſides theſe a multitude of Names with which all ſorts of Vice are diſguis'd.

The next Queſtion is in what Wiſdom and Folly conſiſt. A wiſe Man is one that knows what ought to be ſaid and done, and a Fool is one that is ignorant of both. But is he that is thus ignorant, in this Condition without knowing it? Yes certainly. *Oedipus*, for Inſtance (ſays *Socrates*) was in this Condition when he made that Prayer which we ſpoke of before; but we ſhall find a great many others, who

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who without being transported with Anger like him will request real Evils of God while they think they are asking real Goods. For as for *Oedipus*, if he did not ask for what was good neither did he think he ask'd it; whereas others do the contrary. To begin with your self, *Alcibiades*: If the God to whom you are going to pray should suddenly appear to you, and ask you, if you would not be willing to be King of the Athenians, of all *Greece*, nay of all *Europe*, or (if that seem'd too little for your Ambition) of the whole World, would you not be extremely pleas'd, and return home with abundance of Joy, as one who had receiv'd the greatest Good in the World? Who would not be transported with such a thing as this? (replies *Alcibiades.*) But (says *Socrates*) would you give your Life for the Empire of the Greeks, or that of all the Barbarians together? No certainly (says *Alcibiades*) for then I could not enjoy it. But what if you could enjoy it, (continues *Socrates*) and this Enjoyment must needs prove fatal to you? No (says *Alcibiades*) I would not do it on that Condition.

You see by this therefore (says *Socrates*) that it is not safe to desire or accept what we know not. How many Men after they have passionately desir'd to be Kings, and have left no Stone unturn'd to obtain their End; have become the Sacrifices of their extravagant Ambition? The Story of *Archelaus* King of *Macedonia* is yet fresh in Memory. He ascended the Throne by his Crimes, and was assassinated by his Favourite, who could not maintain himself in it above 3 or 4 days; but was murder'd by a third who was ambitious to fill the same Place.

But without looking after foreign Examples, how many of the Generals of our Army have been condemn'd to Death in our own City! how many of 'em exil'd! and how many others have we seen, who after they had pass'd through innumerable Dangers, Toils and Labours, have fallen in the midst of their Triumphs, by the Calumnies of their Enemies! A great many other Persons, after they have ardent-

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ly desir'd Children, have been very unhappy in obtaining 'em. And thus it is with the rest of our Desires; and tho' nothing is more common than Instances of this kind, yet there's scarce any Man who would refuse the Thing he desires, if God should offer it to him, or who would cease to ask it, if he were sure to obtain it. And we may every Day see Persons repenting their former Prayers, and making such as are quite contrary to 'em. Therefore we must acknowledg the Truth of what *Homer* says, *viz.* That nothing is more unjust than the Complaints Men make against the Gods, whom they accuse of being the the Cause of their Miseries, whereas they are the occasion of 'em themselves, who by their Folly draw down Mischiefs on their own Heads, which were not design'd for 'em.

A great Poet who knew the Ignorance of Mankind upon this Account, endeavour'd to cure it by giving 'em this Prayer, which I think is an admirable one. *Great God, who knowest better than we what is necessary for us, give us the good things we need, whether we ask 'em or not; and keep evil things from us, even when we ask 'em of thee.*

Then Ignorance is a very fatal thing (says *Alcibiades*) seeing it changes our Prayers into Curses, and prompts us to beg of God our own Miseries.

Hold a little, says *Socrates*, don't condemn Ignorance in General; if one sort of it is pernicious, there's another that is very useful. For instance, would not *Orestes* have been happy if he had not known his Mother, when he sought after her to kill her? For if he had not known her, he had not kill'd her, his design being only against her. So that this kind of Ignorance would have been very good for him: There is an Ignorance then (says he) which ought to be commended; and this he proves with great Evidence. And now he lays down this as a Principle, that all the Sciences in the World without that by which we know what is very good, are

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not only useless, but most commonly extremely dangerous.

'Tis not sufficient (says he) that in the Council of a Prince, or of a Republick, there be Men of Ability in every thing that relates to Peace, War, and and all other things belonging to Politicks, if they are not expert in the knowledg of what is very good; that is if they are not under the Direction of the Divine Spirit, and do not well understand what is best, and most just, they are incapable of governing a State well; so that nothing but Injustice and Discord will be seen to reign in it. For while these Ministers think they know what indeed they do not understand, and continually suffer themselves to be led by Opinion, and not by knowledg, they never judg aright but by Accident. They are like Ships well stor'd with every thing needful for a long Voyage; but which for want of a Pilot can't choose but be lost in a little time. It would be much more useful for these Men to be ignorant of what they know, provided they were convinc'd of their Ignorance; for then they would not intrude themselves to give Counsel in things which they don't understand, and yet think they do. Therefore that Soul, that City or that Republick that would be happy must acquire this Science, which alone makes others turn to a good Account; without it, the greater Fortune either particular Men or States enjoy, the more impossible it is for 'em not to commit very great Crimes, either in acquiring Riches or augmenting their Forces, or the like. Without this Science a Man may have all others and yet never be the better for 'em: And to such a one that Verse which *Homer* made against *Margites* may be apply'd.

He knew many things, but knew them all amiss.

For this wise and divine Poet does not mean by this, that he did not know 'em well, as if one could properly know amiss what one knows; but signifies by this Enigmatical Expression, that he knew 'em all unhappily, or that it is was a great Unhappiness

pineſs to him to know 'em. For where the knowledg of God is not, there is no Good. And if theſe Sciences are unhappy to us, 'twould be better for us to be ignorant of 'em, and conſequently there is a ſort of Ignorance more uſeful than the Sciences. This is ſtill more true in Prayer than in all the other Actions of Life. And 'tis better to ask nothing of God, than to ask what is Evil of him, when we think we are asking Good, and conſequently the Prayer I have been ſpeaking of is the moſt perfect of all others.

Upon this Model the Prayer of the Lacedemonians was form'd; Who are content to ſay, *Lord, grant us what ſeems good and comely to thee.* They never requeſt any thing but this, and yet are the happieſt People in the World. To this purpoſe *Socrates* relates a Story which he had heard told by ſome old People. He ſays, the Athenians having been often overcome in the Wars they had with the Lacedemonians, reſolv'd to ſend to the Oracle of *Jupiter Ammon*, to know the Reaſon why the Gods rather favour'd the *Lacedemonians* than the *Athenians* who offer'd 'em more Sacrifices, erected more Temples and Statues in their Honour, and made 'em more Preſents, and more magnificent Oblations than all the Greeks together. Whereas the Lacedemonians were ſo guilty of Avarice in their Worſhip, that they ſcarce ſacrific'd any Beaſts but what were blemiſh'd, and mutilated; tho they were very Rich. The Prophet anſwer'd 'em in a few Words. *The Benedictions of the Lacedemonians are more agreeable to* Jupiter *than all the Sacrifices of the Greeks.* He calls their Prayers *Benedictions.* So that the Lacedemonians were belov'd of God, becauſe they knew how to pray; whereas the reſt of the Greeks were hated of him, becauſe they did not underſtand how to offer Sacrifice. And *Homer* (ſays he) ſignifies the ſame thing, when he ſays the *Trojans*, when they built a Fort, *offer'd whole Hecatombes to the Gods, the ſmoke of which aſcended to Heaven*,

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Heaven, but the Gods refus'd to accept 'em becauſe they hated the ſacred City of Troy, *King* Priamus, *and his People.* The Occaſion of this hatred, was becauſe the *Trojans* knew not how to pray, but would have oblig'd God by their Sacrifices to do, not his own Will, but theirs. But God ſuffers not himſelf to be corrupted by Gifts like a Uſurer; and that man muſt be a Fool, who thinks to obtain his Favour by ſuch Sacrifices as the Wicked are better able to offer than the Righteous. God only regards the Sanctity and Purity of the Soul, and eſteems nothing but Juſtice and Wiſdom. Now none are truly Juſt and Wiſe but thoſe who know how to perform their Duty toward God and Men both in their Words and Actions. What do you think of all this, *Alcibiades?*

Alcibiades ſtruck with the Evidence of theſe Truths, anſwers, that he is not ſo ſenſeleſs, as to oppoſe his weak Underſtanding to that of God, and to contradict his Oracles.

Then don't be in ſo much haſte, *Alcibiades*, (continues *Socrates*) to offer your Prayers, leſt God to puniſh you, ſhould anſwer the Imprecations you are going to utter againſt your ſelf: For you are not a Man likely to uſe the Prayer of the Lacedemonians; you are too proud, for that is the ſofteſt name I can give your Imprudence; therefore wait till you arebetter inſtructed how to demean your ſelf, both toward God and Men.

Alas! When ſhall I be inſtructed in this? (replies *Alcibiades*) and who ſhall be my Maſter? what Pleaſure I ſhould take in obeying him!

It muſt be he who takes care of you (ſays *Socrates*) and who truly loves you; that is God, 'tis he that muſt teach you to pray well. But before he communicates to you this Knowledg of what is very good, which alone can make you diſcern what is your true Good, and ſuggeſt ſuch Prayers to you as will be for your Advantage, he muſt diſſipate the Darkneſs that beclouds your Soul; as *Minerva*, in *Homer*,

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Homer, dispell'd the Mist that cover'd *Diomedes* his Eyes, and hinder'd him from distinguishing God from Man. For while we are destitute of the knowledg of God, we are incapable, either of understanding him, or of following him, and consequently 'tis impossible for us to pray well.

Let him scatter then, (replies *Alcibiades*) let him destroy this Darkness of mine; I abandon my self to his Conduct: and till that happy day comes which, if it please God, I shall not be long expecting, I'll defer my Prayers and my Sacrifice. In the mean time give me leave to express my Thanks to you, for your wise Counsel, by putting this Crown on your head which I wear on mine.

I readily accept that Favour (says *Socrates*) and as in *the Phenicians of Euripides*, *Creon* seeing *Tiresias* coming to him with a Crown of Gold, which was the first Fruits of the Spoil of the Enemy, and with which the Athenians had honour'd him for his Art, said, *I take your Crown, which is the sign of Victory, for a good Omen, for you see we are also in a great storm of War.* So I must say I take the Honour, I now receive at your hands for a happy Presage; for I am engag'd in no less a Conflict than *Creon*; while I am endeavouring to gain the Victory over all your Lovers.

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THE ABRIDGMENT Of *EUTYPHRON*, OR Of Holineſs.

Eutyphron meets *Socrates* in the Kings Porch, which was a Place on the right Hand of the *Ceramique*, where one of the IX Archons, who was call'd *the King* preſided during his year. Surpriz'd at this Novelty, (for it was the firſt time that *Socrates* had appear'd in this place) he asks him what it was that could oblige him to leave *Lyceus* to come into this Porch. For 'tis not likely (ſays he) that you have any Proceſs here before the King, as I have. 'Tis worſe than that, (ſays *Socrates*) the Buſineſs I have is that which the Athenians call an *Accuſation*. How (ſays *Eutyphron*) does any one accuſe you then? For I can't imagine that you would accuſe any Body. *Eutyphron* who is going to accuſe his own Father, can't believe that *Socrates* would accuſe any Man; of ſuch a ſtrange piece of Extravagance, and of ſo found an Opinion of himſelf is a ſuperſtitious Man capable. And *Plato* improves this with a great deal of Addreſs to inſinuate that at *Athens* honeſt Men never follow'd the Trade of Accuſers.

Socrates ſays, he accus'd no Body. Who is it that accuſes you then? (ſays *Eutyphron*) I don't very well know him (ſays *Socrates*) he is a young Man: And not content to tell him his Name and the Place of his Birth, he draws, his Picture; which is that of

of a Man whoſe Phyſiognomy Promiſes nothing of Good: He has, ſays he, Lank Hair, a Thin Beard, and a Crooked Noſe. All theſe Marks can't make him known. This young Man (continues *Socrates*) like a great Politician, has caus'd me to be cited before the City as our common Mother, and accuſes me of forging new Gods and rejecting the old.

Oh (ſays *Eutyphron*) I perceive what the Matter is, becauſe you ſay you have a familiar Genius, a God that conducts you, *Melitus* accuſes you of introducing new Opinions, knowing very well that all ſuch things as theſe are ſuſpected by the common People, who are always ready to receive Accuſations of this kind. What do not I ſuffer, when I ſpeak of divine Things in the Aſſemblies, and am predicting what ſhall come to paſs! The People laugh at me as if I were a Fool: Not that any thing that I have foretold has fail'd of its Accompliſhment? but 'tis becauſe they naturally envy all ſuch as we are.

My dear *Eutyphron*, (replies *Socrates*) perhaps 'tis no ſuch great Misfortune to be laugh'd at. The Athenians don't much trouble their Heads about a Man's Ability, provided he concerns not himſelf to teach others what he knows; but if any one makes a Profeſſion of teaching, they are *downright angry* with him, either out of Envy, as you ſay, or for ſome other Reaſon which we know not. I don't at all deſire (ſays *Eutyphron*) to make tryal (as you have done) to my Coſt, what Sentiments the Athenians have of me.

There's a great deal of difference (replies *Socrates*, improving this Confeſſion of *Eutyphron* to ſhow, in the Perſon of this Diviner, the Character of thoſe that preſided to teach Religion, *viz.* that they taught nothing, but through fear left the People in ignorance) perhaps you are very reſerv'd and refuſe to teach what you know; whereas I fear the Athenians will think the love I bear to all Mankind induces me to tell 'em too freely all I know, without asking any Reward of 'em. But if they would

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only laugh at me (as I said just now) as you say they do at you, it would be no very troublesome or unpleasant thing to pass a few hours in laughing and jesting. But if they take up the Matter in earnest; then 'tis only for such Diviners as you to know what will be the Event.

It may be (says *Eutyphron* like a great Diviner) you'll sustain no Damage by it, and I hope you'll have a happy Issue of your Business, as well as I of mine.

Then you have some Business here, (replies *Socrates*) are you Plaintiff or Defendant? I am Plaintiff, says *Eutyphron*. Whom do you prosecute (says *Socrates*) I prosecute my Father (says th'other) your Father, good God! (says *Socrates*) and what is the Accusation then? Of what do you accuse your Father? I accuse him of Murder, (replies *Eutyphron*.) Of Murder! (says *Socrates*) That indeed is an Accusation above the reach of the People, who will never comprehend that it can be Just. For this is not an Attempt for an ordinary Man, but for one who is arriv'd to the utmost pitch of Wisdom.

You say true, *Socrates*, (replies *Eutyphron*) deluded by this Commendation. But (says the other) is it any one of your Relations that your Father has killed? without doubt (continues he) it must be so, for you would not bring your Father before a Court of Justice, if he had only kill'd a Stranger.

What an Absurdity is that (says *Eutyphron*) to think there's a difference in this respect between a Relation and a Stranger: The Case is equal; the only thing to be regarded is the Justice or Injustice of the Action; for if the Action be evil you are oblig'd to prosecute the Author of it, whatever Friendship or Relation is between you; for you render your self an Accomplice of his Crime to have the least Familiarity with him, and not to endeavour to bring him to punishment, which alone can purge and expiate you both. But to apprize you of the Fact, the Deceased was one of our Farmers, when we liv'd at

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Naxus, he held a piece of Land of us; one Day having drank too much he fell into a Paſſion with one of our Slaves, and knock'd him o'th' Head: My Father put him into a deep Pit, bound Hand and Foot, and ſent hither to conſult thoſe who have the Inſpection of all Matters of Religion, and Caſes of Conſcience, to know what he ſhould do, and during all this time neglected the poor Priſoner, as an Aſſaſſin whoſe Life was of no conſequence; and ſo he dyed; Hunger, Thirſt and the weight of his Irons kill'd him, before the return of the Meſſenger that my Father ſent. Upon this the whole Family is mightily diſturb'd at me, becauſe for the ſake of an Aſſaſſin I accuſe my Father of Murder, which they pretend he has not committed: and if he had committed it, they maintain that I ought not to proſecute him, ſeeing the Deceaſed was a Villain and a Murderer; beſides that 'tis an Impious Action for a Son to bring a criminal Proceſs againſt his Father; ſo ignorant are they of Divine Things, and ſo incapable of diſcerning what is Profane and Impious from what is Juſt and Holy.

Socrates amaz'd at a Poſition ſo preſumptuous and falſe, asks him if he thinks he ſo exactly knows all Divine Things, and can ſo preciſely diſtinguiſh that which is holy from that which is profane; that the Caſe being as he relates it, he can proſecute his Father without fearing to commit an Impious Act.

Eutyphron, like a Superſtitious Bigot, who deſpiſes all the World beſide, and thinks he ſees more clearly into Matters of Religion than any Body elſe, anſwers, What Advantage ſhould I have above other Men, if I did not very exactly know all theſe things?

Socrates feigns himſelf extremely pleas'd that he had found a Man of ſo clear a Head and ſo great Abilities, who might give him ſo much aſſiſtance in the troubleſome Affair in which *Melitus* had engag'd him; and earneſtly conjures him to teach him what is properly holy, and what profane; and to give him ſuch

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a juſt Idea of both, as may always enable him to diſtinguiſh 'em with certainty.

Eutyphron here ſtill keeps his Character very well. That is holy (ſays he) which I am doing, namely to proſecute in a Court of Judicature every one that commits Murder, Sacrilege, or any other unjuſt Act of the like Nature, without any diſtinction; Let it be Father, Mother, Brother, *&c.* 'Tis the ſame thing.

This Definition, which ſprings rather from blind Zeal, than the knowledg of Holineſs, not ſatisfying *Socrates*, *Eutyphron* attempts to prove it by Authority. He maintains that all Religion conſiſting in imitating the Gods, he could not do a more pious and holy thing than to proſecute his own Father, ſeeing *Jupiter* put *Saturn* in Chains becauſe he devour'd his Children; and *Saturn* himſelf had treated *Cœlus* with yet more Rigour for ſome other Fault.

Socrates inſinuates that he doubts of the truth of theſe Stories, becauſe even Reaſon teaches us not to attribute any unworthy thing to the Deity. However (ſays he Ironically to *Eutyphron* after his uſual manner) if you, who are ſo able a Man in Religious Matters, agree with the Common People in this, and believe theſe Traditions as well as they, 'tis abſolutely neceſſary that I ſhould believe 'em too, I who am but ignorant in theſe things. Therefore I entreat you in the Name of that God who preſides over Friendſhip, do not deceive me, but tell me if you believe that there ever were ſuch things, as you have been relating.

This Bigot who is always credulous and conceited, makes no ſcruple not only to ſay, that he believes it, but adds that he believes things yet more ſurprizing, of which the Common People are ignorant, meaning without doubt the Myſteries that were known only to thoſe that were Initiated; and maintains all the Fables of Poets and Fancies of Painters as fundamental Points of Religion.

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Socrates does not trouble himself with the Confutation of 'em; that would finish the Dispute too soon, and he is not willing to offend him. Therefore he proceeds to ask him, as if he were willing to be instructed by him, what it is that he calls pious and holy, and desires him to give a clear and distinct Idea by which he may judg of every thing that is pious and holy. For a true Definition ought to make known the Essence and Nature of that which is defin'd.

Eutyphron answers, that it is that which is pleasing to the Gods, and consequently that that is profane and impious which is displeasing to 'em.

Socrates takes advantage of this Definition, and shows that the Gods being often divided among themselves, their Quarrels must needs arise from their disagreement about what is just or unjust, profane or holy. And that according to this, one and the same thing is holy and profane, seeing it pleases some of 'em and displeases others. Therefore the Definition of holy and profane can't subsist with the Plurality of Gods.

This Consequence is certain, and would be sufficient to reclaim a wise Man from that Error, and to convince him that there is but one God. But *Eutyphron* preserves his Character better than so. 'Tis no such easy matter to undeceive a superstitious Man. To elude this Consequence he engages to prove that the Action of his Father was displeasing to all the Gods, and that his was agreable to 'em.

Socrates does not press him with the Absurdity of this Persuasion, which is rather a Supposition than a Certainty. For since their Theologie acknowledges that the Gods are very often contesting about Matters of this Nature, how could *Eutyphron* be certain that they agreed about the Action he was going to undertake? In an Affair of this Consequence a greater Certainty is requisite than that which arises from Opinion: It was very easy by this Means to reduce him to an Absurdity: but *Socrates* takes another

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ther course to expose the Ignorance of the Man still more; and thereby to overthrow a Religion which had no better Props than these. Therefore he convinces him that this Definition is not perfect.

Eutyphron thinks to rectifie it by saying, that which is Holy is what pleases all the Gods; But *Socrates* answers, that this is only to explain one of the Properties of a holy Thing, instead of discovering the Essence of it. He does not ask if that which is Holy is belov'd of the Gods, no Body doubts of that: He would know why it is lov'd, and what it is that renders it worthy of Love. For if that which is holy, and that which is belov'd of the Gods were the same thing; since the Gods love that which is holy only because it is holy, they would love that which they love only because it was belov'd of 'em. And on the other hand, if that which is belov'd of the Gods were belov'd of 'em only because they love it, it would follow that the Gods love without reason, and that that which is holy would be holy only because it was belov'd. In a word, (he says) there is a great deal of difference between these 2 Terms, *Holy* and *Belov'd of the Gods*, and they are entirely opposite. For one Man is lov'd only because they love him, and another is lov'd, because he deserves to be lov'd. That is to say, That which is Holy is belov'd of the Gods only because it is Holy, but 'tis not Holy because 'tis belov'd of them. The Matter in hand therefore is to explain the Nature of that which is Holy, and not its Qualities, and to define what it is and why the Gods love it. This is very perplexing to a superstitious Man, who continually takes up things without Examination, and believes a thing only because he believes it.

Eutyphron does not dissemble his Trouble but confesses that his Thoughts are fluctuating, and that he knows not how to fix 'em.

Socrates to make the Matter (which is very serious) a little pleasant, takes occasion from it to speak of the Works of *Dedalus*, who made moveable Statues,

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tues, which never ſtood ſtill but when a certain ſpring which they had was tyed and ſtop'd. He let's *Eutyphron* know that his Principles are as moveable as theſe Statues. The Governing Spring is not yet ſtop'd, but is continually going, his meaning is, that *Eutyphron* ſpoke by Opinion, and not at all by Science. To help him out therefore he asks him if he does not think that which is Holy is Juſt. To this *Eutyphron* agrees: Next to this the Queſtion is, whether that which is Holy is a part of that which is Juſt, or that which is Juſt a part of that which is Holy. 'Tis ſoon decided that what is Juſt is the Genus and what is Holy the Species. For there are many things Juſt which are not Holy; but none Holy which are not Juſt. So that what is Juſt has a larger extent than what is Holy.

Nothing now remains but to know what part of that which is Juſt that which is Holy is; *Eutyphron* ſays, 'tis that part of Juſtice which reſpects the Gods, and the Care of their Worſhip, and that the other part concerns Men only.

This Anſwer throws 'em into another Difficulty, and that is how to know in what this Religious Care conſiſts, and whether it be of the Nature of all other Cares, which tend to the Profit of that which is car'd for. For if ſo, our Holineſs muſt render the Gods better and more excellent, which would be an impious Thought.

Eutyphron anſwers, that 'tis a Care like that which Servants take of their Maſters: Holineſs then (ſays *Socrates*) is a kind of Servant to the Gods: But what do the Gods do by the Miniſtry of this Servant? For as Phyſicians operate Health by the Miniſtry of their Art; the Gods muſt needs operate ſomething by the Miniſtry of our Holineſs. Now what is it that they operate? *Eutyphron* anſwers, that they engage us to pleaſe them by our Prayers and Sacrifices, and that Holineſs and Piety conſiſt in this on which the Welfare of Families and Republicks depends. As on the contra-

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ry Impiety is the ruin, both of particular Perſons and States.

Socrates collects from this indefinite Anſwer, that Holineſs is the Art of ſacrificing and praying. To ſacrifice is to give, and to pray is to ask. So that Holineſs conſiſts in giving and asking. Such things only are ask'd as are wanted, and ſuch things only given as are neceſſary to thoſe to whom they are given; for it would be ridiculous to give a thing which they have no occaſion for.

From hence he draws this Concluſion, that Holineſs is a Traffick between God and Man. But what profit can God receive from our Offerings? For as for us 'tis very viſible what profit we receive from him, ſince we have not the leaſt Good but what proceeds from his Bounty: Are we then ſo crafty (ſays he) to draw all the Advantage of this Commerce to our ſelves only, ſo that God gets nothing by it?

Eutyphron preſs'd with this Argument; ſhuts up all in ſaying, that God leaves what is profitable to us, and contents himſelf with that which is pleaſant; and that 'tis our Reſpect, and Gratitude that is ſo pleaſant to him; which returns exactly to the former Definition; that that is Holy which is pleaſing to the Gods.

Socrates ſhows him, that he has hitherto only made a Circle, and entreats him not to refuſe him the knowledg of ſo great a good. But *Eutyphron* like a true Votary of Superſtion, who is always preſumptuous, and never confeſſes his Ignorance, ſeeks only how to get rid of him, and refers this Enquiry to another time, telling him ſome urgent Buſineſs calls him elſewhere.

Thus ends this Dialogue, which deſtroys the falſe Opinions which then reign'd in the World, without eſtabliſhing the true. The Death of *Socrates* occaſion'd *Plato* to write thus imperfectly and ſparingly. Beſides this is his Method, he always refutes before he teaches. But his manner of refuting fails not to make a diſcovery by way of Anticipa-

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ticipation of what he designs to establish, and does maintain elsewhere. Here we see the superstitious Man is always near the Truth, but never reaches it. 'Tis certain that Holiness is pleasing to God, 'tis certain likewise that it produces a kind of Commerce between God and Men, and that this consists in Giving and Asking; but the ignorant Athenians conceiv'd this after too gross a manner.

Holiness can't be in us without Conversion, nor Conversion without Love, and this Love engages us to give our selves entirely God, and to ask of him to give himself to us, that he may keep alive in us that divine Flame which purifies our Souls, and makes us resemble him. In this consists that Commerce between God and Men, which makes up the whole of Religion, as *Socrates* and *Plato* both acknowledg'd.

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